On the Idea of European Islam: Voices of Perpetual Modernity by Hashas, Mohammed
  
 
 
 
 
On the Idea of European Islam 
Voices of Perpetual Modernity  
 
By 
Mohammed Hashas 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to Political Theory Programme in 
the Faculty of Political Science, LUISS University of Rome, Italy  
 
 
LUISS Advisors:     External Advisor: 
Professor Sebastiano Maffetone   Doctor Jan Jaap de Ruiter 
Professor Francesca Corrao    Tilburg University, the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         March 2013 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally left blank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract  
This work raises and deals with the following question: is European Islam 
possible? Following the methodology adopted in studying the selected texts, I argue that 
it is possible, theologically and politically. To corroborate my argument, I assist myself 
with three sub-questions that correspond to three cognitive and methodological stages of 
work. In the descriptive stage, I tackle this question: what is European Islam? I select 
four projects that advocate what I refer to as the “idea of European Islam.” These projects 
are advanced by Bassam Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou, and Abdennour Bidar. 
Despite their differing approaches, I use textual analysis approach in reading the main 
aspects and concepts of their projects, which I later use for comparative purposes and 
conceptualization of the idea of European Islam.  
Subsequently, I enter the comparative stage so as to better understand what 
European Islam brings new. This stage deals with the following question: what is new in 
European Islam? Here, I revisit three scholarly generations from the Islamic tradition as a 
way of finding out what they share, or not, with European Islam. I refer to the Muʻtazila 
rationalist theological tradition, with major reference to the example of Qadi Abd 
Aljabbar. I then refer to some iconic figures of the “early reformists” of the Arab-Islamic 
Renaissance (naḥḍa), and “late reformists” or contemporaries.  
The third and final stage is evaluative. It deals with this question: is European 
Islam a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine”? This analytical stage uses two 
philosophical frameworks, one theological and the other political, one “Islamic” and the 
other “Western” to use common differentiating markers: Taha Abdurrahmane’s 
framework of theological renewal for innovative modernity, based on his The Spirit of 
Modernity (2006), with reference to “humanization-historicization-rationalization” 
innovative plans, and John Rawls’ “idea of overlapping consensus,” based on his 
Political Liberalism (1996).  
The “idea of European Islam” as I conceptualize it is “revisionist-reformist,” or 
“traditional-modern,” in the sense that it embraces modernity values and legitimizes them 
theologically-politically. It “sacralizes” man, “divinizes” modern values, and 
“perpetuates” modernity. It does not deny the divine but works with it as the ultimate 
source of ethics and meaning. The “Muslim Prometheus” as an heir of the universe does 
not antagonize with God. Man becomes a “co-worker” with God. In summarizing 
statements that correspond to “world-society-individual” comprehensive framework I 
adopt in this project, I argue that European Islam 1) “humanizes the world through 
divinely willed inheritance for cosmic wellbeing,” 2) “historicizes revelation through 
fiqhology (or practical fiqh) for social wellbeing,” and 3) “rationalizes individual faith 
through the principle of ethical liberty for individual wellbeing.” This makes it 
confidently “inlandish” in liberal constitutional democracies, as those of Western Europe.    
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    Preface  
  Transliteration  
Arabic terms are transliterated according to the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES) transliteration system.  Frequently used words such as Muslim, 
Muhammad (the Prophet), Quran, Sunna, Sharia, Shahada, hadith, fiqh, kalam, falsafa 
madhab, umma, ijtihad and jihad, appear without diacriticals; they also appear 
unitalicized, and in the upper or lower case as just listed. They are not italicised either. 
Transliterations, especially those with diacriticals, are italicised. An apostrophe is used 
for the letter hamzah. A superscript comma is used for the ‘ayn letter instead of cayn. The 
exceptions in the transliterations that occur in this work are due to the different styles the 
studied scholars and citations use, which I cannot change. For example, “Sharia” will be 
found written in four forms: “Sharia” (in upper case), “sharia” (in lower case), “Shari‘ah” 
and “shari’a” (either in upper or lower case, besides the apostrophe of the Arabic letter 
‘ayn). “Shahada” will be found also written as “Ash-Shahada.” “Jamal Eddine al-
Afghani” will be found also referred to as “Jamal Ed-dine Afghani” or simply “Afghani.” 
Titles of books and sentences in Arabic do not start in upper case, except for terms like 
kalam, falsafa and fiqh that occur as titles of (sub-)sections.  
Translation  
All the translations from Arabic and French are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
Referencing notes and titles of books are either in English, or in French, after their 
original titles are provided. Arabic original titles are provided in brackets when they are 
first referred to, and the subsequent citations from these titles are to the English 
translation, for ease of reference. The bibliography also provides the non-English titles 
translated and transliterated, instead of providing the Arabic scripts or listing the Arabic 
titles in a different category. “Primary sources” in the bibliography refers to the major 
texts studied in this work, and is not limited only to texts on “the” European Islam 
examined here; it also includes the supportive texts I have used, as my “methodological 
concerns” in the main introduction explain.  
Abbreviations 
Abbreviations in the acronym format are not used. Instead, shortened titles are 
opted for, to avoid the confusions titles bearing similar words may invoke. For example, 
Tibi’s Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: Religious Reform and Cultural Change is 
abbreviated as Islam’s Predicament in the repeated references to the same work.  
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Introduction  
This work raises and deals with this question: is European Islam possible?
1
 The 
question was raised at the end of a presentation I delivered in a seminar during my 
research stay at the Center for European Islamic Thought, at the University of 
Copenhagen, in April 2012.
2
 A colleague then asked me, following my own question that 
I have included at the end of the handout which he had, “so, is European Islam possible 
or not?” I replied “Theologically, it is possible; politically, it depends!”3 I was aware that 
my answer could raise more questions than providing a clear answer. My answer could 
look more like that of a diplomat who prefers ambiguity, or a religious scholar or a 
believer who defends his own faith in light of unwelcoming politics. By “politically, it 
depends!” I had the current status quo in mind; that is, the European diverse political 
responses to the Muslims’ demands and Islam’s presence. My answer was partly 
sociological, and not theoretical. Now, in this work, I deal with texts, and I am bound by 
a theoretical framework. Briefly here, this work argues that European Islam, in light of 
the texts studied here, is possible theologically and politically.  
To reach a detailed answer to the above guiding question I go through three 
cognitive, or methodological, stages, and each of them matches a supportive question. 
First, I clarify what European Islam stands for. This stage corresponds to the following 
supportive question: what is European Islam? I study four scholars that defend “the idea 
                                                          
1
 For the format of the question, I am inspired by the Indian-Pakistani poet-philosopher Mohamad Iqbal’s 
seventh lecture, entitled “Is religion possible?” in his widely read work The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam (London: Oxford UP, 1934). Iqbal adopts the question format from Immanuel Kant’s 
“How is Metaphysics in General Possible?” (1783) found in the latter’s work; Paul Carus, ed. Kant’s 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1912) 1-163. The 
Iranian philosopher Abdulkarim Soroush delivers a lecture in Harvard in 1996 bearing the same question 
format, “Is Fiqh Possible?” Soroush, The Expansion of Prophetic Experience: Essays on Historicity, 
Contingency and Plurality in Religion (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009) 96. 
2
 The title of the presentation was “European Islam and the Idea of Religious Pluralism: Reading Tariq 
Ramadan,” 26 April 2012.  I am grateful to the participants in this seminar, mostly from the Center for 
European Islamic Thought and Systematic Theology Department, for their fruitful feedback.  
3
 Overall, I take theology to mean the “contemplation of religion” (tadabur in Arabic) in both its physical 
and metaphysical matters, and politics to mean the “management of world affairs” (tadbīr). I have 
borrowed the terms “contemplation” and “management” from Taha Abdurrahmane’s rūḥu addīn   [The 
Spirit of Religion] (Beirut and Casablanca: al-markaz ath-thaqāfī al-ʻarabī, 2012) 509. I say more on this 
especially in Part IV, Sections 1a-b, 2a-c, when I refer to Islamic theology (kalam) and Abdurrahmane’s 
framework I adopt in my evaluation of the idea of European Islam.  
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of a European Islam”4 (Bassam Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou and Abdennour 
Bidar). I use “textual analysis” method of approaching texts, which is common in 
religious studies, as I explain further in due time. I refer to this as the descriptive stage.  
Second, I compare European Islam with some classical and contemporary Islamic 
scholarly tendencies as a way of finding theological grounds to European Islam from 
within the Islamic tradition. This work corresponds to the following supportive question: 
what is new in European Islam? I refer to the classical school of the Muʻtazila and its 
rationalist ethical theory. I also refer to some distinguished Islamic reformists who I see 
supportive of what European Islam is moving to, i.e., the “rationalization of ethics.” I 
refer to this stage as the comparative stage, since it makes reference to other classical and 
contemporary Islamic trends. It is at this stage that I claim that there is an interesting 
kalam (Islamic theology, or religious dispute) legacy being slightly and differently 
revisited in European Islam, and there appear significant signs that some of the Muʻtazila 
rational perceptions of ethics advocate. That is why I refer to European Islam’s 
reformism as “revisionist-reformist;” it builds on the tradition, and does not “kill” God; it 
just negotiates His revealed social laws and relegates them to the moral sphere, and gives 
man the rational means to translate that morality into adequate human-made laws. My 
emphasis on the perception of ethics in European Islam stems from my belief that there 
could be no reform in Islam – assuming that such a reform is needed – without a 
developed ethical theory that answers the needs of Muslim believers in their daily life, 
when revealed texts are “silent,” “not detailed enough,” “controversial,” or “inadequate” 
for a particular time and place.  
Third, and finally, I evaluate European Islam based on two frameworks, one 
“Islamic” and one “Western.”5 From this stage onwards, I start using my triadic 
                                                          
4
 The term “idea” is used as a general term mean general theoretical content of the subject referred to, here 
European Islam. I use it as synonymous of “concept,” though “idea” is broader in scope. I also note that I 
sometimes use the following phrases interchangeably: The idea of European Islam, the concept of 
European Islam, European Islamic thought, European Islamic discourse. When I introduce John Rawls’ 
framework of overlapping consensus, I add “doctrine” to European Islam to mean its theological general 
content. In this sense, I am borrowing Rawls’ definition of “idea” and “concept.” Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP, 1996) xxxvi, n. 2. All references to Political Liberalism are from the 
same edition.  
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framework of analysis “world-society-individual” to understand the comprehensiveness 
and newness of European Islam.
6
 I subsequently substantially use the framework of the 
Moroccan philosopher Taha Abdurrahmane, and his corresponding analysis of reading 
the Quran and modernity – innovative “humanization-historicization-rationalization.” His 
framework is of paramount importance in examining new theological propositions in the 
studied projects of European Islam. Ultimately, I evaluate the idea of European Islam by 
opening it up to the political framework of John Rawls, with main reference to his “idea 
of overlapping consensus.”7 This stage matches the following question, using Rawls’ 
terms: is European Islam a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine”? I name this the 
evaluative stage; it is evaluative in the sense that it deduces the “political” from the 
“theological” or “doctrinal” to scrutinize it in light of the constitutionally liberal and 
democratic framework of a recognized theory as that of Rawls’ “political liberalism,” 
overlapping consensus in focus.
8
  
As a result, the guiding question and the three stages I have devised end with 
constructing the idea of European Islam. The latter has been present in the literature of 
Islam and Europe without a serious attempt at arguing for it more comparatively, 
theologically-politically. This is what I advance in this work, which I claim to be 
innovative.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
5
 I use these terms now for methodological clarity, though the idea of European Islam, as will be made clear 
by the end of this work, tries to go beyond these differentiations of “Islam” versus “West.” I use the terms 
here simply because the two major frameworks adopted are from scholars that clearly adhere to the 
“Islamic religious worldview,” and that is the case with Taha Abdurrahmane, and to the “Western liberal 
worldview,” which is the case of John Rawls. There is no doubt that juxtaposing “religious” with “liberal” 
is not adequate, because a religious worldview can be liberal, and the liberal worldview can be religious, 
though on different levels and degrees. The point I should stress here is that my use of the “Islamic” and 
“Western” frameworks does not mean an opposition, which is “commonly” taken to be so when these terms 
are brought together, nor does it mean that there are no differences. This project, at the end, is about this 
issue of compatibility or not. My use of the terms and their corresponding frameworks is primarily for 
methodological and comparative reasons. This will become clearer as I proceed.  
6
 I have thought of “world-society-individual” triadic axis to methodologically clarify the aspects of 
newness in European Islam. This framework portrays the comprehensiveness of a world religion like Islam. 
Its utility becomes clearer when I start using the more substantial evaluative framework of Abdurrahmane, 
which I also use in my integration of Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus.  
7
 I use new terms in inverted commas when they are first introduced. I drop them as I proceed, assuming 
that the reader now follows and understands their origins and meaning. Sometimes I do put them in 
inverted commas again in the middle of this work or by its end to stress the concept.  
8
 When I use “political liberalism” in lower cases, I do not mean the “title” of the book but its “idea.”  
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In presenting this work I first outline this “extended introduction” in four 
technical sections.
9
 I have opted for a “long” introduction to avoid making the “historical 
sketch” part of the main argument in the main text reserved to the studied scholars on 
European Islam. Without this contextualizing introduction my main argumentation may 
not be clear enough. In the first section of this introduction, I say some words on my 
interest in the studied subject studied here. Then I introduce the remaining three sections, 
which go as follows. Second, through a “historical sketch,” I contextualize my broad 
approach and how I have come to construct my understanding and reading of the subject 
under focus. Third, I outline my methodological concerns about the topic and how I have 
come to select the four studied scholars for this project, in light of the broad debate on 
Islam and/ in Europe.  Finally, fourth, I outline the content of the four parts of this 
dissertation, the way I have structured it out, for what purpose, and the outcomes of my 
approach. Each of these three technical stages will be explained further below, in this 
introduction, and more so in each part of the text.  
1. On Personal Interests in Understanding Islam in the Modern World  
This work falls within my broader interest in understanding Islam in the modern 
world. I have in mind Bernard Lewis’ “historical” question - What Went Wrong?10 
However, I am not so much keen on understanding what went right or wrong directly 
from a historical perspective. I am more interested in understanding “what is going 
on with Islam in the modern world.” If this question is answered, the previous one could 
be explained. Though thoughts on such questions started to take shape early in my 
academic career in different disciplines as a student in a society (Morocco) which has 
been oscillating between “tradition and modernity,” and seems to identify itself in this 
midway position, it is Islam in Western Europe that has taken primacy in this broad 
project, because it is here, in Western Europe, that the question of religion in society is 
tense and more controversial. Not to put too fine a point on it here, I considered it 
                                                          
9
 I use “stages” for the cognitive, methodological, approach of reading the texts studied here; I use “parts” 
to refer to the space given to each scholar, separately. I use “sections” for the technical division for the 
introduction.  
10
 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford UP, 2002).  
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important and interesting to change contexts and study Islam in the world that is already 
“modern” while keeping my interest in Islam in the countries in transition at the 
backstage for awhile. The so-called Arab Spring unprecedented events, which started in 
December 2010 in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), need time to show which 
socio-political pathways the concerned societies opt for, seeing that religion still plays an 
important role in these societies daily life. There is no doubt that I belong to a generation 
of MENA region that has experienced various internal and external intense debates and 
pressures in which religion and/in politics figures as a major theme for socio-political 
change. This issue has travelled to Europe through immigration. Being myself driven by 
intellectual migration, I have found myself travelling from North Africa to Europe with 
these thoughts in mind.    
 As a graduate in both Postcolonial Studies and later on in European Studies, I first 
started my interest in Islam in Europe from immigration perspectives. I studied how the 
EU treats the subject of its immigrants, as well as its “new Europeans” (European 
nationals of immigrant descent), with a focus on the case of Muslims after the terrorist 
events of 9/11, 2001. I found out that the EU immigration policies since the late 1990s 
are reactions to events, as if there were no vision, and no futurist planning about the new 
arrivals to Europe and how to treat them, and “integrate” them.11 Reading records about 
the first waves of immigrants of the 1950s and 60s, and how the European Community 
Member States, and later as EU, have reacted to that through various policies, I reached 
the contemporary debate of, first, political Islam, Islam in Europe, and then European 
Islam. “Political papers” on Islam seemed to lack “something” for me, for a better 
understanding of the issue; they became repetitive, if not in the manner (approach), then 
in the matter (content). I had to find my own approach of reading Islam in Europe. I 
decided to trace the intellectual origins of the term “Euro-Islam” (of Bassam Tibi) and 
then “European Islam” (of Tariq Ramadan).12 I had to compare their thoughts, make them 
                                                          
11
 Mohammed Hashas, EU Immigration and Integration Policies: Facts, Achievements and the Challenge 
of the Muslim Question (Saarbrücken: LAP Lambert, 2010). 
12
 Studying the intellectual history of the term “European Islam” is not enough, seeing that the debate is, in 
historical terms, recent. Maybe the future generations may find it interesting to research the topic from such 
a perspective since, by then, more versions of the idea of European Islam would have developed; at least, 
that is a factually based assumption.  
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speak to each other, and compare them to some other “Islamic reformist” voices, inside 
Europe, and at times outside Europe. I have then settled down with the idea that 
discussing Islam in Europe solely politically is not enough. Attempts should be made to 
probe more theological issues, which political Islam, violent fundamentalists, radical 
secularists, and Islamophobists avoid either because it serves their ideological-political 
agenda or because it serves to cover their intellectual ignorance of other aspects of the 
matter they pretend to defend or refute. I am certainly not saying that I am myself 
avoiding the political while researching European Islam. Rather, I try to examine the 
other side of the story which is not very much shown, by bringing some theological-
philosophic insights to the front, for a better understanding of the issue.
13
  
2. On Islam in Europe: Inlandish or Outlandish?14  
Jorgen Nielsen speaks of four stages of the Muslim presence in Europe. The first 
is the period of Islamic Spain and Muslim rule in Sicily; the first was ended by the 
                                                          
13
 The Austrian-American historian and Arabist Gustave E. von  Grunebau (d. 1972) expresses in a good 
passage the thoughts and dilemmas a researcher and intellectual faces in the onset of his work. Such a 
passage explains a lot of the failures that research on Islam in Europe in particular has faced. I explain this 
point when I refer to Methodological Concerns on Studying Islam and/ in Europe.” The passage, which 
opens Grunebeau’s article, reads as follows: 
The theologian like  the  intellectual  and  social historian  and  the  historian of  religions  faces  
the  predicament  of  having  to  reconcile  the  internal consistency of  his  data with the internal  
consistency, true or apparent,  of the  attitude and  expectations permeating  his  several audiences. 
The urge to  communicate  with one's public beyond the mere purveying  of information  is  not  
only  strong  but  legitimate.  Contact  with  one's  own  period may  be  the  mainspring of  that  
eternal  renewal  of  scholarship which  is one of its principal  justifications; and  to  cast results  in 
language  effectively meaningful to  the  reader  is  the  precondition of  any  opening  of  the  
gates to  the hidden and alien. At the same  time, concessions of phraseology and style tend to  be  
exceeded, and ties  are  developed, more  or  less  surreptitiously,  between the  author's  drives 
and  real  or  imaginary  drives of  the public  he  hopes  to  influence or  has  decided to  play  up  
to. And  it  is  too readily  forgotten  that  intellectual systems of  whatever kind -  are in  danger of  
obsolescence  less  for  their  primary thought  experiences than  for  the extraneous  doctrines,  the  
political  and  scientific  verities  of  the  day,  or their formulation,  which suffer  alike from  
progress and  shifts  of  concern and  becloud  the  factually  impeccable  with  that  aura  of  the  
archaic and the  irrelevant  which truckling  to  the  fashions  of  the  moment was  meant to  
dispel.  In  brief,  the  surest  guaranty  of  early  obsolescence  is  veiled apologetics.  Stylistic  
skill  and  discretion,  not  to  speak  of  technical competence, promote  acceptance  but 
degenerate  into  the embarrassment of  suspect persuasion the  moment the  outlook  of  the  
audience  changes, a turn of  affairs  always more imminent  than the author expects. 
Gustave E.  von  Grunebau, “Approaching  Islam:  A Digression,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 
(May, 1970) pp. 127-149. 
14
 By “Islam is inlandish” I refer to the work of the Italian sociologist Stephano Allievi, “The International 
Dimension,” in Brigitte Maréchal, et al., eds. Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003) 449-488. 
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reconquista in 1492, and the second by the Normans in the early 13
th
 C. AD. The second 
dates the spread of the Mongol armies who later converted to Islam in the 13
th
 C. and left 
Muslim communities like the Tatar in Russia, along with others between Poland and 
Ukraine, and in the Caucasus and the Crimea. The third records the Ottoman expansion in 
the Balkans and Central Europe. The fourth is the current phase of post-WWII.
15
 This 
means that Muslims have been in Europe for centuries, and a post-1945 immigration 
wave is but a new phase in different intellectual, economic and political circumstances.    
 Historical antagonisms and relations, however, still harbor around the subject of 
European Muslims.
16
 Europe seems to have forgotten or not to have paid enough 
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 Jorgen Nielsen, Towards a European Islam (London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1999) 1-2. 
Niselsen’s historical reference is to the Muslim presence in Europe. This precision aside, I also have the 
historical relations between the European lands and Arab-Islamic lands of Western Asia and North Africa 
in mind. A deeper understanding of the relations between these two geographies and worldviews influenced 
by two world religions (Christianity and Islam) is a requisite. Though I cannot detail my idea here, I would 
like to put my project into a broader historical perspective. I subscribe my project on European Islam to 
three main stages that I tentatively consider to characterize the relationship between the so-called “Islamic 
world” and the current “West” and “Europe” in particular: 1) the medieval relations stage, 2) the modern 
relations stage, and the 3) contemporary relations stage. The three have their dark and bright sides 
(meaning wars and socio-political, economic and intellectual exchanges), which make the history of 
“Europe” and the “Islamic world” largely interdependent. Richard Bulliet describes this reciprocal 
influence well: “The past and future of the West cannot be fully comprehended without appreciation of the 
twinned relationship it has had with Islam over some fourteen centuries. The same is true of the Islamic 
world” (Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia UP, 2004) 
45). I locate the medieval relations stage from the advent of Islam in the7th century to the end of the 15
th
 
century, mainly 1492. I locate the second stage, the modern relations stage, between 1492 and 1945. The 
third stage is post-1945. It is still in the making; it could be labelled post-modern, or post-Orientalist. It 
could also be labelled post-religious, meaning post-classical-religion and rational faith. It could also be a 
the “second stage of the axial age.” This does not mean that “-isms” and “centrisms,” be they religious, 
secular, or atheist, would disappear. With the third stage, there seems a growing move away from the Islam 
vs. Europe, or Europe vs. Islam, dichotomous mindset. It is the stage of more hybridization between the 
two worldviews, the Western and the Islamic, the modern and traditional, the secular and divine, the 
physical and metaphysical. I am not trying to “do dialogue” here. I am more concerned with intellectual 
exchange, mostly driven by socio-political and economic leitmotivs, when I speak of fertilizers. As will 
become clearer in this work, I see “European Islam” as a new “idea” that tries to bring these histories and 
traditions together. I should note that the idea presented in this historical sketch has to be argued for in 
length as a historical approach, which I do not intend to argue for here. My point is that this sketch is my 
personal understanding of relations between the Arab-Islamic world (more precisely, Western Asia and 
North Africa (WANA)) and Europe as I have been studying them from various angels in my 
interdisciplinary academic career. It is presented here as an intellectual opinion that needs further details to 
make of it a full-fledged argument. I intended this to be read as an additional introductory note to my 
general framework of approaching the religion of Islam in Europe. 
16
 The literature on the subject is beyond listing. I allow myself some general remarks that help in 
contextualizing my approach. I cite more influential contemporary works as I proceed, while these 
historical sketches are my summary of my consideration of this literature.  
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(academic) attention to its “indigeneous Muslims”17 that have inhabited its soil prior to 
1945. The Muslim world also seems to have forgotten that Muslims as a minority around 
the world and in Europe in particular have long been there, and not much attention was 
paid to them, and thus not much has been learnt from their experiences of theological and 
political adjustments.  
 In light of these historical notes, three further remarks can be inferred from the 
current stage of relations between Europe and its Muslims. These remarks revolve around 
three main questions: 1) which Europe is meant in European Islam? 2) Does the West 
differ so much from (Western) Europe when considering it in “West vs. Islam” 
dichotomy?  3) Is there only one European Islam?
18
 I allow myself just some notes to 
briefly underline why “European” Islam is substantially different from “Western” Islam. I 
say more on researching European Islam on the sections devoted to methodology. 
First, which Europe is meant in “European Islam”? It is Western Europe that is 
mostly referred to when the issue of Islam in Europe is discussed for various reasons: 
historical, political, economic, and philosophic. It is Western Europe that entered into 
conflict with the Muslim world in the past, and vice versa, and has been seen as the heart 
of Christianity, and the heir to Greco-Roman, and Judeo-Christian, legacy. It is also the 
part of Europe that is more developed, and thus the one that first sent for workers post-
1945, and thus the one able to set up the work permits, citizenship controls, immigration 
policies, etc. It is also liberal and secular, and thus more challenging to the religious and 
conservative Muslim mindset. It is Western Europe that has been characterized by its 
homogeneity, until the Two World Wars obliged it to welcome immigrants from the 
Third and Islamic Worlds to re-build the continent; its homogeneity is being challenged 
now, and so are its secular and liberal ideals. Less heated is the debate in Eastern Europe, 
                                                          
17
 I refer to H. A. Hellyer's section entitled “Indigenous Muslims: A Model from Within” in his “When the 
“Other” Becomes “Us”: The Future of Muslims and Islam in Europe,” Comparative Islamic Studies 2.1 
(2006) 67–78. 
18
 More questions can be raised here, like: which authority defines the scope of the debate and its agenda? 
What discipline is responsible for that: philology, Middle Eastern studies, Oriental studies, etc.? See, for 
instance, H. A. Hellyer, Muslims of Europe: the “Other” Europeans (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009) 
Introduction 1-12.  
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which has a substantial centuries´ old minority of Muslims and non-Muslims; still, this 
does not make it immune from the debate.
19
  
 Second, does the West differ so much from (Western) Europe when considering it 
in “West vs. Islam” label? In this project, I assume that there is a difference. The liberal 
and secular Americas, as well as Australia and New Zealand, are part of the “West.” But 
the historically long “homogeneity” of Western Europe and its past dominance by, and 
later on conflicts, with the Church is not replicated, for example, in the USA. The non-
European part of the West first emerged as colonies of the old Europe, dissidents and 
religious conservatives 8the Puritans in the US), and most importantly as immigrants, 
thus “heterogeneous.” Henceforth, what distinguishes them is that they have developed 
into multicultural and liberal entities that share the core values of modernity as they first 
sprung in Europe, but, unlike the “homogeneity” of the latter and its religious wars, they 
seem more accommodative of religion.
20
  
 If the models seem to differ because of history, why are the Muslims the 
“question/problem” also in the Americas, mainly in the US? Two reasons can be 
advanced here. First, since the 1960s and 1970s, the USA has started to intervene heavily 
in the Middle Eastern issue of Palestine/Israel, and that has caused an intense inner anger 
against the US foreign policy. The 9/11 events, Afghanistan and Iraq wars escalated this 
feeling among Muslims, but this feeling would be even greater in the US, and around the 
world, against Muslims. “Islamic terrorism” is not just for the terrorists, but nearly 
“every” Muslim got the label “tagged” to him. Mahmood Mamdani came up with the 
phrase “good Muslim, bad Muslim” to explain the status quo from the US perspective. 
Islamophobia in the US seems more political than cultural-religious.
21
 Second, the reason 
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 Amir Mirtaheri, “European Muslims, Secularism and the Legacy of Colonialism,” European Journal of 
Economic and Political Studies EJEPS 3 (2010) 73-86. 
20
 To give a simple example as a marker of the place of religion in politics between two different liberal 
societies of the West, in secular/laïc France, no president of the Republic can ever speak of his religion in 
public or in campaigns. In the USA, “In God We Trust” is stamped on the Dollar banknotes, and “God 
Protect America” is in the tongue of every USA president. There is no record of an atheist US president. 
Another example that can be given is that while in Western Europe religiosity is hardly expressed in public 
by ordinary citizens, the Americans are on the contrary more open to say they are religious. For more 
differences and similarities on this point, see, for instance, José Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, 
Secularisms,” in Craig Calhoun, et al., eds., Rethinking Secularism (New York: Oxford UP, 2011) 54-73. 
21
 Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Mulim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” 
American Anthropologist (2003) 104(3): 766-775; Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and 
12 
 
why Islamophobia in the Americas seems more political is the fact that most of the Arab-
American community enjoys a better socio-economic status. This is not the case in 
Europe. Most of the first immigrants to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (and few earlier) 
were illiterate, very poor, and with no professional skills. They came to Europe to work, 
save some money, and go back, but their plan could not be realized in few years, and they 
had to stay, invite their families to join them, and settle down once and for all. These 
early immigrants lived a traditional life in their slums, ghettoes, and HLMs, and the only 
main contact with the modern European society was their workplace. This has impacted 
their status on various levels – socio-economically, politically, and culturally.22  
Third, what is a European Muslim?
23
 Is he (or she) very different from the Arab 
Muslim, Sub-Saharan Muslim, American Muslim, or Asian Muslim? In 1979, Ayatollah 
Khomeini met a group of Saudi Arabian students in Tehran on the occasion of the 
Bairam, Eid al-Aḍḥā, and among what he said was this: “Muslims have to find Islam 
again.”24 Are European Muslims trying to find Islam again? Or, are they trying to find a 
new (European) Islam, with the same old spirit but new interpretations and forms?  Such 
questions, and the label “European Muslim” it carries within it, seem immensely 
important in the age of global movement and multiculturalism, for at least two main 
reasons, each divided into two sub-reasons, derived from Islamic theology. These are 
ontological and historical reasons.
25
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press/Doubleday, 2005); Vartan Gregorian, Islam: a Mosaic, 
Not a Monolith (Washinghton D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003) Preface and Introdcution;  
22
 Abdulkader H. Sinno, ed., Muslims in Western politics (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009) See chapters 2 
and 5. 
23
 This question is actually part of the main or more important question that Akeel Bilgrami interestingly 
raises, and to which he finds no one clear answer, because various factors define the identity of one person, 
and not only his religiosity as he thinks of it: Bilgrami, “What is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and 
Cultural Identity,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 18, n. 4 Identities (Summer 1992) 821-842. 
24
 Ayatollah Khomeini, “Muslims must find Islam,” in Andrew Rippin and Jan Knappert, eds. Textual 
Sources for the Study of Islam (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1990) 191-192. 
25
I borrow these two reasons from the Mufti of Bosnia-Herzegovina Mustapha Cenic who calls for a single 
European Muslim authority to face the challenges of the current age. He calls for a third way in which 
European Muslims live both their Eastern and Western identities and values in harmony and in more 
understanding attitudes. I will raise after a while the issue of religious authority and its possibility or 
impossibility in Europe, as in the rest of the Islamic world. See for instance: Mustafa Ceric, “The Challenge 
of a Single Muslim Authority in Europe,” Centre for European Studies, European View (2007) 6:41–48.  
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Ontologically, first, the Quranic invitation of man, and acceptance of the latter, of 
the message of Islam as a monolithic message (hamlu arrisalah) has made the contract 
between the divine and the non-divine perpetual and universal, carried by humankind, 
and not only by Muslims, and thus applicable anywhere and everywhere, despite 
geography, language, or political differences. Human beings in general are supposed to 
invoke the divine with which they have an ontological bond. Second, it is the person that 
is most concerned with it, with no mediation between him/her and God. This makes this 
“divine/spiritual link” based on personal responsibility and free choice, initiated into by 
Shahada (Testimony) of Tawhid (Oneness). Historically, first, the task of the Muslim is 
then is to derive human perpetual peace with the rest of humankind despite its difference. 
The world is seen a priori diverse, and its diversity has to be perpetually established. 
Second, and seeing that the phase spoken about here is that of Muslims in Europe, the 
ontological and the historical intertwine, not to push the person to be divided between 
either a divine message or a non-divine/secular message, but to find the perpetual 
contract that the person has towards God and the inhabitants of this universe - Europe in 
this case. The challenge is to live both at the same time and place, and not to escape one 
or the other – that again being based on religion as a choice.  
Despite these two (ontological-historical) reasons that are supposed to shape the 
Islamic mindset and worldview universally, difference in interpreting them is quite 
evident even in the majority Islamic countries. Diversity in interpretation then has been 
part of the core of the Islamic ideal worldview, despite its seemingly unifying creed. The 
Islamic worldview is shared by Muslim believers, at the ontological level – 
theological/philosophic diversity at that level is also present. However, interpretations of 
part of Islamic law are very diverse geographically because of the historical aspects that 
characterize these geographies. Not to go into details here, it is enough to see that the 
Islamic majority countries have adjusted the Islamic worldview, especially the 
jurisdictional part of it, according to society´s socio-cultural and historical specificities. 
Islam as a belief is the same in Morocco and in Asia, or in Sub-Sahara and Europe, but its 
practices are various. The same applies to Islam between Eastern and Western Europe, 
and within Western Europe as well.   
14 
 
Therefore, attention has also to be paid to the potentially various meanings of 
European Islam. Which Europe is meant here and by implication what European 
Muslim? Western Muslims is vague as a label as is European Muslims, unless one is 
satisfied with generalizations. Mustapha Cenic, a leading voice of Balkan Muslims and 
Islam, speaks of a single Muslim authority in Europe, where mainly the Sunnite and 
Shiite, and some other sects, can join efforts, forget about their ethnic backgrounds, sects 
and languages and live in Europe a truly universalist and pluralist Islam which has been 
homogenized for centuries. Cenic refers to three categories of Muslims in Europe: the 
“indigenous Muslims” that have been in Europe for centuries; “emigrant Muslims” of 
post-1945 era; and “native Muslims,” and he means the “new Europeans,” the offspring 
of the emigrants; they are born in Europe and they consider themselves European of 
Muslim faith or background; the new converts are also in this category. The three 
categories still face different challenges, and make speaking of one European Islam a 
challenge to be studied and considered.
26
 Cenic makes it clear that the idea behind this 
single authority is to organize Muslims better and make them aware of their 
Europeanness, and able to contribute to national, regional, and world peace, security, and 
prosperity.
27
  
My reference to Mustapha Cenic´s idea here about European Muslims´ categories 
in history (indigenous, emigrants, natives) and his call for a single authority among 
Muslims just makes my point of diversity of Muslim voices and Islamic practices clearer 
and corroborates the idea that European Muslims, and most of their representatives, either 
institutionalized or not, speak of a problem, the problem of being here in Europe but not 
feeling at home, mostly because they say the host country, which is now theirs, is still 
considering them different because their religion is “foreign” and their values do not 
match with the current Western secular and liberal values. As to those among them who 
feel at home, the indigenous Muslims, they also feel a kind of malaise because their 
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 Ceric, “Single Authority,” 42. 
27
 Ceric says, “It is now time that we seriously consider a way to institutionalize the presence both of Islam 
as a universal religion and Muslims as global citizens.” He adds, “It is not enough that Europe recognizes 
the presence of Islam on its territory. Muslims deserve more than that […]; Muslims in Europe need a 
single Muslim authority,” Ceric, ibid.  
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common perception of European Islam is now being confused with the European Islam 
being debated in Western Europe.  
Though the “indigenous Muslims,” like those of the Balkans and parts of Russia 
and the Baltic (Tatars), seem to be trying to feel that their past history and their old 
presence in Europe can help in enriching the current debate on this issue and thus 
contribute to solidifying the idea of European Islam, Western Europe does not seem to 
have invested much in this direction, nor do the Muslims in Western Europe seem to have 
learnt from their coreligionists in the same Continent. Bugarel argues that “The study of 
Balkan Muslim diasporas underlines some major differences between Balkan Muslim 
populations and the other Muslim populations present in western Europe [...]; one has to 
consider European Islam not as an existing fact, but as an ongoing process.” This 
complicates the idea of one European Islam, and makes researching it academically 
fertile.
28
  
3. Methodological Concerns on Studying Islam in Europe 
Who defines European Islam and European Muslims, and what institutions and 
representatives are able to do them service is then one of the main issues that European 
Islam as a topic has to face as well. This is not to say that much research is not done on 
Muslims in Europe for the last three-four decades. On the contrary, there is an 
overwhelming research interest in the field, 1) politically, 2) sociologically, and 3) 
anthropologically.  
 Politically, much fusion and confusion has taken place over Islam in the Middle 
East and Islam in Europe. There are various reasons behind that, which cannot be detailed 
here. The point to stress, however, is that scholarship on the Middle East has given itself 
the authority to speak of Islam in Europe, and ultimately of European Islam, with utter 
neglect of the socio-political and historical situation between the two spaces that require 
different scholarly approaches. Much of the classical Orientalist and essentialist trends 
have been passed on from Middle Eastern issues to issues of Islam and Muslims in 
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 Xavier Bougarel, “Balkan Muslim Diasporas and the Idea of a “European Islam,”” in Tomislav Dulić et 
al., eds., Balkan Currents. Essays in Honour of Kjell Magnusson, Uppsala: Uppsala Multiethnic Papers 49, 
2005, 147-165. 
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Europe. These trends have grown in intensity when merged with the securitization 
approach adopted in most European countries, particularly since 9/11.
29
  
 Sociologically and anthropologically, three prime remarks make my consideration 
of sociological and anthropological work not enough for me to understand European 
Islam. First, current studies of Muslims in Europe have built on Orientalist scholarship, 
and that impacts research findings and perceptions. The sociology of Islam
30
 hardly 
developed as a discipline in contemporary Islamic societies, nor did it attract early 
European sociologists.
31
 With such a void, scholars would depend on Orientalist Middle 
Ages texts that methodologically cannot be relevant in the study of the contemporary 
societies, and even in understanding Muslim communities in Europe.
32
 Maxime 
Rodinson, the French renowned scholar, describes this as the “continuance of the past 
impetus.”33 Joselyne Cesari, a French expert on Islamic studies, says that the current 
anthropological and sociological studies have used Orientalist scholarship in their 
disciplines, and that has affected the current study of Islam and Muslims in the West: 
In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and 
therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. 
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 I refer here to some works that fall within this category and deal with “political Islam” and 
“radicalization.” I do not mean that these works are “anti-islamist” or “Islamophobist”: Gilles Keppel, The 
War for Muslim Minds:  Islam and the West (Cambridge: Belknap, 2004) chapter 7; Abdulkader H. Sinno, 
ed. Muslims in Western Politics (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2009) mainly Chapters 8 to 
12; Tahir Abbas, ed. Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective (Edinburgh UP, 2007) mainly 
part I and II; Michael Emerson, et al., eds., Political Islam and European Foreign Policy (Brussels: Center 
for European Policy Studies, 2007) chapter 10; Samir Amghar, et al., eds., European Islam: Challenges for 
Public Policy and Society (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2007) part A, chapter 1 to 3; 
Joselyne Cesari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe,” Challenge Research Paper, no. 14 / April 2009. 
30
 See the recent work of Tugrul Keskin, “The Sociology of Islam,” in Keskin, ed. Sociology of Islam: 
Secularism, Economy, and Politics (Winchester: Ithaca Press, 2011) 1-20. 
31
 The Iranian sociologist and theologian Ali Shariati (d. 1977) tried to theorize “Islamic sociology” but I 
cannot see his theory to have been taken seriously by scholars in the Islamic world. See, Ali Shariati, On 
the Sociology of Islam, trans., Hamid Algar (Berkely: Mizan Press, 1979) chapter 6 and 7; Max Weber’s 
“sociology of religion,” for instance, does not give much space to Islam. Max Weber is believed to have 
developed interest in Islam not as a religion but as an antithetical element to capitalism. Overall, his work 
on Islam was left unaccomplished. The British sociologist Bryan S. Turner says that “sociologists are either 
not interested in Islam or have nothing to contribute to Islamic scholarship,” so the sociological study of 
Islam remained weak or inexistent for long. See, Syed Anwar Husain, “Max Weber’s Sociology of Islam: 
A Critique,” University of Dhaka, n.d., available at:  http://www.bangladeshsociology.org/Max%20Weber-
Anwar%20Hosain.htm 
32
 For a clearer idea of what I mean, see, Gabriel Marranchi, The Anthropology of Islam (Oxford and New 
York: Berg, 2008) chapter 3 and 6; Nissim Rejwan, The Many Faces of Islam: Perspectives on a Resurgent 
Civilization (Gainesville: Florida UP, 2000) Part IV.  
33
 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam, trans. Roger Veinus (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1987) 99-104. 
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Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the 
study of Islam in the field of social sciences, tensions remain strong between 
Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and 
Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle.
34
 
Second, these two fields seem to have been influenced and guided by the political 
rhetoric. Much of the fieldwork, for example, targets Muslim minorities alone, and does 
not advance that level of academic inquisitiveness to other minorities for a better 
understanding of the issue. Comparative studies could have been more fruitful than when 
they target one religious minority, which the political and media discourse already 
targets.
35
 The increasing scholarships on Muslims in Europe illustrates the fact that 
research on this particular minority is not purely academic, but is also politically driven, 
some of which is being politicized. That is, some of the conducted research on Islam and 
Muslims in Europe is used by political parties and ideologies when that suits them in 
some political campaigns, preparations for elections, and alike manners. I am not saying 
that academics should always find topics of research that are not problematic. 
Researching the unproblematic may be nonsensical. What is being said here is that a 
number of critical researchers who belong to these fields in particular have publicly 
denounced the exaggerated focus on Muslims in Europe, especially when this focus is 
driven by the political discourse, which the media and right wing parties, for instance, 
(mis-)use.
36
  
                                                          
34Joselyne Cesari, “Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam,” Harvard Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Review 8 (2009) 148–175.  
35
 The Swedish theologian Goran Larssen calls for studying Muslims as any other minority, and proposes 
comparative religious studies for a better, unbiased, understanding of religiosity among Muslims, and thus 
Islam in the modern world. Goran Larssen, “The study of Islam and Muslims in Europe: a Critical 
Evaluation,” (review essay), 2008, available at: 
http://imiscoe.socsci.uva.nl/publications/workingpapers/documents/CommentsbyGoranLarssonGoteborgUn
iversity.pdf   
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 For the last two years, I have taken part in a number of workshops and conferences around Western 
Europe, and I have noticed that there is a growing tendency among a number of scholars to agree on 
“finishing” with studying Islam as a security issue/ threat of Europe, and to distance themselves from the 
political and media rhetoric. Birgitte Schepelern Johansen and Riem Spielhaus are publishing an interesting 
evaluative work on polling Muslims in Europe to show the methodological risks involved quantifying 
specific populations with a focus on Muslims in Europe. The project has been presented in a number of 
workshops in 2011 and 2012 in the Center for European Islamic Thought in Copenhagen University, and 
Austria University, among other workshops. Among the findings of this report-text, which studies a 
number of polls produced in various European countries for the last decade, are as follows: the manner of 
posing questions by the pollers (sociologists) focuses on particular “controversial” issues of religious 
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Third, academic dependence on the political discourse could harm immensely the 
framework of research. Research on Muslims in Europe can turn quickly into research on 
Islam, and here the shift occurs, consciously or unconsciously, from fieldwork based 
research on Muslims to inferences about Islam as a religion, without a methodologically 
sound match. This is not to say that the behavior of Muslims is not Islam; rather, the link 
between the two requires a clear discipline of interpretation, which may not often be 
found in one scholar, or scholarly discipline on this religion. This mostly happens when 
the sociological data extrapolated from fieldwork is misused by a particular political 
discourse and essentialist academic line of thought. 
Overall, what I could see in the literature is that Muslims in Europe are studied in 
one of three ways. One, they are studied in light of Middle Eastern Islam, which makes 
European Muslims themselves unsatisfied with the approach and the results. Two, the 
emerging European Islam projects are studied in isolation, without an attempt to match 
them with the sociological-anthropological work done in the field. The gap remains 
between European Islam in theory and European Muslims practices. Three, which 
follows from point one and two, there is no thorough “intra-comparative study” that is 
conducted on European Islam projects as a way of examining what they contribute to the 
debate, in light of their Islamic tradition as well as European modern liberal-and-secular 
tradition. Nor is there an “inter-comparative study” in which European Islam projects are 
compared with some projects theorized about in the Islamic majority countries to see 
where differences and/or similarities lie. Certainly there are minor attempts in that 
direction, but the ones most heard of or circulated are of two types: 1) the ones that are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
practices (like violence, terrorism, and polygamy); sometimes the informants are not given choices in 
answering questions, and are bound to answer “yes or no” though the question may have other answer 
options; some confusion of religious sects and names is detected, which shows lack of knowledge on the 
religion that is investigated; and moral issues of religion are hardly investigated; focus is put on the issues 
that are politically and “mediatically” controversial. While waiting for the book release, reference could be 
made to this article that summarizes the argument: Birgitte S. Johansen and Riem Spielhaus, “Counting 
Deviance: Revisiting a Decade’s Production of Surveys among Muslims in Western Europe,” Journal of 
Muslims in Europe (2012) Vol. 1, Issue 1, 81- 112. On the media representation of Muslims in Europe, see 
for example: Wasif Shadid and Pieter S. van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in 
the West: Causes and Solutions,” in Shadid and van Koningsveld, eds., Religious Freedom and the 
Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002)  174-196; for 
a specific country sample, see Andreas Zick and Jörg Heeren, “Muslims in the European Mediaspace,” 
London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, German Report, 2011, retrievable from:  
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Muslim_Media_Report_-_German_Academic2.pdf 
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either Islamophobic, by anti-Muslims or ex-Muslims, or highly Eurocentric though they 
keep the Islamic label stamped on their discourse; and 2) the most conservative, and 
especially the violent fundamentalists, or extremists.
37
  
The above contextualizing notes are purposefully generic, for the introduction 
cannot allow more than that, and I do not intend to deal with them again in the 
argumentation-text again. To move to clarify my project, I refer to two distinguished 
scholarly trends/ examples of socio-political approaches to European Islam, and based on 
them my project can be better understood and contextualized. The first of these two 
examples claims that European Islam is not grounded theologically (Olivier Roy), while 
the second example claims it is grounding itself on that (theological) level (Jorgen 
Nielsen and Felice Dassetto). The two, however, do not go into theoretical elaborations 
on that, for they argue from socio-political perspectives. As will be made clearer as I 
proceed, I stand on the side of the second trend, and try to develop my argument from 
theological bases that the scholars I study refer to, before the political bases of this 
argument are also met. I briefly present the two trends first.  
The renowned French scholar Olivier Roy writes in his Vers un islam européen 
[Towards a European Islam, 1999] that there is no theological new input to Islam among 
Muslims in Europe. He believes that there is no rethinking of the religious dogma among 
Muslims in Europe. All he sees is the age of “post-Islamism,” characterized, among other 
aspects, by “individualization,” “privatization,” and “deterritorialization” without 
theological re-interpretations. I quote him in length:  
We see then that the minority fact does not necessarily bring about a theological 
or jurisprudential aggiornamento but rather a disconnection between the 
theological debate and the creativity of a religiosity which is centered on the 
individual. […] It [i.e. individualized European Islam] is not a reformed Islam 
because not only the dogma but also the corpus of interpreters and jurists remain 
uncontested. […] European Islam is deterritorialized, deprived of institutions that 
                                                          
37
 Salafists are commonly wrongly depicted as extremists and violent; actually only a minority of them are. 
Salafists are generally peaceful though they stick to the literal interpretation of the Islamic main sources, 
the Quran and Sunna. They are also referred to in the media generally as fundamentalists, but not every 
fundamentalist is extremist and terrorist. It is one of the terms that has been misused. A fundamentalist is 
classically the one who goes back to or refers to the fundamental sources (Quran, Sunna, and consensus, 
ijmāʻ). Now, mostly in the media, a fundamentalist is someone who is ready to use violence, change the 
political system into an “Islamic” one, and alike connotations. I use “extremism” to refer to “violent 
fundamentalism,” and “extremists” to refer to “violent fundamentalists” or “violent Salafists.”  
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could impose norms. […] We are certainly wrong to wait for a theological 
reform, or a theological voice, for the liberalization of practices (like the veil, 
food, etc.) which would allow to the Muslims to adapt to Occidental norms.
38
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
According to Roy, the resurgence of Islam among Muslims in Europe, and in the Islamic 
majority lands, are broadly “anti-intellectual” especially among fundamentalists and 
salafis. This is the case for religion in general in the 21th century.
39
 He calls this “sainte 
ignorance” (sacred ignorance).40 In Globalized Islam (2004), Roy does not change his 
mind. He still views Islam in the West in general to be looking through the Western 
lenses, “The issue is not Western versus Muslim values. […] The debate occurs within a 
single “cultural” framework: that of the West.”41 Due to the fact that it works “within” 
the Western framework, Roy then sees no Islamic theology being revisited or developed, 
“Islam in the West is Western not to the extent it changes its theological framework, but 
because it expresses that framework more in terms of values than of legal norms, 
whatever the content of those values.”42 What Roy considers to be changing is not the 
dogma, but simply the practice of believers, “What is changing is not religion but 
religiosity,” and he ascertains this since the “liberal thinkers do not meet the demands of 
the religious market.”43  His conclusion then, as quoted in length above, is that European 
Islam “is not a reformed Islam because not only the dogma but also the corpus of 
interpreters and jurists remain uncontested.” As a political scientist and sociologist of 
religion, Roy’s views cannot be so much contested, but his conclusions on the theological 
level need revision. My work here goes against his conclusions about European Islam.
44
 I 
                                                          
38
 Olivier Roy, Vers un islam européen [Towards a European Islam] (Paris: Esprit, 1999) 89; 90; 91.  
39
 Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia UP, 2004) 31; 35. Roy uses 
the term “anti-intellectualism;” “anti-intellectual” is the adjective I have derived from it. 
40
 Roy, La sainte ignorance: le temps de la religion sans culture [The Sacred Ignorance: The Age of 
Religion without Culture] (Paris: Seuil, 2008) 189.  
41
 Roy, Globalized Islam, 335-337. 
42
 Ibid., 31. 
43
 Ibid., 30-31. 
44
 The political scientist Jytte Klausen has conducted 300 interviews with Muslim association leaders, 
politicians, businessmen and intellectuals in seven European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Great Britain, France, and Germany) between 2003 and 2005, and arrived to the conclusion that there is an 
emerging European Islam. In her data analysis, and in a comment on Roy, she sociologically states what I 
am arguing for in this dissertation theoretically-theologically. She says “I have more fundamental 
disagreements with Roy. He sees no evidence of any serious rethinking of religious dogma among 
European Muslims. I am convinced, on the contrary, that a “European Islam” is emerging upon a new 
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see European Islam emerging, and from theological and intellectual perspectives. In this 
sense I am closer in views to the Danish scholar Jorgen Nieslen.  
 At the time when Roy published his book on European Islam in French, Nielsen 
did the same, with a work bearing the same title in the same year in English, Towards a 
European Islam (1999). In the main, Nielsen imbues his sociological study of Muslims 
mostly in Britain with a historical touch. Though, like Roy, he does not go into deep 
theological investigations into the matter, he still sees “grounds for optimism” in what 
concerns the integration of Muslims in Europe and Europe’s ability to respond positively 
to that, if it brings up its past heritage of pluralism and tolerance, away from “restrictive 
and sometimes oppressive forms of nationalism.”45 In Muslims in Western Europe (3rd ed. 
2004), Nielsen sees the young Muslims, born and educated in Europe, as being influential 
in leading their community of believers, and in giving shape to new forms of expressing 
and practicing Islam, forms and priorities “relevant to their European situation.”46 
 Nielsen notes that there is a lively intellectual debate going on within the Islamic 
community, and less attention is given to it. He compares it to the formative Islamic 
intellectual era: “less is being paid to the internal debates taking place. Here there is a 
range of philosophical and theological discussions, which in many ways remind one of 
the debates which ranged among Islamic theologians in the formative periods of the 
eighth–eleventh centuries.”47  
In different wording, Nielsen believes that Muslims in Europe “are being 
watched” by their co-religionists in the Islamic majority countries, as if there were a shift 
in theological balance. In forwarding Tariq Ramadan’s To Be a European Muslim (1999), 
Nielsen states the following: “The irony of the situation has become that living on the 
margins of the Muslim world has taken European Muslims back into the theological 
centre. In doing so they are being watched also from the geographical center [i.e. the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
epistemology of faith and a new hermeneutics of textual interpretation.” Jytte Klausen, The Islamic 
Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford UP, 2005) 204-205. 
45
 Jorgen Nielsen, Towards a European Islam (London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1999) 10. 
46
 Nieslen, Muslims in Western Europe, 3
rd
 ed.  (Edinburgh UP: 2004) 172.  
47
 Nielsen, “The Question of Euro-Islam: Restriction or Opportunity?” in Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, 
eds. Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity, and Influence (Cambridge UP: 2007) 34. 
22 
 
Muslim world].”48 This makes it clear that European Muslims “are asking fundamental 
questions about Islam”; fiqh (which focuses on legal matters) is being questioned, and 
theology (which focuses on morality) is being given more weight.
49
 Some reputed 
sociologists and anthropologists on Muslims in Europe are in accord with the argument 
of Nielsen. In La Construction de l’islam européen [The Construction of European Islam, 
1996], the Belgian sociologist Felice Dasseto, recognizes a “growing new Islamic 
rhetoric”50 - meaning a religious discourse that tackles theological matters - which makes 
of Western Europe “a land of Islam.”51 In a recent work, Discours musulmans 
contemporains [Contemporary Islamic Discourses, 2011], Dassetto includes Europe as a 
field which is experiencing diverse Islamic intellectual dynamisms.
52
  
In light of these preliminary notes, I contend that a new approach of studying 
European Islam has yet to develop, and my approach here is an attempt in that direction. I 
am certainly not claiming that my approach covers the critique I have advanced above. 
This work here is putting the first building blocks of further elaborations and 
                                                          
48
 Nielsen, Forward, in Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999) 
xi-xiv. 
49
 Ibid., xi-xiv.  
50
 Dassetto uses the term “Islamist rhetoric” in French which I translate as “Islamic rhetoric” to avoid 
misunderstanding him by the reader as suspicious of this growing rhetoric.  His use of the term “islamist” is 
not negative, as is common especially in Western media and among some other scholars who distinguish 
between “Islamist,” which they mean to be violent or at least ideologist, and “Islamic” which refers to 
religion as a doctrine. Felice Dassetto, La Construction de l´Islam européen: approche socio-
anthropologique [The Construction of European Islam : Socio-Anthropological Aprroach] (Paris and 
Montreal: L´Harmattan, 1996) 237.  
51
 Ibid., 11. Here, too, by Western Europe as a “land of Islam” Dassetto does not mean the “conquest of 
Europe” and its annexation to the land of Islam, as some journalists-writers affirm when they use the term 
“Europe as a land of Islam.” Dassetto’s view is also shared by Stephano Allievi who studies Islam as “a 
European fact”; “Islam is inlandish,” in his terms.  Allievi, “The International Dimension,” in Maréchal, et 
al., eds. Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, 449-488. Overall, Dassetto is closer in perspective to Nielsen; 
their close perspectives are echoed in their co-authored piece, among others, which frames the variety of 
outlooks of Islam and Muslims in Europe,  Felice Dassetoo and Jorgen Nielsen, “Conclusion: Past, Present, 
Future,” in Maréchal, et al., eds. Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, 531-542.  
52
 Dassetto categorizes contemporary Islamic thought, since the mid-19 century, into four tendencies: 1) the 
“literalist foundationists,” or early salafi reformists, 2) “adaptive foundationists,” 3) “symbolic 
foundationists,” and 4) “deconstructionists,” or hermeneutists). He mentions Tariq Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou 
and Abdennour Bidar (who I study in this work) among the contemporary voices of Islam of the third 
category, “symbolic foundationists,” since they mix the mystical and individualist experience of Islam with 
its doctrinal teachings. Dassetto uses the term “foundationists” instead of “fundamentalist” or “salafist” 
because the latter terms have been, according to him, misused especially by the media. See, Felice 
Dassetto, coord. Discours musulmans contemporains [Contemporary Islamic Discourses] (Louvain: 
Harmattan, 2011) 1-28.  
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comparisons for future research. So, as I delve into the debate myself, I open up 
territories of research which have been present in previous as well as contemporary 
works in Islamic thought in the Islamic majority countries, but which have been generally 
neglected among the current research on Islam in Europe for numerous reasons, 
summarized in the preliminary historical notes above.  
 
4. Methodological Concerns on Conceptualizing European Islam 
Research Question: Is European Islam Possible?  
As put in the outset of this introduction, my research has been driven by the 
following main question: Is European Islam possible? In developing an answer I have 
divided this question into three cognitive stages – that correspond to three methodological 
ones. Each stage corresponds to a sub-question.  
One, What does European Islam mean? This question corresponds to the first 
cognitive/ methodological stage in which I describe four projects on the topic. This 
makes the descriptive stage. As will be further illustrated below, European Islam here is 
not inclusive of all voices of Islam in Europe. Focus is on scholars who have a reputation 
and audience, either among ordinary believers, or academia, and sometimes both.  
Two, what is new in European Islam? This question corresponds to the second 
cognitive/ methodological stage termed the comparative stage, since it refers to some 
trends in the Islamic tradition, mainly the Muʻtazila, besides some modern (or what I 
refer to as “early”) and contemporary (or “late”) reformist voices. The rationale behind 
referring to this legacy, even in short, is to find comparative grounds of theological 
justification for the emerging European Islam. With these references, this stage argues 
that European Islam aims at “rationalizing ethics.” That is, it introduces arguments that 
support the making of an (Islamic) ethical theory that clearly differentiates between 
morality and law, without denying the divinity of these ethics. It is a kind of “civil 
Islamic reform(-ation)” without the act of “killing” or “denying” God/ Allah. Because of 
the “rationalization of ethics” European Islam advances, in the footsteps of the late 
Muʻtazila theology, and other contemporary reformist voices, I call such an advancement 
“revisionist-reformist” since it is not a breakthrough in Islamic thought, though it could 
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be considered so for European Islamic thought that is still in the making. European Islam, 
henceforth, continues a tradition, and renews its reasoning aspects. It is also reformist in 
the sense that it adopts modernity values and argues for them “from within,” for 
theological legitimacy of the renewal.   
Three, is European Islam a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine”? This question 
corresponds to the evaluative stage in which the conceptualization and findings of 
theological grounds for European Islam are measured in light of Abdurrahmane’s 
innovative modernity framework and the Rawlsian political framework of overlapping 
consensus. The three sub-questions end with the conclusion that European Islam is 
possible theologically, and politically. I further explain the content of each of the three 
stages (descriptive, comparative, evaluative) in “Content Outline” below, after the “Five 
Criteria of Selection.”   
Speakers of European Islam: Five Criteria of Selection 
Such an intellectual enterprise, which is in its early stages of scrutinizing the 
emerging European Islamic thought, requires, in my view, a comparative and 
interdisciplinary approach. One or multiple texts that are very similar in approach, and 
come from the same academic background, do not serve the rationale of this research that 
targets comprehending the very idea of European Islam, as differently advanced by the 
scholars studied here (to be referred to below). For this purpose, a circle of four scholars 
are selected. The four come from different backgrounds and thus develop different 
approaches to their idea of European Islam. Their background difference is what this 
work uses to advance part of its thesis, i.e. the emphasis on Islamic ethics by the four 
scholars, slightly the way kalam theologians did in the formative years of Islamic 
thought. The selected scholars are as follows: Bassam Tibi (b. 1944), Tariq Ramadan (b. 
1962), Tareq Oubrou (1959), and Abdennour Bidar (b. 1971). Each of the four calls for a 
particular version of European Islam. Tibi presents political justifications for “Euro-
Islam”; Ramadan presents both political/public and theological justifications for 
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“European Islam”; Oubrou is close to Ramadan, though, as I read him, he tries to be even 
more theological; and Bidar presents the theosophic
53
 reading of European Islam.  
 My selection of the studied scholars, and their texts, is based on five criteria. 
First, the scholar should speak from “declaration” and not from “conjecture” perspective, 
using Rawls’s terms.54 They should have an Islamic background, and speak from within 
the religion or doctrine studied, i.e. Islam. The fact that they are Muslim makes them 
more aware of the issues Muslims in Europe in particular face, be they positive or 
negative. A non-Muslim scholar or ex-Muslim could have been chosen, but that would 
not contribute much to my approach; I am looking for scholars that are engaged in 
discussing the matters of their faith, and not the ones who speak against it because of 
particular circumstances they have gone through themselves as Muslims at a particular 
age, and which drove them to leave it, and speak against it later, as is the case with 
intellectuals like the Somali-Dutch Ayan Hirshi Ali, the Iranian-Dutch Afshin Ellian, the 
Iranian-Dutch Ihsan Jami, and the Indian-British Ibn Warraq.
55
 Simply, I want to listen to 
Muslim voices, or at least those who claim they are, so that I can integrate the version of 
reform they propose from within. The methodology of this work requires this criterion.  
Second, the scholar should be living, or should have lived, in Western Europe. 
Living in the Americas or in Eastern Europe may not help the scholar to have a thorough 
understanding of the delicate questions Muslims face in Western Europe, which has a 
different history with both the Christian religion and the Islamic religion in particular. 
Though multicultural as it may seem in reality, Western Europe’s policies towards the 
religious minorities, the Muslims in particular, are not homogeneous and are not 
considered equal compared with its “native” religions (Christianity and Judaism). This  
                                                          
53
 By “theosophic approach” I mean “theological philosophy” or “rational theology,” and not only the 
Eastern and Islamic mystic tradition. I clarify my note when introducing the work of Bidar. 
54
 The terms are Rawls’, introduced in “The Idea of Public reason Revisited.” They are types of 
“justification” that a particular doctrine is compatible with the concept of the political. Reasoning from a 
“declaration” position is a view conveyed by a believer, from within; that is, he belongs to this doctrine, as 
is the case with a Muslim believer or scholar who gives justifications of compatibility of his religion with 
the political concept of “justice as fairness” As to reasoning from “conjecture,” it is carried out from 
outside, by someone not believing in or member of this doctrine, as is the case with a non-Muslim scholar 
who presents Islam as compatible with the concept. Rawls, “The Idea of Public reason Revisited,” The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), 765-807. 
55
 Various associations of ex-Muslims are founded in countries like France, Germany, Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Australia. The councils and their manifesto are available on line, like the Council of Ex-
Muslims of Britain, at www.ex-muslim.org.uk .  
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makes Western Europe a particular secular and liberal case that very much challenges 
classical conceptions of religion, including the “newly arrived” Islam. As is required of 
Muslim religious scholars/ ulema to live or at least be well immersed in the daily issues 
that face their co-religionists, the same could be said of scholars and intellectuals not 
trained in religious classical seminaries, and who speak of the Muslim question and 
Islamic reform in Europe.  
Third, which is a continuity of the second criterion, the intellectual biography of 
the scholar is taken into account, since it impacts his intellectual itinerary. By intellectual 
biography is meant the way the personal or family background and the academic training 
of the scholar have impacted his vision of Islam in Europe, and his thought on European 
Islam. Without a consideration of the spacial-temporal conditions in which the scholar 
has developed his argumentation, his theses could be read out of their context, and could 
be dangerously generalized about other situations and contexts of Islam and Muslims. 
The European condition then has to be kept in mind. That is why I refer to the biography 
of every scholar studied here. 
Fourth, the public presence of the scholar is considered, though not emphasized. 
In treating texts and measuring their potential influence on the public and politics, 
considering their public presence and circulation is important. This comparative work is 
not based on fieldwork; it is theoretical, but its choice of the selected scholars stems both 
from their presence on the ground as well as the potential impact they may still have in 
the future on European Islamic thought, seeing that they are among the pioneering texts 
of this label “European Islam.” All the scholars selected here have a remarkable presence 
in the public debate over Islam and Muslims in Europe especially in their corresponding 
countries of residence. Most of them have an international audience as well.
56
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 Yet, this work cannot say that they have the same audience. Tibi and Bidar may have more audience 
among Muslim and non-Muslim intellectual believers, secularists and liberals; Bidar is both a philosopher 
and a mystic/ Sufi in his approach, which intellectual and “liberal Muslims” may find more interesting, 
while Ramadan and Oubrou may have a religious audience, composed mostly of practicing believers, 
besides non-Muslim sympathizers. I do not mean that practicing believers are not intellectual; a good 
number of the second and third generations of Muslims in Europe are both practicing and of higher 
education; their daily practices may be liberal, but they may not call themselves so, since they practice; for 
them, a Muslim liberal generally does not practice, but only believes, or is Muslim by culture only, and not 
by conviction.  
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Fifth, and despite their different backgrounds, the scholars studied here all bring 
to the fore the ethical message of Islam and stress it in their version of European Islam. 
As will be argued in this thesis, they all tend, though not systematically, to rationalize 
ethics, which the late Muʻtazila school of thought, mostly culminated in the work of the 
renowned rationalist scholar Qadi Abd Aljabbar (d. 1025), pioneered between the 9
th
 and 
11
th
 centuries. I do not aim here to raise a profound discussion on Islamic ethical theories. 
The aim in this work is to see some characteristics of Muʻtazila rational thought in 
European Islam, and how that can impact some of the socio-political Islamic issues that 
are unresolved yet in Europe. Some modern (“early”) and contemporary (“late”) 
reformist scholars based mostly, but not all, in the Islamic majority countries tend, too, by 
means of their various approaches, to rationalize the divine message, à la Muʻtazila, 
despite the fact that they do not mention this classical school by name since it has been 
tarnished and defamed by some orthodox scholars and political regimes since the mihna 
(“Inquisition-like”) of the school in the 9th century.57  
The selected scholars then do stress the ethical question in Islam in light of not 
only the current socio-political situation in Europe, but also in light of the socio-political 
changes and challenges that the Islamic majority countries mainly of the broad Middle 
East have been facing for about the last two centuries. What I see these scholars to be 
doing is to re-ground the Islamic ethical message in the liberal-secular European context. 
It is here that the theological and the political intertwine to a large extent. Because of the 
political pressure over the religious in Europe, and equally because of the religious 
challenge of the political status quo, I have found myself building a historical link 
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 I will say more on the Muʻtazila and refer to the mihna the school went through in the mid-9th century. 
This form of inquisition the school went through was a reaction, a result, since the political regime aimed at 
establishing the Muʻtazila tenets by force, and after about three decades, the dominant Ashʻari came back 
and retaliated in what is termed mihna. Since then, the Ashʻari, which adopts Divine Command Theory in 
approaching reason and revelation, has dominated Islamic thought and political regimes that govern most 
Muslim majority countries. Scholars have ever since avoided affiliating themselves to the rationalist 
Muʻtazila for fear of being called “apostates” or “deviants.” Only recently more openness has been noticed 
towards invoking the school. I do not translate Mihna as Inquisition, as some tend to do, since Mihna in 
Islamic history is a political decision issued and imposed by the Caliph, a political authority, and it was not 
a single religious authority that issued it, as was the Inquisition of the Church in Europe. Similarities aside, 
this distinction of single authority is important in my perspective to avoid confusing traditions and 
histories.   
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between the present and the past in Islamic thought so that European Islam can be better 
understood in its efforts to present theological justifications for its “existence” in Europe.           
More clearly about this potential historical parallelism, I should say that my 
understanding of the contemporary socio-political circumstances of the debate over 
European Islam brings to the fore early socio-political circumstances that were raised 
especially during the reign of the third and fourth Caliphs, Othman and Ali, which 
ultimately influenced the politico-theological paths of Islamic thought in general 
afterwards. I am referring here to the socio-political issue of who had the right to govern, 
on what basis, and the main theological and political divisions that developed out of that 
feud: Sunnites, Shiites/ Shi‘a; Kharijites, Murji’ites, and later on Muʻtazila, and 
Ash’arites/ Ashʻaria, to list these among other sects and schools.  An overview of these 
trends of thought will be briefly provided in due time, in Part IV, Section 1, with more 
focus on the Muʻtazila. That is to say, theological, and ultimately philosophical, disputes 
flourish when the political situation is tense and requires “argumentation” to find out 
theological justifications and political solutions to various issues. That is the task the 
kalam legacy contributed to Islamic thought. Without saying much here, kalam theology 
discussed issues that belong to the field of what is known now as political theory and 
philosophy of ethics, besides issues of divine nature (like the attributes of God).
58
 Thus, 
symptoms of kalam renewal in Europe could be detected in European Islam.  
The current socio-political situation of Islam in/and Europe does correspond, 
mildly if not largely, socio-politically to the early formative period that brought about 
political and theological changes to the Islamic community. Still, and again in light of the 
previous historical notes, I contextualize my reading in the intellectual labour that Islamic 
thought has been in for nearly the last two centuries, chiefly since the beginning of the 
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 There is a tendency to see kalam differently from Christian theology. Kalam seems to include both 
theological and philosophical debates, and is not only synonymous with Islamic theology and its 
counterpart Christian theology. Islamic theology, when it is used as Islamic theology, includes traditions 
like the one of the rationalist Muʻtazila. In this sense, it does not deal only with issues of divinity and 
salvation; it also deals with secular issues generally (secular) philosophy deals with. That is, the 
Mutakallimūn, practitioners of kalam, were both theologians and philosophers. In this perspective, I follow 
the work of George Hourani’s Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1985), Majid Fakhry’s Ethical Theories in Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1991), and Mariam Al-
Attar’s Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought (Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2010). I say more on this in Section 1, Part IV, where I refer to their work in more length.  
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Arab-Islamic Renaissance of the mid-19
th
 century. Various reformist trends have 
developed since, but symptoms of return to the ambiance of the formative intellectual 
debate, which flourished mainly between the 9
th
 and 11
th
 centuries, are very visible. 
There is revision in the reform being advocated in contemporary Islamic thought, 
including the emerging European Islamic thought. European modernity opens space to 
Islamic thought to revise its own past, and rethink its conception of religion in light of the 
modern changes. (More on this will be said below, when referring to the idea of 
European Islam as both European and Islamic concept.)  
The age of kalam will not return in the same way as it first developed, but some of 
its main themes are being revisited in contemporary Islamic thought. Discussing the 
fundamentals of Islam, and rebuilding an updated understanding of religion and re-
contextualization of the message of the Prophet Muhammad are being heavily discussed 
by the Muslim reformist ulema/ religious scholars, and philosophers. European Islam is 
not immune from this debate. Though it may develop its own path of understanding and 
practicing the message of Islam, European Islam, as I will illustrate in this work, is part 
of the current debate, which in turn has its roots in the formative era of Islam. European 
Islam in this sense, as I will recurrently mention, is both revisionist and reformist. It is 
revisionist since it keeps relations with the founding sources; it is reformist since it tries 
to build on them in light of the European modern achievements and context.  
As a matter of fact, my selection aims at making European Islam speak to itself 
more dialectically for the sake of an intellectually religious dispute and argumentation 
(kalam), besides answering the criterion of what the scholars have in common in raising 
Islamic reform(-ation) for European Islam. I have not come across a work that presents 
what European Islam is about in a comparative study where some scholars that claim the 
idea of European Islam “talk to each other” or “listen to each other.” The selected 
scholars hardly mention each other in their works, and when they do, they do so without a 
thoroughly analytical argument that either supports or refutes the other's views. Ramadan, 
for instance, hardly mentions any of the three scholars studied here; yet, he refers to 
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“some scholars” as advocates of “light Islam,” and Tibi is considered one of them.59 Tibi, 
on the other hand, just labels Ramadan a “fundamentalist in disguise,” distances his 
version of Euro-Islam from Ramadan's, and does not go into any analytical critique of the 
latter's thoughts. Oubrou and Ramadan meet in person often in conferences and have got 
engaged in the debate over their interpretation of Islam and secularism in Europe, but still 
that is not written and analyzed; that remains in conferences, keynote speeches, and 
public debates. Bidar has appeared lately in the francophone public and intellectual 
context; he is, for example, not receptive of Ramadan's work either, and like the others, 
he just expresses that as if it were a mere opinion, and does not engage in full 
comparisons. There is an indirect intellectual exchange among them, and this 
comparative study makes it more direct to find out commonalities and differences that 
form the emerging European Islamic thought. 
 
What “This” European Islam Does Not Include: Reply to Five Objections 
These methodological notes being made, and before moving to outlining the 
content of the work, the question of “intellectual modesty,” to call it so, has to be raised 
to avoid essentialisms and silencing of other European Islam voices: do the scholars 
studied here represent European Islam in all its varieties and possible versions? That is, 
does what is left out through the criteria outlined above harm the outcome of this 
research? The brief answer is as follows: this research does not claim to represent but to 
present a version of European Islam; it is not all inclusive, but it is not exclusive as well. 
The arguments presented by the scholars and the way I read them make my argument and 
version of European Islam advanced here inclusive of diverse voices, which may not be 
represented directly but still can find their ideas hereby expressed.  
The previous five criteria of selection seem to exclude five main categories of 
voices to the debate. The objections to such a methodological exclusion may be 
expressed as follows: 1) the European Council for Fatwa and Research is referred to only 
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 In a conference on democracy and the Arab world LUISS university hosted in Rome, on 21 January 
2011, I asked Ramadan about why he does not refer for example to Tibi in his critique of “other” versions 
of European Islam, and he simply said he does not necessarily have to. As I will also note in Part II in 
which I read his thoughts, Ramadan generally does not name the scholars he disagrees with; they are 
generally labelled as '”liberal,” or '”conservative,” or “salafists,” etc.  
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in passing; 2) the Shi‘a voice, the second major sect of Islam after the Sunnis, is not 
referred to at all in “this European Islam”; 3) the traditionalist non-violent salafies as well 
as their small fraction that calls for violence or the establishment/ restoration of the 
Islamic state; 4) women in terms of gender representation seem absent; and 5) voices 
from other geographical parts of Western Europe are not underlined. (As to the “wide 
Europe,” I already mentioned that the issue discussed here is more heated in consolidated 
liberal democracies, and is not so (yet) in Europe post-1990.) Below I respond to each of 
these five objections.  
First, I do not make much reference to the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research, which was established in Dublin in 1997 and is headed by the “global Mufti” 
Youssuf al-Qaradawi,
60
 primarily because it is an institution, composed of a board of 
scholars who have different approaches to Islam, and Islam in Europe, and thus variety of 
views is bound to be found within it and no one clear view on European Islam may easily 
be made clear in light of this variety. This is the case particularly because a lot of the 
scholarly committee members are not European, or at least originally not European, 
which makes European Muslim scholars like Ramadan and Oubrou consider the Council 
more Arab than European.
61
 Moreover, though it publishes various texts on Muslim 
codes of conduct, ethics, etc.,
62
 the Council has mainly remained tied to issuing fatwas 
(non-binding legal opinions) instead of working out a thoroughly new reconsideration of 
the traditional sources in light of the European context.
63
 Some of its published works 
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 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen and Bettina Graf, eds. The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-
Qaradawi (Columbia UP, 2009).  
61
 As of 2011, the scholarly committee composed of thirty eight members were from the following 
countries: Qatar, Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Egypt, Kuwait, UAE, Pakistan, Germany, 
Norway, Belgium, UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Bosnia, Switzerland, Holland, USA, and Canada. More 
could be found at the council’s webpage: www.e-cfr.org/en .    
62
 Two texts are well read on minority jurisprudence (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt): Youssuf Al-Qaradawi, fī fiqh al-
aqalliyyāt al-muslima [On Muslim Minorities Jurisprudence] (Nasr: Dar Ashuruq, 2001); Taha Jabir al-
Alwani, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities (London and Washinghton: International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2003). 
63
 The issuing of fatwas is done in a scholarly manner; scholars study the issues raised by ordinary 
Muslims, in light of the traditional sources, and in consultation with the European Muslim experts in the 
field concerned, e.g. health, economy, family issues. For a case of a woman who converted to Islam, but 
whose husband remained non-Muslim, whether she should stay with him or ask for divorce, the Council 
stayed without a solution for two years, and at the end it gave various options, and left the final decision to 
the concerned woman. Alexandro Caeiro, “Transnational Ulama, European Fatwas, and Islamic Authority,” 
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call for new “civilizational fatwa” paradigm (iftā’ ḥadārī),64 in light of the modern 
geographical and political rapprochement beyond the classical divisions of the abodes,
65
 
and encourage Muslims for full and active participation in their European countries of 
residence.
66
 Most of these works, besides the specific theme they tackle, they also keep 
the tone of daʻwa/ proselytization alive, but they stress that it should be peaceful, based 
on Muslims ethical behaviour, and within what the laws permit in Europe.  
Henceforth, in my reading of the literature of ECFR, I see that though it tries to be 
more receptive and positively responsive to the problems the Muslims face in (Western) 
Europe, it still considers them a minority that has to protect itself from melting into the 
mainstream society which is generally not religious. The ECFR indirectly claims 
authority over the Muslims of Europe, tries to keep them within the classical 
jurisprudential premises that are not different from those in the Muslim majority 
countries. For this reason I have not opted for selecting one of its scholars, or its overall 
“mission,” for my study here. More clearly, in Section 2, Part IV of this work, I try to 
show that European Islam has legitimate views to consolidate John Raws’ overlapping 
consensus, while I see that the ECFR could be used only for a modus videndi frame of 
work.  
Second, for the case of the Shi‘a, especially three arguments could be advanced 
here. One, the Shi‘a are a minority in Europe, reflecting their status within the Islam faith 
at large. Most of the Muslims in Western Europe are of Sunni origin, migrating from 
North Africa and the Middle East. The Sunni dominance is reflected, for example, in the 
membership of the European Council for Research and Fatwa (ECFR). Its scholar 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi, eds. Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and 
Dissemination in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2011) 121-141.  For Fatwas, two 
main volumes have been published, and are available online at: http://e-cfr.org/ar/index.php?cat_id=337 , 
besides periodical short fatwa announcements or articles. The council also produces scholarly papers, 
which can be found at: http://e-cfr.org/ar/index.php?cat_id=341  
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 Abdel Majid Annajar, fiqh al-muwātana li al-muslimīna fi ūrupā [Citizenship Jurisprudence for Muslims 
in Europe] (Dublin: ECFR, 2009) 77-88. 
65
 Abdullah Ben Youssef Al-Judai, taqsīmu al-maʻmūra fi al-fiqh al-Islami wa atharuhu fi al-waqiʻ [World 
Division in Islamic Jurisprudence and its Actual Impacts] (Dublin: ECFR, 2007) Chapters 3, 4, and 5.   
66
 Hussam Shaker, moslimou urupa wa al-mosharaka as-siyassiya [Muslims of Europe and Political 
Participation] (Dublic: ECFR, 2007) chapters 1, 7, and 8; Faysal Mawlawi, al-muslimu muwātinan fi 
ūrupā[The Muslim as a Citizen in Europe] (al-ittihad al-‘alami lil ‘ulama’ al-moslimin, 2008) Chapters 3 
and 4. 
33 
 
members are Sunni, and none of them originates from, say, the Shi‘a Iran.67 Still, the 
work of the Iraqi top Shiite cleric Marje Ayyatollah al-Ssistani (b. 1930) has a wide 
circulation among some Muslims in the West; he urges them to obey the laws of the 
countries they reside in, as manifested in his Fatwa in 2006, without neglecting their 
religious duties. His book A Code of Conduct for Muslims in the West (2012) develops 
this argument.
68
 Second, the Shi‘a diaspora of Iranian descent tend to be less religious or 
not religious when they are in Europe, most probably because of the Islamic Republic 
oppression they experience at home, which they no longer want to be associated with 
when they are abroad. So, their religious presence in Europe, and the West in general, is 
“silent” or “invisible,” compared to the Muslims of Arab origin who tend to have a more 
affirmative affiliation with their religion.
69
 Third, the previous two arguments may well 
explain why the scholars of Islam in Europe are themselves either of Arab origin and thus 
of Sunni background and are attracted to dealing with the mainstream Islam, Sunni Islam, 
or they are aware of the classical differences between Shi‘a and Sunni Islam orthodoxies 
and in their reform agendas they, in my view, on purpose, try to overcome those sectarian 
distinctions by focusing on the main theological aspects that they share.  
Third, the majority non-violent salafies are not directly referred to in my study. 
Salafies generally do not claim that there are various Islams, European, Arab, Asian, etc.  
Politically, and theologically, they do not believe in such a paradigm of thought. They do 
not defend or claim the idea of European Islam. They practice Islam in Europe, respect 
Europe’s laws, but still think of themselves as “muhajirun” (migrants to un-Islamic 
lands), and what they can do is to live Islam as they perceive it, and hope to help others 
convert, or at least guide their “deviant” co-religionists. Moreover, a lot of their ideas are 
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 The Shi‘a scholars have their own council/ Majlis, which was founded in Europe in 1992. For more, 
check their webpage: http://www.majliseulama.org/ 
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 Ayyatollah Assestani, A Code of Conduct for Muslims in the West (Freebooks, 2012). Part One of the 
book focuses on migration (hijra) to non-Islamic lands. For the Fatwa, it received a lot of media attention 
particularly in Canada:  CBC News, “Obey your country’s laws, Iraqi cleric urges Muslims,” June 14, 
2006, available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2006/06/14/fatwa-muslim.html  
69
 The Turkish/ Anatolian Alevis, who are of Shiite origin, are religious, and have found ways to receive 
recognition in Germany where they make a large community, Krisztina Kehl-Bordogi, “Alevis in Germany 
On the Way to Public Recognition?” ISIM Newsletter 8/01, 9, available at: 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17497/ISIM_8_Alevis_in_Germany_On_the_Way_
to_Public_Recognition.pdf?sequence=1  
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indirectly voiced by the studied scholars. Tibi devotes a lot of space to debunk violent 
(international) fundamentalism, while Ramadan argues against the literalist salafies.
70
  
Fourth, the same applies to the question of gender representation: the scholars 
presented here defend gender equality. This work cannot be said to be gender-biased 
since it represents   no female scholar on the subject. It may have been more interesting to 
integrate a female voice that argues for European Islam, but my five criteria outlined 
above have disadvantaged this option. If I were studying Western Islam, I could have 
then integrated some of the following female scholars mostly based in the USA: Leila 
Ahmed, Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, or Saba Mahmoud.
71
 
Fifth,  as to whether geographical representation is considered in the selection 
made in this study, it should be born in mind that this is neither a sociological nor an 
anthropological fieldwork; it is theoretical and thus able to be expanded to various 
secular-liberal societies where the political system has developed differently. It should 
also be born in mind that the five selection criteria make it equally expandable and 
applicable to various Western societies. As to the fact that France dominates the debate, 
and its internal discussions are quickly disseminated throughout the West, that is 
explained by the fact that religious sensibilities and the lines between the Church and the 
state are historically clearly designed, and have become an iconic representation of 
“radical secularism,” (French laïcité), to use Tariq Modood’s description.72  
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 Salafism and Fundamentalism are not necessarily violent or extremist; they simply advocate a return to 
the Prophetic model of life, especially in its personal behavior; only a small fraction of them advocates 
violence and hope for the “return” of the Islamic State. I generally avoid the terms for the confusion that 
has afflicted them after terrorist attacks conducted by Islamists in the last few decades. For they categories 
of Salafies, see Roel Mejer, ed. Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia 
UP, 2009) Introduction 1-32. For the violent or militant salafism, see Frazer Egerton, Jihad in the West: the 
Rise of Militant Salafism (Cambridge UP, 2011) Chapter 1.  
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 I refer to Fatema Mernissi and Amina Wadud among the female reformist voices in Part IV. Some of the 
major works of the scholars mentioned here include: Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical 
Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) ; Amina Wadud, Qur'an and 
Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective (Oxford UP, 1999); Wadud, Inside the 
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Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran (University of Texas Press, 2002); Saba 
Mahmoud, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
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 Tariq Modood, “Moderate Secularism and Multiculturalism,” Political Studies Association, Politics: 
2009 Vol (29) 1, 71-76, available at: 
http://www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/moderate_secularism_and_multiculturalism.pdf . 
For the debate on French secularism and “French exceptionalism” read, for instance, Maurice Barbier’s 
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Besides, the size of the Muslim population in the country, France, should be taken 
into account. It is estimated to be around five-six millions, the highest in Europe, after 
Russia, and most of it is composed of Muslims of North African descent, that is, mostly 
Arabs and Berber that are also Arabic speaking. This means that there are strong ties and 
affinity between Muslims of France and Muslims in good parts of the Arab world. More 
importantly, this fact may have impacted the development of a serious debate in France, 
and all around Western Europe, in the early years of WWII and the immigrants arrival to 
the Continent as guest workers. The latter were not thinking of settling down once and for 
all in Europe, nor were the plans of the receiving countries to receive them once and for 
all. So, culturally and religiously, the immigrants stayed closely in touch with their 
countries of origin and did not think profoundly of adjusting their religious beliefs to the 
new context. Seeing that France in this case was the country that received most of the 
Arab guest workers means that the North African-Middle Eastern conception and practice 
of religion was also received with them, unlike Germany which received mostly Turks, 
and the UK which received guest workers dominantly from Asia. This explains, besides 
the French internal strong secular metabolism, the involvement of French Muslims now 
in reading their Islamic tradition in light of their French secular-liberal ideals – which 
Western Europe also shares.  
These factors noted, the debate in France then does not seem to concern France 
alone, but also impacts the other secular-liberal countries, and the Arab world as well; 
this makes the French debate theoretically at least “exportable” and intellectually 
“consumerable.” Even Tibi’s notion of Euro-Islam first came out in a conference in The 
Institute of the Arab World (L'institut du monde arabe) in Paris in 1992.
73
 Despite his 
German long sojourn, which has given him a picture of the problems Muslims and Islam 
face in Europe, he is more 'laïc' in his approach. Ramadan is Swiss, and it is from within 
                                                                                                                                                                             
article, which was translated into a number of languages, “Towards a Definition of French Secularism,” Le 
Débat n. 134, March-April 2005, available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0205-Barbier-
GB.pdf ; on the same issue, read the interesting thoughts of Talal Assad, “Trying to Understand French 
Secularism,” in Hent de Vries, ed. Political Theologies (New York: Fordham UP, 2006). The chapter is 
also available online at: http://www.iasc-culture.org/THR/archives/AfterSecularization/8.12IAsad.pdf  
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 BassamTibi, ،“Les conditions d’un‘‘euro-islam’’ [“The Conditions of a “Euro-Islam””], in Robert 
Bistolfiand Francois Zabbal eds., Islams d’Europe: integration ou insertion communautaire? [Islams of 
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the French debate that his ideas and some of his controversies, flourished; the same 
applies to Oubrou and Bidar. Despite this heavy presence of the French contextual 
influence, all these scholars have become more transnational and international, for the 
debate is not only French at the end.  
 
Research Methodology: Content Analysis Textual Method  
                                 
 With these methodological notes on the scholars, I now speak of the approach 
implemented in reading their texts. According to Chad Nelsen and Robert Woods, Jr. 
content analysis approach is more common in religious studies, since it targets decoding 
meanings, more than linguistic structures that discourse analysis and critical discourse 
analysis target. Nelsen and Woods argue that content analysis is first and foremost used 
to describe and explain characteristics of messages embedded in texts. This goes through 
a systematic summary of the texts examined so as to provide valuable historical and 
cultural insights into the subject dealt with. The analyst decodes the text, generates 
content categories or structure, according to the aim he has framed in mind, and tries to 
reach to “latent content,'” beyond the “manifest content” of the text. 
Content analysis method of reading texts takes into account the various internal 
and external factors that contribute to the interpretation of a text or multiple texts. It 
recognizes the epistemological basis upon which the research and the results stand. 
Principally, it recognizes that the search for meaning/ content in a text is not only 
discovered in the process but is also constructed for two main reasons. First, as the 
analyst/ reader  starts a project of interpretation and reading, he often already has aims in 
mind, which influence, minimally if not maximally, the outcome or the way he/ she 
constructs it.  This is so since reading a text is necessarily linked to external reasons, past 
or futurist, hidden or experienced, etc.  Simply put, the context influences the production 
of the texts, their readers/ interpreters, and the outcome, since the audience perceptions, 
and the effects of interpretation are also generally taken into account by either the text 
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itself or the interpreter or both.
74
 For content analysis then, as I see it, there is an 
epistemological reservation stated at the beginning of any intellectual project that 
attempts producing knowledge. My choice of this textual methodology matches the 
historical review as well as the selection criteria and the notes made researching Islam 
and/in Europe.        
 As to the functions of content/ textual analysis, which work as a structure for 
work, they could be summarized as follows. They target 1) identifying developments and 
changes in a particular phenomenon or research area (This corresponds to Parts I, II, and 
III, besides this introduction; 2) finding commonalities and differences between the texts 
analyzed, as well as the texts related to this phenomenon or subject, and comparing the 
results with standard classical texts of the subject studied (This corresponds to Part IV, 
Section 1); and 3) referring to other variables of the same or related phenomenon in 
another or same context for evaluation and judgment (This corresponds to Part IV, 
Section 2).
75  
This methodological structure of textual analysis is followed in this work, as 
shown above, and will be further outlined below.   
 The texts of the four scholars are read text-by-text and not point-by-point for two 
reasons. One, in this initial phase, point-by-point comparative analysis does not serve the 
aim of comprehending the way the projects on European Islam have developed, on what 
basis and for what purposes. It simply misses the context. Second, on the other hand, 
text-by-text analysis provides the background, achievements, challenges, as well as the 
horizons each text opens up to the studied subject.  
 However, not all the texts studied here are considered for substantial use. Tibi’s 
project of Euro-Islam ends up being considered for instrumental use, while the three 
other projects remain substantial. It is the methodological apparatus adopted here that 
reads him so.  That is, Tibi paves political grounds for the theological debate that takes 
more space in this work, especially with reference to Taha Abdurrahmane’s framework 
(to be further explained below). Tibi is used instrumentally because his project ends in 
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what I refer to as “Euro-modernity,” and does not attempt theological justifications of his 
idea. As I will explain in due course, though he calls for the revival of Islamic classical 
rational heritage, he does not present the argument in more theological terms to support 
his political claims of Euro-Islam, according to Abdurrahmane’a framework. Though a 
pioneering voice of Euro-Islam, and after comparisons with the other studied scholars 
following the established methodological framework, Tibi’s project appears less 
innovative. As to Ramadan and Oubrou, they are substantially used because they make 
heavy reference to the Islamic sources in light of the European context. Their approaches 
stand in between Tibi’s s and Bidar’s. Concerning the latter, also substantially used, he 
presents solid grounds for his approach by means of the way he reads the Quran and 
modernity, which makes him the most innovative among the comparisons the adopted 
analytical framework attempts to establish in this study.  
 Content Outline: Three Stages for Understanding “This” European Islam  
      The content of this dissertation is methodologically divided into three stages, and 
technically into four parts. Following the broad functionality of content analysis, I have 
divided this work into three stages: 1) descriptive, 2) comparative, and 3) evaluative. The 
first stage takes more space in this work. The first three parts of this work are descriptive 
of four different projects on European Islam. The three parts are descriptive, but not just 
so. There is a substantial component of contextual and textual analysis already in this part 
of work. The comparative and evaluative stages are both condensed in the fourth part. 
The comparative stage takes the first section of the fourth part, and it is where I build a 
link between European Islam as examined here and parts of the Islamic tradition, past and 
present. The second section of the fourth part, the evaluative and most analytical stage, 
adopts two frameworks, one theological, and “Islamic,” based on Taha Abdurrahmane’s 
The Spirit of Modernity (2006), and the other political, and “Western,” based on John 
Rawls Political Liberalism (1996).
76
 More on each of these parts follows below.  
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 The Descriptive Stage: Four Projects on European Islam  
The descriptive stage – which corresponds to Parts I, II and III - aims at catering 
for the following considerations. Initially, the intellectual biography and the way the 
scholar has entered the debate and shaped his thoughts on the issue are traced. This is 
followed by underlining his views on the Islamic accumulated tradition, and the way he 
considers it in the European context; his considerations of the major sources of the 
Islamic tradition (Quran, Sunna, and Islamic schools of thought when applicable) are 
underpinned; if a change in his considerations of the tradition transpires, it is noted with 
reasons; then this is ended by his conception of European Islam and the way he conceives 
of it to take place. This is done with each scholar, with details. At times, if the literature is 
less on a particular scholar, this is then done briefly, as is the case with Oubrou, while if 
the scholar is prolific, and has gone through a particular intellectual journey and 
development, then this is emphasized and thus more space is given to it; this is more so 
with Ramadan. Each part on these scholars is sporadically filled in with my own remarks. 
The structure followed in reading their texts is mine, and it broadly follows the textual 
analysis method described above.  
The first part is devoted to Tibi and his political justifications for Euro-Islam. Tibi 
is Syrian-German (he has lived and worked in Germany for about 44 years. He is a 
political scientist, expert in international relations (IR), religious fundamentalism, and the 
Middle East; he is an advocate of introducing religion as a branch of study in IR. He is 
the first scholar to use the term “Euro-Islam” in a conference in Paris in 1992. Tibi is 
selected as an advocate of Euro-Islam particularly from a political perspective in which 
security and the securitization of Islam have played a pivotal role in influencing the 
public and intellectual debate over Islam and its necessity for reform in Europe. Besides 
the earlier five criteria of selection, the choice of Tibi for this fourfold circle of scholars 
stems from the fact that his project is pioneering in calling for “Euro-Islam,” and is very 
much politically driven. That is, his reform agenda that ends in Euro-Islam answers so 
much the political needs than the theological in-depths or justifications. But since 
                                                                                                                                                                             
well as their relevance will be made clearer, and simultaneously indirectly examined, as their frameworks 
are both explained in isolation, and subsequently applied to the European Islam texts examined here.  
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theological changes are most often pushed by socio-political factors, Tibi’s voice remains 
important in the field. His ideas, at the end, are defended by the three other scholars, too, 
but the way they do that is significantly different. At a  certain evaluative stage in this 
work, Tibi’s approach is put aside and referred to as immersed in what I refer to as 
“classical dichotomous thought,” following my deductions based on Abdurrahmane’s 
analytical framework.   
Ramadan fills in the gap Tibi leaves “unfilled” on what concerns the theological 
input for European Islam. Ramadan, a Swiss of Egyptian origins (the grandson of Hassan 
al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brothers) has pursued a literary-philosophic 
education in his early university studies, before he moved to work on Islamic 
jurisprudence, which has become his major field of expertise, and based on that he calls 
for “radical reform.” He is a prolific writer, engaged scholar, worldwide lecturer, and 
public intellectual. He is an icon for European Islam, and for the European Muslim youth. 
Among the four scholars, Ramadan is a  prominent “political/ public theologian.” This is 
so since his reading of the Islamic sources in Europe comes as an engagement in the 
political/ public debate over the compatibility of Islam with secular and liberal values of 
Europe, and the West in general.  
Ramadan tries to find a midway where politics and theology work together for 
social justice political stability, based on ethics that both need. More particularly, he 
makes Islam accommodative of the political context where it grows, and vice versa. He 
uses his theological knowledge in light of the human socio-political developments 
achieved in Europe. His theology is political in the sense that it keeps itself abreast of 
human developments, without breaking with the divine. At the same time, his political 
attitudes are theological, in the sense that they find their justifications, and at times 
refutations, in the theological. Saliently, and clearly, he has gradually changed his 
theologico-political attitudes from antagonism (as will be shown in Part II) into a more 
harmonious outlook that opens doors of reconciliation between the two within his 
“radical reform agenda” that stresses ethics and considers the Universe another Book of 
Revelation, equal to the written Book of Revelation, the Quran. Oubrou is close to this 
framework.   
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Oubrou was born in Moroccan. He has been living in France for the last three 
decades.  He is director of the Bordeaux Mosque, and ex-president of the Association of 
the Imams of France. After he had left biology and medicine studies, he pursued religious 
studies, and has become a self-made theologian, and public intellectual, besides his 
profession as an imam. Though Oubrou also gives ample space to answer some of the 
recurrent political challenges posed on Islamic theology, he, more than that, tries steps 
further by digging into theological matters of faith, like the attributes of God on which he 
is producing ten volumes, the Day of Judgment and free will. Oubrou’s attempt tries to 
go beyond the political constraints, though they are the push factors behind such religious 
revisions. His philosophy of religion tries to reground Islamic faith in a secular world 
where man’s anthropological life is different from the classical religious life that 
experienced the first manifestations of Sharia during the Prophetic era. He proposes the 
secularization of Islamic thought through geotheology, and Sharia of the minority 
apparatuses.        
 Bidar, a young French philosopher, fills in the fourth piece that closes the circle 
made for this study. Immersed in Western philosophy, Bidar opens out theosophically to 
the Islamic tradition. Most importantly in his contribution to European Islam are his 
concepts of Self Islam, Islamic existentialism, the immortality of man, and the 
overcoming of religion. Owing to his philosophical background, Bidar’s approach stands 
among the most innovative and challenging in the emerging European Islamic thought. 
His approach merges the Sufi tradition and the philosophic one, and implicitly answers 
some of the political controversial questions about religion in the public sphere in light of 
modernity three principles – liberty, equality, and fraternity – which he sacralises.  
The Comparative Stage: Developing Benchmarks for Conceptualizing the 
Idea of European Islam  
In this cognitive stage – which corresponds to Section 1, Part IV - I go into the 
second methodological step of my work, which is referred to as the “comparative stage.” 
This stage aims at answering the following question: What is new in European Islam? 
The answer is a statement of threefold: European Islam (1) “rationalizes ethics,” and in so 
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doing it is (2-3) “revisionist-reformist,” or “traditional-modern.” Nonetheless, this is not 
yet the place where I provide my analytical answer to the question. This comparative 
stage precedes my analysis (which comes in Section 2, Part IV) because the answer I 
provide cannot be understood without being familiar with the classical and contemporary 
scholarship contributions to Islamic thought and theology in particular. “Newness” in 
European Islam cannot be first raised as an issue, and second cannot be detected, if 
revisiting the classical contributions as well as the contemporary debate are not examined 
even briefly. To avoid any short-sighted conceptualization of European Islam, I revisit 
three scholarly traditions in Islamic thought: 1) the medieval Muʻtazila, 2) the “early 
reformists,” known as modernists, of the mid-19th and early 20th century, and 3) the “late 
reformists” or contemporaries. 
 The Muʻtazila, the rationalists of Islamic theology (kalam), make the first 
generation in Islamic scholarship that I refer to in tracing continuity in Islamic thought, 
for their emphasis on the ability of human reason to objectively differentiate between the 
right and wrong in ethical values. For some of them, revelation is but a promulgation of 
what reason achieves. My reference to this rational heritage is for two methodological 
reasons. First, this reference shows that the questions of ethics and reason are old in 
Islamic thought, and revisiting them show that the debate in contemporary Islamic 
thought in general is serious and intense; it resembles in its intensity the kalam early 
debates. Second, this reference is a theological justification that European Islam is not 
uprooted from the tradition and is consequently not a simple mimicry of Euro-modernity, 
though the latter’s degree of influence is certainly high (I argue for that in length in 
Section 2a, Part IV). This noted, I claim that the Muʻtazila heritage is not what European 
Islam wants to bring back; rather, it is a rational tradition that it builds on, though it often 
hardly refers to it directly.     
In this comparative stage I also refer to the second and third generations of 
scholarship in Islamic thought which I see European Islam building on. The second 
generation is that of the “modernists” of the Arab-Islamic Renaissance that I call “early 
reformists.” This generation is marked by some distinguished reformists who emphasize 
the role of reason in reviving the tradition, but remain limited in their scope of revival by 
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the Sharia classical prescriptions. I refer to Jalal Eddine al-Afghani, Mohamed Abduh, 
and Rachid Rida. The third generation I refer to with emphasis in Islamic scholarship is 
the contemporary one, which I call “late reformists.”77 I tentatively classify the late 
reformists I refer to into three main categories: 1) “hermeneutists,” or “ethicists-
textualists” (exemplified by the work of Fazlur Rahman, Mohamed Arkoun, Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zayd, and Hassan Hanafi), 2) “egalitarianists-legalists” (Fatema Mernissi and Amina 
Wadud, and Abdullahi Ahmed An’naim), and 3) “neo-rationalists” (Mohamed Abed 
Aljabri and Abdulkarim Soroush). More on this classification will be said in due time.
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Not to go into details here, they, however, all claim not to deny the divine in their reform 
projects. They all emphasize the place of human agency and reason. They give ethics the 
primal place among the classical Islamic sciences and branches of approaching and 
studying texts. European Islam emerges in this context, with these scholarly generations 
that precedes it. European Islam’s claims of defending human agency, the faculty of 
reason, and endorsement of modernity values in light of religious ethics, without denial 
of the divine, are the aspects that make it revisionist or traditional, and thus continuous of 
previous reforms in Islamic scholarship.  
 
The Evaluative Stage: Is European Islam a “Reasonable Comprehensive 
Doctrine”? 
This is the most critical stage in my work. It corresponds to Section 2, Part IV. It 
uses all the material introduced in the previous two stages. It is here that I conceptualize 
the idea of European Islam, and evaluate it based on the two frameworks of Aburrahmane 
and Rawls, one mainly theological and the other political - or one “Islamic” and the other 
“Western” to use the dichotomy with reservations - respectively. Ultimately, this stage 
revolves around the third supportive question of this project: is European Islam a 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrine?” According to frameworks followed, the answer is 
“yes, it is,” which qualifies this project to answer the guiding question also positively: “is 
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 The main reason behind this tentative classification is methodological. It groups the scholars referred to 
in terms of the content of their approaches. Their closeness then is content-based. See more on this in 
Section 1d, Part IV.  
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European Islam possible?” “Yes, it is.” Now, I introduce the two frameworks I use for 
my evaluation.  
Why Using Abdurrahmane’s Spirit of Modernity in Understanding 
European Islam?
79
 
My aim is to study the main theoretical advances European Islam makes. Thus, 
for example, in my conceptualization of European Islam I do not use the “five pillars” of 
late modernity as conceived by the American theologian Harvey Cox in his widely read 
Religion in the Secular City: toward a Postmodern Theology (1985).
80
 Nor do I use the 
“five dilemmas” of modernity as formed by the sociologist of religion Peter Berger in his 
classic Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion (1979).
81
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 See Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York:  Simon & 
Schuster, 1984). Cox, briefly, advances five pillars of modernity late manifestations. One is the emergence 
of sovereign national states as independent political entities. With that goes the democratic chain of the rule 
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modern life needs order and good management of its affairs. Bureaucratic rationalism is the key for that. 
Institutions become the channel of managing modern affairs, and this has its costs on the individual (i.e. 
feelings of alienation), as Berger also puts it clearly when speaking of the dilemmas of modernity. Four, the 
quest for profit maximization becomes the way out for distributing as well as reproducing of goods and 
services. Both socialism and capitalism share this aspect. Five, secularization and trivialization of religion 
culminate the picture of modern life. Religion and its institutions are weakened, and in the best shapes used 
for secular purposes (Cox, 183). In “The Secular City after 25 Years” Cox sees no escape from secularism 
in the modern world, despite the risks it holds within it. Among the reasons that has enhanced the 
prevalence of secularism is Christian theology which makes the other world the focus of man, and this 
worldly matters are neglected.  Cox, “The Secular City after 25 Years,” The Christian Century, November 
7, 1990, 1025-1029, available online at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=206 
I see a lot of similarities between Cox’s approach of Christian theology and that of, for example, Hassan 
Hanafi in the Islamic world, and Abdennour Bidar, who is studied here, in Europe.  
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 Peter Berger, Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979) 71-79. The five key dilemmas of modernity, which are also its elements, that Berger offers 
are  briefly as follows: 1) abstraction (the abstraction of society is that process of institutionalization that 
characterizes the modern society through the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, technologized 
economy, high level of urbanization and the media of mass communication;  these factors cause 
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Instead, as a benchmark for my critique of each of the studied scholars, I use Taha 
Abderrahman’s critique of the “modernist” Quranic approaches, which he deals with in 
The Spirit of Modernity: an Introduction to Founding Islamic Modernity (2006).
82
 
Abdurrahmane’s critique is directed to some “reformist/ modernist” scholars of Islam in 
the Muslim majority countries, like Mohamed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, and Nasr Hamed 
Abu Zayd – I study these scholars’ main arguments for reform in this work, in the 
comparative stage (Section 1, Part IV). Broadly, Abdurrahmane does not consider their 
approaches to be originating from within the Islamic tradition. That is why he has 
devoted his project to re-ground Islamic theology-philosophy on its own traditional 
sources, using his methodological tools of logic and linguistics to generate Quranic 
concepts that solidify the Islamic worldview of ethics. Abdurrahmane develops a unique 
approach to reason and ethics and the way religion fuses them both in works like The 
Question of Ethics: a Contribution to Ethical Criticism of Western Modernity (2000), The 
Spirit of Religion (2012) and The Question of Practice (2012).
83
 This is a critical stage in 
my work. I allow myself lengthy space below to introduce my project more clearly.  
Abdurrahmane’s three main points of criticism of modernist Quranic studies that I 
use are considered in his terminology as “plans” or “strategies” (khuṭaṭ) that target 
desacralizing the sacred. For him, they are “mimetic” plans, borrowed from European 
history without a genuine study of the Islamic different history and its harmonious 
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 Abdurrahmane, su’ālu al-akhlāq: musāhamatun fi an-naqd al-akhlāqī lilḥadātha al-gharbiyya  [The 
Question of Ethics: a Contribution to Ethical Criticism of Western Modernity] (2000), rūḥu addīn   [The 
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al-ḥaq al-islami fi al-ikhtilāf al-fikrī [The Islamic Right to Intellectual Difference] (Casablanca and Beirut: 
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approach of religion and politics through man’s ontological freedom entrusted to him in 
the metaphysical world on his creation, as well as on his descent to earth.
84
 These 
“mimetic plans” are the “humanization plan,” the “rationalization plan,” and the 
“historicization plan.”85   
Against their “mimetic” and de-divinization aspects, Abdurrahmane proposes 
“innovative/creative” outlook of the Quran and the tradition, for there is “no entrance to 
modernity for Muslims without a new reading of the Quran.”86 For him, unlike the 
European “innovation” (modernity) which came as a result of conflict with religion, and 
is thus labeled “discontinuous innovation” (ibdāʻ mafsul), since it cut ties with the divine, 
he proposes “continuous innovation” (ibdāʻ mawsul), for there has not been a strong 
conflict with religion in Islamic history.
87
 Abdurrahmane is not against the 
“humanization, rationalization, and historicization” approaches of the sacred texts, but is 
against degrading to the extent of forcing oblivion of the divine. That is one of the main 
reasons why his critique is relevant to my reading of European Islam. The latter 
differently adopts such approaches and plans but equally calls for an innovative way of 
preserving the sacred, humanizing the divine without massacring God. For such a goal 
Abdurrahmane proposes “innovative humanization plan,” “innovative rationalization 
plan,” and “innovative historicization plan.”  
These three benchmarks for “continuous innovation” (ibdāʻ mawsul) correspond 
to three concepts that I infer from my reading of European Islam (They are detailed in 
Section 2a-b, Part IV). Summarizingly here, Abdurrahmane’s 1) “innovative 
humanization” corresponds to the “inheritance of the universe” as deduced from 
European Islam; 2) “innovative rationalization” corresponds to “ethical rationalization” 
or “rational faith”; and 3) “innovative historicization” corresponds to “practical fiqh” or 
“fiqhology.” Each of these three concepts, in turn, takes as its praxis one of the following 
axes, respectively: the world, society, and the individual. There is no need to note again 
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that this conceptualization builds on the studied texts; for their full development, these 
concepts need more space than devoted to them in this introduction. My inferences aspire 
to ultimately understand European Islam as a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine” 
within particular frameworks, “Islamic” and “Western,” religious/ theological and 
political. As I will try to show below, the final framework to be used is John Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus for the stability of pluralist constitutional liberal democracies. I go 
back to clarifying my three inferred concepts ( 1) “inheritance of the universe,” 2) 
“ethical rationalization,” and 3) “practical fiqh” or “fiqhology.”).88  
First, for the inheritance of the world, the universe, earth in focus, is considered as 
a Book, like the revealed book of the Quran, and so it can be interpreted differently, as is 
the Quran, and most importantly, it is a given, a gift, from God to His heir, man; it is an 
inheritance; man is given nearly infinite powers to invest in it, using the attributes of 
goodness, justice, and mercy that he has inherited from the soul of God. This means that 
the universe is part of the sacred, and not outside of it. If man is the heir, an eternal 
Caliph, and there is no other revelation to be expected –always according to Islamic 
perspectives – then God has sacralized everything, man and the universe, and each 
deserves contemplation and respect as part of the divine, besides the guiding book of the 
Quran. Islam becomes a “Sharia,” a way of being in the world, and not a mere law. The 
sacredness of the world is maintained through man’s “trust” (amāna) and “spiritual 
responsibility.” (Ramadan, Oubrou, and Bidar emphasize the same idea, differently. See 
the part dealing with each scholar.) For example, modernity itself is part of the sacred, 
because both the universe and man are sacred entities, and so is modernity which is a 
philosophy that links the two as a worldview. However, when some of the consequences 
of modernity are measured, and their consequences do not serve the ethical message of 
religion, then only that particular aspect of modernity is not sacred (This is mainly 
Bidar’s view).  
Second, ethical rationalization builds on the inheritance of the world. The 
individual is its center. If the world is man’s, then he has but to use his reasoning faculty 
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to live in it ethically and to unfathom its mysteries as a second Book of revelation. 
(Ramadan, Oubrou and Bidar are very close on considering the world a Book). The 
rational way of doing so is to constantly seek the “good” that human reason can realize, 
and which revelation general ethical guidelines approve. Rationalization here does not 
belittle metaphysical aspects of religion. Rather, they are another field of study, for more 
thinking. Intuition is not neglected. The individual is free, and is burdened with 
responsibility. His deeds, very rational as they may be, are challenged with moral 
responsibility that requires a minimum of consistency, so that rationalism and autonomy 
do not lead to bigotry and whimsical adventures that dehumanize man. With ethical 
rationalism, the individual believer practices “Self Islam” with immense awareness of the 
energy he is allowed to discover within himself to exercise it in the world, ethically, and 
responsibly. Ethics and practice, faith and work, are not fields apart.  
Third, by practical fiqh, or fiqhology, I mean that Islamic Sharia law is considered 
positive, secular, and for this inherited world, where man is the Caliph. This concept 
centralizes society and its well-being. The classical distinction the Muʻtazila, for 
example, made between moral theology and positive law is being stressed by European 
Islam. Sharia law, with some of its strict, and controversial sanctions like the penal code 
(the huddud), are examined in their historical context; the conditions of their applicability 
are measured in light of the message of Islam, which is internal peace (Tibi’s Islam of 
tolerance, and Bidar’s Self Islam are examples) and social justice (mainly Ramadan’s 
view, though shared by the other scholars, too). The market of literalist fatwas (religious 
legal non-binding opinions) and the emphasis on Islamic legal aspects, instead of 
understanding the intent and objectives of the Lawgiver confuse the modern Muslim 
believer who wants to keep his faith and at the same time live in a constitutional 
democracy that respects basic human rights and equality of genders and people. The 
classical distinction between legal theories (uṣūl al-fiqh) and positive law (fiqh) are 
invoked so as not to separate the two (i.e. the spheres of laws that the religious doctrine 
dictates and the ones the state implements), but so as to fuse them as much as possible 
(Oubrou’s Sharia of the minority is an example). With European Islam, fiqhology 
becomes more pluralist in the sense that it recognizes its limitations in the political arena, 
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and admits its epistemological modesty. That is, it arrives to the fact that religious law, if 
it does not metamorphose itself according to its believers needs, loses parts of its 
“comprehensiveness” and is consequently obliged to admit both inter-and-intra-diversity. 
Overall, the three concepts intertwine in giving the individual theological justifications to 
lead a good life. These are conclusions derived from the methodological framework 
outlined earlier.  
Why Using Rawls’ Political Liberalism in Understanding European Islam?  
By now it should be clear that this project is still struggling with its leading 
question: is European Islam possible? What has been examined until now is mostly 
theological. Having conceptualized the idea of European Islam, following a clear 
methodological line, I now have to make a “founded assumption” so that the passage 
from “Islamic theology” to “Western liberal politics” stands feasible and tenable. The 
assumption goes as follows: European Islam is a comprehensive theory of the good.   
Having assumed that European Islamic theory of the good is comprehensive, in 
light of what has been advanced until now, after having described its selected voices, and 
compared it to others from within the Islamic tradition, now is the stage to evaluate it, by 
opening it up further to a “Western” political framework that claims to be embracive of 
reasonable pluralism. In my assumption, a theory of the good has to face at least two 
main challenges to pass the test of evaluation, considering the multicultural aspects that 
colour liberal societies in Europe: 1) How far is the theory able to preserve the good it 
theorizes when society is multicultural, and other theories of the good are bound to push 
for space in the same society? 2)  How far is the theory able to prove that it is good if it 
does not prove that it can also be right, and thus open to be endorsed by others who might 
have ignored or distrusted it in the past, or never heard of it before?  
These two assumed challenges are actually more theoretically argued for by John 
Rawls’ two, say, “complementary”89 worldwide influential works, A Theory of Justice 
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(Theory in short, 1
st
 ed. 1971, rev. ed. 1999), and Political Liberalism (1
st
 ed. 1993, 
1996). Very briefly and simplistically put here, in the first work he theorizes the way for 
a just society, and in the second he defends it further for the sake of its stability in a world 
characterized by pluralism and different theories of the good, be they religious, 
philosophical, or moral. In introducing Political Liberalism, he says that his work has 
been driven by the following question, which, I believe, every ordinary human society 
wishes to have an answer to: 
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free 
and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible 
that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live 
together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is 
the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support of 
such an overlapping consensus?
90
 
The framed questions above answer the reason behind my use of Rawls’s “idea of 
overlapping consensus,” developed as one of the pillar ideas of Political Liberalism.91 
The idea of European Islam will be examined in light of the framework of “overlapping 
consensus” that aims at finding moral grounds for political stability in a “well-ordered-
society.” Case studies like sexual liberty, gender equality, worship rituals, and jihad will 
be referred to. The integration of overlapping consensus as an evaluative framework of 
the idea of European Islam makes the last sub-section of Part IV, which closes this work. 
It stands as an “attempt” in this research project, compared to the substantial use of 
Abdurrahmane’s framework.  
 In clearer terms, what this project seeks behind the use of overlapping consensus 
framework is to understand how European Islam offers an internally pluralist theological 
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doctrine out of which a reasonable European Muslim believer may successfully reconcile 
his normative commitments to European Islam as a comprehensive theory of the good 
with his political commitments to the liberal constitutional society in which he lives. This 
fundamental idea is derived from the previous descriptive, comparative, and evaluative 
stages. It is what the reformist aspects of European Islam revolve around. I do not go into 
details in introducing the major concepts that go with Rawls’ overlapping consensus here. 
That is done amply enough in the text in due space. I suffice myself now with defining 
overlapping consensus and some basic terms that are essential for its realization.  
An overlapping consensus is the answer to the above crucial question of how it is 
possible to establish and preserve unity and stability given the pluralism that 
characterizes current societies. It searches for “stability for the right reasons.” It is 
realized when a number of reasonable comprehensive doctrines consent to a set of 
“political” principles – referred to in his work by “justice as fairness” - and support these 
principles on moral grounds, each from its own comprehensive background. The groups 
in an overlapping consensus use their respective reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
only in order to justify a given set of principles; they do not have to use their doctrines to 
shape the principles. This is mainly done through three stages of justification (pro-tanto, 
full, and public justification). An overlapping consensus targets stability, and not mere 
political agreements that may be aborted by a group or many in cases of power shifts. 
The main principles agreed upon are supposed never to be overthrown or changed by one 
group that is in power.  
Overlapping consensus is different from modus vivendi which is an agreement on 
certain principles, but which are vulnerable to change when the balance of power among 
the concerned groups changes to the advantage of one or some, against the others. 
Overlapping consensus, though difficult to realize as it may seem compared with modus 
vivendi, is a “realistic utopia.”92 It is so since it supposes a profound agreement on the 
“basic structure of society” as a “fair system of cooperation” among “reasonable” and 
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“rational,” free and equal citizens.93 Such a conception of overlapping consensus, to be 
explained further in Part IV, allows religious, philosophic, and moral “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines” to keep their belief in the truth of their doctrine, on 
metaphysical or other grounds, as long as they can come to the “political” with 
justifications from their own beliefs, to the extent that the political becomes part of their 
doctrine. Rawls sees most influential religions in the world as “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.”94 Being reasonable means endorsing the idea of “reciprocity” in admitting fair 
terms of cooperation in a society of free and equal citizens, whereby these terms are 
willingly accepted, without priority to self-interest, since all participants agree to them 
and respect them reciprocally. Reasonableness targets groups interests, a form of 
prioritizing the common good. A reasonable person accepts the “burdens of judgment,” 
(i.e. “the sources, or causes, or disagreements between reasonable persons,”95 and 
consequently recognizes the reasonableness of other comprehensive doctrines. 
“Reasonable pluralism” grows out of this circle of argumentation. It is different from 
“mere pluralism.” Reasonable pluralism admits reasonable and yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines; it is a space for diversity of doctrines to be united under one 
just political system that Political Liberalism in general proposes. That is, it “does not 
attack or criticize any reasonable view.”96 Political Liberalism does not advocate any 
system of truth or good. What it advocates is the “political” stability of a “fair system of 
cooperation.”97 I stop referring to more Rawlsian concepts here and the details of 
overlapping consensus. What I do next is that I justify my selection of this framework.  
 Three main reasons stand behind my selection of Rawls’ overlapping consensus 
as an evaluative framework of the idea of European Islam.
98
 The first reason is that 
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 Ibid., 170 
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 Ibid., 55 
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 Ibid., xix 
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 Ibid., 15-22 
98
 By evaluation I simply mean measuring how the latter can be successful in a constitutionally well 
ordered liberal society from the lenses of liberal political theory. I could have used other frameworks to 
evaluate European Islam from (Western) political theory perspectives. Prominent projects relevant to the 
idea of European Islam could have been used here, like Will Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, Charles 
Taylor’s philosophy of religion and revision of secularism, Chandran Kukathas’ critique of Kymlicka, or 
Phiku Pareth’s rethinking of multiculturalism which sees limitations in the way multiculturalism and 
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Rawls’ Political Liberalism is a “revolutionary” work within the modern Western liberal 
political philosophy.  If Theory tries to depart from the dominant utilitarian philosophies, 
his Political Liberalism tries to depart from the “comprehensive doctrines of liberalisms 
such as those of J.S. Mill and Kant,” as Rawls emphasizes.99 Rawls distances his political 
liberalism project, which is historically based on the “Reformation” era100 from 
“Enlightenment project.”101 The latter seems to have aspired for a secular world, without 
religion, while the former reconciles religion with other nonreligious doctrines. Rawls 
roots his Political Liberalism in the Reformation, “the historical origin of political 
liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath,”102 
since it is the first base for religious and nonreligious reasonable pluralism, which 
Political Liberalism develops further.  
While the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill propagate (and 
universalize) their version of the good, Rawls’ Political Liberalism stands “impartial,” 
since it does not have such an ambition – though some scholars like Bhikhu Parekh 
suspect it. European Islam – and other various Islamic projects in the Islamic world – is, 
as I see it, more open to the political liberalism of Rawls, than to classical comprehensive 
liberalisms that belittle or neglect the religious mindset and other versions of the good. 
That is so because European Islam’s version of the good seems substantively 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pluralism (of especially Rawls and Kymlicka) is tied to liberalism as a by default fact of the modern age. 
Not to make a long argument here, I think that Rawls’ political liberalism project is more convenient to my 
project for the main reason that European Islam does aim at securing community rights that may block 
reforming contemporary Islamic thought in general and Islam in Europe in particular. European Islam is 
reformist, and aims at fusing the political and the theological, as will be illustrated with examples, and I see 
Rawls’ framework more accommodative of such an endeavour than the others. For the cited projects, see 
for example: Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991), Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995); Taylor, Multiculturalism: 
Examining The Politics of Recognition (Princeton UP, 1994), A Secular Age (Harvard UP, 2007); 
Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford UP, 2003); Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2
nd
 ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2006); 
Europe and the Muslim Question: Does Intercultural Dialogue Make Sense? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP-
ISIM, 2007) 
99
 Political Liberalism,  xxxvii, 78, 145, 149, 199, 200, 211, 375, 400  
100
 Ibid. xxii   
101
 Ibid., xviii. This passage is illustrative: “Political liberalism is not a form of Enlightenment liberalism, 
that  is,  a comprehensive liberal and often secular doctrine founded on reason and  viewed as suitable  for  
the modern age now that the religious authority of Christian ages is said to be no longer dominant. Political 
liberalism has no such aims” (Ibid., xxxviii). 
102
 Ibid., xxiv 
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accommodative of the political aims of Political Liberalism: social justice, and stability, 
or what could be referred to as “perpetual peace.”103 The opposite seems also to match 
such a contention: liberalism in its Rawlsian version has opened up to the religious. This 
means that it does not make much sense if one studies Islam (in Europe) and projects 
modern/ liberal theories on it, and says “you see, Islam is compatible with liberalism!”104 
Liberalism’s comprehensiveness failed to find ways to the Islamic majority countries, to 
the extent that up to now the notion of “liberal(-ism)” does not resonate well in the ear of 
many believers, simply because classical liberalism tells them that what they believe in 
“is useless” or “is not good” – to put it in these simple terms. That is because liberalism 
was hegemonic in its “classical” version(s). Thus, if European Islam is accommodative of 
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 These are concepts/conclusions that European Islam, as studied following Abdurrahmane’s framewok, 
underlines. 
104
 A number of Muslim scholars who have studied disciplines besides, or sometimes outside, “classical 
Islamic sciences” argue for the need of reforming or updating the understanding of Islam. The idea of 
looking at Christianity and Europe, Reformation and Enlightenment, are not absent from these scholars’ 
reform agendas. Generally, there is a tendency to learn from the experience of Europe and Christianity 
without total projection, since the history of the Church differs from the history of religious authority in 
Islam. Titles binding Islam to Reformation and Enlightenment are numerous. For example, in the 1930s, 
the renowned Mohamed Iqbal wrote that Protestant reformation was an event to learn from to avoid losing 
the ethical message of Islam in the modern world; its political drive should not make Muslims oblivion to 
its ethical significance: 
We are today passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe, and 
the lesson which the rise and outcome of Luther´s movement teaches should not be lost on us. A 
careful reading of history shows that the Reformation was essentially a political movement, and 
the net result of it in Europe was a gradual displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by 
systems of national ethics. The result of this tendency we have seen with our own eyes in the 
Great European War […]. It is the duty of the leaders of the world of Islam to-day to understand 
the real meaning of what has happened in Europe, and then to move forward with self-control and 
a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social polity. (Iqbal, The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam, 155)  
Nader Hashemi sees in the contemporary resurging violent Islamism a way for the emergence of Islamic 
secularism, a form of Islamic Reformation à la Catholic-Protestant Reformation wars, Nader Hashemi, 
Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2009); Olivier Roy sees also in “post-Islamism” and the fundamentalist resurgence of Islam a 
form of Islamic Reformation, Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: 
Columbia UP, 2004) 5-6. Some other titles that bear the term “Reformation” and Enlightenment” include 
An’naim, Towards an Islamic Reformation (New York: Syracuse UP, 1990); Hesham A. Hassaballa, “Does 
Islam Need a Reformation?” 07 May 2009, available at: http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=31922 ; Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gulen Movement 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012); Malek Chebel, Manifeste pour un islam des lumières: 27 propositions pour 
réformer l'islam [Manifesto for an Islam of Enlightenment: 27 Propositions to Reform Islam] (Paris: 
Hachette, 2012); Ibrahim Kalin, “Does Islam need enlightenment?” 27 August 2009, available at: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-185246-does-islam-need-enlightenment.html;  
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Rawls’ Political Liberalism, it is because the latter is also accommodative of religious 
doctrines like the former. This leads me to the next point.  
The second reason behind opting for the Rawlsian framework is a “historical 
necessity.” Historical relations between “Europe” and “Islam” post-1945 seem to enter a 
new phase. It is not a question of dialogue among religions here. It is a historical era, 
characterized by multiculturalism and pluralism, fed by the immigration flows especially 
from the religious Islamic world to Europe. The plural landscape seems to be affecting 
both “Europeans” and “Muslims” alike.105 It seems then that concepts like “reasonable 
pluralism” and “rational faith” are necessary for the sake of the preservation of social 
justice and stability or perpetual peace. The four studied scholars on European Islam also 
believe that the current historical moment requires a framework that accommodates 
modern values and belief.
106
  
In introducing this work, I said that there are signs of reviving kalam (Islamic 
theology). The age of kalam grew up in a socio-political context of diversity 
characterized by a seemingly open space for freedom of conscience.
107
 European Islam 
has not gone into some profound theological issues as did the early kalam theologians, 
but it is mostly the political context that is relevant in my comparison here. The rational 
advances of European Islam resemble in a number of ways the achievements of 
rationalist Muʻtazila scholars that prioritized reasoning in understanding revelation 
instead of being bound by literary interpretations.
108
 What I want to convey is that the 
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 I am using these labels on purpose, but with high level of reservations, because they are full of historical 
tension, and, if critically considered, are incomparable: Europe is a geography, while Islam is a belief 
system. One can contain the other, and vice versa. Assuming that a geography cannot contain/accommodate 
a faith, or the contrary, is illogical. A European can be Muslim, and a Muslim can be European.  
106
 Tentatively I have noted three main historical stages of relations between “Islam” and “Europe”: the 
medieval stage that ended in 1492, the modern stage that ranges from 1492 and 1945, and the contemporary 
one that started in 1945.  Revise a section entitled “On Islam in Europe: Inlandish or Outlandish?” in this 
introduction. Abdennour Bidar in particular defends the idea that “Islam and  Europe” are entering a new 
historical stage of hybridization.  
107
 These freedoms should not be expected to be identical with the modern freedoms. Centuries of age and 
the difference they impact on human intellect should be born in mind, otherwise one falls into 
methodologically serious mistakes.  
108
 There is no need to say that I am not romanticizing the Muʻtazila legacy. They are an example that 
deserves mention. They, but not all of them, were rational but not liberal in the sense the moderns use it 
now. They were liberals in their time, if I can say so, since they urged the use of reason in understanding 
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diversity of the European context has contributed fundamentally to the emergence of 
European Islam, a fact which resembles a past reality in Islamic history. This also brings 
about the Reformation era of Europe when one considers Rawls’ Political Liberalism. 
The Rawlsian scholar Sebasttiano Maffetone affirms this view in his study of Rawls, “In 
some ways, the situation in which classical liberalism was born is repeated today. As was 
once the case for religion, today politics is divided by bitter conflicts, sometimes not so 
different from the religious ones of the past.”109  
The third reason behind using Rawls’ overlapping consensus framework is that 
the so-called reformist voices of Islam, and European Islam advocates in this study, have 
not been included in the few but remarkable works that study the Islamic tradition, with 
reference to Rawls’ work. Until now, to my update, four scholars have published such 
works: Mohamed Fadel, Andrew March, Hamid Hadji Haidar, and Mehmet Favzi 
Bilgin.
110
 None of them has dealt directly with what I have tried here – European Islam. 
Haidar studies Mill’s and Rawls’ liberalisms and their accommodation or not of the 
Shiite tradition, and arrives to the idea that “liberalism cannot lead Muslims at home.”111 
As to what the Shiite Muslims can benefit from the liberal state, in the case of being a 
minority, Haidar says it is religious education which Rawlsian liberalism offers, unlike 
Mill’s.112 Bilgin, on the contrary, argues that Rawls’ Political Liberalism is very 
                                                                                                                                                                             
revelation, which could partly be matched with the right of “freedom of conscience” as known now among 
the moderns. I refer to Section 1a, Part IV for more on the Muʻtazila. 
109
 Maffetone, Rawls, 264   
110
 I mean scholars who have produced texts on the issue in English. Raja Bahlul has also produced a text 
on the limitations of Rawls’ idea of “public reason;” he suggests an “Islamic public reason” that is more 
accommodative of religious arguments in a conservative  society. (Bahlul’s “Islamic public reason” is close 
to An’naim’s “civic reason” introduced in Islam and the Secular State, 2008; Raja Bahlul, “Toward an 
Islamic Conception of Democracy: Islam and the Notion of Public Reason,” Critique: Critical Middle 
Eastern Studies (Spring 2003), 12(1), 43–60) 
111
 Hamid Hadji Haidar, Liberalism and Islam: Practical Reconciliation between the Liberal State and 
Shiite Muslims (New York and Hamphire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 3.  
112
 In Part III, “The Liberal State and Shiite Muslim Citizens,” he says “One significant point that results 
from this comparative examination is that what Rawls’s neutral liberal state offers to Shiite Muslims is 
little more than what Mill’s secularist liberal state offers them. The major privilege of the list of 
protections, freedoms, and opportunities that the Rawlsian state provides to Shiite Muslims is the 
availability of religious schools with public funds to Shiite Muslim Children.” Haidar, Liberalism and 
Islam, 159.  
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applicable in religious societies, since it gives good space to religious doctrines.
113
 The 
two, Haidar and Bilgin, do not work on the Islamic minority in Europe, nor do they refer 
to the scholars I refer to. They work on the Islamic majority countries, with a focus on 
Shi‘a in the case of Haidar.114  
My work is closer to what Fadel and March have probed. They have both focused 
on Muslim minorities in the West. While Fadel has produced various articles on the 
matter,
115
 March has put that into a distinguished work that may open new horizons in 
comparative political theory, in addition to a number of articles on the theology of Tariq 
Ramadan.
116
 The work of these two scholars has been inspiring to my work here. 
However, two significant reasons have encouraged me to try a new pathway that these 
scholars have not tried, and I consider them important and have to be recalled for a better 
understanding of this study-approach.  
First, especially with Fadel and March who deal with Muslim minorities in the 
West, they do refer to the Islamic classical texts produced over the centuries until the 19
th
 
century, that is, before the colonial era which influenced the intellectual contribution of 
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 Bilgin says: “I mainly argue that political liberalism presents an account of political morality that should 
be agreeable to most citizens of faith” (p. 3). Fevzi Bilgin, “Political Liberalism and Inclusion of Religion,” 
Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 7, 2 (2006). This view is further developed in his book, Political 
Liberalism in Muslim Societies (Oxon and New York, Routledge, 2011) 1-7. See Chapter 3 and 4.  
114
 Meysam Badamchi has produced an interesting dissertation in which he reads Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism as applicable to Muslim majority countries, with reference to the Shi‘a tradition. Badamchi, 
“Political Liberalism for Muslim Majority Societies,” unpublished PhD dissertation (LUISS University of 
Rome, 2012). 
115
 Mohamed Fadel, “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public 
Reason in Islamic Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 21,No. 1, 2008, 1-65, available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085347 ; Fadel, “Political Liberalism, Islamic Family Law, and Family Law 
Pluralism: Lessons from New York on Family Law Arbitration,” Legal Studies Research Series, No. 09-05, 
2009, 1-82, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=[1421978 ; Fadel, “Muslim Reformists, Female 
Citizenship and the Public Accommodation of Islam in a Liberal Democracy,” University of Toronto, 
Faculty of Law, The Social Science Research Network, 2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727457  
116
 Andrew March, “Liberal Citizenship and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus: The Case of Muslim 
Minorities,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 4 (2006); March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship and the 
Search for Overlapping Consensus (Oxford UP, 2009). For the articles he devotes to the theological 
thought of Tariq Ramadan, see: “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and “Overlapping 
Consensus,” Ethics & International Affairs 21, 4, 399–413, Winter 2007; “Law as a Vanishing Mediator in 
the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” European Journal of Political Theory vol. 10 issue 2 (April 
2011) 177-201; it is also available at New York Law School webpage at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478910; 
“The Post-Legal Ethics of Tariq Ramadan: Persuasion and Performance in Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics 
and Liberation,” Middle East Law and Governance 2 (2010) 253–273.  
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Muslim scholars. Fadel and March mainly argue that their choice stems from the fact that 
Muslim believers would not “listen” and “give credibility” to scholars who (may) seem 
influenced by Western education; Islam for Muslim believers seems authentic only 
through the classical texts, so Fadel and March follow this assumption to show that even 
in such a case, classical texts prove open to political liberalism and able to be morally 
engaged in “fair terms of cooperation,” to use Rawls’ terms, with liberal democracies. 
They affirm that if that is successfully illustrated, then that implicitly means that the 
reformist voices of Islam, which they broadly do not study but sometimes merely refer to 
en passant, are equally able to be morally engaged with political liberalism. Simply put, 
they say that Islam’s “predicament” has to be solved in the past; the past legacy is 
pluralist enough to teach the contemporary-modern Muslims. I certainly agree with them. 
But someone has to study the moderns as well! Here comes my second point.   
The second reason behind my reference to the contemporary reformists is to give 
space to new voices of Islam. They may whisper new thoughts in Islamic thought, and 
think of the “unthought in Islamic thought” using Mohamed Arkoun’s terms.117 My point 
is this: the search for overlapping consensus should not blind us, researchers, from 
thoughts that may call for “something” beyond mere moral commitment to the 
conception of the political in a liberal democracy. Islamic thought should not be blocked 
from renovating itself on various levels, and not only on the legal level which seems the 
focal point of the study of many.  A constitutional liberal democracy is not governed just 
by pure political conceptions. Liberty and equality allow citizens to think beyond the 
political, to live the good life they envision. European Islam, which is growing up in the 
middle of such a world of liberty and equality then must allow a vast space of free 
thinking for its believers, including the ones who claim the faith but are not practicing or 
are practicing in their own way, as is the case with, say, Bidar’s Self Islam, or Oubrou’s 
Sharia of the minority.  
As to saying that European Islam is not Islam, or is not like the “common”/ 
“orthodox” Islam, it is like saying Rawls’ Political Liberalism is not liberal(-ism) – some 
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 Mohammed Arkoun, The Unthought in Islamic Thought (London: Saqi Books, 2002). 
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may object to such a comparison. Political Liberalism has grown out of – rather against - 
classical and comprehensive doctrine of classical Christianity and classical liberalism. 
European Islam, too, has grown out of - rather against – both literalist Islam and classical 
liberalism. If there are voices that theorize European Islam from within liberal 
democracies, then most possibly their theorizing is “reasonable,” and is also most likely, 
if not surely, to be “liberal.” Scholars of the Islamic tradition then should not obfuscate 
such voices. Maybe in the medium or long term, applying overlapping consensus (and 
public reason) on the Islamic tradition would no longer be needed, since the new 
reformist voices would have won the hearts of most believers! Scholars like Bhikhu 
Parekh, from “conjuncture” perspective, may then say “That is exactly what “the hidden 
agenda” of political liberalism is about! It converts non-liberals into liberals!”118 I would 
say that a believer has to be allowed his freedom of conscience and freedom of 
expression, and has to be allowed to learn, through the school, to have access to the 
teachings of his doctrine (be it religious or not), and the future decision about “what to 
be” and “how” is up to him (to be liberal or not, or something in-between) as long as the 
“fair terms of cooperation” are respected by all, and stability and social justice are 
granted. It is for this reason that studying post-19
th
 century Muslim scholars is important, 
even though their reputation as “authentic” is not (yet) as established as the pre-19th 
scholars’ is.  
Therefore, while I use the framework of political liberalism (overlapping 
consensus in focus), I am at the same time integrating new voices of Islam, as long as 
they are not scholars or intellectuals notorious for blasphemy or ex-Muslimness. I would 
not study, for example, Ayan Hirsi Ali as a reformist scholar, because she is ex-Muslim 
(thus her view moves to “conjecture” perspective, and is no longer a “declaration”),119 
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 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2
nd
 ed. 
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2006) 88. Only the phrase “hidden agenda” is Parekh’s; the rest is my formulation.  
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 The terms are Rawls’. They are types of “justification” that a particular doctrine is compatible with the 
political concept. Reasoning from a “declaration” position is a view conveyed by a believer, from within; 
that is, he belongs to this doctrine, as is the case with a Muslim believer or scholar who gives justifications 
of compatibility of his religion with the political concept of “justice as fairness” As to reasoning from 
“conjecture,” it is carried out from outside, by someone not believing in or member of this doctrine, as is 
the case with a non-Muslim scholar who presents Islam as compatible with the concept. Rawls, “The Idea 
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and more importantly she attacks the doctrine itself; so, how can she speak of reforming 
it if she belittles and defames its pillars and symbols?  Tibi, Ramadan, Oubrou and Bidar, 
on the other hand, claim to be Muslim, respect Islam, and their reform voices, whatever 
be their level and premise, do not attack the “sacredness” of religion or its “belief” per se, 
but parts of its comprehensiveness. Their “authenticity” comes from their allegiance to 
the concerned faith, and their view, henceforth, is “declaratory” - from “declaration” 
position, namely from within as Muslim believers.
120
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997) 765-
807.  
120
 In a note, Rawls, from “conjecture” position, considers the project of Abdullahi An’naim “a perfect 
example of overlapping consensus” (Rawls, “Public Reason Revisited,” 783-784, n. 46). An’naim, later, 
introduces his concept of “civic reason” in his project of reform, a concept very close to Rawls’ “public 
reason.” I introduced An’naim when studying some contemporary reformist prominent projects outside 
Europe; see Section 1d, Part IV.  Such a project, from within the Islamic tradition, should not be denied a 
study simply because Muslim believers may not accredit it or accept it. Like him, and others, the European 
Muslim scholars studied here, should be considered as part of this tradition as long as they prescribe to it, 
instead of limiting scholarship to pre-19
th
 century period, as the previous scholars, like March, do.  
I 
 
 
 
 
Part One: Bassam Tibi  
Political Justifications for Euro-Islam 
 
As a Muslim, I ask myself why most of my co-religionists fail to acknowledge this 
predicament in order to find solutions. The answer that comes to mind was given to me 
when I was at school in Damascus. At the age of ten I dared to ask: “Why are the 
conditions we live under not in line with verse 3/110 in the Qur’an: You are the “umma 
community” that has ever been raised up for mankind.” The question was supported by 
reference to media coverage by a young Muslim boy who had discerned that the 
Europeans and Americans were more advanced than his own community: “So, why this, 
if Allah says we are superior to all non-Muslim parts of mankind?” My teacher replied 
without any hesitation: “We are in a “mihna/crisis” and Allah is examining us.” To me, 
as a ten-year old, this answer was neither satisfactory nor convincing. I moved to the 
West at the age of eighteen for my academic training. That story has never left my mind. 
It has been the background of my desire, throughout my years of study in the West and 
the ensuing decades of academic research in the Islamic world itself, to get a better 
answer. The related thinking dominates the present book. I felt compelled to look for a 
more satisfactory explanation than I received in Damascus. A Muslim is better qualified 
than are Western postmodernists to address these issues. I state this without any Saidian 
[Edward Said] bias.  
Bassam Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity, 2009: 46.
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1. Islam’s Predicament with Modernity  
 
In this part of my work I sketch out the thoughts of Bassam Tibi on Euro-Islam. 
Before doing that, I should note that Tibi does not dedicate his academic career of five 
decades just to the development of the concept of Euro-Islam since 1992, the time when 
he started using it. Basically, Tibi belongs to the International Relations (IR) discipline, 
but his works on the Middle East, Arab nationalism, political Islam, fundamentalism, and 
civilizational dialogue have allowed him to develop an interdisciplinary approach that 
works heavily on culture, society, and religion.  This to say that in reading Tibi one has to 
take the whole pile of his writings into account and re-arrange them according to the 
approach designed for such a reading. That is what I try to do here. About twenty of his 
German books are not included in this compilation I work on. I depend heavily on his 
books written in English, besides his journal articles, book chapters, edited books, 
published lectures, and interviews. While seeking some guiding lines about my research, 
Tibi recommended that I make use of his last book, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: 
Religious Reform and Cultural Change (2009), since it makes the detailed summary of all 
his academic career and approach. Besides this work, I certainly go back to his 
beginnings, i.e. his earlier works: The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in 
the Scientific-Technological Age (first published in German in 1981, and in English in 
1988), Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change (1990), The Challenge 
of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (1998), Islam between 
Culture and Politics (2001), and Political Islam, World Politics and Europe (2008).
121
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 The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age, trans. Judith 
von Sivers (Salt Lake City: Utah UP, 1988); Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990); Arab Nationalism between Islam and the Nation-State 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997) The first edition of the book goes back to 1980; The Challenge of 
Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkeley: California UP, 1998); Islam 
between Culture and Politics (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave and Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs Harvard University, 2001); Political Islam, World Politics and Europe (New York: 
Routledge, 2008); Islam’s Predicament with Cultural Modernity. Religious Reform and Cultural Change 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2009). I do not use abbreviations for the titles of the books, because 
that could be so confusing, seeing similarities of wording in titles in this field. I avoid abbreviations in all 
this work. Rather, I use shortened titles, i.e. I take the first part of the title instead of repeating all of it. 
I note that my first contact with Tibi, via email, goes back to 30 June 2011. It is during this first contact that 
he recommended focusing on his synthesizing work Islam’s Predicament. In a recent contact, 10 October 
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 The idea behind going through the intellectual career of Tibi is not to write his 
personal biography. Rather, it is to trace the beginnings of his idea of Euro-Islam, after 
going through his perception of the Islamic current socio-political and intellectual status. 
Focusing just on his later writings does not put the debate in context, for Euro-Islam is 
the outcome of a series of events in the Middle Easter, North African, and the rest of the 
Islamic world, before it becomes a European issue. This fact of regional and international 
politics are what have driven, as will be seen, a scholar of International relations into the 
debate of reforming Islam and consequently ending up with Euro-Islam. This peculiarity 
in approaching religion from International Relations (IR) lenses seems particular in Tibi´s 
work, and there is no doubt that this aspect has made him a leading voice in calling for 
including religion, especially Islam in this case, in the IR discipline. Later in my analysis 
I will categorize his approach among the scholars who study the resurgence of Islam from 
within ‘security based approach” instead of opening up to studying Islam from 
“theological perspectives,” as Tariq Ramadan, for example, tries to do.   
 From Damascus to the World  
 In most of his writings, Tibi does not tire from stressing his background in 
Damascus, and how that contributed to shaping his later academic career, in which he 
tries to be innovative and reformist. Tibi belongs to a noble Damascene family (Ashraf 
Banu al-Tibi) that traces back its origins to the Prophet of Islam.
122
 As a child he was 
introduced to Quranic studies. At school, he remembers very well to have asked his 
teacher about the causes behind the contemporary misery of the Arab and Islamic world. 
The reply he received would be stuck in his mind ever since, and would push him later in 
his career to seek answers. The answer the teacher gave him was that the Arab-Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2012, Tibi has published two other books in English, summarizing his intellectual career on Islam and 
Islamism. These two books are Islam and Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging 
(Routledge, 2012), and Islam and Islamism (Yale UP, 2012). These last two books are not examined in my 
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world was in crisis (mihna) as an examination from Allah.
123
 The kid did not swallow the 
answer, and in the West, to which he travelled for academic training, he would dig into 
this “mihna” and try to fix it. His philosophical training takes its shape at Frankfurt 
School with Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and later on Jurgen Habermas (b. 1929), 
“Thanks to my Western academic education, and in particular to the philosophical 
reasoning studied in the Frankfurt School of Theodor Adorno (1903 – 1969) and Max 
Horkheimer (1895 – 1973), I have acquired the detachment needed for pursuing a 
scholarly non-apologetic approach, as well as for related unbiased thoughts.”124 “But 
beyond this the Frankfurt School gave no further guidance,” since it “was not helpful for 
a proper understanding of religion.”125 After an inspiring encounter with the Jewish-
German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885 – 1977), who was knowledgeable of Medieval 
Islamic philosophy and had written on Ibn Sina´s rationalism (Avicenna and the 
Aristotelian Left, 1963). Such a contact leads the young scholar of Damascus to publish 
his first book The Arab Left (1969), while still a 25 years old PhD student. This book 
brings him in touch with Edward Said (1935-2003), who invites him to speak of the Arab 
Left as part of his book The Arabs of Today: Perspectives for Tomorrow, 1973.
126
 Tibi 
keeps friendship with Said but soon departs from him academically afterwards, for the 
reason that neither Orientalism nor Orientalism “in reverse”127 do help in solving 
international tensions, which Tibi tries to placate with his inter-civilizational dialogue 
approach.   
 Tibi bears in mind the idea of Ernest Bloch (1885 – 1977) that the study of 
religion would be reductionist if tied solely to the economic machinery and social 
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conditions. Tibi, like Bloch, saw this as a “vulgar expression of Marxism.”128 Instead, 
Tibi strongly sees religion as a cultural system which a variety of factors influence. 
Besides acknowledging the influence of Emile Durkheim (1885-1917) who sees religion 
as a “fait social” (social fact),129 he does not settle as Durkhemian for he is “wary of 
reducing religion to a social context.”130 It is with Clifford Geertz (1926 - 2006), the 
influential American anthropologist (1926-2006), that he most sympathizes intellectually, 
“The reader will clearly find out how much I lean on Clifford Geertz’s cultural 
anthropology, but consistently with an attempt to go beyond his approach.”131 There is a 
need to stop for a while at Geertz’s ideas to understand Tibi better.  
 In his work The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), Geertz defines culture as “a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward 
life.”132 In his fieldwork in the Islamic world, Geertz finds out that the “elusiveness of the 
subject matter” of religion is the most challenging item while researching as an 
anthropologist in religious societies, and this challenge becomes worse as one moves 
from describing it to finding it, “Our problem, and it grows worse by the day, is not to 
define religion, but to find it.”133 This quest of “finding religion,” according to Geertz, 
starts with and ends in looking at it as a cultural system. That succinctly put means that 
Islam, with which Geertz is concerned, does not seem to flourish in one context and thus 
to have one cultural variety which can be exported or similarly lived all around the 
Islamic world. There are versions of Islam that have to do with culture. That makes Fred 
Inglis (b. 1937), a reader of Geertz, wonders about the “mysteries of Islam,” “What is 
Islam? A religion? A civilization? A social order? A form of life? A strand of world 
history? A collection of spiritual attitudes connected only by a common reverence for 
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Muhammad and the Quran?”134 Inglis ends up speaking of the “venture of Islam,” 
coloured with world cultures diversity, adopting and conforming by thus the three 
volumes work of the American scholar of the history of Islam, Marshal G.S. Hodgson 
(1922 – 1968), The Venture of Islam (first published in 1961). This Geertzian perspective, 
to which Tibi refers to again and again when dealing with Islam’s Predicament with 
modernity, envisions a variety of “Islams” that are coloured with different cultural 
systems. This aspect is what makes Tibi relevant to the study of European Islam and the 
development of a European Islamic culture, after religion has gone through a process of 
reform which the culture in which it grows adopts cultural modernity. More of this 
becomes clearer as I proceed.  
 The emphasis on culture in the production of religious meaning is rooted in Tibi´s 
attempt to dig deep into the distinction between religion in substance as “a spiritual belief 
and an ethics” and religion “in its role as a political ideology.” The first requires “divinity 
studies” while the latter requires “cultural analysis.” He is concerned with the latter, 
without totally putting aside the former. His study revolves around Islam and its 
oscillation between culture and politics.
135
 In crude terms, religion here is a cultural 
system.  
When Tibi moved to Germany as a young man of 18 years old, this distinction 
was not clear in his mind yet, and he had to work it out. His academic training, along 
with the European worldwide know scholars, he frequented and came in touch with, 
made him realize that the Middle Eat he belongs to by birth and early education has a 
particular reading of Islam, so much Arabocentrist, socio-culturally affected, and narrow 
in its perspective. In his research and professorship tours around the world, Tibi was 
affected by the way Islam was indigenized, adapted and adopted socio-culturally 
especially in Africa and Asia, to produce Afro-Islam, and Indo-Islam.
136
 This pushed him 
to read Islam in light of the cultural system in which it is practiced. This implies that it 
can bear interpretations according to space and time, and the mihna (crisis) he 
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experienced as a child and also as a Muslim scholar and citizen in Europe can be, for 
him, remedied through a reading, a reinterpretation and revisit of the past to overcome the 
current crisis, thus be able to speak of Euro-Islam.  
a. Islam as a Cultural System 
 
Starting from his Geertzian perspective, Tibi does not tire from repeating that Islam is 
a cultural system. He also does not tire from repeating that he is a pious and yet liberal 
Muslim. To be clear, he does not deprive this religion from its divinity. The divinity he 
questions revolves around the cultural aspects this same divine religion has been clothed 
with in various geographies and locations of the world. The divinity and universality of 
Islam is not questioned; what is questioned are the ways both divinity and universality 
have been used to the extent of freezing their utility for the human being to which they 
are destined. In other words, divinity and universality of Islam have not been studied in 
historical perspectives and in context; rather, they have been imprisoned in history and in 
the same way the religion was first revealed in the seventh century BC. Apart from its 
five pillars, Tibi is against any aspect of essentializing Islam; it is that which has caused a 
cultural stagnation, according to him, in the Muslim world and mind. In contradistinction 
to any essentialism, he tries to answer the common, and yet difficult question, “What is 
Islam?”  
To answer this pivotal question, Tibi does not work on the metaphysical worldview of 
Islam. Instead, he contends that no religion stands in isolation from wo/man and society. 
That is, Islam, and like any other religion, makes sense in society, “religions represent 
cultural systems, which are both influenced by processes of social change and are 
themselves able to affect them.”137 To study Islam, then, he had to look at its 
development in society; he had to consider it as a cultural system, “We ask what Islam 
really is if, in the Geertzian sense, we are to speak of the Islamic religion as a single 
cultural system.”138  
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 Cultures adopt religions since they shape their world view, as much as that 
religion may later on be shaped by the culture that has adopted it. Tibi’s most interesting 
borrowing he has made from Geertz’s cultural and symbolic anthropology shapes 
considerably his study of Islam, namely religion as a “model of” and “model for” reality. 
The former simply means that religion makes part, only part of a certain cultural system, 
while the latter, which is more important here, does shape this culture. Models of reality 
relate to the representation of objects like those in nature, which means that they are 
“concrete, displaying structural congruence with the depicted object.” Unlike them, 
models for reality “apply to concepts of things, such as human activity,” and are abstract 
“theories, dogmas, or doctrines for a reality with which they are not in structural 
congruence.” They “relate, either metaphysically or rationally, to human perceptions of 
reality and their character; they cannot be penetrated experimentally, only 
interpretatively.”139 At this metaphysical, abstract, and interpretative level, one enters the 
symbolic level of religion in society and culture.  
According to Geertz, a religion is “[1] a system  of symbols which act to [2] 
establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [3] by 
formulating concepts of a general order of being and [4] clothing these concepts with 
such an aura of factuality that [5] the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”140 
Tibi explains this in the Islamic context by arguing that there is a need to study the 
religious symbols in the Islamic context to scrutinize the way Muslims understand the 
Texts (Quran and Sunna/Hadith) through their behavior. The idea is to “to observe how 
people perceive these texts and how they create their religiocultural symbols in this 
context, so as better to understand the Islam of today as a social reality and a cultural 
system,”141 after centuries from the date of revelation. The observer, the anthropologist in 
this case, can notice that “the moral insight,” the symbol, becomes unequal to the “moral 
experience,” i.e. real life behavior. For Tibi, such a difference between perception and 
reality is conducive to crisis, and sometimes encourages militancy to bring the moral 
insight into reality and the world that seems different into the same picture the symbol 
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institutes in the mind of the believer. Such a crisis in interaction with the text, in living 
what is being believed in, happens because the ordinary believers do not raise questions, 
nor do they use common sense and reason in dealing with religious symbols.
142
 This 
happens while the Muslim elite are torn between appeals to the great Islamic tradition 
they know to be popular and the secular political institutions that tend to weaken that 
tradition.
143
 Tibi exemplifies for this by the term of umma (commonly translated as the 
Islamic nation): while the Texts refer to the Muslims as a community of believers in its 
abstract manifestation, the masses tend to concretize this symbolic concept and see it in 
reality. The frustration of the fundamentalists and their aim to build a political 
community out of this umma concept shows the misunderstandings that occur in 
interpreting and living a concept, and how that affects some believers to the extent of 
acting to “restore” or “build” it anew, even militarily. Tibi also refers to what Walter 
Zenner calls “bahavioral lag”: as an anthropologist, he conducted a fieldwork among 
Muslims in Morocco and found that they do not necessarily follow what they believe in 
when it comes to certain religious sanctions and ordinances. Tibi, in a not much different 
context, refers to the practice of hiyal, or legal tricks, in centuries past among the 
Muslims in commerce as a way of evading strict laws. The intention behind citing these 
examples is to demonstrate that Muslims behavior is also constrained by socio-cultural 
and economic factors, which affect the interaction with the religious Texts.
144
  
The perception of religion as a cultural system imbued with symbols that do not 
seem to change in time and yet not always followed fully in practice brings about the 
question of truth in Islam and its place in history. In orthodox Islam truth is one and is 
complete, with the Seal of Prophets, Muhammad, and the revelation of the Quran. It is 
valid for all times, religions, and for all humanity. Such a truth is ahistorical. This 
understanding raises the main issue of progress and development, and Tibi wonders if 
these issues ever existed or were discussed before the encounter with the developed West. 
(Later he affirms that such concepts existed during the Hellenized era of High Islam, of 
the Abbasid era (750-1258). This is to be clarified when Tibi’s reform propositions are 
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studied. In this beginning, Tibi is still trying to raise thorny questions to problemize the 
predicament further). The metaphysical absolute truth seems to reign and prevent the 
“cultural accommodation of social change,” a change which human societies normally 
experience: 
If these conceptions are unalterable per se, as in the case of Islam, even though 
reality is changing continually, then we are bound to ask whether Islam presents 
an obstacle to change, [and…] whether Islam as a cultural system demands 
absoluteness and nontemporality, and is therefore hostile to history and an 
impediment to change, or whether Muslims have developed their own ways of 
circumventing this absoluteness in their daily practice, without ceasing to believe 
in it [i.e. Islam as a cultural system].”145  
To break away from a historical imprisonment, Tibi, though not a historian by training, 
tries to revisit Islamic history in its main stages and later political divisions to corroborate 
his idea of the impact of culture on Islam, and consequently his perception of it as a 
cultural system.  
  Tibi believes that the contemporary Islamic cultural system is very much 
impacted by the Arab culture and political ideology.
146
 From the early years after the 
advent of Islam, the Arabs, to whom the Prophet Muhammed belonged by blood, would 
dominate the Islamic political community, and affect it culturally as well. The first 
division that lives up to now was based on tribal belonging: the Shi‘a, partisans of Ali the 
fourth Caliph, wanted to pass governance from the Quraish Arab tribe (to which Ali 
himself belonged) to Ali’s side, believed by Shi‘a to be the first Imam and vicegerent of 
Allah, and they believe that the Prophet nominated him a Caliph even before the three 
other Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Ottman. The Battle of the Camel in 656 between 
Aisha, wife of the Prophet, and Ali, the Fourth Caliph, and subsequently the Ummayads” 
coming to power in 661 to guard the Quraish Arab tribe in power was a turning point in 
Muslims history. It was what divided the Muslim world into its two main denominations, 
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the majority Sunni and the minority Shi‘a, i.e. partisans of Ali.147 Besides the period of 
establishing Islam by the Prophet from revelation date in 610 to his death in 632, the four 
Caliphs reigned for about thirty years in all (632-660); three of them were killed, Abu 
Bakr, Umar, and Ali. The Prophet’s period as well as the Caliphs” one are commonly 
referred to as the most glorious and just period in Islamic history. The Ummayad Dynasty 
would take over from 660 to 750, which would be overthrown by the Abbasids who 
would rule from 750 to 1258, which marked “the zenith of Islam’s development.”148 The 
Ottomans kept the Islamic empire dominant, mainly militarily but stagnant culturally, 
from 1453 up to the First World War and the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 by 
Kemal Attaturk. The Muslim Spain and Sicily kept their political and intellectual 
independence during this period, and had their first rulers from the Umayyads, but later 
on from North Africa, mainly from Morocco, which was never under the Ottoman rule. 
The Persians were not under the Ottomans either. This diversity in political ruling was 
stamped by the socio-cultural environment of the regions ruled and the dynasties that 
reigned.  
 Equally, in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, Muslim societies seem generally not to 
have undergone the same tribal or ethnic political rivalry that the Arab Peninsula 
underwent. Henceforth, their cultural interaction with Islam as a religion differs, 
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according to Tibi. For example, “the African marabouts, who in the absence of a 
priesthood in Islamic doctrine, represent a functional equivalent to clergy in African 
Islam, are not only religious leaders, but also magicians and soothsayers, thereby 
retaining numerous magical forms of pre-Islamic African cultures.”149 Among the 
Berbers, the natives of the Maghreb, the Muslim chief has the authority to bestow divine 
blessing (baraka).
150
 In India and most Asia where the Muslims have always co-existed 
as a minority with other religions, the Muslims have adopted a number of local practices, 
to the extent that even the Indian caste system was projected and copied by the Muslims 
for hierarchy. In Indonesia and Malaysia, which have a big impact on Tibi’s development 
of the notion of Euro-Islam, he witnessed an “open Islam” that adopts the local tradition, 
or at least is open to it.
151
 During his fieldwork and contact with scholars and social 
activists in Muslim societies and communities around the world, Tibi has found that the 
ordinary Muslim does cohabitate with the cultural geography where s/he belongs, and 
there is not much tension between the Texts and the practices, “In the mind of the 
average Muslim, however, this tension does not exist, and most Muslims believe that they 
live in accordance with Islamic law.”152  
Shi‘a Islam, which has developed its own Islamic cultural tradition seems very much 
different from the Arab version of it. That is so much the case in Iran where it is majority 
Shi‘a . Shi‘a Islam is Persian according to the Arabs, and is considered just a deviation 
from the true Sunni Islam, which the Wahhabi movement tries to widespread. For 
instance, the Ashura festival is celebrated by the Shi‘a to commemorate the death of 
Husseyn ibn Ali at the hands of the Ummayad in the Battle of Karbala in 680. Husseyn is 
one of the grandchildren of the Prophet Muhammad, and a son to Ali the non-dynasty 
fourth Caliph, and thus a Shi‘a Imam. Ashura corporal practice is considered a sin, 
haram, by the Sunnis because it climaxes with a ritual flagellation.
153
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According to Tibi, certainly the above mentioned examples all make part of the 
Islamic civilization, but they belong to different cultures. They belong to the same 
civilization that has shaped the world with a new and different perspective since its birth, 
but has equally been diversified by the cultures and societies it has reached. Besides 
typical practices in different cultural settings, there is Sufism (mysticism) that is common 
to all these cultures and makes an unavoidable contribution to Islamic thought and 
practice as a whole. For Tibi, Sufism is the heart of Islam in the sense that it leaves no 
way to ideological or theocratic orders and consequently permits numerous ways to God. 
It deals with the believer as a person, and it is him or her that is most concerned with 
religion. Sufism develops many ways, tariqas (tariqa, a way), of practicing Islam.
154
  
The cultural practices widespread in Muslim societies make Tibi ascertain that there 
is a difference between the “tariqa Islam,” and the “legal Islam” commonly referred to as 
Sharia. The former is the “popular Islam” as practiced by the believer masses; the latter is 
what literally the Texts (Quran and Sunna) describe. Tibi puts it this way: “The Islam of 
everyday life differs in many ways from that of the ulema (scribes), who see themselves 
as the guardians of the Shari’a.”155 “Islam as a cultural system has been adopted by non-
Arabs and integrated into non-Islamic, indigenous, previously existing symbolic 
systems.”156 These perceptions of Tibi influence his formation of the concept of Euro-
Islam as another tariqa to live Islam in Europe, as later sections of this work will show, 
“[…] my concept of Euro-Islam, that is, of a European understanding of Islam, which I 
have analogously developed in relation to Afro- and Indo-Islam.”157 In brief, the cultural 
practices challenge the ulema who “essentialize Islam in putting it above history, social 
and cultural change.” Tibi goes so far as to compare this essentialization to the work of 
Western Orientalists, “On these grounds, the Islamist notion of “true Muslim” resembles 
in a bizarre way that of the homo islamicus as presented by biased Western 
Orientalists.”158  
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b. Politics in Islamic Lands between the Profane and the Sacred  
If Islam as a cultural system can reform itself and adopt itself to new contexts and 
circumstances, then its potential for impacting social life are higher, including the 
political life. To the question “what went wrong with Islamic politics?”159 Tib focalizes 
the interior weakening circumstances. He speaks against the dependency theory; i.e. the 
deterioration of the situation in Islamic societies because of the Western dominance 
alone. The Western formation of the world market, as well as its secular institutions, 
plays just a part in the worsening of the Muslim countries. Stopping this dominance or 
withdrawing from the world market does not solve the problem. Facing it with socio-
religious changes is the outlet. Tibi does not give much attention to the debate started by 
the Oxford historian Roger Owen (b. 1935) who wonders whether the underdevelopment 
in the Arab Muslim world is only noticeable because it is compared to the developed 
West.
160
  
 The socio-economic as well as intellectual gap between the governing elites in the 
Muslim world and the masses aggravates the debate on social change and pushes the 
blame of underdevelopment to the external factors. The failure of the governing and 
Western educated elite to urge quick socio-cultural reforms angered the masses and made 
them aware of the North-South divide on the standards of life. The masses do not see that 
their elites and their socio-cultural conditions are also to blame for their economic 
underdevelopment. All they see is the West as the main factor, for which hatred grows. 
Here grows a “need to have an indigenous medium of articulation in order to express 
these intensifying anti-Western attitudes. Islam is the best form of articulation for this 
purpose.”161 
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 If the social structures (sociogenesis) changes in Europe took place in tandem 
with the norms and value systems (psychogenesis) changes,
162
 the case is different in the 
Arab-Muslim world because their history with religion is different from Europe’s history 
with its religion. In contemporary history of the Arab Muslim world, as in the past 
centuries, religion has hardly been seen as an enemy to people; on the contrary, it is a 
source of identity and relief to them. This is seen more clearly when politics fail to 
answer their needs, as is the case with Arab Muslim societies after independence that is 
being discussed here. The recourse to religion in an evolving society that tries to finds its 
way between tradition and modernity occasions a dilemma, or what was referred to 
earlier as a “behavioral lag.” That is, “the parallel existence in the same society of norms 
and values of a no longer existing historical formation along with newly evolved social 
structures.” Such is the case because “norms and values do not change as fast as 
structures do.”163 This state of “in-betweenness” applies to societies that either lack 
updated political philosophies and theories that ease the political life of people or to 
societies that undergo social changes exerted from outside, as in conquests and 
colonialism. The Muslim societies are a case in point: they lacked updated political 
philosophy since the fourteenth century (after Ibn Khaldun),
164
 and experienced European 
imperialism from the eighteenth century, and the Mogul and Turkish dominance earlier.  
Under such a pressure of being exposed to the West without a clear and updated socio-
cultural system, the Muslim individual living in this state of transition falls in “need for 
religion to maintain identity in the process of change.”165 The problem Tibi worries about 
is not the recourse to religion per se by the individual, but it is its politicization to face 
change and block it that worries him, “Islam as a system of belief has never lost 
significance for its adherents. […] The current reemergence of Islam as a political 
ideology is not therefore to be defined as re-Islamization, but more accurately as political 
revitalization, or as the repoliticization of the sacred.”166  
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 Tibi goes selectively through some historical stages in Islamic politics to argue 
that Islam is not a political system, as first argued Ali Abderraziq, a scholar of al-Azhar 
in 1925, at the moment of the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate. It is a cultural system 
that merges the religious and the social. He refers to detailed case studies from the current 
Arab world to exemplify for his point that Islam is adjusted to the socio-cultural history 
of the geography it governs, and thus there is no one clear-cut political model in Islam: 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, etc. The Prophets life as a leader of the Muslim 
community could be divided into two stages: The Mekka era (570-622) and the Medina 
one (622-632). The first ranges from the birth of the Prophet, passing by the descent of 
revelation upon him at the age of forty, and his start of disseminating the message of 
Islam mainly focusing on “establishing new ethical foundations for an Islamic embracing 
of individual human rights.”167 Tibi, like some reformists à la Muhammad Mahmoud 
Taha (1909 - 1985) and his student Abdullahi An”naim (b. 1946) to whom i make 
reference in due time (in Part IV), asserts that “in early Meccan Islam, before the 
founding of the ﬁrst Islamic polity at Medina, in a Bedouin culture hostile to state 
structures, one fails to ﬁnd Qur’anic precepts related to war and peace.”168 Mecca Islam is 
considered to be focused on the humanist and universal aspects of Islam, and not on legal 
matters. 
  Regarding the second Prophetic stage, the Medina period, it is during which that 
the Prophet established the Muslim community and entered into political treaties with the 
non-Muslim communities who had their denominational rights as dhimmis (People of the 
Book) under the Muslims’ rule. For some, the Medina Document prepared by the Prophet 
in consultation with the allying tribes of Muslims and non-Muslims in 622, which marks 
the beginning of the Islamic calendar, is the first constitution in world history. For Tibi, 
however, the Medina Document/Constitution and era, constitutes not only the beginning 
of a new religion, but also the beginning of a new civilization around a central and 
organized authority. 
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Tibi adopts Reinhard Bendix’s (1916 – 1991) term that the early years of Islam 
can be said to be ruled by a “charismatic prophecy” which is unparalleled to any other 
ordinary political experiences. “The Prophecy is unique and cannot be either passed on or 
repeated,” adds Tibi.169 During this “charismatic prophecy” political era, the terms of 
‘state” or “Islamic state” (dawla Islamiya, nizam islami) were never used by the Prophet 
nor were they employed in the language of the Qur’an.  The term “Islamic state” is a 
recent invention,
170
and has to be distinguished from the “Prophetic Era,” to mean both 
Mecca and Medina periods of the Prophet, from the rest of early Islamic history. 
After the Prophetic Era, the pre-Islamic tribal tendencies about governance and 
authority would come into sight again. This led to the division between the Sunnite and 
the Shi‘a, and few other minor sects. The former would form the history of the Caliphate, 
and the latter that of the Imamate. The first four Caliphs were chosen after consultation 
among the elders of the tribes; the later ones would designate themselves as leaders of the 
Muslim community, after dynasties took the rule over, starting from the Umayyad, the 
Abbasids, the Fatimid, etc. up to the Ottomans. The ruler here had to follow the Sharia, 
though despotically, and the Muslim jurisprudents (faqihs and ulemas) had to obey him 
and make people follow him in the form of bay”a (collective consent and loyalty to the 
Caliph on behalf of the people). In rare histories of Muslim societies were they 
independent. Tibi says that “the political ideals of Islam were not practiced because of a 
lack of appropriate institutions,” which turned the Caliphs/Sultans rule into a ‘sultanic 
form” (alḥukm assultānī), more shaped by the ruler’s willings, a form which does not 
correspond to the basic rulings of Sharia and Islamic ethics.
171
 As to the Shiite version of 
authority,  the Imamate, it is the charisma of the ruler that matters most, and this cannot 
be of ordinary posture, for it depends on the succession of the imams that is allegedly 
affiliate with the ahl al-bayt, the People of the House of the Prophet. According to Tibi, 
Shi‘a Islam in general was hardly involved in direct politics, until the Safavids reign 
(1501-1722), and the current Ruhollah Khomeini’s theory of wilayt al-faqih (clerical 
authority) which has brought them to the center of politics since the Iranian Revolution in 
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1979. That brought to politics the voice of theocratic Muslim jurists.
172
 This re-
politicization of Islam in Iran and elsewhere is contemporary and is a distortion of the 
ideals of Islam which have hardly had a suitable institutional platform to be applied, 
except from cases the Prophetic era and Hellenize Islam highlight.     
Tibi’s reference to particular historical periods in Islamic countries politics aims 
at discrediting the claim that such a history has seen a harmonious marriage between 
Islamic ideals and politics. Again, he is not denying the presence of Islam, but he is 
shedding light on the way it has been used, and sometimes abused, which made its ideals 
remain theoretical. Building on the notions most controversial nowadays in international 
relations and European contexts, Tibi discusses in different contexts some concepts that 
are attributed to Islamic history out of context. He does so to refute the “Islamic new 
disorder” the Islamist fundamentalists try to construct wrongly basing themselves on the 
past. The terms he sees troublesome are umma, daʻwa, jihad, and nizam islami, which all 
contribute to the making of dar al-islam, the abode of Islam, versus dār al ḥarb, the 
abode of war.  
Sharia and Shariatization of Religious Concepts: Umma, Daʻwa, and Jihad  
Tibi argues that the political “imagined umma”173 “is no longer of any 
significance for existing realities in our contemporary world.”174 The Quranic verse (sura 
al-Imran 3:110) which speaks of the Muslims as the best community of the faithful 
(khayr umma) is wrongfully associated with the European notion of “nation” for the 
“nation-state.” So, a wrong analogy is formed to refer to a community of believers as a 
political community. The issue of faith is politicized by dints of projecting a modern 
European concept on an Islamic notion of faith, which is universal. The universal aspect 
of Islam and the Muslim faith is henceforth seen as a world political community, with 
imagined territories.  
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The umma originally was not political but based on faith.
175
 Being it based on 
faith, it knows no geographical nor racial or ethnical boundaries. In his historical reading 
of the Prophetic tradition, Tibi considers that the ﬁrst Islamic political community 
(umma) was not a state but an umma of the faithful, as the Qur’anic verses revealed 
between 622 and the death of the Prophet in 632 all speak of.
176
 The umma “recognises 
neither limitations nor exclusivity. Any person who converts to Islam becomes a member 
of this umma, while Christians and Jews can live as dhimmi (protected minorities) under 
Islamic tutelage.”177 Tibi recognizes that “we come across tensions between the religious 
precepts of equality and the very realities standing in contrast to it.”178 Later on, when the 
politicization of the community took shape, dhimmitude took a pejorative sense for the 
minority of Jews and Christians. That has resulted in the viewing the umma as the 
superior community among the divine religions.  
For Tibi, the diversity in Islam has been an accompanying characteristic in its 
development since its advent. He sites, among others, the testimony of the preeminent 
German scholar of classical Islam, Josef van Ess (b. 1934), about the transformations of 
the social meanings of the umma concept: 
In early Islam people acted as members of collectivity and thought along these 
lines. This collectivity was the framework of belonging to a social group. In fact, 
the notion of the umma which in modern times enjoys great references barely 
played a role in early Islam.
179
 
In the formative year, despite the faith that united them, “the tribes had each their own 
mosques” and “people dismissed the idea to pray behind an Imam who does not belong to 
one’s own tribe,” continues Josef van Ess.180 In light of this historical background, Tibi 
questions the meaning of “umma” the homogeneity of the “Muslim society.” For him, the 
latter is mostly “used in plural and sometimes as a synonym for ‘societies with a Muslim 
population or culture.” The term then “basically applies only to those societies whose 
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members profess Islam.” From this follows that “once we become aware of the cultural 
diversity in Islam it is easy to see that the attribute “Islamic” cannot at all be applied to 
any existing cohesive entity.”181 Tibi cites Leonard Binder (b. 1927) to corroborate his 
point:  
The concept of the umma served as a referent for the identity resolutions of 
individual Muslims throughout Islamic history. But […] identity was a religious 
and not a political category of concern until recent times. It is with the 
politicisation of identity and the posing of the problem of the individual and the 
political community that Islam and politics have had to be reconciled within a 
new framework.
182
  
With these historical notes Tibi goes back to his perception of the cultural in the 
religious symbols. The concept of the umma moves from being a metaphysical concept 
related to faith pure and simple to becoming an identity benchmark for the individual and 
for the group, the community of believers in the same faith. And seeing the cultural 
diversity of the umma, Tibi believes that it in no way can be united or be considered as a 
political unity, “When it comes to culture, Muslims differ greatly despite the belief of 
belonging to one umma.”183 The believers who confuse the symbolism of umma and its 
realization in factuality can lead the fundamentalists among them to act militarily to 
restore an order that do not see but only think of.
184
 Such a perception of “the Islamic 
community (umma) thus denies all forms of plurality and comprehends itself as the core 
of that proportion of mankind united by monotheistic faith.”185 This supremacy that 
nurtures itself by faith for political reasons, ignited by societies in a status of “a defensive 
culture,” leads us, writes Tibi, “to assume that there is “a psychological barrier” among 
Muslims to learning from other cultures, to which they feel superior. Islamic rationalists 
in medieval Islam were in a position to overcome this barrier, but contemporary Islamists 
are not!”186  
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 The umma concept is problematic for both the Muslim communities in Muslim 
majority countries as it is for the Muslims in Europe, viz. European Muslim, which is the 
final focus of this work. It is here that the umma issue becomes controversial and “into 
conflict with citizenship inasmuch as Islam is also the basis of a civilisational identity.”187 
Caught between European racism and Islamists” supremacism, “Migrants who really 
want to become citizens are caught between rejection and the pressure to join a cultural  
umma-ghetto.”188 For Tibi, it is high time the umma notion takes back its original 
meaning as a community of the faithful, and not of supremacists and political ideologues, 
for its politicization just widens the gap between dar al-islam and dar-alharb or dar-
alahd, which are also cultural and political constructs.  
 The fundamentalists” attempt to concretize politically the concept of umma 
explicitly means that there are other “ummams” (non-Muslim communities also 
translated commonly as nations) which are supposed to be different. The fact that the 
Muslim umma is believed to be the “best” and the ‘superior” among the rest of ummas 
means, in the literalist meanings of the Text the way the fundamentalists interpret it, that 
they should be invited to Islam through daʻwa, proselytizing. “Jihad stood always in the 
service of daʻwa/proselytization.”189  
In Tibi’s analysis, “Islam’s image of itself is to be the religion of peace.” The 
Muslims are asked to disseminate this daʻwa / mission worldwide. The daʻwa as an 
invitation to Islam is supposed to be peaceful, but the non-Muslims usually hinder the 
peaceful spread and completion of this mission. This process is known in Islamic history 
as futuhat, openings, and not as conquests. “In the classical doctrine, the use of force for 
the spread of Islam is not war but rather jihad, in the worst case a “defensive war,” for 
jihad is not an aggression.”190 In the case non-Muslims submit to Islam through 
conversion or subjugation, this daʻwa can be pursued peacefully. If they do not, Muslims 
are then obliged to wage jihad-war to subdue them. “It is only in this meaning that jihad 
is understood as a defensive action of violence.” In Islam, peace entails that non-Muslims 
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surrender to the call of Islam by conversion or by accepting the status of a religious 
minority of dhimmi, which has to pay an imposed tax/jizya for its affiliation with the 
Muslim community; the dhimmi receive protection, and, as a pay back, they do not take 
part in the wars. This “privilege” of “dhimmitude” applies, however, exclusively to 
Christians and Jews.
191
  
As for the non-monotheist religions, they are considered to be kaﬁrun/ inﬁdels. 
Concisely put, “World peace is perceived as the result of successfully carrying out the 
daʻwa, being the Islamic proselytization, leading to the submission of all humankind to 
Islam, thus mapping the entire globe.”192 This means that the daʻwa had to travel east and 
west, north and south by means of the futuhat. The latter, though normatively peaceful, 
history says otherwise, according to Tibi. The futuhat carried with them violence, despite 
the normative ideals behind them, and the jihad was not purely non-violent in realization:    
In apologetic Islamic writings we often read that jihad-wars were not violent. This 
is presumptuous, because Islamic jihad-wars were violent. In history, non-violent 
warfare does not exist. Despite the high ethical standards imposed by the classical 
doctrine, Islamic jihad-wars were also related to blood-letting. The distinction 
between the normative and the historical level in the study of jihad reveals many 
self-deceptions most Muslims continue to believe in.
193
 
Tibi draws distinctions for more clarifications in light of a historical reading of Islamic 
history of jihad. Tibi differentiates between “classical jihad” and “modern jihadism.” To 
this I turn now. 
 Classical jihad goes back to the Prophetic era referred to earlier. Especially in the 
Mecca period, the divine message does not mention war though the small Muslim 
community was surrounded by hostile tribes.   In the Medina period, which is seen as the 
first Muslim political community, the Muslims opened lands and asked people to either 
convert or surrender to Muslims rule for protection. Yet, after the Prophet’s life it was not 
always an ideal process of futuhat. The notion of the land of Islam and the land of war 
started early and it did not break down until Vienna defeat in 1683. It deteriorated after 
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Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, to be followed later by the European expansion of 
empires. Tibi is clear about the fact that generally there was hardly a process of jihad 
without violence: “It is true that the religious doctrine of jihad determines the attitude of 
common Muslims and that there is, except in Suﬁ Islam, no Islamic tradition of non-
violence. However, the violent jihad as a war has never been gloriﬁed in Islam.”194  
 Jihad in Classical Islam, in Tibi’s description, has rules that were advanced taking 
their historical period into account. It could be compared to the current term of war, it 
was then a regular, in the sense of regulated, war. For example, No war could be waged 
without peaceful negotiations and call of the other communities to enter peacefully under 
the banner of Islam. Under the banner of Islam, they receive protection but they pay 
taxes. If the negotiations fail, then a war is announced, and not entered into unawares. 
The elders, women, animals and plans have to be protected in war. Prisoners” treatment 
has to be decent. Agreements and contracts have to be kept.
195
  “It is therefore wrong to 
describe Islam in general as a “religion of the sword.”“196 With this perception of jihad, 
the Crusades were faced and the futuhat made under the dynasties that took over the reign 
in Islamic history. During the colonial period, liberation movements took the religious 
understanding of jihad as their push-factor. It is “anti-colonial jihad” that was started by 
reformist and influential figures like al-Afghani, Abduh, etc.
197
 
With the subjugation under European outreached empires, the Muslim’s notion of jihad 
in its Classical version within the umma dichotomy came to be adjusted. Tibi cites the 
Moroccan Islamic Moroccan scholar Ahmed bin Khalid al-Nasiri (1835–97) whom he 
sees as the pioneer in adapting the Islamic classical notion of superiority to that of 
adaptation and conformism to the new European supremacy.  
No one today can overlook the power and the superiority of Christians. Muslims 
[…] are in a condition of weakness and disintegration ... Given these 
circumstances, how can we maintain the opinion and the politics that the weak 
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should confront the strong? How could the unarmed ﬁght against the heavily 
armed power?
198
 
According to Tibi, al-Nasiri does not cancel the idea of jihad but just suspends it 
according to the Muslims” necessity, maṣlaḥa – like the IR realist approach that advances 
national interests.
199
 This attitude of adaptation to the modern international politics would 
be adapted by most al-Azhar scholars. Yet, with the failing political reforms in the Arab 
Muslim worlds since the nineteenth century, and chiefly after independence, resurgence 
of jihad has come back in a distorted manner, out of its temporal and spacial context.   
 The twentieth century would experience the rebirth of jihad as a means to reclaim 
the liberation of the Islamic lands. In 1928, Hassan al-Banna (1906 - 1949) established 
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. “The Message of Jihad,” “risālat al jihād,” became, in 
Tibi’s reading, one of the pillars of this movement.200 Al-Banna is for many, including 
Tariq Ramadan as will be seen later, a social activist, anti-Zionist and anti-colonial 
activist, and not a jihadist in the way fundamentalists understand him.
201
 The jihadism 
that has been attached to the Muslim Brothers goes mainly to Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966) 
who became the inspiration of the movement after al-Banna was killed in 1949. Besides 
Social Justice in Islam (1949), World Peace and Islam (1951), In the Shade of the Qur’an 
(30 volume commentary on the Qur’an, 1954) and other theological and literary writings, 
Qutb is mainly known for his Milestones or Signposts on the Road, maʻālim fī attarīq, 
published in 1964, after 10 years on imprisonment under Nasser’s regime, which 
culminated in his hanging in 1966. Qutb is said to have influenced international jihadists 
like Ayman al-Zawahiri (b.1951), Oussama Ben Laden (1957-2011), and Anwar al-
Awalaqi (1971-2011). The Pakistani Abu al-A”la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) is another 
figure of high authority in the politicization of jihad. It is him who coined the terms the 
“Islamic state,” “Islamic revolution,” “alhakimiyya,” and “aljahiliyya,” (which Qutb 
borrows from him) in many writings, mainly voiced in The Islamic Law and Constitution 
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(1941), and disseminated also through Jamaat-e-Islamic, Islamic Party, which he founded 
in Lahore in 1941. Tibi argues that with such influential figures, “Jihad is back as 
jihadism.”202 That is, jihadism targets the world system, which jihadists describe as 
“jahili” (based on the ignorance of God), and they aspire to replace it by an Islamic State 
and hakimiyat Allah (Allah’s rule). 
 Over and again, Tibi clarifies his points of differentiation between jihad and 
jihadism, and between ordinary Muslims, and the Islamist jihadist fundamentalists. He 
feels sorry that such confusion in world politics during the “war on terror” era took place 
after 9/11. It is the Islamists, not the ordinary Muslims, though as they are on many 
issues, that do think of restoring the “Islamic State” and build a Pax Islamica, as a “revolt 
against the West.”203 Tibi goes back then to his main idea of the failure of cultural change 
in Muslim societies and how that affects not only national and religious politics, and 
world politics as well. The jihadists agenda is a case in point. To overcome this malaise 
of projecting classical concepts on politicized religion, Tibi goes on with his call for 
reforms that touch religious understanding. Cultural modernity is the way out; theocracy, 
Islamic democracy, and nationalist secularism have been tried; they simply do not work, 
in Tibi’s analysis. “Post-secular society,” in Habermas” sense, is not the answer either.204  
c. Islamic Scripture: Divinization of Language and Religious Education 
 Since the descent of revelation and the writing of the Quran during the third 
Caliph’s reign, Arabic has been considered also a sacred language, the linguistic medium 
of Sharia,
205
 and has henceforth been “immortalized.”206 Cultural change affects language 
as much as language development affects cultural change. The cultural change occurs 
when linguistic change consequentially affects the heart of change in society: law. 
Language of the Quran here is instructive and not only expressive. Despite the 
development throughout history of Islamic schools, maddahib, and flexibility in 
interpretation, the general tendency in orthodoxy for centuries has been nonreformism in 
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Islamic law; does this mean that this non-change affects language similarly?
207
 For Tibi, 
‘social change affects “extralingual” situations.” During the High Islam era, Arabic was 
able to adapt the new changes in Arab Islamic civilization. Yet, “the basic grammatical 
structures of “arabiyya have hardly altered at all in centuries.”208 In this situation, “how 
can Muslims perceive change culturally if their perception is shaped by an “arabiyya that 
is ostensibly not subject to change?” It is the “eternally valid” commitment of Arabic to 
the Quran as the ultimate divine revelation that keeps it unchangeable, as the revelation 
is.
209
     
 Tibi is for the constant change of language to accommodate the cultural change of 
its speakers. The Hellenization period in which the Arab Muslims took and developed 
Greek philosophy makes part of High Islam, in Tibi’s wording. In this period, Arabic was 
open to accommodate the new terminology and philosophical concepts. It was able to be 
the language of science during the Middle Ages, though some schools (of Kufa and Basra 
for instance) expressed fear of the sacred language and suspected its advocates from the 
philosophers. The latter, like the Greek philosophers, did not appreciate the genre of 
poetry and the work of poets.
210
 Language would develop hierarchally according to the 
circles to which it belonged: 1) Islamic sciences (related to the Quran and Sunna), 
sciences of the ancients (Greek philosophy), and literary sciences (ulumu al-adab).
211
 The 
high time of Arabic began to collapse with the decrepitude of the Abbasid empire, and 
the issuing territorial states, to be followed by the Ottoman times in which (Persian and) 
Turkish, as well as territorial dialects would develop at the expense of the Standard 
Arabic.
212
  
During the encounter with the developed Europe in the eighteenth century, Arabic 
was found to be unable to contain the variety of scientific and socio-philosophic 
achievements of Europe. Among the battles taken for liberation was a linguistic one taken 
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to free the Arab Muslim societies from the weakness that has touched even language. Al-
Tahtawi was critical of the way language was focused just on exegetical matters and 
commentaries, instead of being also used in the sciences which he saw Europe doing well 
in. The Syrian-Lebanese Arab avant-guardists of nationalism esteemed very much the 
power of language in both cultural and political revival. Satiʻ Al-Hursi (1882–1968), the 
spiritual father of popular Arab nationalism, and Salama Mussa (1887–1958), the early 
Arab nationalist-socialist, for instance, saw that language renewal goes hand in hand with 
socio-cultural and civilizational change.
213
      
Tibi does not stop at blaming politics alone about the linguistic problems that 
have impacted cultural progress in general. He also deals with the classical 
methodologies the educational systems adopted throughout the centuries, basing his ideas 
on the work of the historian George Makdisi (1920-2002), among others. Tibi is critical 
of the focus given to religious studies that have been at the forefront of the educational 
system (at the famous al-Qarawitine in Morocco, al-Qayraouane in Tunisia and al-Azhar 
in Egypt for instance) at the expense of the exact sciences and philosophy. The former 
depend on rote learning which do not develop critical thinking, while the latter depend on 
informal learning groups which do not have many adherents, since they are mainly 
privately funded, which limits their expansion.
214
 Importantly, for Tibi, the Islamic 
madrassa is not concerned with a process of investigation and inquiry but with “a 
learning process in the sacral sense,” unlike its European counterpart which is reason and 
empirical based: 
The Muslim education system is characterized by a lack of conscious cultural 
reception of change, for in Islam man, as a makhluq (creature of God), is 
supposed to live solely according to the unalterable divine commandments 
proclaimed in the Islamic revelation.
215
 
  Seeing that revelation ranks superior to any other previous revelation or human 
produced knowledge, such an educational system blinds the Muslims from recognizing 
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the realities that “do not correspond to this self-image, and therefore also deprives them 
of the ability to cope with those realities and to contribute substantively to their 
change.”216 It is the “psychological barrier” of supremacy that should be overcome. Since 
the nineteenth century, the time of contact with the modern West, the educational systems 
in the Muslim world have tried to cope with secularized and semi-secularized education, 
but have not overcome the same old problem. The idea of taking from the West just the 
sciences without values, for Tibi, is not a solution, for modern sciences go with certain 
values.
217
  
d. Islamism: Globalizing Fundamentalism  
For Tibi, the current crisis Islam and Muslim societies experience is basically 
cultural. To surmount it, “cultural modernity,” which is his main term to express religious 
reform and social change, has to be adopted, to replace the old orthodox and patriarchal 
readings of religion, which are very much culturally overloaded and burdened. Cultural 
modernity, always in Tibi`s view, is the answer to Islam’s Predicament with modernity, 
and it is that which is required to facilitate the development of Euro-Islam afterwards.  
This cultural inability to adopt modernity is the result of internal and external 
factors. For the internal factors, which will be dealt with throughout this section, it is the 
centuries of intellectual stagnation and excommunication of reason that have handicapped 
development in the Arab-Islamic world. That has affected religious interpretation of the 
Texts (Quran and Sunna), philosophy (falsafa), theology (kalam), the arts, culture in 
general, besides politics and economy. It is all a chain of effects that spill over. Tibi tries 
to go to these factors and raise their importance and need for reform and change. To these 
I return in detain in the coming sections. As to the external factors, I refer to them in 
passing here as a way of contextualizing the argumentation of reform and change.   
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There is a tendency in Tibi’s thought to say that Islam’s Predicament is the Arab’s 
predicament.
218
 He is for sure very against Arabocentrism, but the location of the Arab 
world in the heart of the Islamic world, makes the issue look like more Arabized. Since 
Napoleon’s conquest attempts of Egypt in 1798, the Arab-Islamic world has been ever 
since open to colonial powers, from the 1820s up to the independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, with the continuous pressure from the US from the 1990s Gulf War, Afghanistan 
invasion in 2001, and Iraq invasion of 2003. The chain of these historical events have 
substantially affected not only the region but also the international politics, thus the 
necessity to develop an approach that could be workable for the required changes in the 
region as well as the one required in the international arena. Tibi uses his political science 
background and international relations expertise to face a cultural issue that is tied to 
religion.  
Tibi believes that the international pressure of the West on the region enticed its 
intellectuals and politicians to suggest solutions and reforms. The first attempts of 
Muhammad Ali of Egypt (1769 – 1849) failed, after Napoleon’s three years of conquest, 
because they focused on machination and the military to counter Europe, instead of deep 
reform of culture and society. Yet, in his attempt to open up the cultural life to the 
European world, Muhammad Ali sent in 1826 a group of students for studies in Paris. At 
the head of the delegation, as an imam of the group, was Rifa Rafi Attahtaoui (1801-
1873). In Paris, Attahtaoui would be amazed by the modern life, its society, women 
liberty, the sciences and the educational system. His Paris Diary was influential for the 
modernist attempts that developed by the end of his life. With that grew the modernist 
movement from the 1870s to the 1930s-1940s, with the acclaimed names like Jamal 
Eddine al-Afghani (1838 - 1897), Muhammad Abdu (1849 - 1905), Qassim Amin (1865-
1908), Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935), Muhammad Iqbal (1877 – 1938), etc. For Tibi, the 
reformist attempts of such scholars were selective in the sense that they did not go deeper 
in questioning the historicity of the cultural and religious norms, including the Sharia 
prescribed legal sanctions (hudud) for instance. The disappointment of these intellectuals, 
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and their successors, with European Enlightenment would emerge before, but mainly 
during, the fight for liberation in the 1950s and the 1960s which would open the way for 
another wave of ideas in connection with the tiers mondialists (Third Worldists). A kind 
of intellectual and political effort took different paths and failed to make one force.    
Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State (first printed in 1981) is a 
well-circulated reference and one of the most successful books of Tibi, a fact which 
explains it republication in 1990 and 1997.
219
 In the book, which is a contribution to 
postcolonial attempts towards Arab enlightenment along with other Arab leftist 
intellectuals like Saddiq al-Azmeh (b. 1947), Tibi argues that “Arab nationalism 
succeeded in de-politicizing Islam for more than half a century.”220 The Arab-Muslim 
reformists targeted mainly the European colonial presence as well as the Ottoman 
dominance over the Arab-Islamic world. The modernist movement subscribed to 
resistance, and thus became more nationalist in spirit than truly culturally reformist. The 
Wahhabi movement, started by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) subscribed 
to the same idea of resistance first, and made it close to the modernists in terms of 
political agenda. Such a marriage of convenience between the two did not banish religion 
from politics, and did not reform the culture, which feeds itself by religion. This 
continued even after the coming of the secularist Free Officers to power in Egypt, for 
example, led by Gamal Abd e-Nasser on 23 July, 1952.  
According to Tibi, the Arab national secularists effort “to destroy the Islamic 
revitalization movement [i.e. Wahhabism] did not mean that its theoreticians had 
abandoned Islam entirely.” Rather, “they denied its claim to be an all-embracing system, 
and relegated it to a cultural sphere where it could only form a part of Arab national 
culture.”221 What was missing in the Arab nation State “dream” or myth,”222 using his 
terms, was the substance the nation State of Europe was based on, that is, individual 
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liberties and popular sovereignty, or la volontè générale (the general will), using J. J. 
Rousseau’s term. There was a failed projection of what the nation State is on a traditional 
Arab society that tried to secularize without liberalizing. That hybrid socio-political 
construction was “a rhetoric based on the reality of the Arab’s common traditional 
cultural heritage projected into the modern model of nation-state.”223 This qualifies them 
to be merely “nominal States,”224 unable to stand strong because the change was not 
democratic.
225
 Otherwise said, “It is rather the problem of cultural accommodation of 
social change.” 226 Such a change is bound to the cultural structure that religion 
influences. Briefly put, “the problems are related to the incompatibility of Islamic 
universalism with the modern secular nation-state.”227 
Much worse for the Arab nominal States is their defeat in the Six Days War 
against Israel in 1967. Before 1967, the Sinai crisis of 1956 had already weakened the 
popularity of Nasserism. From Tibi’s perspective, this marked a turning point in regional 
and international politics.
228
 The war revealed much about the failing structures and 
planning’s of the secular nationalist States. More importantly, it gave space for the 
emergence of political Islam
229
 which ideologizes a universal faith for universal 
dominance,
230
 chaos and disorder.
231
  
For Tibi, political Islam was in the making since the 1920s, after the glamour of 
European Enlightenment ideas started to lose their charm, and at the time when the 
Palestinian issue, along with the liberation movements, started to become a regional and 
later on an international issue. The creation of the Muslims Brothers by Hassan Albanna 
(1906 –1949) in 1928 would make the Islamist voice more appealing, at first by taking 
part in the liberation movements. For Tibi, the early seeds of destruction of politics in the 
Arab world, were the use of religion in political liberation movements. Pan-Arabism and 
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Islam seemed to go together, to win liberation from the Ottomans, but especially from 
Europe. 
After 1967 Six Days War defeat, the intellectuals in the Arab world, chiefly the 
secular-liberals, would find themselves “torn between the tyranny of political regimes 
and the threat of being slain by Muslim fundamentalists.”232 Sadiq Jalal al-Azmeh, with 
his two infleuncial books Self-Criticism after the Defeat (1968) and Critique of Religious 
Thought (1969), occasioned space for direct and open criticism both to the failed 
nationalist secularism and religious non-reformism.
233
 Over and again, the reason lies in 
the fact that “an Islamic cultural understanding of the nation-state and a corresponding 
new world view of Muslims is unfortunately still lacking.”234  
After the modernists of the 19
th
 century, Tibi goes on afterwards to refer to some 
contemporary reformists and their projects to which he does not agree without going into 
details into why.  Abdullahi An`naim was invoked earlier and no need to refer to him 
here again. Tibi refers also to the famous Mohamed Arkoun (d. 2010) who calls for 
“Rethinking Islam,” a title of one of his books, and developing new scientific methods of 
Quranic studies.  Tibi says that Arkoun “claims to deliver gold and he wants to be seen as 
the Islamic Immanuel Kan.” He acknowledges that he “is certainly a significant thinker 
on contemporary Islamic civilization, but he lacks the intellectual vigor of Kant in his 
addressing of the issue.” “He coins nice terms, addresses important issues, but barely 
goes beyond idealistic thinking and is – as Robert Lee puts it – unlikely to ´muster 
general support.”235 He adds, “A rethinking of Islam is something other than the rhetoric 
of Mohammed Arkoun.”236 I will refer to Arkoun, and other contemporary scholars in 
Part IV later in this work, but I just say here that Tibi does not present the work of such 
scholars he criticizes in details not does he say in what exactly he disagrees with them, 
which remains a flaw point in his approach of contemporary reformists, as I will argue in 
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due space (Part IV, Section 2b). For Sadiq al-Azmeh, the Syrian philosopher, he, 
according to Tibi, has ´a rather poor knowledge of Islam´ and ´the ulema used this flaw to 
disqualify him´ and his critical discourse of the religious discourse. As to, Hamid Abu 
Zayd (d. 2010), he is briefly described as being ´less courageous´ in his reform 
proposition.
237
 It is only Mohamed Abed Aljabri (d. 2010), the Moroccan philosopher 
who conducts a reconstruction of Arab and Islamic thought from within, that appears to 
the only contemporary scholar to win the appraisal of Tibi because he is very Averroist 
and rationalist in his approach. It is from him that Tibi gets the formula: “the future can 
only be Averroist!”238 – namely, the future cannot be but reason-based. 
Nonetheless, it is the return of the fiqh mind-set in contradistinction to rationalism 
that characterize especially the last three-four decades of the 20
th
 century. Like the 
medieval Islam which saw the competition and at the end prevalence of the fiqh over 
reason school, the current Muslim world sees the same historical process being relived, 
i.e. fundamentalists versus reformists. The latter, for Tibi, are less heard than the former. 
However, even among the reformists Tib does not feel satisfied. What is lacking in these 
contemporary reformist discourses is, for Tibi, a big move that would shift the paradigm 
of thoughts towards cultural modernity.  
Fundamentalism: Globalizing Jihadist Islam  
The resurgence of political Islam, used by Tibi interchangeably to mean 
fundamentalism and Islamism, does not solve the crisis the Arab-Islamic world is in. 
Rather, it is but another diversion from the real problems and questions that should be 
asked, as Tibi argues. The situation in the Arab-Islamic world, as broadly depicted here, 
does affect regional and international politics, “we cannot separate what happens in the 
Middle East from the respective international environment.”239 
It is mainly in The Challenge of Fundamentalism (1998), and Political Islam, 
World Politics and Europe (2008) that political Islam is pictured to have global effects, 
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which have to be faced by working on cultural change as well as religious reforms. In 
The Challenge of Fundamentalism, Tibi clarifies his distinction between Islam as a faith 
and Islam as a political ideology. Because of his direct criticism of socio-cultural aspects 
of the Muslim societies and well as his focus on Islamism as a field of study in 
international relations, Tibi must have encountered suspicion about his perception of the 
religion of Islam per se. To pose himself in a clearer frame of work, the reader finds him 
making such clarifications: “My experience in Germany of being deliberately 
misunderstood on this point compels me to reiterate that I direct my criticism not toward 
Islam as a faith I as a Muslim adhere to, but toward fundamentalism as an ideology.”240 
For him, as a liberal, moderate, and reformist Muslim, labels he uses to describe himself, 
Islam itself, being a tolerant religion, is not and cannot be a threat, and it is a disservice to 
world peace to speak of Islam, one of the world’s major religions, in terms of “threat” 
and “confrontation”:  
My religion is an open-minded faith, neither an  intolerant political ideology nor a 
concept of world order, as Islamic fundamentalists and some in the West—so 
fiercely contend. The Qur’an unmistakably commands: “[There is] no compulsion 
in religion” (Qur’an: surat al baqarah, 2:256).241  
Especially in the two books just mentioned, Tibi theoretizes for a discipline of studying 
fundamentalism as a “new world disorder.” This discipline is Islamology. Neither space 
nor the theme I am concerned with here allows a detailed description of this part of IR 
work of Tibi. However, certain aspects of this discipline are relevant to the project 
undertaken here, for without a distinction between Islam and Islamism, the idea of 
European Islam remains a risk to be rejected from the very beginning.  
 In Tibi’s IR theory, Islamism is a political world order that uses the Islamic 
religious rhetoric to replace the Western hegemony. It was seen earlier how the modernist 
attempts as well as the secular nationalist projects failed and gave way to political Islam 
from the 1970s. There are two varieties of Islamism: 1) a world order based 
fundamentalism, and 2) an nationally based fundamentalism. In brief terms I refer to the 
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second type first for two reasons: first because it has to do with the socio-cultural reform 
religion as a cultural system has to undergo, as Tibi contends, and second because it 
indirectly rekindles the rhetoric of the internationalized fundamentalism, and makes the 
internal and external relations look at it with suspicion, if not with total unease. This 
territorial fundamentalism, according to Tibi, sees the West as an opponent to Islamic 
reawakening and to Muslim societies liberation and development. Main examples of this 
type include Iran and Sudan; their Islamist governments make the organized version of 
Islamism take place, a reality which aborts any social change and religious reform. Minor 
examples include Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, and the Algerian 
Islamist Front of the late 1980s and early 1990s. These national fundamentalisms do take 
sometimes nationalist or ethno-fundamentalist look; such a kind of religious-based 
fundamentalism, and is similar to Serbian and Hindu fundamentalism. Though chaotic 
and violent, these national fundamentalist movements and governments are not a big 
threat to world politics as the international Al”Qaeeda is, yet their danger is felt in 
negating change and religious reform, which perpetuates the crisis nationally, and affects 
the international arena.  
 As to international Islamic fundamentalism, it aims at replacing the current world 
order. After the demise of the Soviet Union, and especially the Afghan War against the 
Soviets, Islamism just widened its horizon and begun to overthrow the West from leading 
the world order, “Why not defeat the West, too?”242 Islamic fundamentalism uses the 
religion of Islam as rhetoric to draw attention of the world to the miseries of the Arab-
Muslim world, and thus justify its world scale agenda. Tibi tries to dismantle this rhetoric 
from within, in the sense that he brings his Islamic background into the front and 
compares it with political Islam discourse. In doing so, he does not fall into the trap of 
being apologetic. On the contrary, as the later sections will show, his call for the religious 
reform and the adoption of cultural accommodation situates him far from the apologetics.  
Now, I sketch out some elements that characterize political Islam or Islamism, 
always in the eyes of Tibi. First, the socio-economic gap between the West and the rest of 
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the world has created a sense of cynicism about the Western values of modernity, among 
which are human rights, equality, and justice. The fundamentalists, like the rest of the 
Third Wordlists, reject the values that dominate them and put them in an unprivileged 
position. This has a lot to do with the idea that globalization as an institutional structure 
has succeeded in dominating the world, and that includes the labor markets, the baking 
systems and administrations. But globalization as a cultural system, i.e. as a container of 
Enlightenment values, could not be exported, nor could it be adopted easily. This has 
affected the post-colonial world, and the Muslim world in particular. This was made 
worse by the failing projects of the Arab secular nationalists. This has created a cultural 
fragmentation that seeks “allegedly authentic, local, cultural roots.”243   
Second, the fundamentalists are selective in their political agenda. They adopt the 
technological side of modernity and Western achievements. At the same time, they adopt 
cultural and religious elements that identify them with a particular culture and 
civilization, in this case the Islamic civilization. Further than that, while in their concrete 
communities, they mobilize kinship and ethnic commitments.
244
 “At issue in each case is 
a political ideology, not the religion so cynically linked with that ideology.” 245 This way, 
“Fundamentalism does not address religious beliefs, but rather a sociopolitical worldview 
[…] based equally on an equally selective and arbitrary politicization of religion.”246  
Third, the fundamentalists plan to reshape the world order by adopting Allah’s 
rule, (hakimiyyat Allah), which “is recent, and that one fails to find it either in the Qur’an 
or in the hadith tradition of the Prophet, the only two authoritative sources of Islam 
recognized by all Muslims.”247 Allah’s rule is composed of three main traits that made 
part of the classical Islamic discourse, but are adopted out of context for pure political 
reasons: these traits are the concepts of the umma, the jihad, and the daʻwa. For the 
Islamists, the umma means the international mass of Muslims as a political block, while 
in origin it was first used by the Arab nationalists to mean the geographical Arab 
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societies, including the Christians, and it excluded the Turks and Persians. The 
fundamentalists do project the notion of the nation on a religious precept which is 
universal, i.e. the Islamic umma of faith.
248
 The same mis-adoption has occurred to the 
term jihad. For Tibi, it is difficult to convey to Western readers the Islamic meaning of 
jihad, which they wrongly translate as “holy war.” “Jihad is simply a religious duty 
Muslims must fulfill in carrying out Allah’s message.” The reinterpretation of the term 
stands for the “jihadization of Islam,” for “in the classical doctrine, there is no 
justification for the slaying of individuals. The Qur’an forbids assassination and ambush 
attacks.” As to daʻwa/ call to Islam [or proselytization] like Christian evangelism, Tibi 
believes that it is supposed to be peaceful.
249
  
 Fourth, and I limit myself to these four religious idiosyncrasies here, the 
fundamentalist assert that be it the last divine message, the “nizam Islami” (Islamic order) 
has to rule and dominate the world, and replace the Westphalian European model. And 
seeing that the West is the one that is in the lead, instead of the Islamic world which is 
following, they feel “hurt” and “humiliated.” The supremacy aspect is taken politically, 
and is not interpreted in its spiritual aspects. “The concept of the nizam Islami / Islamic 
order does not exist in the Qur’an, nor does it in the hadith of the Prophet.”250 For Tibi, 
“This is not a religious but a civilizational issue; the clash is between two 
universalisms—one secular, one divine—each claiming global validity.”251 Tibi 
concludes that “The turath / Islamic heritage includes no concept of world order, as 
Muslim fundamentalists prefer to believe. Their quest for an Islamic world order is 
simply a reading of modern thinking into classical Islamic concepts.”252  
 These characteristics gathered from various fieldwork research and theoretical 
conceptualizations of Tibi are conducive to a number of remarks, from which I select the 
following.  First, Islamic fundamentalism is simply one variety of a new global 
phenomenon in world politics; there are other religious fundamentalisms that have 
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resurged especially after the end of the Cold War to counter the Western hegemony; 
Islamic fundamentalism plays the tone of a “defensive culture”253 in this point. Second, 
the movement, though skillful in being totalitarian, and in adopting “irregular war,”254 
lacks the capabilities and resources necessary for achieving its agenda, but belittling this 
challenge as a rhetoric is erroneous, for it has already a remarkable presence in Algeria, 
Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and some other places, including the secular Turkey 
whose Prime Pinister, Rajap Tayyed Erdogan, Tibi describes as “fundamentalist.” Third, 
“any promotion of hostility to Islam itself in the guise of a clash of civilizations would 
unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists in their efforts to antagonize the 
West.”255 Forth, last but not least, fundamentalism has become an issue affecting Western 
societies in the search for models for the Islamic migrant communities: 
communitarianism, gheottoization, or integration as individual citizens.
256
 To counter the 
Islamization of Europe, which is disseminated by global jihadism, Euro-Islam comes as 
the answer Tibi envisions, “Europe and its Muslim migrants need a Euro-Islam opposed 
to the diaspora ideology of Islamism that produces jihadists like those who ignited the 
violent events of Madrid, Amsterdam, Paris and London between 2004-6.”257  
2. Cultural Modernity for Religious Reform and Cultural Change: towards 
Euro-Islam  
Tibi repeatedly says that there is only one modernity. Multiple modernities is/are 
‘semi-modernity.” He defends the idea that modernity is universal though it is born in 
Europe. Other cultures and civilizations can adopt it somewhat differently, but they 
cannot think of “multiple modernities,” and thus multiple differences in its outcome, i.e. 
multiple sciences, etc. “Just as there are no multiple modernities, there can be no multiple 
sciences.”258 Tibi makes it clear that modernity ´is secular, not Christian,´ to make 
modernity a universal phenomenon that could happen to any religious society, and thus 
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can be applicable to Muslims, too. He also makes it clear that ´commitment to cultural 
modernity is not an Orientalism´ but is a commitment to ´freedom for the people of 
Islam.´
259
 Cultural modernity then is an invitation to continue with the Islamic 
medievalist heritage which was rationalist for some time and which was, more 
importantly, open to borrowing from the other, mainly the Greeks in philosophy matters. 
Without an honest endorsement of this old tradition, anything else leads nowhere, in 
Tibi’s thought:  
If that Islamic medieval rationalism that recognized the universality of knowledge 
continues to be declared a heresy, and if authenticity is narrowed down to a 
polarization of the self and otherness, then Muslims of the twenty-first century 
will continue to be unsuccessful in embarking on modernity.
260
  
The utmost fear Tibi nurtures after about a century and half of attempts of reform 
is the idea of ‘semi-modernity.” The latter means borrowing modern technology and its 
administrative mechanisms without delving into the core of modernity, based on 
individual human rights, the rule of law, rationality, and secularization. Modernity goes 
along with cultural changes and a reformed worldview, unlike semi-modernity which 
hosts orthodox ideas of supremacy and ´nostalgia´ for an ideal Islam that is not pluralist. 
Semi-modernity is a failing ´dream´ that depicts Islam´s ongoing predicament with 
modernity.
261
 Otherwise said, “Islamic modernism is in fact not really modern, because it 
does not contribute to a rethinking of the dogma. It is rather, an illusion of semi-
modernity.”262  In his agenda of cultural modernity, Tibi emphasizes three main aspects: 
secularization, subjectivity and pluralism, and rationalism.  Both civil Islam, for Muslims 
in Islamic majority countries, and Euro-Islam, for European Muslims, build on these 
features.  
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a. Politics: Secularizations vs. De-secularization  
 Tibi’s project of cultural modernity is modern, secular, and reason-based. 
“Cultural modernity is a project based on the recognition of the primacy of reason.”263 
Behinds it lies his claim “to reconstruct the Shari’a.”264 It is “an aspiration toward 
innovating the Shari’a.”265 As a reminder, Tibi takes Sharia to mean Islamic law. Such an 
endeavour in reforming religion within the premise of cultural modernity “is not alien to 
Islam,” argues Tibi. Rather, “cultural roots of modernity existed in Islamic thought.”266 
Tibi takes religious reform as pivotal for cultural reforms for the concerned Muslim 
majority countries, but equally for world peace which he calls for, from his position as an 
IR expert. As noted earlier, reference to IR here is not my focus; I refer to it just when I 
see it fits and to highlight certain points. Here, for example, IR reference is relevant 
because Tibi sees that Sharia, Islamic law, should be reformed to take into account the 
current world system and international relations treaties, conventions, and protocols. It is 
also relevant because reforming Sharia would draw a clearer distance between the 
Muslims and Islam, the Islamists and Islamism. A reformed Islamic law, in brief, builds a 
pluralist culture and society which affects positively the world at large, for the Muslims 
and Islam are all over the world.    
 For Tibi, the term Sharia, which occurs only once in the Quran (sura 45, verse 
18), holds an ethical, not a juridical meaning. The juridical meaning is a construction, 
“Historically, I maintain that the Sharia, as a legal system, is a post-Koranic 
construction.”267 It “is the work of religious ﬁqh-scholars in Islam;” “it is not God’s 
revelation.” Still, the fact that it has not undergone change for centuries “is viewed as a 
divine law revealed by God, even though it is purely a human interpretation.”268 The 
faqihs have been able to establish themselves as the guardians of the Sharia. They have 
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been “closer to political power than to God and thus they reached high standing as 
legitimators of the rulers throughout Islamic history.”269  
 Though Sharia has written records, it is an interpretative and not a codiﬁed law. 
Traditional Sharia, for Tibi, is not a law for the state, for it is in effect a civil law that 
focuses on human relations such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and the like, “shari’a 
was restricted to civil law.”270 In the domain of state politics, during Medieval Islam, the 
Caliphate was considered to be governed by the Sharia. However, the distinction between 
politics, siyassa, as a domain of the caliph, and Sharia, as a domain of the ulema, 
amounted to a separation between religion and politics. It is just after the politicisation of 
this cultural pattern by Islamic fundamentalists in the second half of the twentieth century 
that Sharia becomes a law for creating the political order of an Islamic state.
271
  
 Historically, Tibi adopts Noel Coulson’s (d. 1986) division of Sharia and its 
development into three phases, and adds a fourth according to his reading. The first 
phase, which ranges from the post-Quranic era to the 9
th
 century, is the formative phase 
during which an Islamic legal system was developed. The second phase, which ranges 
from the tenth to the twentieth century, tells the rigidity of this law which claims to be 
valid as divine truth for all times and does not change as history moves on. The third 
phase takes form in the twentieth century, with the introduction of the European 
institutions of the secular nation-state into the Muslim world. Such a happening justifies 
itself because Islamic law has been unable to face the European legal and political model. 
the gates of  ijtihad opened once again during the encounter with the West. The fourth 
phase, which Tibi adds to Coulson’s division, is portrayed as “anti-Western 
fundamentalism.” This phase aims at “de-Westernisation of law” and “Islamization of 
law.”272 More importantly for Tibi is the fact that “the Islamic deﬁnition of an 
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international law lays claim to an imposition of Islam on the entire world,” which is an 
unconcealed opposition to the ideal of worldwide cultural pluralism.
273
  
Tibi argues that Islamic imperial states, which were not Islamic states but simply 
received religious legitimation, are historical examples of secular orders. They were 
rationalist in their advocacy of the sciences and capitalist economy. He goes so far as to 
say that if the rationalists of High Islam as well as the Sufists managed to stay longer and 
impact society and power, they could have anticipated modernity centuries ago. He refers 
to the work of the Syrian philosopher Tayyeb Tizini (b. 1934) about the Muslim secular 
rationalists: 
The political and social content of those ideas of Arab-Islamic thinkers […] is 
expressed in a hostile attitude to the dominant feudal intellectual position. The 
social basis for this attitude was to be found in the then considerable vertical and 
horizontal development of commodity production and in economic activities 
generally, and it went hand in hand with the development of natural sciences such 
as chemistry, astronomy, medicine and mathematics.
274
 
Similarly, the Sufists, besides the visible Islamic rituals, they basically worked on the 
inner side of the Self, known as “batiniyya/ inwardness.”275 Unlike these historical 
examples that support his secular order thesis, Tibi broadly blames the ulema/ faqihs for 
having mediated between man and Allah, and also between man and the ruling elite. The 
ulema have created a clergy though supposedly there is none in Islam that calls for it. 
This makes him believe that ´the ideal of Islam does not match the reality, whether in the 
past or in the present.´
276
  
Failure to reform Islamic law to keep up with historical social changes and 
development brings about frustration and fundamentalism, as seen earlier. Despite the 
hijacking of Islamic law by fundamentalists, classical fiqh scholars still have not dared to 
make remarkable changes because for them the Sharia is divine. This attitude is held 
though ordinary people do deviate from the legal norms of this same Sharia, and some of 
                                                          
273
 Ibid., 158 
274
 Qtd in Islam’s Predicament, 197.  
275
 Ibid., 197 
276
 Ibid., 196 
102 
 
its sanctions, hudud, are not practiced in most Islamic societies, like the stoning and the 
cutting off of the hands: 
Clearly, the behaviour of people who believe in an immutable dogma must in the 
course of the centuries deviate from that dogma, if it is not newly formulated and 
adapted to suit new conditions. But because that dogma claims not to be 
historically conditioned, and because it conceives of itself as eternally valid, a 
rethinking of it would contradict its essence and runs the risk of being involved in 
a heresy. This is the substance of the great centuries-old gulf between legal 
philosophy and practice in the history of Islam.
277
  
Tibi contends that the Sharia which influences the cultural mode in Muslim life 
does not correspond to the modern legal theories. The latter consist of a logical and 
linguistic dimension, a sociological and psychological dimension, and ultimately an 
ethical or political dimension.
278
 In Tibi’s view, the Sharia has yet to be clarified and 
reformed accordingly, for it is not codified and it is the divinity of the Quranic text that 
defines its instructive text and inscriptions of the ḥalāl and the haram, the permitted and 
the forbidden.
279
 
Tibi is critical of the classical interpretation of Islamic law. Though most of it was 
developed after the Prophet and canonized in different jurisprudence schools, madahibs, 
with time it was elevated to the status of divinity, as the Quran is. Accordingly, Sharia is 
also immutable and eternally valid, and consequently cannot, with time, help people 
shape their socio-cultural life. The jurist becomes an interpreter of eternal laws and does 
not go much beyond them. The legal norm, then, ends up in building an existence for 
itself in theory, while the practice of people develops according to the social needs; the 
theoretical diverges from the practical,
280
 which creates a psychological dilemma in the 
mind of the believer, a fact which modern law does not lead to. The “behavioural lag” 
and “legal tricks/hiyal” anthropologists note when studying Muslim societies behavior 
and its correspondence with the Sharia norms are examples of the gap between Sharia 
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and society’s evolutionary practices, which need to be studied again in light of modern 
challenges and legal advancements.  
Tibi advocates the revival of the tradition of ijtihad (intellectual exertion) in the 
Islamic tradition. After the four main jurisprudence schools took hold of the Islamic 
tradition, they have been honored and built up on, without going back to the original 
Quranic Text and Prophetic hadiths. This is known as deduction by analogy, qiyās. 
Solving legal issues without referring to the original texts, and being satisfied with the 
qiyās/analogy or mimicry/taqlid, is said to have closed the gates of ijtihad for 
centuries.
281
 That heritage of ijtihad is what Tibi calls for again, “it is possible to find 
intellectual plurality in Islamic history […].The Koran contains general principles that are 
intended to be understood as an Islamic ethic and that also allow for varying 
interpretations within the ijtihad tradition.”282 
Tibi introduces some modern legal techniques into Islam (Islamology) to revive 
the ijtihad practice. They mark part of “juristic hermeneutics”: “topic thinking,” and 
“flexibilization.” For “topic thinking” or “topics,” it is a technique of thought which 
focuses on problems.
283
 “Topical discourse” serves the discussion of focused legal 
problems. The adoption of this method would mean that law derives from the problems 
Muslims face in daily life and not from the Texts of Quran or Sunna or madahib 
accumulated archive. This entails deriving meanings in new contexts from old texts 
without damaging or neglecting them.  
As to “flexibilization,” it is a technique used mainly in German jurisprudence to 
convey “the nonrigid handling of legal norms.” Unlike the hiyal/tricks legal tradition in 
Muslim societies that experience a gap between the philosophy of law and its practice, 
flexibilization aims at incorporating that mode of social change without nullifying the 
rigidity of Islamic law.
284
 This way, the ijtihad that implicitly means that the Texts are 
open to interpretation does not differ from the idea of law as an “open texture” in Herbert 
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Lionel A. Hart’s (1907- 1992) terms.285 With topic thinking and flexibilization, the 
problem at stake does not wait to be solved or be influenced by historically old contexts, 
but it carries itself to the Text and contexualizes itself therein. Such a process allows for 
Islamic law to be up to date, in parallel with the social needs, and henceforth contribute to 
the development process. There is no dynamism without law reformation.
286
  
Again, Behind Tibi’s project of cultural modernity profoundly lies the secular 
project, as he acknowledges. “This book [Islam’s Predicament with Modernity…] is, in 
substance, a secular project.”287 Tibi differentiates between secularism and secularization, 
and he claims that it is he who first introduces this distinction in Islamic thought, because 
it draws on “the precious tradition of Islamic rationalism.”288 “This is a new approach in 
Islamic thought, which I claim to have established.”289 Otherwise said, Tibi calls for 
secularization instead of the “Shariatization” of Islam, and at the same time he distances 
himself from the European ideology of secularism. Secularization for Tibi is a universal 
‘social process that could take place in any society,”290 and for Islamic thought it is but a 
continuity of a process that started and ended in the medieval rationalist ages. 
There is a trilogy that Tibi puts on the table to clarify his project of secularization. 
This trilogy is: secularity, secularism, and secularization. Using his words, 
Secularity is a state of affairs in a modern society where religion no longer 
determines all aspects of life in a quasi-organic manner, but is not abolished […]. 
Secularity is a state of affairs in society; secularization is a social process; and 
finally secularism is an ideology.
291
  
Otherwise said, secularity is the conditionality in which a secular order rules; the secular 
here does not mean non-religiosity (la-diniyya), but takes its original Latin meaning of 
´worldly´ (from saeculum),   i.e. that which is concerned with world affairs.
292
 Tibi is 
against the imported ideology of secularism because he believes that reform should come 
                                                          
285
 Ibid., 70 
286
 Ibid., 74-75  
287
 Islam’s Predicament, 178 
288
 Ibid., 183  
289
 Ibid., 187 
290
 Ibid., 189 
291
 Ibid., 182 
292
 Ibid., 188 
105 
 
from within and not from without. Instead, he advocates secularization which can take 
place in any developing society in history; it is a ´prerequisite for modern societies, 
regardless of their civilizational background.´
293
 Unlike the tradition that may hamper 
progress, secularization encourages it, and without it no development occurs. Secularity 
as a new social order does not abolish religion, but makes it just part of the new social 
order in which other elements become equally important. “This does not mean abolition 
of religion,”294 since “the process of secularization can and do occur in societies in which 
people draw on Islam for their faiths and ethics.” 295 
Tibi argues that “shari’a and democracy are incompatible.”296 Sharia for him has 
never been a constitution or a law of a state. “In the Quran “shari’a means morality, not 
law,” and the Prophetic period which experienced the “Medina Constitution” is but a 
modern reading of the Islamic past;
297
 i.e. that was not a law of a state, but a code of 
morality that is specific to the “Prophetic charisma.” As a code of morality, Tibi makes it 
clear that it should remain a private matter, as it is in Europe. He brings to the fore the 
“Protestant ethic” (developed by Max Weber) as a model, which the future of Islam will 
end in; it is only when privatized that Islam can embrace secularization and 
industrialization, and finally development. He recognizes that Reformation was not only 
individual focused for self-piety, but was also interested in ruling the world from a 
religious perspective; he takes the Weberian understanding of the Protestant ethic and its 
potential for the nourishment of socio-cultural change and capitalism. In The Crisis of 
Modern Islam (1988), Tibi writes the following:     
In Europe the Industrial Revolution and the technological-scientific culture it 
produced have not led to the extinction of Christianity in spite of this culture’s 
rational underpinning. But religion is secularized and, as an ethic, is primarily 
relegated to the internal sphere. Afghani [the reformist] makes a vigorous appeal 
to Luther and uses his Reformation as a model for the Islamic people; he ignores, 
however, the crucial fact that the Protestant ethic has been primarily domiciled 
within the sphere of interiority and that, for Luther, the religious man, as a 
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personally accountable Christian individual, is dependent upon himself. The 
future of Islam seems to lie in a parallel direction.
298
 [Emphasis added] 
Tibi is aware of the fact that the secularization he has in mind is the harbinger of a 
´complex social evolution´ that can have crucial repercussions on the religious system 
which becomes a ´part system of society.´ It is evolutionary after the will for it comes to 
people, and it is not evolutionary in the sense that it is a natural historical phase. It 
becomes so just when it is pushed for from within and from below, ´The secularization of 
society is neither an evolutionary nor a determined process. The process can only take 
place in society if the people involved want it and engage in action for it. Otherwise, it 
will never be successful, or will simply not occur.´
299
  
Besides, Tibi argues that next to cultural change, ´industrialization is also a 
requirement for secularization.´
300
 This leads him to say that development, based on 
secularization and individual endeavors, is human and universal, and not purely European 
or Occidental/Western. Here, he distances himself from mimicking the European model, 
“The secularization of Islam cannot come about along the lines of the Western 
pattern,”301 and adds that “Muslims can create their own Oriental Islamic variant of this 
stage of civilization [development] in which Islam would be reduced to a subsystem of 
the greater, whole social system: that is, to a religious ethic.”302 Such a process of 
secularization and perception of religion happened in societies and civilizations before in 
ancient African, Asia, and Latin America, and it is happening in the West now. 
Development can happen to any society, as does secularization and industrialization.
303
 
This certainly touches on the issue of human´s mastery of nature for their needs. The link 
between the two depends on the degree of rationality of the concerned society. Where it 
leads is based on the rational process and the proximity society makes between the 
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sacred, the profane and the political; and broadly this proximity if grounded on harmony, 
it does not end in mastery, but on affinity and reciprocal reflection.
304
  
 Over and above, according to Tibi, what some call “Islamic modernity” since al-
Afghani up to the secular nationalists” period failed to embrace modernity because they 
undermined its cultural values, true secularization, and opted for ideological secularism 
and technological modernity. Islamic modernity failed to rethink the “religious dogma” 
and satisfied itself with the “illusion of semi-modernity.”305  At the heart of modernity, 
cultural modernity in Tibi´s terms, is the question of secularization, the banning of 
religion from playing a direct role in politics but allowing the visibility of its morality and 
spirituality, which is a bold step that Muslim societies should develop and endorse 
culturally. Besides secularization, Tibi advocates the adoption of the modern conception 
of subjectivity and individual freedom, and the re-adoption of rationalism of Islamic 
falsafa/philosophy as ways of overcoming the predicament of modernity.  
b. Individual Rights and Pluralism vs. Islamic Supremacism  
For cultural modernity to work, it has to be based on individual freedom. 
Subjectivity is primary. It upholds individual agency and promotes pluralism in society. 
This is not the case with Sharia and the concept of umma that bind the individual to the 
community. This be the case, the Islamic cultural system then becomes unable to meet up 
with modernity in its entirely. Without individual rights, modernity is met half-way, and 
Islam, like all religions, becomes entangled in an impasse, termed here predicament.
306
 
Tibi argues that Sharia is in conflict with individual human rights as adopted 
internationally since 1948 through the UDHR. He further believes that it does contain the 
Huntinghtonian thesis of “clash of civilizations,” for the individual is effaced in the place 
of the community, which in turn is considered as superior to any other religion or man-
made philosophy. Tibi says: 
Let it be said candidly: the Shari’a – believed to be superior and pure, according 
to the worldview of Salafists and Islamists – establishes fault lines – like those of 
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Huntington’s Clash of Civilization. Individual human rights have no legitimacy 
whatsoever in the Shari’a. […] Individual human rights have no legitimacy 
whatsoever in the Shari’a.307 
In Islam, Muslims, as believers, have “fara’id/ duties” vis-à-vis the collectivity of 
the “umma-community,” but no individual rights in the sense of entitlements.308  
 
He adds that the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights of Cairo in 1982 is not enough and 
does not comply with the modern standards of human rights that centralize the subject. 
“There can be no specific Islamic human rights in the name of authenticity.”309  But 
taking into account that there are international needs for “universal morality,” Muslims 
can find in Hellenized Islam sources to back up their support for a shared morality.
310
 The 
latter is the “only thing” that “could unite humanity,” seeing the differences in world 
cultures.
311
 While he calls for the adoption of human rights by everyone, particularly the 
Muslims, here, he frequently warns against understanding this as a Westernization or 
universalization of the Western values, “I am not playing with words when I opt for 
universality of values and at the same time criticize the ideology of universalism.”312 
Western universalism would denigrate the right of non-Westerners, “a sweeping Western 
universalism is not the solution,” that is the reason why the adoption of individual human 
rights should be developed from within.
313
 When the individual is values, pluralism 
reigns, and supremacism vanishes.   
“Cultural modernity provides a concept of pluralism.”314 The pluralism Tibi has in 
mind is “universal” and goes against any religious narrow doctrine; “it is a segment of 
secular cultural modernity.” If secularization accommodates religion without abolishing 
it, as seen earlier, here, pluralism opens up to not just one religion, but to as many as 
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society is fraught with. Pluralism ‘stems from the political theory of democracy, which 
places all parties on an equal footing.”315 Though it originates in political science since it 
relates to the political culture of parliamentary democracy, pluralism now is required to 
be upheld by any ideology or philosophy or religion, “democracy and pluralism have 
neither Islamic nor Christian nor any other religious roots.”316 Islam, like any other 
component and party in society, has to adopt this idea of pluralism, against the 
supremacist view it has of itself as “the final revelation” and “the only true religion.”317 
Such an enterprise “can only be successful in the spirit of an “open Islam” that goes 
beyond scriptural confines.”318 Tibi believes that Islam can accommodate pluralism, 
while its counterpart, i.e. Islamism, cannot because it aims at establishing a supremacist 
Islamic order.  
Islam already accepts diversity, but it is pluralism that has to be rethought of from 
within. Diversity is not enough; it is a component of pluralism paradigm. “Islam accepts 
diversity, but not pluralism.” The latter is a normative concept that goes beyond the 
concept of umma to accommodate ´a set of basic values, norms, and rules to be shared 
with non-Muslims´, while the former is a state of affairs, a description of what is there.
 319
  
In Tibi´s thought, it is the Sharia’s weak stance when compared with international 
law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the liberal democratic values that 
challenges the Muslims to rethink particular issues of their religion to accommodate 
pluralism. Legal aspects of Sharia law stand as the main barrier in the reform Tibi, and 
other reformists, calls for: 
For scholars such as myself, living and working as Muslims in a state of tension 
between Western and Eastern culture, the question arises whether Islamic legal 
discourse, with the great steps forward made by Europe in its own legal sphere, 
can be fertilized without at the same time sacrificing Islamic authenticity.
320
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The main legal issues concern individual and collective rights. They can be numerated as 
follows: 1) the place of the non-Muslim monotheists (Jews and Christians) as dhimmis, 
i.e. protected minorities instead of being considered equal, 2) the place of the other non-
Muslim non-monotheists (Hindus, Buddhists, etc.) as unbelievers/kāfirūn in Islamic 
thought, 3) the consideration of the Shi‘a as heretics, and vice versa, 4) the place of the 
Muslim or non-Muslim reformists who are at times convicted of apostasy and death 
through takfir doctrine, 5) the discrimination against all religious minorities within Islam 
(Baha’i, Ahmadiyya, etc.), and 6) discrimination against women.321  
 The adoption of pluralism is needed because there is a lot from religious legacy 
that has been either not updated to keep up with the historical changes of societies or 
because the politicization of religion has taken a fundamentalist guise as seen before. The 
Islamic world order, hakkimiyat allah, the umma, jihad, Shariatization of law, and 
proselytization are among the main concepts that belittle the importance of pluralism and 
abort reforming Islam: 
For Islam to achieve an accommodation of pluralism of religions and cultures, 
which is possible, Muslims need to have an honest willingness to rethink inherited 
Islamic concepts of the non-Muslim other, and thus to change their worldview. In 
short, they need to go beyond apologetics and scriptural interpretations. Put in 
plain language: in a world of pluralism of religions there is no room whatsoever 
for supremacy.
322
  
The supremacy that is discussed here is at the theoretical and normative level, which is 
found in a number of classical texts. Tibi admits that those texts have to be historically 
contextualized and that tolerance and respect is very much emphasized in the Quran and 
some Hadiths. His fear is with the return of religion the way it is advocated by some 
theologians like al-Mawdudi, Qutb, Anwar Aljundi, Muhammad Zaibaq and Ali Jarisha 
who speak of the supremacy of Islam. Such political theologians refuse dialogue because 
it (dialogue) equates ´the last true revelation´ with Christianity and Judaism.
323
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 Tolerance, tasamuh, in classical Islam subdues the People of the Book as a 
minority and considers the non-monolithic non-Muslims as infidels. At its time, it was an 
advanced model; it game the human being his/her dignity despite colour, race, or gender. 
However, the modern standards of tolerance are higher, and diversity has to elevate to the 
status of considering the ´othered´ non-Muslim other as an equal person, equal citizen in 
a democratic society, this applies to man as much as it applies to woman, despite their 
religious or philosophic or ideological affiliations. Tibi sometimes seems puzzled with 
Islamic history, its diversity, and various interpretations and models it has taken, ´There 
is an inner contradiction in Islam.´
324
 By way of illustration, the notion of umma for him 
is supposed to be universal and able to accommodate even the non-Muslims within the 
Muslim community, if Islam is truly universal. Here, the umma is ´inclusive, not 
exclusive.´
325
 Yet, the resurgence of the notion of the umma has narrowed down its scope 
and made of it a negative religio-political term.  
 So, though he claims that pluralism the way he advocates it cannot be 
extrapolated directly from Quranic texts, Tibi still believes that there are references that 
can uphold it as it upheld the past tolerance and diversity achievements. Pluralism as held 
here then does not find all its ingredients in the Islamic texts, simply because the 
historical conditions were different. Religious legitimacy is needed for his approach, and 
he backs it up with verses that call for tolerance and respect of religious differences. Tibi 
writes the following: 
The concept of pluralism definitely does not exist in the Quran, nor was there ever 
a corresponding reality in Islamic history.
326
 […] No scriptural approach could 
ever provide a promising avenue. Nevertheless, I refer in this inquiry to the 
scriptural approach for the sake of establishing a religious legitimacy for 
pluralism in Islam. One can use Quranic references in pursuit of this – however, 
with an awareness of the limits of the approach.
327
  
Among the Quranic verses Tibi invokes are the following: “There is no compulsion in 
religion” (2:256), “You have your religion and I have mine” (109:6), “Allah does not 
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change people unless they change themselves” (13:11).328 The pluralism aspired to 
nurtures “open” and “civil Islam.” Pluralism in Islam would affect Muslims in Islamic 
majority countries, Muslims in Europe, and wherever they are. That would also 
contribute to inter-religious, inter-civilizational, as well as intra-religious dialogues for 
world peace. 
c. Knowledge: Rational Falsafa vs. Fiqh-Orthodoxy 
 Cultural modernity cannot stand if knowledge is not reason-based. This does not 
happen if the heritage of Islamic falsafa/philosophy is not revived to make rationalism 
alive again from within. This is among the other levels of reforms Tibi proposes. Two 
sub-arguments underpin his proposal. The first one is his belief that knowledge based on 
reason is universal, and does not stop at some geographies or cultures, and the second is 
that High Islam, though short-lived, was based on reason and open to other cultures and 
civilizations. The scriptures argue for the use of reason as well, “The scriptures […] have 
left ample room for rationality.”329 With these two mains arguments rethinking Islam can 
overcome its impasse. Tibi refutes the idea of the Islamization of knowledge and science. 
He also belittles the idea of multiple modernities advanced by postmodernists, 
postcolonial theorists, Islamists, and some anthropological studies.
330
  
 Based on reason, the idea of authenticity and ´purification´ of thought disappears. 
´Enlightenment applies to all humans and could thus be shared by most cultures.´
331
 Tibi 
defends the idea that the Hellenized period of medieval Islam shows that ´borrowing´ was 
never a problem for the early Muslims:  
To be authentic is to maintain the self while borrowing/learning from the other. 
According to this understanding, Islamic ´falsafa/rationalism´ can be viewed as 
authentically Islamic. In this sense, reference to Western theories and approaches 
in order to grasp and conceptualize Islam´s predicament with cultural modernity 
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cannot be dismissed as “unauthentic,” as is done by postmodernists and Islamists. 
To engage in borrowing from other cultures is an authentic Islamic mindset. 
332
 
Enlightenment at the era of Hellenization occurred because the “Muslim mind” followed 
the Quranic and Sunna tradition that encourage learning. The Prophet´s words that 
encourage to pursue learning even from distant lands, ´even from China,´ is common 
among Muslims, but the contemporary Islamists are far from adopting it, argues Tibi.
333
  
 In his work on the comprehensive intellectual history in Islam,
334
 Tibi finds that in 
medieval Islam, science ranked high.
335
 For the medievalist rationalists, ´the rational 
legacy of Hellenism was not an ´Aristotelian imperialism.´´
336
 The Abbasid era is the 
most thriving and rationalist era in Islamic history. Harun al-Rashid (reigned from 786 to 
809) and his son al-Ma”mun (reigned from 813 and 833) who set Dar al-Hikma, the 
House of Wisdom, are shining examples of the investment in the sciences and translation 
of the works of the Greeks into Arabic and from Arabic into Latin.  Cordoba and Toledo 
(Tulaytila in Arabic) centers are another example from Islamic history.
337
 Tibi repeatedly 
states that the worldview that characterized Hellenized Islam (High Islam) was secular in 
the sense that it did not reject the divine view from its reasoning. The Muslim 
distinguished philosophers from the 8
th
 to the 14 centuries are the main reference for Tibi 
when it comes to the compatibility of reason and divinity.  Alkindi (801–873), al-Razi, 
Rhazes in Latin, (854-925), al-Farabi, al-Farabius, (872-950), al-Ghazali, Algazel, (1058–
1111), Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), known as Averroes in Latin, Ibn Sinna, known as 
Avicenna, (980-1037) up to Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), besides the school of the whole 
Mu”tazilite from the 8th to the 10th century, are the frequent names Tibi refers to as the 
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rational era-makers as defenders of reason in early Islam. He calls for the revival of this 
lost heritage, which is hardly included in Muslim educational systems. 
 Tibi believes that during the high days of Islam, rationalists and their defenders 
were a small community and faced strong opposition from the orthodox schools. The 
Ash´arite opposition of the Mu”tazilite is very known and decisive in Islamic history, but 
the problem is that the Mu”tazilite heritage is not taught in educational systems in the 
Muslim world.
338
 The Islamic fiqh orthodoxy controlled the Islamic system of education. 
In his study of the Islamic intellectual history, Tibi finds that ´The fault lines in classical 
Islam were not between the ´self´ and the ´other,´ but rather within its civilization, i.e. 
between rational knowledge and sacral fiqh-jurisprudence.´
339
  He compares this 
antagonism between the rationalist sand the orthodox scholars with the current trends and 
antagonism between the reformists and the fundamentalists.
340
  
Tibi says that if the rationalists were accommodated and their ideas 
institutionalized, modernity could have taken shape in the Islamic world before Europe. 
Here are his words: 
Just as Europe had its Descartes and Kant, Islam had its Farabi, Ibn 
Sina/Avicenna, and Ibn Rushd/Averroes. They were rationalists of the same 
caliber. In Europe, however, the thinking of Decartes was institutionalized and 
thus developed into a cultural Cartesianism, with the result that, as a reason-based 
(res cogito) philosophy, it was able to shape the prevailing European worldview. 
In contrast, Muslim rationalists were prevented from doing so. They were denied 
the opportunity to determine the course of Islamic civilization and its 
worldview.
341
  
For Tibi, it was reason and not fiqh that raised Islamic philosophy of the time, and it was 
philosophy based on reason that these Muslim philosophers contributed to Europe. “The 
contribution of Islam to Europe on the eve of the Renaissance was falsafa, and certainly 
not fiqh.”342 It is based on this heritage that Tibi corroborates his argument of cultural 
modernity and gives it an Islamic aura, “The Islamic rationalism of Averroes is a cultural 
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heritage that makes modernity authentic for Muslims.”343 Averroes makes a special 
contribution in Tibi’s argument because he, Averroes, speaks of the ´double truth,´ 
alḥaqiqa al-muzdawaja, which succinctly advances the compatibility and 
complementarity of the two world views in search for the truth, the divine and the 
worldly, the reasonable and metaphysical-reasoning, which can be taken to mean that 
secularization does not abolish religion, and vice versa.
344
 The flourishing of Islamic 
philosophy took place because the spirit of cultural opening to the world and learning 
from other cultures and civilizations were characteristics of early Muslims. The 
Hellenization of Islamic philosophy did not make the rationalists look less Muslim nor 
did it affect their identity as religious individuals.
345
 This capacity of learning from the 
other is what Tibi brings up to reform Islam. The fact that his cultural modernity project 
refers to Western theories does not make his approach “unauthentic,” first because he 
refers to Islamic past history and philosophy, and second because this heritage itself kept 
its authenticity though it borrowed a lot from Greek philosophy and other cultures, which 
in turn was used/borrowed when the Europeans took it back from Renaissance.
346
    
 After Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), the last main Islamic philosopher of high caliber, 
and the founder of the science of sociology and historiography according to the great 
historian of civilization Arnold Toynbee’s (1889-1975) testimony, the Muslim world 
collapsed into an intellectual stagnation and taqlid (mimicry of the past, without 
intellectual exertion). Internal and external constraints would contribute to that. The 
internal constraints could be summarized in the weight fiqh schools gained through 
politics and educational systems at the expense of the demising rational tradition. Since 
then, the gates of ijtihad ´nearly closed´ and built just on the main jurisprudence schools, 
madhahib, instead of practicing the ijtihad in a more genuine basis by getting into the 
founding texts in the Quran and the Sunna themselves and contextualize them according 
to new needs. As to the external constraints, it is the division of political power in the 
Machreq as well as in the Maghreb, including Spain, and the focus of the Ottoman 
                                                          
343
 Ibid., 239 
344
 Ibid.,  251  
345
 Ibid., 241 
346
 Ibid.,  243 
116 
 
Empire on the development of the military and jihad instead of science that the cultural 
life deteriorated.  
d. Euro-Islam: Modern, Secular, and Pluralist  
 I reiterate that in my approach I argue that Islam in Europe, being discussed here 
in its historical, political and intellectual development as European Islam in these initial 
decades of establishing itself in the continent, goes on with the debate of modernity and 
its challenge of, and being challenged by, Islam. The reform agenda of Tibi falls within 
the scope of my research approach. Muslims in Europe, with the many issues over their 
(said failed or at least difficult) integration, are still part of the political and theological 
debate that concerns their co-religionits in general either in the communities where they 
make a majority or significant minority worldwide. Reform projects are discussed in the 
East as much as they are discussed in the West, in Europe in particular. Many scholars 
involved in this endeavor are based in the West or even come from it, as is the case with 
the two main scholars I refer to.  
 Muslims in the diaspora, like their co-religionist in the Muslim majority countries, 
carry with them the impasse of Islam in the face of the modern Europe. Signs of the 
continuity of what Tibi calls “darkness” phases in Islamic history are echoed in Europe 
and can be seen in the fundamentalization of some Muslim youth and their inability to 
differentiate between the two worldviews, the divine and the profane, the public and 
private in religion. The Muslims´ burning of The Satanic Verses of Salam Rushdie in 
1989 reminds Tibi of similar events in Islamic history, i.e. the burning of the works of 
Muslim medieval rationalists and their indictment as heretics and apostates.
347
  
 The various issues Tibi raises when discussing his Islam reform agenda repeat 
themselves when the Muslim diaspora in Europe is invoked. However, since Western 
Europe is already liberal, democratic, and secular in various ways according to each 
country and its history, some issues like democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
secularization take a secondary position. Priority in Euro-Islam goes to the aspects of 
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pluralism in (the reformed) Islam and the manifestations that either denigrate or solidify 
its modernity.  
 Tibi is clearly against any consideration of Europe as a land of Islam or a land of 
da´wa. He is a strong opponent of fundamentalist Islam made diffuse among the Muslims 
in ghettoes and suburbs. Even the Muslim Brothers networks and their said moderate 
presence in Europe are dangerous for him. They ghettoize Muslims even in their 
moderate views. He considers Tariq Ramadan on of them, and clearly opposes his 
version of European Islam and his notion of Sharia as dar-ashahada. Proselytizing leads 
to ethnic ghettoization and alienation. He gives the examples of the Muslim bombers that 
took place in London, Madrid, the killing of Van Gogh in Amsterdam, and includes the 
Paris banlieue riots of 2005 in this category; he calls it “French Intifada.”348 The fear of 
Islamizing Europe through the concept of hijra and daʻwa, proselytizing and call to Islam 
through migration, is very much opposant to the idea of Euro-Islam and its various 
values, among which is the freedom of the individual. 
Tibi is equally critical of multiculturalists and group rightists. For him, that too 
just exacerbates ghettoization and gives more space for encroaching on the values of 
liberal democratic societies by both the fundamentalists and the European 
muliticulturalists, as is the case of the German Orientalist Tilman Nagel (b. 1942). 
According to the reading of Tibi, Nagel aims at alienating the Muslim immigrants by 
keeping them as ´others´ in Europe by means of the ´protected minorities´ scheme.
349
 Tibi 
invokes case studies he conducted in Indiam and the serious repercussions of “minority 
rights” policies have on society overall politics: 
given the already existing evidence of a growing hatred toward foreigners and the 
dreadful right-wing radicalism, we should be very cautious in discussions on 
collective minority rights and also need to discern the Muslim hatred ignited in 
some mosques against ““Jews and crusaders.”“ I have misgivings that any 
granting of minority privileges and special collective rights to cultural and 
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religious groups would be counter-productive, leading to similar results as in the 
case of India.
350
 
Minority rights would just fuel Right Wing as well as “ghettoized” minorities and 
solidify the gap between the two.  
Postmodernists and relativists are all the same for Tibi. They call for cultural 
difference without being aware of the risks and repercussions of alienation of the groups 
studied, ´There are blind Europeans who fail to see that such an Islamization would result 
from their idea of ““multi-cultural discourse,”“ a romantic ideology directed against 
cultural pluralism that combines cultural diversity with a consensus over core values.´
351
 
Tibi goes further, as would postcolonial critics do though he is critical of their critique, 
too, and states that “European multiculturalists look at other cultures with a sense of 
romantic-eccentric mystiﬁcation, following the Euro-centric tradition of viewing aliens as 
bons sauvages.”352  
Broadly, for Tibi, ´multi-culturalism is based on cultural relativism,´
353
 which is 
not the same as ´cultural pluralism´ which is based on modern values that everyone 
should endorse in Europe, including the Muslims. For example, Tibi is against the 
naming of mosques founded by German-Turks after the Ottoman Sultan Fatih (1432 –
1481) who conquered the European soil during his expansion, because, for him, that is an 
abuse of multiculturalism.
354
 For him, this shows that the mindset of ´religious 
imperialism´ still harbors in the mind of multiculturalist communitarians and proselytizer 
neo-absolutist Muslims, who could be supported by undemocratic regimes in the south of 
the Mediterranean. Tibi summarizes the point in this passage: 
The granting of multi-cultural minority privileges to Muslim migrants in Europe 
could prove to be a double-edged sword with far-reaching harmful consequences. 
On the one hand it could facilitate the unwanted interference of Islamic-
Mediterranean, mostly undemocratic governments in the affairs of Muslim 
migrants in Europe, which happens already. On the other, it could also lead to the 
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minorities in Europe being used as the ghetto, hijacked by the self-proclaimed 
representatives of political Islam acting in exile and operating as a transnational 
movement.
355
 
Otherwise put, minority mindset does not work for Euro-Islam. The European Muslims 
would still feel alienated, and the European natives would still feel centrist towards the 
others, the Muslims. Even the moderate Imams and Muslim scholars who speak of 
Europe as the abode of testimony widen the gap between citizens in the same society, and 
their discourse rekindles the idea of “religious imperialism”:  
More peaceful Imams, like Zaki Badawi of London or the Swiss-born Tariq 
Ramadan, present themselves as moderates, but the fact that they label Europe as 
a part of dar al-Islam/abode of Islam is an offense to the idea of Europe. Cultural-
relativist multi-culturalism accepts these offenses as examples of cultural 
communitarianism and fails to see the religious imperialism that is included 
within this neo-absolutist universalism.
356
  
Tibi dismisses any idea of considering the abode of Europe part of the abode of 
professing Shahada (testimony) as Tariq Ramadan, for instance, does in his project (to be 
dealt with later). “Reformist Euro-Islam, as I present it, is not what Ramadan claims to be 
a European Islam,”357 for “despite its Muslim population, Europe is not dar al-Islam.”358  
 Like the Muslims who are working on reforming Islam, the Europeans 
also have to revise their heritage, especially their perception of the historic Muslim 
“Other.” Tibi believes that the idea of Europe with all its values of liberal democracy and 
human rights is experiencing a crisis in its identity. Its ésprit de corps, in Montesquieu´s 
terms, “is characterized by uncertainty, oscillating between vanishing Christianity and 
crumbing secularity” There is a need for an open Europe, as much as there is a need for 
an open Islam, “If Europeans do not change, they risk the Islamization of Europe.”359The 
idea of “remaking the Club,” the Club of Europe, alone without giving space to the 
´other´ does not solve integration issues. “Both [Europeans and Muslims] need to 
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change”360 to build an open society. For that to take place, Europe needs to reconstruct its 
asabiyya, i.e. its ésprit de corps. Tibi borrows the term asabiyya from the Muslim 
Philosopher Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) and his pioneering work on sociology and 
historiography, ilm al-‘umran, in al-muqaddima/ Prolegomena:    
For Ibn Khaldun […] each vivid civilization is based on a spirit of asabiyya, best 
translated with Montesquieu’s term ““ésprit de corps,”“ as already mentioned. 
The rise and decline of civilizations is related by Ibn Khaldun to the state of 
asabiyya: if this is strong, then a civilization thrives; when it weakens, then the 
decay begins. As a Muslim immigrant living in Europe, I believe I can see a very 
weak European asabiyya facing the strong self-assertive sentiments of Muslim 
newcomers.
361
  
Cultural pluralism, which Europe has the credential to accommodate, is what a 
new ésprit de corps, a new asabiyya is about. The well standing of Europe needs that all 
its citizens, whatsoever be their religion and philosophy of life, feel it (i.e. Europe) by 
heart, “Europe needs a combination of self-awareness (asabiyya) and tolerance to come 
to terms with the Islamic civilization.”362 “From a dialogic Euro-Islamic perspective,” 
Tibi adds, “it is a healthy sign if a common European asabiyya can be shared.”363 
European asabiyya makes ´citizens by heart´ and not “citizens by passport.”364 That 
applies to all Europeans, including the Muslims who have to enhance a “Euro-Islamic 
asabiyya.”365  
“Euro-Islamic asabiyya” is a core concept in Tibi’s idea of Euro-Islam. Before 
coming to its manifold meanings, two options have to be mentioned as a rationale behind 
Tibi´s version of Islam in Europe: option one is the Europeanization of Islam; option two 
is the Islamization of Europe. Euro-Islam constructs the first option because it contributes 
to the idea of Europe without discrimination, ethnicization, or Islamization. Euro-Islam 
constructs the identity of Muslims where they feel that they belong to the same polity 
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with their European patriots.
366
 “The idea of a multiple identity determines the concept of 
Euro-Islam, inspired both by the idea of Europe and by the historical experience of the 
Hellenization of Islam in the better days of Islamic civilization.”367 By the “idea of 
Europe” he means “an inclusive concept of freedom and citizenship” that finds its roots 
in the Enlightenment.
368
  
 Tibi’s idea of Euro-Islam is rooted in his project of cultural modernity. If cultural 
modernity is for all Muslims wherever they may be, Euro-Islam is mainly destined for the 
Muslims of Europe, the European Muslims. When tackling the concept of Euro-Islam, 
one still has to bear in mind Tibi’s earlier views of religion as a cultural system. His 
reference to Afro-Islam, Indo-Islam, and Arab Islam helps in understanding his vision of 
Euro-Islam.
369
 Unlike the common mediatized view of Islam as monolithic in 
manifestation and practice by Western media, Tibi defends his idea and says that Euro-
Islam is “intended to provide a liberal variety of Islam acceptable both to Muslim 
migrants and to European societies, one that might accommodate European ideas of 
secularity and individual citizenship along the lines of modern secular democracy.”370  It 
is also reason-based, “Muslims in the diaspora are advised to embrace the rational view 
of the world.”371  
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 Tibi drives to the idea that ´Euro-Islam is the very same religion of Islam, 
although culturally adjusted to the civic culture of modernity.´
372
 A long citation gives 
Tibi space to speak his idea clearly: 
The major features of Euro-Islam would be laicite, cultural modernity, and an 
understanding of tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to 
Abrahamic believers (People of the Book, ahl al-kitab). In addition, by 
acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism, Euro-Islam would give up the 
claim of Islamic dominance. Thus defined, Euro-Islam would be compatible with 
liberal democracy, individual human rights, and the requirements of a civil 
society. It would also contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result 
in ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow complete 
assimilation of Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption of forms of civil society 
leading to an enlightened, open-minded Islamic identity compatible with 
European civic culture.
373
  
Euro-Islam thus described is the modern face of “Hellenized Islam.” It is “open,” “civil,” 
and “pluralist,” to use Tibi´s preferred terms, “inspired both by the idea of Europe and by 
the historical experience of the Hellenization of Islam in the better days of Islamic 
civilization.”374 It denotes multiple identities, but not multiple modernities.  
Let it be said without ambiguity: It is not an exaggeration to state that the future 
of Europe will be determined by the ability of both Europeans and Muslim 
immigrants to establish peace between themselves. They need to forge a pattern 
of Euro-Islamic identity based on the core values of Europe, described as the idea 
of Europe endorsed by a liberal and reformed Islam. A polity for people of 
different religions can only be a secular one, and the idea of Europe is secular, not 
Christian. The value-conﬂict between Islamism and the idea of Europe is not a 
conﬂict between Islam and Christianity, nor is it a clash of civilization.375  
 Because Euro-Islam targets the Muslims and the non-Muslims alike in Europe, 
Tibi proposes the development of a “civic culture” based on “intercultural ethics.”376 
Otherwise said, “civic culture” builds on “enlightened Islamic education” and “a real 
inter-civilizational dialogue aimed at establishing multiple identities, a cross-cultural 
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consensus,” over “individual human rights.”377 While the Europeans have to revise their 
centrist views of the other, and their multiculturalists and postmodernists beware of the 
risks of minority rights they advocate, the Muslims, on the other hand, have to adopt the 
idea of Europe and what it means, without this being an invitation to assimilation. By 
consenting to the idea of Europe, Muslims, despite their diversity in Europe, have to 
disconnect their understanding of Islam from Sharia, the legal conception of Islamic law, 
and have thus to abandon jihad and daʻwa/proselytization.378 “Enlightened Islamic 
education,” within “civic culture” scheme, “is a means of maintaining an Islamic identity, 
but not if it serves segregationist ends.” “The proposition here is that Muslims become 
members of the European body politic they live in, without giving up their Islamic 
identity or rejecting the identity of Europe.”379 
Recapitulation 
 In this part of my work I have tried to sketch out the main features of Bassam 
Tibi’s agenda of cultural modernity to reform Islam, and to make it accessible in theory 
and practice to the Muslims in the Islamic lands and in Europe. I have opted for outlining 
his agenda as an example of a liberal Muslim scholar from political science perspectives. 
It should be noted that the reform focuses on the legal aspects of Islam. I do not intend to 
be analytical here, but merely recapitulative. I leave my analytical part to Part IV of this 
work. In the first section of this part I have shown how Tibi considers Islam in society as 
a cultural system that is influenced by a number of society’s internal and external 
enrichments and weaknesses. As Tibi argues, apart from the Prophetic period and the 
Abbasid flourishing era, the Muslim world and mind has ever since fallen into mimicry 
(taqlid) of its predecessors instead of exerting ijtihad for renewal.  
From the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, up to the eighteenth century, the time of 
the first major encounter with the modern West, the Muslim world just stagnated on all 
levels. In its early attempts of modernization after this encounter, it, however, failed to 
make a breakthrough in its reform, because the dogma condensed in Sharia law was still 
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considered divine, as if it were the word of God itself. The secularist attempts after them 
failed both for internal and external reasons. And that gave space to the frustrated 
fundamentalists to rise up, and replace the reform endeavours of religious scholars with 
obscurantist agenda to overthrow the West from its hegemonic stance. That brought back 
religious historically-old concepts into modern revival, without taking into account the 
world socio-political changes and economic interdependencies that bind the Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Fundamentalism then obscured the enlightened aspect of the religion of 
Islam. To overcome this predicament, adopting cultural modernity with its main aspects 
of secularization, rationality, and subjectivity seems a historical necessity for an “open 
Islam.” Islam in Europe, in its version of Euro-Islam that adopts the same modern 
features, answers the dilemma of European Muslims and makes their residence 
unproblematic. 
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Part Two: Tariq Ramadan 
Theologico-Political Justifications for 
European Islam 
 
For years, in the course of my work on law and jurisprudence, I have been reading and 
analyzing reference works on the fundamentals of Islamic law (usûl al-fiqh) and their 
concrete and practical implementation in different historical periods (fiqh), with the aim, 
of course, of finding new answers to the new challenges faced by contemporary 
Muslims—and, among them, Western Muslims. Many fields have been investigated by 
contemporary Muslim scholars, many proposals have been drawn up and the reform of 
reading and understanding as well as the exercise of ijtihâd have been a continuous 
practice. Today, however, we seem to have reached a limit, so that we shall have to ask 
ourselves precisely not only what meaning we give to the notion of reform […] but also 
what its objectives must be. To put it clearly, what reform do we mean? 
Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, 2009: 27. 
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The discourse
380
 of Tariq Ramadan on European Islam is different from that of 
Bassam Tibi both in content and form. This part of the work is devoted to presenting this 
discourse, its beginnings, developments, and aims. As I did with Tibi, I go briefly 
through the intellectual biography of Ramadan to link it with the development of his 
discourse. I do not get engaged in the controversy that the French media has built around 
him, but I refer to it for its convenience to the topic whenever I see the need for that. I 
also consider it convenient to state as early as this stage, before the comparative and 
evaluative stages which come later, that I will study Ramadan not chronologically but 
thematically, as I have done with Tibi. However, it is important to note two points at this 
stage, to be born in mind: first, there has been a shift, a development in Ramadan´s 
discourse on reforming Islam, especially in its legal aspect, which can certainly impact 
the understanding of European Islam, and contemporary Islamic thought debate in 
general. My focused research on Ramadan started mainly in 2009, before his Radical 
Reform (2009) came out. The shift I will refer to concerns this book and its subsequent, 
The Quest for Meaning (2010). I was not surprised to read, about two years later, in 
November 2011, the review of Andrew March about Radical Reform, in which he 
describes the shift as an “explosion.”381 Second, this shift noted in Radical Reform does 
not affect his whole contribution in the debate of contemporary Islamic thought and its 
concentration on European Islam, and that shows how consistent his arguments are when 
it comes to issues of human rights and ethics for example. These two notes make my 
thematic study of Ramadan match to a large extent the chronology of his writings. In the 
outset, I note then that I prefer to speak of “development,” instead of “explosion” in 
Ramadan’s thought. Speaking of “early Ramadan” and “late Ramadan” is possible. This 
will be gradually explained in the coming sections of this part, Part II, and more of it will 
be discussed in the analytical Part IV.  
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In this overture, I just need to mention the books I will be focusing on. As noted 
earlier, Ramadan has penned about 30 books, some short and some long, besides 
countless public lectures worldwide and opinion articles for newspapers, on line websites 
and his personal website. In my selection, I make use of his major works that date from 
the 1990s up to 2010: Les musulmans dans la laϊcité (1994), Aux sources des renouvea 
musulman: d’al Afghani à Hassan al-Banna – un siècle de reéformisme islamique (1998), 
Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity (2001), To Be a European Muslim: A 
Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context (1999), Western Muslims and the 
Future of Islam (2004), In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of 
Muhammad (2007), Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2008), What I 
Believe (2009), and The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism 
(2010). Among his minor works I consult - besides some of his videoed lectures, TV 
encounters, and articles - Muslims in France: The Way towards Coexistence (1999) 
Musulmans d´Occident: construire et contribuer (2002), Entre l´homme et son Coeur: la 
voie de l´unique (2004), Quelques lettres du coeur (2008, and his long interview with 
Aziz Zemmouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan? (2006).
382
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The Beginnings: From Geneva to the World 
 The physical journey of Ramadan to Europe could be traced back to the activism 
of his grandfather, from his maternal side, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brothers (shortened as MB) in Egypt in 1928. His father, Said Ramadan, himself, too, an 
activist and prominent intellectual within the MB married Wafa al-Banna, a daughter of 
Hassan al-Banna. Said Ramadan had to escape from President Gamal Abd Nasser’s 
Egypt, after the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in 1954: a Muslim Brother was accused 
of trying to kill Nasser. Said exiled himself, for security, in Switzerland in 1954, where 
Tariq was born, in 1962. His father, Said, was active in international Islam; he founded 
the World Islamic League in Saudi Arabia , and established the Islamic Center in Geneva 
in 1961.  
On the personal level, the young Ramadan faced questions of religion around the 
age of sixteen, and that did not take a form of revolt, as he says; rather, he was 
determinate to make his own choices, without internal or external pressure.  He says he 
had questions about and to God, but no doubts.
383
 That coincided with the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, and the repercussions of which he did not like. The revolution 
represented religion as an oppressive worldview by which personal choices have little 
space where to be articulated. As early as that age, he says he felt the need to speak up for 
religious liberty of expression.  
When asked how his observance of religion was considered among his peers, 
especially that he was travelling in Latin America, India, and Africa, he says that 
wherever he went his choices were respected, and never met with any disdain. About ten 
years later, Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988) in the UK, and the headscarf 
affair (l’affaire du foulard, 1989) in France would raise the freedom of expression and 
religion in the public sphere to unprecedented levels of tension inside and outside Europe. 
As the debate intensified, Ramadan could hardly see beacons of reasoning and profound 
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analysis, but mere emotional politics in the forefront, from Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, as he narrates to Aziz Zemmouri.  
These three main events (the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie Affair, the 
Headscarf Affair) pushed him to work on his Islamic background more seriously to get 
involved in the debate for an enlightened dialogue and understanding. In retrospect, he 
tells Zemmouri in the interview, ´At a certain moment in my life, I felt the need to know 
better the meaning of what I believed in, and the need to deepen its substance and be able 
to tell myself: ´this is what I believe in.´´
384
  His family background, and more 
importantly its exile, had a say in shaping his worldview, ´exile of my family, the 
suffering that resulted from it, and the up-rootedness all played an undeniable role in my 
life.´
385
 The quest for justice and resistance to any unjust discourse, be it ideological, 
religious, or philosophic, Western or non-Western, are among the lessons his family exile 
has taught him.
386
  
As the youngest of six children, not all his brothers are religious – one of them 
even revolted against religion, but his brother Hani, who is in charge of the Islamic 
Center in Geneva, is religiously active, and Ramadan publicly distances himself from his 
methodology of interpreting religious texts, a point that Ramadan’s detractors invoke 
when his family genealogy is put on the table, which is often done. He affirms that there 
was freedom within this religious family context: 
It was not easy, growing up in a committed Muslim family while dealing with 
people outside who were drinking, and all that. But I was protected on ethical 
grounds, as a religious person, first of all by playing sports, every day, for two 
hours or more — football, tennis, running. And reading, reading, reading, five 
hours a day, sometimes eight hours. My father warned me that life was not in 
books. But it meant that even though I stayed away from drinking, I got respect 
from the people around me. I was known as “the professor,” “le docteur.””387 
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As an adolescent, and later as a young teacher and dean at the age of twenty-four in 
College de Saussure, active in sports and solidarity work inside and in the third world, he 
was elected as one of Geneva personalities in 1990.
388
  
Ramadan university studies in French literature and philosophy culminated in the 
writing of a PhD dissertation on Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 - 1900), entitled Nietzsche as 
a Historian of Philosophy (published in 1998 as De la souffrance: etudes Nitzscheenne et 
islamique (On Suffering: Nietzscheaen and Islamic Studies)). Along with Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky (1821 –1881), the Russian renowned literary figure, the two philosophers 
would become “my universal frame of reference.” Despite his immersion in European 
philosophy, he still “felt lonely in Europe, facing racial discrimination, and all that. So I 
idealized Egypt. My body was in Europe, but my heart was over there. I wanted to go 
back “home.” The young Ramadan went to al-Azhar university in Cairo in 1991, with 
Iman, his wife, a Swiss convert, and their kids, to profound his command of the Islamic 
sciences, mainly Islamic jurisprudence, in a one-on-one intensive training for a 
curriculum of five years, which he condensed in fourteen months, `I resigned both from 
my post as a dean and as president of the Helping Hand Cooperative [...]. I needed 
change and to return to the sources of my faith and spirituality.`
389
 The sojourn in Egypt 
empowered his comprehension of Islam and “turned him into a convinced European.” In 
his encounters with Iam Buruma, a renowned Dutch-American journalist and writer, he 
says, “I felt I had been misled” and adds:  
The philosophical connection between the Islamic world and the West is much 
closer than I thought. Doubt did not begin with Descartes. We have this 
construction today that the West and Islam are entirely separate worlds. This is 
wrong. Everything I am doing now, speaking of connections, intersections, 
universal values we have in common, this was already there in history.
390
 
Ramadan followed his early life activism later in his academic life. “I want to be 
an activist professor,” he told Buruma in an interview. As an activist professor, since the 
early 1990s after his return from al-Azhar, Ramadan built strong networks with the 
                                                          
388
 What I Believe, 8-11 
389
  Ibid., 14 
390
 Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” available online. 
131 
 
Muslim community in his country, but mainly in Lyon, the French city closest to him 
geographically, where he would lecture constantly, sometimes to spectators that 
numbered 1500, up to 3000, while holding lectureship at the University of Fribourg in 
Switzerland from 1996 to 2003. His work with The Union of Young Muslims and the 
Tawhid bookstore and publishing house in Lyon contributed to building his career as a 
brilliant communicator, sermon giver, lecturer and advisor of especially the young 
Muslims in France. Le Monde, Le Monde Diplomatique, and Polis magazine, besides 
Tawhid bookstore, would push his name into the public, with videocassettes, Islam, le 
face à face des civilizations: quel projet pour quelle modernité (1994), les Musulmans 
dans la laicité (1994), and other edited books. In 1995, France denied him entry, but 
petitions flooded, and the ministry of interior soon released an error statement.   
Ramadan’s work at the grassroots level alarmed mostly the French left-wing 
politicians, journalists, and intellectuals who have both contributed to his further 
engagement in the debate as well as to the controversy they have built around him: ´the 
double speak of Tariq Ramadan,´ as the journalist Caroline Fourest entitles her book on 
him, Brother Tariq: The Brother Speak of Tariq Ramadan (first published in French in 
2004; and translated in the US in 2008). This book seems to have dictated the beginning 
of any debate with Ramadan, which most journalists and scholars have to go through 
when reading about him. The book, in brief, is critical of Ramadan, and labels him as 
fundamentalist, anti-modernist, anti-secularist, and anti-feminist, a member of the 
Muslim Brothers, and an advocate of their agenda of Islamization of Europe. Ramadan, 
in a TV encounter with Fourest few years later told her that she had misquoted him about 
200 times.
391
 Sadri Khiari lately enters the debate and reverses the discourses against 
Fourest. His Sainte Caroline contre Tariq Ramadan: le livre qui met un point final à 
Caroline Fourest (2011) argues that Fourest’s couple of works on Ramadan, 
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immigration, and political Islam are narcissist, Eurocentrist, and feed the Huntinghtonian 
thesis of clash of civilizations.
392
  
Most of the published books on Ramadan are written by French journalists and 
public intellectuals, a reality which shows how tense the debate has been in France, 
mostly about certain points Ramadan raise or those that his detractors feel suspicious 
about him, without going into a real theological debate with him. Lionel Favrot would 
follow the same writing method of Fouest in Tariq Ramadan dévoilé: Enquête sur ce 
islamiste qui sévit dans les banlieues (2004). He goes through the family genealogy of 
Ramadan, the MB networks, the Islamization of the banlieu, the internationaloization of 
Islamism, Ramadan´s “integrist” and anti-modern preaching,393 anti-semitism,394 and his 
doublespeak.
395
 Favrot´s work is prefaced by Soheib Bencheick, the grand-mufti of 
Marseille, who says that Ramadan is “by no means a moderate,” and calls for the 
Republic to defend its values against “integrism” and “communitarism” that islamists like 
Ramadan preach.
396
 In the prelude by Lyn Mag´ director in chief, Phillipe Brunet-
Lecomte says that Ramadan is a bomb that is exploding soon, if his ´ambiguous double 
speak´ is not revealed quick.
397
 Paul Landau would go so far as to argue in Le Sabre et le 
Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Frères musulmans à la conquête de l”Europe (2005) that 
Ramadan fills in the Islamist line of Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), founder of MB, Sayyed 
Qutb (d. 1965), the spiritual father of the militant MB, Ruhuallah Khomeini (1902-1989), 
the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution, and Youssef al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), head of 
the Muslim Scholars League and famous for Aljazeera TV programme asharia wa al-
ḥayāt (Sharia and Life).398 The ideology of Ramadan, Landau adds, is not different from 
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that of Ben Laden, ´In fact, the aim pursued by Qaradawi and Ramadan is the same as 
that of Ben Laden: propagate political Islam on earth.´
399
 The conquest of Europe is 
among the Islamists aim of Ramadan, whose first name, Tariq, brings to mind the name 
of Tariq Ibn Ziyad, the first Muslim conqueror of Spain in 711 AD, and whose name is 
marked by Gibraltaer, Djebel Tariq in Arabic.
400
  Landau adopts this interpretation from 
Fourest.
401
 
With Aziz Zemmouri and Ian Hamel, Ramadan is not ´demonized,´ but merely 
subjected to critical questioning and suspicion, especially with Zemmouri. The latter’s 
work, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan? Suivi d”un entretien avec Tariq Ramadam 
(2005), introduces the controversies around the Swiss scholar, and then gives him a large 
space to reply in a long interview between the two. Ramadan takes the occasion to clarify 
his discourse over many issues, since he started his activism up to 2006. As to Hamel, he 
spends two years in an attempt to comprehensively study Ramadan, his family roots, 
networks, and discourse in La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan: Vers un lobby musulman en 
Europe? (2007). He finds out that Ramadan, as a skillful speaker, preacher, intellectual, 
politician,
402
  and ideologue  who rethinks European Islam,
403
 and who suits to be labled 
as ´the Arabo-Muslim Malcom X´
404
 does not hold a double speak.
405
 Instead of double 
speak, Hamel simply suggests ´Ramadanian message´ to describe Ramadan’s 
discourse.
406
 He also deculpabilicises Ramadan of anti-Semitism,
407
 anti-laïcisme,
408
 and 
frees him from the accusations of belonging to MB. For Hamel, Ramadan does not only 
                                                          
399
 Ibid., 211 
400
 Ibid., 206. 
401
 Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Double Speak of Tariq Ramadan, trans. I. Wieder & J. Atherton 
(New York: Encounter Books, 2008) 53.  
402
 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan: vers un lobby musulman en Europe? (Paris: Favre, 2007) 23. 
403
 Ibid., 192 
404
 Ibid.,  10 
405
 Ibid.,,189. « Deux ans d’enquête m’ont convaincu que Tariq Ramadan ne tenait pas de double discours » 
[Two years of investigations have convinced me that Tariq Ramadan had not pursued a double discourse] 
189.  
406
 Ibid., 22 
407
 Ibid., 342 
408
 Ibid., 188 
134 
 
have no links with the MB, but his discourse goes even in its contrary direction.
409
 
Nevertheless, Hamel says that the Ramadanian message still poses questions and raises 
problems.
410
 The main point that Ramadan seems to embody is that which makes of him 
look like the axis that builds the “first Muslim European lobby” that does not antagonize 
with the West and secularism, but works within it to influence this same West, in turn, 
that has influenced its making.
411
  
The media has also contributed substantially to bringing Ramadan into more light. 
Ramadan’s TV shows with French public intellectuals, journalists, and politicians fueled 
the debate in France around him, against him when it comes to his detractors, and for him 
when it comes to the audience he has behind him. His debate with Nicolas Sarkozy, 
Minister of Interior at the time, in 2003 still resonates in the ear of many. When pushed 
out of the subject of debate by Sarkozy to denounce the hudud sanctions in Islam, 
Ramadan, did not reply promptly by denouncing these hudud but reiterated his proposal 
of the moratorium, and tried to explain instead of answering directly, which was taken 
against him. Later, in the long interview with Zemmouri, he explains his points, and 
reveals the TV Channel complicity when it comes to time that was allowed to him. That 
may be the most widespread and controversial debate Ramadan has ever had, and may 
ever have. 
On Octobre 3
rd
, 2003 Ramadan wrote an article entitled, Les (nouveaux) 
intellectuels communautaires, which French newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro 
refused to publish. Oumma.com did publish it. In the article he criticizes a number of 
French Jewish intellectuals and figures such as Alexandre Adler, Alain Finkielkraut, 
Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner – and erroneously 
included Pierre-André Taguieff who is not Jewish - for allegedly abandoning universal 
human rights, and giving special status to the defence of Israel. Ramadan was accused, in 
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return, of having used inflammatory language that is publicly anti-semitic and 
communitarist.
412
  
Beyond the borders of France, Ramadan seems welcome politically and 
intellectually, with critics à la franҫaise in the scene as well. His activism would first 
lead him to The Islamic Foundation in Leicester, where he studied to write in 1996–97 
his Muslims in France booklet, but more importantly his book To Be a European Muslim, 
in 1999, and Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity in 2001, reprinted in 2004 
and 2009. It is within these books than the first phases of Ramadan’s work can be found, 
along with his first work, Musulmans dans la laicité. In October 2005, he began teaching 
at St Antony’s College at the University of Oxford on a Visiting Fellowship. In 
September 2009, Ramadan was appointed to His Highness Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani 
Chair in Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University where he is still based. 
Politically, in September 2005, he was invited to join a task force by the government of 
the United Kingdom during Tony Blair’s premiership.  Ramadan was also an advisor to 
the EU on religious issues and was sought for advice by the EU on a commission on 
“Islam and Secularism” in 2008. Among the Muslim community he is the current 
president of the European think tank: European Muslim Network (EMN) in Brussels.  
The Dutch context welcomed Ramadan, too. Leiden University, distinguished for 
Islamic studies, welcomed him but he declined the offer for professional reasons. He 
accepted the professorship of Identity and Citizenship at Erasmus University in 
Rotterdam, till August 2009 when the City of Rotterdam and Erasmus University 
dismissed him from his positions as "integration adviser" and professor, stating that the 
program he chairs on Iran’s Press TV, Islam & Life, was "irreconcilable" with his duties 
in Rotterdam. Ramadan described this move as Islamophobic and he charged them. He 
defended himself in “Open Letter to My Detractors in the Netherlands.”413 He again 
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received international support from academia against the decision of Rotterdam 
University and Municipality.  
In Italy, Ramadan is present, too, even though the Muslim community second 
generation there is still taking shape. Islam does not seem to be a priority in the media 
and public debate, but this has not made it immune from criticism. The legacy of Oriana 
Fallaci (1929 - 2006) and her islamophobic writings had their audience. In recent years, 
Giuliano Ferrara, director of the newspaper “Il Foglio” and known as a “neo-con” and 
defender of the Judaeo-Christian roots of Europe, along with the vice-director of the 
“Corriere della Sera,” Magdi Allam, were among the main public critics of Ramadan, 
who they accused of “anti-Semitism and collusion to terrorism.” Lately, Ferrara seems to 
have changed his mind on Ramadan and moderate Islam. He invited Ramadan to appear 
on his television programme, and he warmly welcomed the letter which 138 Muslim 
“sages” wrote to Benedict XVI after Germany´s speech in 2006 in which he referred to 
Islam as a religion that widespread by the sword. The book of Nina zu F rstenberg Chi 
ha paura di Tariq Ramadan? l”Europa di fronte al riformismo islamico (2007) [Who is 
Afraid of Tariq Ramadan? Europe in the face of Islamic Reform] is an objective account 
of the ideas of Ramadan, written in the form of interview between the writer and the 
scholar. Among its merits is that it raises the issue of ´hidden discourse of Ramadan´ and 
answers it by saying that if the discourse takes a different non-reformist path, there is no 
need of exaggerated fear since the democratic voices will rise up then to face him! In a 
seminar on the book, Lilli Gruber, a Euro ex-MP and journalist, says that “Tariq 
Ramadan is a real motor of change, who knows everything about us, whereas we know 
nothing about him.” 414  
In North America, Ramadan has a favourable status as well, though detractors à 
la Fourest are present, too. In February 2004, he accepted the position of Professor of 
Religion, Conflict and Peace Building at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International 
Peace Studies, at the University of Notre Dame in Notre Dame, Indiana, in the United 
States, but he faced visa problems from the US State Department under the “Patriotic 
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Act” for ´ideological reason,´ which were dissolved later. He was charged of having 
donated some money to “terrorist organizations” in Palestine. It was only under Obama 
administration in September 2010 that he was allowed entrance to the US. This incident 
also brought wide academic support for him. Prof. R. Scott Appleby, the man who did his 
best to bring Ramadan to Notre Dame, was fascinated by the engagement of Ramadan as 
a scholar. He told Ian Buruma that it is the likes of Ramadan that the world needs to 
bridge gaps between the West and the Islamic world for more understanding:  
He’s doing something extraordinarily difficult if not impossible, but it needs to be 
done. He is accused of being Janus-faced. Well, of course he presents different 
faces to different audiences. He is trying to bridge a divide and bring together 
people of diverse backgrounds and worldviews. He considers the opening he finds 
in his audience. Ramadan is in that sense a politician. He cultivates various 
publics in the Muslim world on a variety of issues; he wants to provide leadership 
and inspiration. The reason we wanted him is precisely because he’s got his ear to 
the ground of the Muslim world.
415
 
The Canadian Gregory Baum sees in Ramadan a Muslim reformist, and not a 
radical, in The Theology of Tariq Ramadan: A Catholic Perspective (2006).
416
 Charles 
Taylor (b. 1931) also does not see security problems in Ramadan’s work. In 2007, the 
New York Time Magazine features him among the most 100 innovators of the 21st 
century. In 2009 and in 2010 an online poll provided by the American Foreign Policy 
magazine placed Ramadan on the 49th spot in a list of the world’s top 100 contemporary 
intellectuals. Ian Buruma wrote a long profile for The New York Time Magazine, entitled 
“Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue.”417 He speaks favorably of him. Stephanie Gery 
did the same when asked to review Ramadan’s In the Footsteps of the Prophet 
Muhammad (translation of The Messenger in the USA), and considered the book to be of 
help in reconciling the Muslim world with the Western liberal societies. This popularity 
has its exceptions.  
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Paul Berman, who supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003, is the American version 
of Caroline Fourest. In his book, The Flight of the Intellectuals (2010), that contains not a 
single footnote or endnote, he considers Ramadan a reformist in disguise, not himself an 
extremist, but his discourse can nurture extremism especially among the youth, “even 
some of the most attractive of thinkers tend, if they have come under an Islamist 
influence, to have a soft spot for suicide terrorism” and “a soft spot for anti-Semitism.”418 
Ayan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-Dutch ex-Muslim Islamophobe, is his favourite. Dwight 
Garner describes the book as “devastating in its content.”419 For Anthony Julius, Berman 
“regards Ramadan as a sinister figure with a sinister agenda.” When Breman says that  
there is “a dark smudge of ambiguity” which “runs across everything he [Ramadan] 
writes on the topic of terror and violence,” he means that “Ramadan cannot be trusted to 
know his own mind, and therefore cannot be trusted when he claims to speak it,”  
continues Julius. For the latter, it is not Ramadan’s admiration which he receives that is 
misplaced, but it is the reading of Breman that is so.
420
 Andrew March in his review of 
Breman’s work echoes what a number of critics say of Ramadan in France in particular, 
“A reader of Berman will get no sense of Ramadan’s overall intellectual project or 
objectives.” Berman’s “big mistake,” according to March, is the link he makes between 
Ramadan’s family genealogy and Muslim Brotherhood, and his criticism of Ramadan for 
not denouncing the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and Islamic penal code publicly and 
directly: 
In Berman’s view, Ramadan was not only born into a kind of original sin but has 
never atoned for it. […] Berman’s big mistake is to suggest that Ramadan invites 
an "esoteric" reading that shows his failure to break decisively with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. By a decisive break, Berman means an open, bold declaration. But 
the real break is right under his nose. […] According to Berman, we must tell 
Muslims, “Either you are pro-Enlightenment or you are soft on stoning.” 421 
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 March means that the content of Ramadan’s work is the indirect break from traditional 
Islamic thought, without a denunciation that Breman and his alikes need to hear to trust 
Ramadan, or at least to listen to him without defaming him and his discourse that they do 
not approach seriously.  
 As an engaged academic, Ramadan has contributed substantially to the debate on 
contemporary Islamic thought and its revival, especially in Europe. He is active both at 
the academic and grassroots levels lecturing extensively throughout the world on 
theology, Islamic law and jurisprudence, applied ethics, social justice, economy, politics, 
inter-faith and intracommunity dialogue. His words summarize his engagement:  
I mean to build bridges between two universes of reference, between two (highly 
debatable) constructions termed Western and Islamic “civilizations” (as if those 
were closed, monolithic entities), and between citizens within Western societies 
themselves. My aim is to show, in theory and in practice, that one can be both 
fully Muslim and Western and that beyond our different affiliations we share 
many common principles and values through which it is possible to “live 
together” within contemporary pluralistic, multicultural societies where various 
religions coexist.
422
  
Ramadan´s engagement has always had a political touch. In Europe, and the West in 
general, he has been very critical of certain governmental policies, like the banning of the 
veil in France, the banning of Minarets in Switzerland, and has also attempted to 
attenuate the tension of the debate during the Cartoon crises all around Europe in 2006, 
and also around Charia Hebdo issue in France in 2011.  
In the regional and international level, he is critical of the US and EU stance 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue, their late intervention in Bosnia war, and their 
damaging Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Gaza War of 2008, up to their recent biased 
treatment of Arab Spring differently, quick intervention in Libya and slow negotiations 
with Syria and Yemen. His political criticism of the old regimes in the Arab world was 
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behind banning him from entering Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. He has 
good relations with research institutes mainly in Morocco and Doha. He is a Visiting 
Professor in Qatar (Faculty of Islamic Studies), where he inaugurated on 15 January 2012 
the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics based on his work Radical 
Reform; he is also a visiting lecturer and professor at Mundiapolis University in Morocco. 
His frequent opinion articles are commentaries on the socio-economic, political, cultural, 
and religious implications of the events concerned. His very recent work, L´Islam et le 
réveil arabe (Islam and the Arab Awakening, 2011) is part of his engagement in the 
changes taking place in the Arab world. In Asia, he is Senior Research Fellow at 
Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan.  
This biographical sketch on the concerned scholar does not claim to have 
exhausted the controversy around him everywhere nor does it claim to have referred to all 
his activities. I have generally referred to the books that deal with his figure and family 
background more than with his ideas. Hundreds of short articles are also written on him, 
but I do not refer to every small piece on that, for the books above bring up the general 
points small pieces invoke about him. Rather, this biographical sketch explains my 
interest in the study of his discourse in a more serious form, beyond the journalistic 
debate that remains superficial, and in most cases biographical. The above biographical 
sketch as well as the coming condensing of his project and its development will be 
compared to that of Tibi and with other selected Islamic reformist approaches to see 
where Ramadan holds tradition, ambiguity, and newness.  
1. Renewing the Islamic Sources of Law: From Adaptation to Transformation 
The coming sections introduce Ramadan the traditionalist, or “early Ramadan one,” 
and the reformist, or “late Ramadan.” I do not mean he has held a “double speak”; I 
mean, as will be explained gradually, that his reading of the Islamic tradition moves from 
a stage to another; namely, it develops. In the first section of this part I introduce 
Ramadan’s early criticism of modernity in the face of the Islamic worldview of Tawheed, 
the Oneness of God. Then I refer to his reading of the Prophetic tradition, and its 
humanist, and universalist teachings. The first section ends with reference to the latest 
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development in the scholar’s thought, summarized in what I refer to as “Ramadan reform 
agenda.” The latter is his testimony that reform has reached limits in Islamic thought, 
which has been trapped in “adaptation” instead of moving to “transformation reform” 
whereby Islamic thought becomes a contributor to world change, and not a mere 
consumer and adaptor. “Radical reform,” or “transformation reform,” questions both 
Islamic classical jurisprudence and formalistic formalism as well as modernity and its 
limitations, and ‘soulless liberation.” 
a. In the Beginning: Islam, Modernity, and the West 
The fundamental question Ramadan raises here is this: “Can The Muslim world 
accede to modernity without denying some of the fundamentals of the Islamic 
religion?”423 Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity is chiefly a study of the 
current “face to face” encounter between the “West” and “Islam,” and what makes the 
difference between the two very clear: the modern, or modernity. I my reading, I present 
this book as the most critical of modernity and the West in Ramadan’s thought. Critique 
of the Muslim world and Islamic traditional thought comes later.   
Initially, Ramadan´s take on Islam is not that of a “pure” political scientist, 
sociologist, or anthropologist who fears the critique of neutrality or subjectivity. Both as 
a believer, and a scholar in what he believes in, Ramadan makes Islam present in every 
aspect of life he tackles: personal, social, cultural, economic, political, or philosophic. He 
is a theologian. Though his scholarly training trajectory is not traditional in the way 
Muslim theologians in the Muslim lands are, he still manages to mix his modern training 
with philosophy and literature. He is a new genre of theologians, one would say the first 
one of a renowned stature in the European soil. Briefly, Islam and the universe are 
indivisible, and inseparable, “The universe of creation is a universe of signs whose 
elements are sacred because they are reminders of the presence of the Creator.”424  In the 
same book, Ramadan narrates and interprets the traditional link between man (and of 
course woman as well), God/Allah, and the universe, in chapters entitled “At the Shores 
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of Transcendence: Between God and Man,” and “The Horizons of Islam: Between Man 
and the Community.” “Man is born innocent,”425 and his gerency, al-khilafatu fi al-ard, 
on earth is originally marked by permission in action (al-ibaha al-asliyya), except for 
what is marked as limits, rights of God, huddud Allah. With the general limits of God 
known in Quran, man is then free to act for or against this gerency on earth. For the 
concerned believer, the relation with God is permanent, and its manifestation is man 
himself and the universe in which he lives and acts. Ramadan says: 
Man lives in a universe whose entire elements are signs wherever he remembers 
God. The elements are sacred as soon as the memory of faith is invoked. They 
become profane by forgetfulness and negligence. This shows how great is man`s 
responsibility. In addition to the trust of faith, he should give account of his 
management of the world.
426
  
To make his life and freedom a daily witness of this responsibility, and thus a 
daily expression of his belief, the believer acknowledges the divine limits and plays in the 
premises of agency in which he has more freedom, but responsibly. The feeling of 
responsibility comes from the submission to God and acceptance of liberty with its limits, 
and these limits become the framework of reference and agency of man. The idea that 
“the whole of Creation is sacred”427 is at the heart of belief in Islam. This is what makes 
the creed of tawhid:  
The central notion of tawhid and the daily expression of the rabbaniyya have 
consequences on the concept of life which renders the world of Islam necessarily 
and irremediably resistant to the evolution and influence of Western culture. Faith 
and reference to God, the idea that the sacred is not uniquely in rituals, but rather 
in any act that preserves alive in one’s conscience remembrance of the Creator, all 
these nourish the daily existence of women and men and give strength and 
meaning to their spirituality.
428
 [my emphasis] 
Tawhid then shapes all relations of man: man to man, man to God, and man and the 
universe, more closely, man and nature. This is what seems to stand in the way of the 
modern in its European definition of what can be termed the “Muslim mind,” which 
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(“European modernity”) Ramadan challenges, and leads him to consider “Islamic 
modernity” as an alternative, at least at this stage of thought. 
 This broad line of relations enshrined in the creed of tawhid falls within the name 
of Sharia, the Way, in Ramadan’s synonymous definition of Sharia, and not mere legal 
prescriptions of social relations. The objectives of Sharia, maqāṣid asharia, are what are 
supposed to frame the premises of these relations for the good of man, and that is what he 
calls “social Islam,” in contrast with the “façade of Islam” of penal codes.429 Because 
these objectives are both temporal and spacial, they need constant change and constant 
interpretation. That is the role of ijtihad and human agency that Ramadan says is needed 
to reform Islamic thought. To arrive at these points, each in some detail, a path has to be 
walked in, which I try to trace below, always following the signs of Ramadan in this part. 
At this stage, I satisfy myself with this to introduce Ramadan’s attitude towards 
modernity, seeing that reform in Islam is commonly said to be driving to adopt or be 
compatible with the principles of modernity to facilitate Islam’s accommodation of world 
changes first, and second to be a modern lived religion in secular and liberal European 
societies.  
 Being European by birth and philosophical training, Ramadan is aware of the 
challenges of modernity to the “Muslim mind” and to the traditional Muslim societies in 
Muslim majority countries as well as to the Muslim communities and minorities 
elsewhere, especially in Europe, the land where modernity first saw inception. So, the 
work he conducts does not seem to just answer the requirements of adapting Islam to 
modern societies, but tries to revise the fundamentals in his religion. He is not attempting 
reform to please the moderns; he is critical of this same modern which he does not see as 
the last model of thought to stop at. In his own terms, he opens the debate, the critique of 
Islam, as well as the critique of modernity. Without doing that, one would miss his 
emphasis on ethics and spirituality later on. He establishes the conditions of the debate on 
equal terms in the following:  
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A dialogue without prevarication must establish itself, and perhaps it should 
centre around the question of modernity. This notion has become the banner 
which is held by all overt progressists, and seems to attract to its ranks only a few 
Muslims who want to remain loyal to their religion and their culture.
430
 
“The right path, at the heart of Modernity” is “our spirituality, in our heart” in this age of 
modernity.
431
  
 The critique Ramadan launches on modernity and the West in this stage stems 
from the fact that Islam and its message is not represented, and only stereotypical 
depictions are what one comes across when Islam is invoked:   
For some years now, one has noticed the daily coverage of Islam by the Western 
media: fundamentalism, the situation of women, freedom of speech and human 
rights being the subjects that are almost exclusively dealt with. Of Islam as such 
nothing of substance is known. Orientalists have given way to political scientists 
and ‘social researchers” who, through an almost legitimate lack of 
professionalism, confuse the essence of the Quranic Message with the 
contingencies of its manifestations that are, often, its most spectacular ones. […] 
The world of Islam appears to us through the most repelling events and, hence, 
one cannot help believing that it is, fundamentally, an enemy of the West. 
Anything that confirms this conclusion is “true”; and anything that disturbs the 
superficiality of this analysis is ‘suspect.”432  
 
This one-sided vision of Islam in the Western mind, according to Ramadan, is most 
importantly rooted in academia and research, which he sees not to have studied the other 
side of Islam: 
Western intellectuals and researchers may well be able to develop the most 
scientific analyses, display the greatest logic and the most experimental local 
approach. But they will give only a partial account of the Islamic phenomenon if 
they do not tackle the special rapport that Muslims, whether practicing or not, 
have with the Quranic message -and with the religious and sacred in general. 
There is, therein, something specific which is not reducible to the understanding 
of the “religious” in the universe of Euro-American culture. It is high time this 
fact was realized […].433 Nothing, or almost nothing, is said about these aspects of 
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Islamic culture because there is a difficulty in thinking that something positive 
can come forth from a universe that is presented through images of “bearded 
men” and “veiled women.”434  
At some point of his description of the specificity of the Islamic worldview, based on 
tawhid and perception of God in every act and view of the universe, Ramadan uses the 
term “Islamic Culture.”435 By the term he means the core that makes the religion of 
Islam, and not the behavior of its believers studied by anthropologists and social 
scientists. The Islamic Culture is what he sees unstudied, or understudied. His enterprise 
is to give this “Culture” of tawhid a new interpretation, to be studied in the coming stage 
of his thought. Before going into that in the next sections, his understanding of modernity 
and its difference from “Islamic Culture” broadly outlined above follows now.  
Ramadan makes a difference between modernity and modernism. Modernity is 
that ‘spirit” of change that occurred in Europe over the centuries since the fifteenth 
century, passing by the Renaissance, Reformation, and reaching the age of 
Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. It was an economic, political, religious and 
social movement in Europe against the European Middle Ages (approximately from the 
5
th
 to 15
th
 century) practices and understandings. (Islamic Middle Ages, from the 7
th
 to 
the 14
th
 century, are the prosperous times of the civilization.)  Modernity is equated with 
modernization as a way of liberation in process, and he uses the terms interchangeably:   
Modernization is a liberation, the breaking of the chains of all intangible dogmas, 
stilted traditions and evolving societies. It represents accession to progress. 
Within this, reason, science and technology are set in motion. Finally, it is also 
man brought back to his humanity, with the duty of facing up to change, to 
accepting it and mastering it. […] These principles are its opposition to any 
tradition, any established order, against any sacredness or inquisitive clergy, 
against any revelation or imposed values; it is the affirmation of man as an 
individual, the claim of freedom, the defense of reason and, by extension, an 
appeal to science and progress.
436
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This era in Europe, the birth of modernity, “was in itself a revolution,” Ramadan writes in 
agreement with Alain Tourain (b. 1925).
437
  This revolution “has given everything to man 
in the West: from liberty to knowledge, from science to technology. In short, it restored 
him to his humanity and to his responsibilities.”438 Reason has become the engine that 
man uses to understand the world, and man has thus become the one who establishes 
limits for himself, beyond any other (religious and divine) authority,  “Without any other 
authority, except its spirit, and without any other norm except the real, it was apt to 
establish values and fix limits for the good of humanity.”439   
The problem is not with modernity, but with modernism. Ramadan states that “As 
with all revolutions, this one [i.e. modernity] has not escaped excesses. […] Rationality 
has become the truth and progress the meaning and value; with the advent of our century 
was born a new ideology: modernism.”440 Modernity gave the European man “his 
humanity and responsibility.” However, there are now qualities that are being denied him 
by modernism that is void of meaning, limits, and is thus turning less pluralist. As the last 
words of the following statement read, Ramadan believes that the modern man who 
assumed his subjectivity at a certain period of time is now a mere object of what he has 
produced without limits: 
The rationalization which is elevated to the rank of an infallible doctrine 
marks its own limits, and man, who was supposed at the beginning to 
become the master of the game, is outrun by the logic which he set in 
motion. The forces of attraction combined with efficiency, productivity, 
growth, investment and consumption have dispossessed man of his 
humanity. Without reference, in search of new values (ethic), he is 
subjected to the meaning of progress and the march towards the future, 
more than he decides them.
441
  
 
Otherwise put, modernity has reached an “abyss” (his term). Ramadan tries to find an 
explanation behind this modern drift to irreligiosity, conflict with God, and tension inside 
the modern Western mind. In a section entitled “Prometheus and Abraham” in Islam, the 
West, and the Challenges of Modernity, Ramadan argues that the tragedy of Prometheus 
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has substantially shaped Greco-Roman, Christian, and modern European thought, and 
contributed to severing the relation man has with God. When Prometheus tries to deceive 
Zeus, conflict between man and god begins; when he steals fire from heaven and gives it 
to mortals, he is punished, condemned to have his liver devoured by the eagle. 
“Prometheus sacrificed himself for me by defying the gods.”442 Though he at times was 
given heroic portrayals, “Prometheus is responsible for the present decade,” Ramadan 
quotes Hesiod
443
 (Greek  poet, lived between 750 and 650 BC). Socratic dialectic, 
Aristotelian syllogism and their political, rational, and metaphysical reflections, for 
Ramadan, are “coloured” by the Promethean challenge.  
Ramadan believes there is a kind of similarity that can be built here between this 
act and the Judeo-Christian perception of the act of pride that led to disobedience of God 
and then the commitment of the original sin, and the feeling of tension that brings about 
lifelong. Relativity of Morality in the realm of politics in the fifteenth century as 
portrayed by Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) goes in the same line of bashing the 
divine from politics, and the assertion of freedom and innocence in place of the original 
sin, rejection, and Salvation. This tension for freedom from the divine finds its way to the 
“modern Prometheus,” Zarathustra of Nietzsche, poetry of Arthur Rimbaud (1854 – 
1891), Gerard Nerval (1808-1855), Paul Verlaine (1844 –1896), Johann Goethe (1749 – 
22 March 1832) , Charles Baudelaire (1821 – 1867), Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677), 
David Hume (1711 –1776), and Emmanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), though differently and 
conciliatory, etc. up to the age of the existentialists Soren Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855), 
John Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Albert Camus (1913 - 1960), and other skeptics, and 
revisionists of the modern. “Metaphysical rebellion,”444 “existential malaise,”445 and 
“existential doubt” are “omnipresent either to consecrate faith or to reproduce God. 
Western history since the Renaissance, and after the re-reading of the Greco-Roman 
legacy [in light of the Promethean tension], has been nourished by the culture of criticism 
and doubt.”446 Ramadan concludes that “The Greco-Roma and Judeo-Christian traditions 
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are marked by this concept of inaccessible harmony. To believe and to assert oneself, in 
the same breath, seems clearly impossible.”447 “The modern Western world is a godless 
world.”448 
What is left for religion after this “metaphysical rebellion” is the private space. 
The latter is where “Modern faith” is expressed, and with time hardly expressed, for it 
vanishes because the individual is not given much choice between religiosity and non-
religiosity. Through biased politics, institutions, especially the school, the modern 
individual, always according to Ramadan, is not given the orientation nor is s/he given 
the chance to live in public and “witness” religion and the divine. This makes the 
moderns “forget” religion, and with time see it as the abnormal. He writes: 
The modern Western world is a godless world. […] “Modern Faith” has no need 
any longer for witnessing, very often we believe in private, alone, and at a 
distance from public space whose objectives seems to be making us “forget.” […] 
Under the pretext of “neutrality of public space,” religious education has 
disappeared or been reduced to one or two hours a week. The ensuing result is an 
ignorance, increasing in importance every year, of religious history and its main 
figures. Freedom and ignorance have been confused with one another, whereas in 
ignorance there is no longer real freedom. Public space, and particularly school, 
instead of being neutral, expresses from now on a real bias. This consists of 
evacuating the question of the Divine and meaning, making it an auxiliary and 
secondary problem. The youth of today, the adults of tomorrow, will at best 
doubt; more naturally, they will neglect anything that is of a “religious” character. 
[…] Skepticism is the rule nowadays.449  
 
The “Modern Faith” that is tolerated mostly when invisible speaks of the rupture 
that the meanings of the divine instill in the minds of the believers, whose number 
decreases gradually because they are “lost” in their search, under “intense psychological 
and inward torture,” for a system that gives them meaning. Ramadan brings back the 
story of Prometheus and the eagle in the following way:  
Everything leads one to believe, in front of this sense of modernity, that we have 
reached, at the end of the twentieth century, the culmination of the Promethean 
experience […]. The eagle’s torment seems to be consuming the inwards of an 
important number, increasing daily, of men and women who want to know what 
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sins they have committed that inflict on them such an intense psychological and 
inward torture. They did not make a choice, but they are assured that they are 
free.
450
 
 
For Ramadan, there is a lack of pluralism in the ideology of modernity, i.e. modernism, 
and this is mostly remarked, according to him, in its encounter with the Islamic 
worldview and the Muslims in the West. This will be dealt with again later on, but just to 
build links here I quote this passage: 
The West is used to dealing with sources possessing a restrained, traditional 
culture such as the Indians of North America and the Aborigines of Australia. 
These ethnicities do not endanger the supremacy of rationalist and modernist 
points of reference. For the first time in two centuries, and in a more 
“confrontational” manner, that even the Chinese and Japanese horizon could not 
pose, the Islamic world contests the universality of Western values either by 
relativizing or questioning them.
451
 
 
The awareness that modernism has turned Europe and the West into a global hegemony 
that tries to colonize the minds
452
 of the rest through various means is what he refers to as 
“Occidentalization” and “Westernization.”453  
Ramadan claims that “our epoch is one of torture” and ‘spirituality is a trial.”454 
Ramadan cites a number of contemporary Western intellectuals and poet-philosophers 
who have spoken of this crisis and are critical of modernity in its ideological version. 
Frederick Nietzsche, Arthur Rimbaud, Serge Latouche (b. 1940), Alain Touraine (b. 
1925), Roger Garaudy (b. 1913), and Edgar Moran (b. 1921) are some of them. The 
malaise of the West Ramadan refers to has to do with two aspects: social morals and the 
ethics of productions that he sees unlimited, which have widened the gaps between the 
rich and the poor, the developed North and the developing South. On social behavior and 
morality, Ramadan sees an excessive liberty that has broken ties with the transcendent 
and moral compass. Family break-ups, single-family parents, women liberation which is 
marketed as a body, sexual liberty, youth delinquency, drugs, AIDS, unprecedented 
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consumption, and related issues are the results of the modern model. These are symptoms 
of “alienation” and “limits” of the Western understanding of the modern: ‘such a 
liberation is a deception and the Western model certainly carries within it alienations 
which leave little to be envied, this despite real progress in the matter of rights.”455 He, 
however, acknowledges that “The West is not reducible to this picture, but it would, 
however, be hypocritical not to admit that we are living under the reign of new cults of 
money, sex, and pleasure in general.”456  
The “mega-machine” of the West, for Ramadan, is harder on Muslims whose 
value system is different, and whose societies are still going through socio-cultural, 
political, and economic changes and challenges. In the Muslim majority countries, he is 
very critical of the Westernization domineering presence on cultural, political and 
economic levels. He is especially concerned with the ethical aspect that guides these 
influences and presence in communities that have a different conception of man, nature, 
and God.  
Ramadan is equally critical of both Muslim and Western intellectuals who speak 
of modernity without being critical,
457
 for mere projections do not help in understanding 
of the real problems of both modernity and of Muslims societies as well as Muslim 
minorities in the West, or anywhere else. The way the Western model is exported and 
publicized, chiefly through the media, is among what makes Ramadan very critical: 
When one encounters Western culture through publicity, broadcasting, films or a 
short stay, then it is impossible to measure the human and psychological 
consequences of this modernity. A fortiori everything, in the discourses and 
achievements through which the West presents itself, is destined to put ahead the 
modern, progressist, in vogue and liberated character of this culture. The Western 
style feeds itself by and through seduction in order to awaken man’s most natural 
and primary instincts and desires: social success will-power, freedom, sexual 
desire, etc. the recent evolution of the morals –as also the principles- of the liberal 
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economy, which are little linked to moral considerations, has led to the situation 
that we know today with an inflation of violence, money and sex.
458
 
These aspects, in the words of Roger Garaudy which Ramadan quotes, picture a world of 
“decadence” void of meaning and happiness that man expected from progress.459 “The 
principle of human rights, the notion of democracy and the ideal of freedom are, in 
practice, emptied of their content.”460 He also quotes Latouche a couple of 
times.
461
Latouche considers the current stage of the post-industrial society in the West a 
dead stage. He goes so far as to say that “the historical failure of the West,” due to its 
market and mechanical values, seems a necessity to re-question the current model of the 
good that has renounced the ideals of Enlightenment. He says: “The historical failure of 
the West, and therefore of its values which carry progress, is the only possibility in order 
that the question of “good”  be re-posited within human societies […].”462  This salvific 
attitude of Latouche is not endorsed fully by Ramadan, at least in his wording. He is 
certainly as critical of progress and modernity as Latouche is, but he does not go so far as 
to suggest the ‘salvific failure” and ‘self-destruction” of the West. Ramadan does not 
want the Muslim societies and communities to adopt the modern rupture with the 
transcendence, for that has dire repercussions that he is critical of in the West now, i.e. 
irresponsible rationality and liberty, and they all revolve around values and meanings in 
relation with the transcendent, the divine.    
 To regain meaning and pluralism in the modern world, Ramadan calls for “critical 
consciousness,” “resistance,” and “a small intellectual revolution” which “entails ceasing 
to suppose that the USA and Europe are culturally advanced and others are trailing.”463 
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He warns that such criticism and resistance “is not, once again, tantamount to being anti-
Western,” for “it is an opposition not to its [Western] being but rather to its manner of 
being.”464 This ‘small intellectual revolution,” for its success, has to take part both in the 
minds of the Westerners and in the minds of the Muslims, be they in the Muslim majority 
countries or in the West as a minor community.
465
  
This description and critique of modernity in its later ideological version does not 
stand without a counter proposal from an Islamic perspective. As a Muslim intellectual 
and reformist who is developing a line of rethinking the Islamic tradition, at this stage he 
proposes an “Islamic modernity” that is, for him, not similar to the current “Western 
model” though it shares with it certain basic values, away from the current practices that 
he critiques, as seen above. This presupposition has its start in a passage that I see 
accommodative of the ideals of European modernity:  
To accept the principles of liberty, autonomy of reason or the primacy of the 
individual is something, but it is something else to identify these solely with 
Western history which has seen their accession to the social field being done after 
a conflict whose extent and consequences on mentalities is still unappreciated. 
The West has given us a particular form of modernity, it partakes of its history 
and points of reference. Another civilization can, from within, fix and determine 
the stakes in a different fashion. This is the case of Islam at the end of this 
twentieth century.
466
 [My emphasis] 
The first underlined principles of modernity that Ramadan cherishes in Western 
modernity are defended here briefly and more thoroughly in his later works that are going 
to be discussed as we proceed. At this stage, it is the general proposal he makes of 
“Islamic modernity” that is of interest. By that he brings the Islamic presence to the 
forefront of modernity and its challenges as well as changes that go with it.  
 Ramadan asserts that “The experience of Faith in Islam is not, up until now and 
even with Muslims living in Western capitals, of a similar nature,”467 i.e. is not the way 
faith is lived in the West, as “Modern Faith,” reserved only for the private sphere and not 
                                                          
464
 Ibid., 271 
465
 Ibid., 288 
466
 Ibid., 7-8 
467
 Ibid., 202-221    
153 
 
very much present in schools for example. Faced with his idea that “The Western horizon 
does not seem to propose, in the facts, great projects of meaning, value, and hope”468 
especially for Muslims, he proposes “Islamic modernity.” From the outset, he is critical 
of the slogan “Islam is the solution.” For him, that too, needs rigorous analysis, and an 
intellectual revolution.
469
 Details apart, his assertion of the Islamic faith at the heart of his 
discourse makes modernism “by essence, incompatible with the cult of the means that has 
today become the rule” in the West.470 In some passages he clearly rejects modernity in 
its latest forms: “If there is no other modernity except that of the model of actual 
Westernization - which is questionable and without doubt erroneous – then one must 
reject modernity.”471 The model that evaluates the Western one is the Prophetic model, 
“Muslim culture, by reference to the Prophet (peace be upon him), is based on the 
concept of the model, or moral comportment, of sociability.”472 More clearly, the social 
aspect of Islamic model opposes the current modern model in behavior and sociability, 
“The Islamic concept of man, love and sexuality prevents the Muslim world from 
following the track of this model of Westernization.”473 This does not mean the Muslim 
societies are ideal and need no reform, “We do not deny that today’s Muslim societies are 
not models of balance and wellbeing.”474 Muslim societies, too, are going through 
feelings of “malaise,” bitterness,” “complex structural and moral crises.”475 My emphasis 
on Ramadan’s biography of the Prophet, to be referred to a section below, falls within the 
scheme of bringing the Islamic reference as a model for ethical human behavior.  
 Reiterated somewhat differently, Ramadan sees in the “awakening of Islam” an 
opportunity to revisit certain models in both the West and Islamic lands to give back 
meaning to a world that seems to lack them. (There is no surprise that ten years later 
Ramadan writes The Quest for Meaning, 2010, just to raise the same issue in a 
universalist way. Again, I will be back to this in due space). The West is searching for 
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meaning.
476
 After it has achieved unprecedented progress on all levels, “laïc morality” is 
“unable now to cope with” this very same “progress revolution.”477 And because the two 
worlds of the West and Islam are merging by means of globalization and immigration, 
“mutual enrichment,” based on awareness and critical analysis, has to be seen as part of 
this rapprochement:  
The awakening of Islam may bring a contribution, hitherto unsuspected, to a real 
renaissance of the spirituality of the women and men of our world. Again one 
should avoid presenting the encounter between Islam and the West under the 
terms of conflict, but see it instead in the perspective of mutual enrichment.
478
 
[Emphasis added] 
Ramadan is here giving Islam a historical role to play again, after centuries of absence. 
“Islam should continue to bring a consequent contribution to the transformation of the 
world.” 479 He even compares the current revival of Islam to that of the 7th century, the 
time of its inception, “The world of Islam is vibrating in this end of the twentieth century 
as it was vibrating at the beginning of the seventh.”480 What is expected of this 
awakening, he adds, is that Islam must evolve the same way the Western model evolved. 
There is an expectation of a “cultural revolution” or “aggiornamento of Islam.”481 At this 
stage, Ramadan is very much against this view, especially for the Muslim majority 
societies, because that would simply mean severing faith from daily life, which he thinks 
Islam cannot bear, for faith in Islam is a daily witness and remembrance, through the 
creed of Tawhid, as shown above.  
 Islamic modernity is based on “finalities,”482 “decency,” “dignity” of man and 
woman,
483
 and “harmony” with nature. “Islamic modernity can avoid the crisis that the 
West is today going through and whose process of modernization ended up by 
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instrumentalizing everything.”484 As long as the religious is not put aside, nothing in 
Islam opposes modernity: 
Nothing in Islam is opposed to Modernity and we can firmly state that the Muslim 
thinkers and ´ulama´ (savants) who are opposed to this notion and to the idea of 
change and evolution that it covers often confuse it with the model which is 
current in the West. Clearly, they confuse modernity with Westernization.  Thus, 
they justify an attitude versed in traditionalism and forms which are sometimes 
somber and rigorist, and which presents Islam as opposed, by essence, to any 
social or scientific progress. Hiding behind the ´drifts´ of the West, they deduce 
that faithfulness to the Message is achieved by an ´absolute´ and definitive 
interpretation of the sources.
485
 [First emphasis added] 
This then is the form Islamic modernity takes in the work of Ramadan: it is founded on 
faith practiced in public, and broadly open to the principles of modernity: liberty, 
individual autonomy, and rationality. The West in itself is not an enemy, but its 
perception of modernity in its ideological format, modernism, is what makes it open to 
especially religious critique based on finalities. What are the theological references 
Ramadan stands on in his theses? How is his perception of an Islamic modernity able to 
answer the details secular and liberal societies force on the Muslim practices?  Does 
Islam in modernity lived in Muslim majority countries differ from the one lived in 
Western societies or it is the same? These questions and others are attempted in the other 
works of Ramadan that I refer to in the coming sections.   
b. Reading the Past: Integrating the Beautiful in the Tradition   
The Prophet’s Biography: an Ethical Model  
The above outline of the creed of Islam summarized in Tawhid makes the first 
part of the first pillar in the Islamic worldview. Its details come along. The second part of 
the first pillar is the belief that Muhammad is God´s Messenger, and the last one in the 
line of monolithic religions (Pillar1, 1a: There is No God but God (Tawhid), and 1b: 
Muhammad is His Messenger). In his project, Ramadan centralizes the personality of the 
Messenger and Prophet of Islam in In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life 
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of Muhammad, and makes it among the sources of law to be always considered and learnt 
from.
486
  
In his introduction to the biographical work on the Prophet, Ramadan admits that 
he does not aim to provide a thick scholarly work because “countless biographies of the 
Prophet Muhammad already exist.” He says the work is for both Muslim and non-Muslim 
readers, and it is based mainly on the authoritative biography of Ibn Hicham (based on 
the accounts of Ibn Ishaq), as-sirah an-nabawiyyab of the 8
th
-9
th
 centuries. Though the 
“Muslims do not consider the Messenger of Islam a mediator between God and people,” 
for “each individual is invited to address God directly,” Muhammad´s life aids in 
understanding the message of God and its interpretation in new contexts. When Aisha, 
the wife of the Prophet, was once questioned about the Prophet’s personality, she 
answered: "His character [the ethics underlying his behavior] was the Quran.
487
 Two 
main ideas are behind writing on the Prophet: first, drawing out the Prophet’s “timeless 
spiritual teachings,” “The Messenger’s biography points to primary and eternal 
existential questions, and in this sense, his life is an initiation;” second, drawing out “the 
historical events that filled the Prophet’s life.”488 What I do below is that I select just 
some of the features that correspond to these two main reasons that have stimulated 
Ramadan to write a lucid, eloquent, and easy to read biography.  
 Spiritually, the Prophet is first depicted to have accepted revelation with quietude 
and without doubts. Though some fear at the very first moment of contact with the divine 
through the Angel Gabriel stirred him, because the burden weighed heavily on him, he 
soon shared the message with his first wife Khadija and his close friend Abu Bakr and 
they assured him that what he had experienced must be true and they believed him 
without doubt. He was known as the “candid” before his prophecy. The quietness with 
which he receives the divine message has its roots in his early life style before revelation. 
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This makes the picture of a man, an ordinary human being with human qualities of higher 
caliber.  
 The Prophet´s welcome of the message of God is quiet, because it is preceded by 
years of contemplation in solitude, in communion with the infinite portrayed in the desert 
as signs of His Greatness: 
The  desert  is  often  the  locus  of  prophecies  because  it  naturally  offers  to  
the  human  gaze  the horizons  of  the  infinite. […] The universe  is  pregnant  
with  signs  that  recall  the  presence  of  the  Creator,  and the  desert,  more  than  
anything  else,  opens  the  human  mind  to observation,  meditation,  and  
initiation  into  meaning.
489
 
Sings of the infinite reflected the Infinite, one of the names of God, in the mind of the 
young Muhammad, and taught him, among other lessons, how to tame his ego, and how 
to soften his heart for the spiritual.  
Certitude in the Oneness of God and His message is accepted, and there is no 
sense of “original sin” to live with on earth: 
All  the messengers have,  like Abraham and Muhammad, experienced the trial of  
faith and  all  have  been,  in  the  same  manner,  protected  from  themselves  and 
their own doubts by God,  H is  signs,  and  His  word.  Their suffering does not 
mean they made mistakes,  nor does it  reveal  any  tragic dimension  of existence:  
it  is,  more  simply,  an  initiation  into  humility,  understood  as  a necessary 
stage  in  the experience  of faith.  […] From his  birth  to  his death, the  
Messenger’s  experience - devoid  of  any  human  tragic  dimension - allies the 
call of faith,  trial among people, humility,  and the quest for peace with  the 
One.
490
 
The encounter with God in Islam is serene, unlike its version in Christianity and the way 
it has evolved in Western thought, as Ramadan argues. Ramadan builds on the story of 
Abraham and Isaac in the Jewish and Christian traditions and its counterpart in Islam, 
with Abraham and Ismail: 
Indeed, the prophets” stories, and in particular Abraham’s, are recounted in an 
apparently similar manner in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions.  Yet a 
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closer study reveals  that  the  accounts  are different and  do not  always tell the  
same  facts  nor teach  the  same  lessons.
491
 
I referred earlier to the Promethean idea Ramadan is critical of, and I do not see a need to 
reiterate it here, though he does refer to it in this biography of the Prophet as well, in 
sections like “The Trial of Faith:  Doubt and Trust,” and “A Tragic Experience?”492 
Briefly, for Ramadan, the encounter with God in Islam answers the primary existential 
questions and builds the first tries with revelation without doubt.  
 The connection with the divine is based on active spirituality, where the religious 
rituals have to be taken into account to make belief enacted physically, to give it 
meaning. The Prophetic lived experience exemplifies mediation not between God and 
man but between the divine and the human. There is no ijtihad with the creed of Islam, 
composed of the five pillars: Shahada (testimony of the Unity of God and Prophethood of 
Muhammad), aṣalāt (the prayer five times a day), as-siyam (fasting the month of 
Ramadan one month a year), azzakāt (social tax paid annually), and al-haj (pilgrimage to 
Mecca once in life for those who can afford it financially and physically).  The rituals 
“require that believers should accept their form as well as their substance.”493 
The obligation of the daily prayer, aṣalāt, as the second pillar of Islam elevates to 
being the first pillar of faith as a spiritual practice. Its importance stems from the fact that 
it is the only pillar that was prescribed during the ascendance of Muhammad to meet God 
in Miraj Journey from Jerusalem to Heaven, after having prayed with all the previous 
Prophets in Jerusalem in Isra´ part of the Journey. In Miraj, Muhammed meets and talks 
from behind a curtain to God who prescribes to him the duty of prayers. Muhammad´s 
ascendance to Heaven is both physical and spiritual, and the command of daily prayers 
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marks this event this way as a manner of remembrance of God through spiritual belief 
and spiritual exercise which takes place physically. Ramadan words it this way: 
 Unlike the field  of social affairs  (al-muamalat),  which  calls  for  the  creative  
mediation of people’s  intellect and intelligence, human rationality here  submits, 
in  the  name  of  faith  and  as  an  act  of humility,  to  the  order imposed  by 
Revelation:  God  has  prescribed  requirements  and  norms  that  the  mind must  
hear and implement and  the  heart  must love.  Raised to receive  the injunction  
of  ritual  prayer,  the  Prophet  and  his  experience  reveal  what prayer  must  in  
essence  be:  a  reminder  of  and  an  elevation  toward  the Most  High,  five  
times  a  day,  in  order  to  detach  from  oneself,  from  the world,  and  from  
illusions.  The  miraj  (the  elevation  during  the  Night Journey)  is  thus  more  
than  simply  an  archetype  of  the  spiritual  experience;  it is  pregnant with  the  
deep  significance  of prayer,  which,  through the  Eternal Word,  enables  us  to 
liberate our consciousness  from  the contingencies  of space  and  time,  and  
fully  comprehend the  meaning  of life and  of Life.
494
 
The prayer then is a reminder of the fact that Muhammad is the seal of all Prophets; he 
leads the prayer with them in Jerusalem. The Muslims first prayed towards Jerusalem as 
their qibla (prayer orientation), but the Prophet changes it later towards Mecca, believed 
to be the first and oldest sacred shrine, to differentiate Islam from Judaism and 
Christianity. It is also a physical reminder of the link that binds the believer and God at 
least five times a day.  That gives meaning and order to the life of the believer.
495
  
The daily life of the Prophet makes part of the spiritual for believers. As a teacher 
to his Companions, his behavior counts as a model to be followed, unless he indicates 
himself that such a behavior is exceptionally for him and not allowed to be replicated. 
Socially, though he is born into Banu Hashem distinguished family that is respected in 
the tribe of Quraysh in Mecca, he still grows as an orphan child whose father dies before 
he is born, and loses his mother, then his grandfather, his protector. He does not use his 
family lineage to reach some social status. He interacts with people; excels in commerce, 
and builds a name for himself by his ethical demeanor. He becomes to be known as the 
sadiq, and amin, the “truthful” and “trust-worthy.” In tribal disagreements or personal 
disputes, he would be summoned to give his judgments, for the tribe believed he would 
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not be biased. He never worships gods of the pagan tribe, nor drinks; he never gambles 
nor goes after women from his early age. 
Muhammad’s generosity is unrivalled, before being a Prophet and much more 
when he becomes so. At times he would have nothing to eat at home because he has 
given everything to the poor. In a hadith he says “True wealth is the wealth of the 
soul.”496 His respect for the elderly, and women is emphasized. Though he never shakes 
hands with them, women would either go ask him for help or consultation in the mosque 
or in his house or in public. Though he married many wives, he never beats any of them, 
and his wives testify to his generosity, and equal treatment among them. At home, he 
plays with his kids, and helps his wives in the household, a behavior which was not 
common among the Arabs at the time. With the orphans, he is generous; he gives them 
time and plays with them. His adopted son, Zayd ibn Thabit, who was his assistant, 
speaks high of his treatment. For the slaves that were common to have at the time, he 
buys none for himself, and treats the others equally, without regard to race, colour, or 
tribal affiliation. His humane relations would touch also the environment, animals and 
birds, for they are all sings of Creation, and they teach divinity and not respecting them 
equals not respecting the divine.  
 Like earlier Prophets before him, when he starts at the age of forty to spread the 
revealed message of Islam, most of his tribe rejects him, menaces him, calls him names, 
and belies the message of Islam and its divinity. He refuses the wealth the prestige the 
tribes of Quraysh give him to renounce his faith. His solitude grows, his love for God 
solidifies, and his patience and mercy over those who hurt him becomes his solace. 
Prayers, fasting, and contemplation in solitude are lifelong aspects of his life to interact 
with the divine more closely, but in tough times of sadness, death of a relative, or a feared 
attack from the “infidels” over his small community of believers in its early stage they 
become his consolation. At a certain point, he prefers exile to the Medina for his early 
companions, as a way of resistance and patience, to avoid a confrontation with the 
Meccans.  
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 Historically, the Prophet acted both as a human being and as a Prophet. In this 
aspect, I select three main aspects that characterize his life as lessons for Muslims and 
human behavior, among others that Ramadan refers to. These three aspects are related to 
1) jihad, 2) polygamy, and 3) his “three mistakes” that the Quran admonishes him for 
having committed. For the concept of jihad, Ramadan goes back to its first appearance in 
the Quran and finds that it means “making an effort” and “resisting” oppression and 
persecution with recourse to the Quran: “Therefore do not obey the negators, but strive  
against them  [Jahidhum]  with  the Quran with  the  Utmost  resistance  [Jihadan  
kabira]” (Quran, 25: 52). God here is demanding of Muhammad to resist the ill-
treatment, insults, and assaults of the Qureyshi opponents of the message of message of 
Islam by referring himself to the Quran, the miracle and the word of God, which has 
some answers for them and their inquiries about the truth of the message. For Ramada, 
the first use of the concept of jihad is ‘spiritual and intellectual.” Jihad here stands for 
persevering in the protection of the new message that holds a new worldview, based on 
social justice, where this life and its worldly pleasures of wealth and power are just a 
passage, a test, towards the After Life, and divine just judgment.
497
   
 Persecution and assaults on the early small community of the Muslims would rise 
and the believers would ask Muhammad constantly of a way out, of possible fight back, 
but he had to be patient, and wait for divine ordainments. The process of waiting for 
Ramadan is part of “patience, resistance, pain” and the manifestation of “jihad fi sabili 
Allah.” It was part of the teachings of the new religion: to resist the status of the world 
with tight belief in a new “revolutionary” message for the community and the world, “By 
calling for recognition of the One God, for the rejection of former idols, for Life after 
life, for ethics and justice, Muhammad initiated an outright revolution in mentalities as 
much as in society.”498 Muhammad refused the offers given to him by the elders of the 
tribes that opposed his message; he refused being crowned a king, and refused their 
wealthy offers, at the expense of dropping the idea of spreading Islam.    
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 Revelation would command that the small community of believers emigrate first 
to Abyssinia, which was ruled by a just Christian king (who converted later to Islam), for 
protection, and from then to Mecca where Muhammad would establish the first city for 
the Muslims, with a clear document (the Document of Medina) that protects the rights of 
minorities and the roles of the non-Muslim allies, pagan, Jews, and Christians. The latter 
two formed what is called dhimmis since they are People of the Book, ahl al-kitab: for 
community protection and non-participation in the war, they had to pay the al-jizya tax. 
For the first time Muslims of Mecca (Muhajirun) and of Medina (Ansar) would know 
pacts of brotherhood as taught by the Prophet, and respect of personal beliefs would 
manifest in the ideals of the Prophet who speaks of Islam but forces no one to convert, as 
a number of stories illustrate. He lived the idea of “Let there be no compulsion in 
religion” (Quran 2:256).499   
 In Medina, the Muslim community made allies and grew in number and order, 
and the Quraysh watched from afar, made allies, and started to attack the allying tribes of 
Muhammad. Here, revelation descends to allow jihad for defense: “Permission  [to  fight]  
is  given  to  those  against  whom  war  is  being wrongfully waged - and verily,  God  
has  the  power  to  succor  them - those who have been driven from their homelands 
unjustly for  no other reason except that  they  say:  "Our Lord is God!”(Quran, 22:39-
40).
500
 Ramadan considers this armed version of jihad as another form of resistance: 
To the jihad of spirituality and  intelligence, which  had  consisted  either in 
resisting the darkest  attractions of  the  ego-centric,  greedy,  or  violent  self  or  
in  answering  the  pagan contradictors” arguments  through  the  Quran,  a  new  
possible  form  of jihad  was  now added:  al-qital,  necessary  armed  resistance  
in  the  face  of  armed  aggression, self-defense against  oppressors. All the forms 
of jihad are, as can be seen, linked to the notion of resistance. On the  level  of  
qital,  armed  fighting,  it  is  so  as  well.
501
  
With this permission to go into war for defense went a number of conditions, that revolve 
around justice and remembrance of God, “let  not  the  hatred  of  others  to you  make  
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you  depart  from  justice.  Be just:  that is next to piety” (Quran, 5:8).502 I collect here the 
main conditions of jihad as a defensive war in the Prophetic period, for they appear 
throughout the biography and not in one setting. One, contracts have to be respected with 
the allying tribes, and have to be annulled only if they are made invalid by the very same 
allying tribe. Two, peaceful resolutions to confrontation have to be advanced, before 
going to war, “But  if  they  incline  toward  peace,  do  you  [also]  incline  toward peace, 
and  trust in  God,” (Quran: 8:61).503 Three, for the ethics of the war, the elders, women, 
and children have to be spared. Captives, war prisoners, have to be respected and well-
treated. Mutilation is not allowed. Animals and the environment have to be respected, and 
vandalism is not allowed. A Prophetic teaching, re-iterated by his Companion, the first 
Caliph, Abu Bakr, reads as follows:   
Do not kill women, children, and old people.  […] Do not commit treacherous 
actions. Do not stray from the right path.  Never mutilate.  Do  not destroy  palm 
trees,  do  not burn  houses and  cornfields, do not cut down fruit  trees, and do  
not kill  livestock  except  when  you  are  compelled  to  eat  them […]. As you  
move  on,  you  will  meet hermits  who  live  in  monasteries  and  serve God in  
seclusion.  Leave them alone; do not kill them and do not destroy their 
monasteries.
504
 
 As to the idea of proselytization, da´wa, through jihad, this does not occur during 
the life of Muhammad; he never waged a war to convert its people by force. Rather, 
Muhammad sends letters of testimony to some main kings and emperors of the time (to 
Negus , king of Abyssinia, Chosroes,  the  king  of  Persia;  to  Heraclius,  the  Byzantine  
emperor;  to Muqawqis,  the  ruler of  Egypt, etc.) to invite them to Islam, and to hold 
them responsible before God of their choice if they refused it.
505
  
 As to the question of the polygamous life of the Prophet, Ramadan does not go 
into a legalist discussion in this biography. He does that in other works. Rather, he 
considers the case of the Prophet an exception, knowing that he married nine to eleven 
women, depending on situations and for different reasons (some of his wives were 
                                                          
502
 Ibid., 90 
503
 Ibid., 108 
504
 Ibid., 201 
505
 Ibid., 161 
164 
 
widows, divorced, or converts). First, Ramadan says that polygamy was common and 
unrestricted in Arabia at the time, and the Quran came to restrict it to four  “with  strict  
conditions  to  be  respected  when  marrying  a  second,  third,  or fourth  wife.” Second, 
“the Prophet’s situation was the exception, since he had remained monogamous for 
twenty-five years,”506 [i.e. from the time he married Khadija at the age of twenty-five 
before his prophethood life, till she died when he was about fifty]. Among the reasons of 
the ‘singularity” of the private life of Muhammad lies in the following: “his  wives  were  
reminded that  they  were  “not  like  any  of  the  other  women” (Quran, 33:32). 
Henceforth,  they were  to cover  their  faces  and  speak  to  men  from  behind a screen  
(hijjab), and  they  were  informed  that  they  could  not  marry  again  after  the 
Prophet’s  death.”507  
 This prophetic and historical singularity apart, Ramadan draws attention to the 
ethical behavior of the Prophet with his wives, which remains the basis for man and 
woman, husband and wife relationship. It was based on love, respect, and understanding 
of the role of Muhammad as a husband and as a Messenger. In an incident, the wives 
would feel jealous of each other or a new wife, but they would soon understand the 
prophetic reasons. In a case of doubt that was a rumored about his wife Aisha, 
Muhammad felt hurt but soon revelation edited his innocent wife. These were examples 
of ordinary feelings in a household, but what was not ordinary was the spiritual ethical 
patience that overcame them. He was just among them, and never beat any of them. At 
home, he would help them in the household, play with them and the kids. His always 
spoke in a calm voice. In public, he integrated them in the social, political, economic, and 
military sphere.
508
 One of his wives narrates that they used to compete in race in the 
desert and she would defeat him in that. Aisha, one of his wives, reports that 
Muhammad´s ethics were the ones prescribed in the Quran, “His ethics were the Quran.”  
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 The other example I select, which Ramadan refers to in different chronological 
orders in the biography, is threefold. It concerns errors of judgment or behavior of the 
Prophet, and about which he receives divine reproach, which in turn becomes, for 
Ramadan, lessons for believers and humankind. One, when he started to reveal the 
message in public, the Prophet faced sarcasm and disbelief from the elders of Quraysh. 
The latter would go to rabbis in Yemen to ask them of ways to test the prophecy of 
Muhammad, seeing that rabbis were familiar with the prophethood of Moses, about 
which Muhammad himself spoke to the Qureyshi. The latter posed their questions
509
 to 
the Prophet, and feeling sure God would help him in this, he instantly answered: “I shall 
answer your questions tomorrow!” Two weeks passed, and the Prophet felt God had left 
him; he was embarrassed, in immense fear of his deed; the Qureyshi mocked him and 
confirmed their claim that he was not a Prophet. After the second week, revelation 
descended to answer the Prophetic test questions, and reprimanded him to be more 
thoughtful and mindful of the knowledge of God and his presence. That was the story of 
the saying Insha Allah, If God wills it. In his interpretation, Ramadan reads it this way: 
Insha  Allah,  "If  God  so  wills":  it  expresses  the  awareness  of  limits,  the 
feeling  of  humility of one who acts  while  knowing  that  beyond what he or she  
can  do or  say,  God  alone  has  the  power  to  make  things  happen. This is  by 
no  means a fatalistic message:  it implies  not that one should not act  but,  on  the  
contrary,  that  one  should  never  stop  acting  while  always being aware in 
one’s mind and heart of the real limits of human power.510  
The rationale behind the story then is to remember God in whatever decision or action 
one makes, for that teaches humility in action and modesty of knowledge that humankind 
has no perfect control of.
511
  
 The second “error” for which the divine reprimands the Prophet concerns his 
“polite but inacceptable” neglect for an old blind man. In its early years, the small 
Muslim community received harassment that escalated to torture and murder. The 
Prophet was approaching the chief of a tribe to ask him to protect his community by 
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forbidding the tribe from assaulting the Muslims. In this meeting, an old blind man (who 
had converted to Islam earlier) asked the Prophet to recite to him some of the Quran to 
ease his passion for Islam. The Prophet ignored him politely. The old man insisted, and 
the Prophet got irritated in that instance. The chief of the tribe ignored them all. 
Revelation descends and reproaches the Prophet for his behavior with the old man, 
though that behavior was aiming at protecting the whole community.
512
  This becomes a 
lesson as well, in Ramadan´s explanation: 
 Seeking  the  protection of a  person of distinction,  socially  and  politically 
useful,  Muhammad  had  neglected  a  poor man, apparently  of  no  significance  
to  his  cause,  who  was  asking  for spiritual  solace;  this  mistake,  this moral  
slip,  is  recorded  in  the  Quran,  which  through  this  story  teaches Muslims  
never  to  neglect  a  human  being,  never  to  turn  away  from  the poor and 
needy,  but rather to serve and love  them. The  Prophet was  never to  forget  this  
teaching,  and  he  repeatedly  invoked  God, saying:  “O God, we  implore  You  
to  grant  us  piety,  dignity,  [spiritual} wealth,  and  love  of the poor.”513 
The third example in the Prophetic trilogy of errors concerns the war ransoms. In 
the early years of their making, when they were allowed to defend themselves in Jihad, 
the Muslims won their first majour encounter with their opponents in Badr expedition 
(Ghazwat Badr). Among seventy captives of the war, Muhammad and his close 
Companions decided to spare them free, except for two notable men of high status for 
whom the Prophet intended to ask high ransom. Revelation later admonished the Prophet 
for this decision that aimed at profit for the community, “It is not for a prophet to have 
captives [of war]” (Quran 8:67).514 Disputes among Muslim soldiers would happen at 
times about war loot especially when the Prophet is not with them, but the revelation 
above would be remembered in later expeditions and wars, and would affect his decisions 
later.
515
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In between these Prophetic spiritual and historical lessons stands another type of 
Prophetic lessons in which the spiritual and the historical intertwine. I refer to the 
experience of exile (hijra), the Companions agency, and the story of Muad ibn Jabal as 
agency´s remarkable example. One, the event of exile (hijra) to Medina - [the first hijra 
was to Abyssinia] – was both historical and spiritual. For Ramadan, it stands for the 
historical rejection and hardships Muhammad and the first Muslim community went 
through, as happened to previous Prophetic messages like Abraham, Moses and Jesus. 
The hijra was a historical rupture from oppression, injustice, and “the exile of the 
conscience and of the heart from false gods, from alienation of all sorts, from evil and 
sins,”516 towards the liberation of the soul. Through that historical event, the Muslims 
would learn to make a fundamental distinction between the fundamentals of Islam and 
the Meccan cultural customs that were connected to it:  
The  community of faith,  following  the  Prophet´s  example,  had  to  distinguish  
between  what belonged  to  Islamic  principles and  what  was  more  particularly  
related  to Meccan culture. They were to remain faithful to the first while  
learning to adopt  a  flexible  and  critical  approach  to  their  original  culture.  
They even had to try to reform some of their attitudes, which were more cultural 
than Islamic.
517
 
That means that the Muslims had to learn the spiritual fundamentals of their faith, and 
would understand that faith is neither temporal nor spacial in limits. That goes to the core 
of existence and meaning faith brings guidance to: 
 The experience  of spiritual  exile […] brings  the  individual  back  to  him - or 
herself  and  frees him  or her  from  the illusions of  self and of the world. Exile 
for the sake of God is in essence a series of questions that God asks each 
individual being:  who are you?  What is the meaning of your life?  Where are you 
going?  Accepting  the  risk  of  such  an  exile,  trusting  the  One,  is  to answer:  
Through  You [God],  I return  to  myself and I am free.
518
  
Exile for the sake of God, in God´s vast space, was an assessment of spiritual patience, 
resistance, and ability to remain the same in faith despite time and space differentials. It 
                                                                                                                                                                             
aspect. For instance, the captured warrior to win his liberty had to teach a number of Muslims how 
to read and write.” Ibid., 109 
516
 Ibid., 87 
517
 Ibid., 85 
518
 Ibid., 87 
168 
 
was an opportunity also to “reform” the understanding of the universal aspect of faith in a 
more pluralist society like Medina.
519
 For instance, when the Prophet heard that the Ansar 
Muslims, the people of the Medina, were having a wedding ceremony, the Prophet asked 
that two singers be sent to them because the people of the Medina were more used to this 
kind of entertainment and the Prophet respected their customs that did not trespass the 
core limits of faith.
520
  
Two, the Prophet, through his agreements and encouragements, allowed 
responsible agency and independent intelligence in the Muslim community. That was the 
case with women and men equally. For women, he encouraged their social and political 
engagement as nurses, merchants, learners, and warriors. For men, he welcomed their 
suggestions as consultants. He allowed the Companions to take part in discussions over 
the issues of the community, and they could make a difference between revelation that 
was not questioned and his ideas as a human being. His suggestions were sometimes 
contrasted, and he welcomed them.
521
 The call for prayers, al-azan, is an example here. 
As seen earlier, the prayer was prescribed in Heaven, and some of its other details like the 
number of kneeling and ablution were part of the Prophet´s prescriptions. For the al-azan, 
he was still considering what shape it could take, something like bells or horn, and 
Abdullah Ibn Zayd suggested it the way it is now, and Muhammad approved it, and asked 
Bilal, a black liberated slave, the first muezzin to call for it.
522
   
Three, it is the dialogue that took place between the Prophet and his Companion, a 
young judge that was heading to Yemen for his job, that is most exemplary for Muslims 
beyond time and space. The story goes as such: 
The  Prophet asked: Muadh  ibn Jabal,  whom  he  had  named  as a  judge in  the  
new  environment  of  Yemen,  “Through  what  will  you  judge?” Muadh 
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replied:  “Through the Book of God.”  Muhammad then asked, ““And if you find 
nothing in the Book of God?" Muadh went on: “I shall judge according to the 
tradition [Sunna] of God’s Messenger.” Muhammad further asked, “And if you 
find nothing in the Messenger’s tradition?”  Muadh  answered  confidently:  “I  
shall  not  fail  to  make  an effort  [ajtahidu]  to  reach  an  opinion.”  This  
answer  satisfied  the  Prophet, who concluded: “Praise be to God, who has guided  
His Messenger’s  messenger to  what  satisfies  God’s  Messenger.” 
Ramadan`s commentary on the story above is his interpretation of it as well as his broad 
message behind writing a biography of the Prophet: sticking to the fundamentals, 
intelligently, and reading them according to time and space. The creed and the ethics that 
go with it are not changeable, but the social affairs that accompany them are open to 
human agency and interpretation, as long as they are founded on unbroken communion 
with God:  
The gradation  in  Muadh  ibn Jabal’s  answers  contained  the  essence  of  the  
Prophet’s  teaching  and offered  the means for  the community  to  follow  him 
and  to  remain  faithful  to  him  through  the  ages:  the  Book  of  God - the  
Quran - and  the whole body of traditions  (ahadith) of  the  Prophet (collectively 
referred to as  as-sunnah)  were  the  two  fundamental  references,  and  when  
faced  with new  situations,  the  keepers  of those  teachings  were  to  make  use 
of their critical  intelligence,  their common  sense, and  their legal  creativity  to 
find new  answers  that  remained  faithful  to  Islamic  principles  but  fit  the  
new context. The fundamentals  of Islam’s  creed  (al-aqidah) and ritual  practice 
(al-‘ibadat) were  not subject  to change,  nor were  the essential  principles  of 
ethics,  but  the  implementation  of  those  ethical  principles  and  the response to  
new  situations  about  which  scriptural  sources  had  remained vague or  silent 
required answers adapted  to particular circumstances.
523
  
Ramadan takes Muhammad´s life as a model for spiritual initiation, “For myself, 
this book  has  been  an  initiation.”524 In his spiritual reflections and memories collected 
in Quelques lettres du coeur (Some Letters from the Heart, 2008), Entre l´homme et son 
Coeur (Between Man and His Heart, 2009), Ramadan invokes the Prophetic example and 
his teachings on love, compassion, solidarity, self-understanding, and activation of 
spirituality at the age of modernity.
525
 Muhammad is pictured never to have resorted to 
                                                          
523
 Ibid., 199-200 
524
 Ibid., viii 
525
 Entre homme, 79. 
170 
 
spirituality as an escape,
526
 but as an engagement in the world for “interior liberation”527 
and world justice.
528
  The Prophet´s model, for Ramadan, is a means to access the 
spiritual world of Islam, “pragmatic” and “active,” in the face of the challenges of 
modernity and its instrumentalized liberty and humanity that knows no limits.
529
  
Development of Early Islamic Politics and Sciences: Overview   
Revelation, which formed the Islamic world view based on Tawhid, and the 
Prophet´s life in its different stages in Mecca and Medina became the two main sources 
that guided the first community of believers after Muhammad´s death. The four 
Righteous Caliphs (al-khulafa´ ar-Rashidun, 632-661 CE) that followed as rulers of the 
Muslim Community based on shūrā (consultation) would follow the Prophetic model. But 
it was at the period of the third Caliph (Ali) that division and turbulence started to take 
place amidst the Muslim community, and would lead later to the establishment of the 
Sunni and Shiite division. In his account, Ramadan says that the early Companions based 
their decisions on Revelation memorized by heart by believers, as well as the hadiths, 
words and deeds, of the Prophet. Yet, there was a tendency to stick to the literal meaning 
of Revelation especially during the second Caliph´s reign, Umar.
 
With conflicts later on, 
which resulted in the death of a number of Revelation memorizers (hufaz), the fourth 
Caliph ordered the writing of Revelation, which was until then mostly memorized by 
heart, into one copy upon which there was agreement, [but not total consensus]; that copy 
became the Quran as known today, compiled in Musḥaf.530   
Moreover, the coming of the first dynasty, the Umayyad (661-750) to ruling, 
some major changes took place in the political management of the Community affairs, 
influenced by tribal customs, Persian, Byzantine, and Indian cultures. For instance, the 
office of Caliph was converted into a hereditary kingship, and the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal) 
was turned into the dynasty´s property. The religious scholars considered this against the 
rulings of the shūrā, consultation and social participation, and habits of the earlier Guided 
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Caliphs.  As a result, some of the revelation learners left the capital Damascus either 
willingly or in disagreement with the new authorities, and that made the hufaz, 
memorizers of revelation as well as hadith, get dispersed. That left space for the risk of 
fabrication and mis-narration of the tradition. This made the writing of hadith equally 
necessary, as was the writing down of Revelation into one version. With these collections 
being made, some would reserve themselves to strictly studying the Quran and the Sunna, 
as was the case with Ibn Umar in Media; they were known as Ahl al-hadith [People of the 
Hadith]. In Kufa, Ibn Masud and his adherents used reasoning and analogy in interpreting 
case studies, in light of the two main sources, the Quran and Sunna. They were known as 
Ahl al-Ra´y,
531
 [People of Opinion]. 
If the Ummayad challenged the Muslim community with new questions and 
situations, it were the Abbasid that would pave a solid ground for the age of flourishing 
and consolidation for the Islamic sciences (750-1258). With Caliphs themselves scholars 
or interested in scholarship (like Harun ar-Rashid, al-Mansur), development of the 
Quranic and Sunna into various sciences led to the emergence of influential schools 
(madhahib), and the birth of Islamic theology, ‘ilm al-kalam or simply kalam. That was 
very much aided by learning from especially Greek philosophy and Christian theology.
532
 
Following a Prophetic conversation with the angel Gabriel, a division in faith was 
established (Islam, Iman, Ihsan),
533
 and that broadly influenced, according to Ramadan, 
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the development of corresponding sciences: 1) The science of worship, al-’ibādāt; 2) the 
science of creed, al-aqida; and 3) the science of ethics and Sufism, attaṣawuf, though 
more derivative branches generated from each.
534
  Otherwise said, the worship would 
develop into uṣūl al-fiqh, the principles of jurisprudence, which determine the 
methodology of deduction and induction of laws from the two main sources, the Quran, 
and the Sunna, followed by the practice of ijtihad, ijma´, qiyās, etc. This branch 
developed into worship rituals studies, ´ibadat, and social affairs studies, mu´amalat. 
Events case by case, as well as the study of methods of communicating and transmitting 
Islam to others were also branches that developed out of the principles of jurisprudence, 
named fiqh al-waqi‘ and fiqh al-awlawiyat, Jurisprudence of the Context, and 
Jurisprudence of Priorities, respectively. As to the science of creed, though in the early 
formative years of the Muslim community was not debated, it was brought into study 
later on, and developed into ‘ilm al-kalam, theology, based on reasoning. The science of 
ethics, on the other hand, concerns the individual and his/her and interaction in family 
and society; within the same science grew Sufism in which the individual is most 
concerned to understand God and march towards Him.
535
 It is the search for al-al-ḥaqīqa, 
Truth.
536
  
Ramadan goes through the main aspects that characterize especially the four 
dominant Sunni jurisprudence schools (madhahib), the differences and similarities, and 
their ijtihad methodologies. He also explains the conditions of practicing ijtihad, the 
various terminology of each school in making analogy before reaching a fatwa, the 
various types of fatwa, and numerous numerations of the developments of these 
jurisprudential practices – which I do not mean to go through here.537 In the main, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
commands. This is the level of righteousness, the level of perfection, the level of doing and saying the 
ultimate good, the level of Ihsan.  
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Ramadan affirms that “The sciences of Islam [...] since the 7th century […] have had only 
one purpose: how to maintain a vivid Faith and yet remain faithful to the Quranic and 
Prophetic teachings in new historical, social and political situations?”538 At least for five 
centuries (750 -1258 CE), these sciences were not formalistic and purely legalist; rather, 
they took time and space into account. The four main scholars of the main madhahib 
were mostly based in different locations, and little time differential between them, and 
that still allowed them to reason each according to his context, and his criteria, which 
were rigorous, but also flexible. The ijtihad they practiced took space and time into 
account. They equally took the common good (maṣlaḥa) into high consideration in their 
jurisprudential rulings. The common good / maṣlaḥa (pl. maṣaliḥ) were initiated into 
legal debates by the Maliki school, enshrined in the maqāṣid (objectives) of Sharia 
initiated by lmâm al-Haramayn al-Juwaynî (d. 478/1085) and developed by Abu Hāmed 
al-Ghazzālī (1058–1111). The common good (maṣlaḥa) raised a debate among scholars 
at the time because some, for instance, used it to allow interest in bank dealing (ribā) 
which a clear (qat´i) text of the Quran forbids. This led al-Gazali to formulate five main 
objectives (maqāṣid) of the Sharia: 
What we mean by maslaha is the preservation of the objective [maqāṣid] of the 
Law [shar], which consists in five things: the protection of religion, life, intellect, 
lineage, and property. Whatever ensures the protection of these five principles 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ruling on the matter concerned, without this matter being abiding for everyone and everywhere, because the 
scholar builds on his own references, and his opinion, fatwa, remains a reference, but not abiding for 
everyone. About five categories of ijtihad were known in the classical period: ijtihad qiyāssi: done on 
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[uṣūl] is maslaha; whatever goes against their protection is mafsada, and to avoid 
it is maslaha.
539
 
These five objectives (maqāṣid) led to other categorizations of the common good 
(maṣaliḥ), and scholars have debated that differently.540 Ramadan develops more 
objectives from these five objectives and categorizes them differently. I refer to that when 
dealing with Radical Reform.  
 The early intellectual dynamism of the Muslim scholars did not restrict itself to 
the Islamic sciences of the Quran and the Hadith, but equally integrated the humanities 
and the hard or exact sciences. This aspect is not separately and clearly dealt with in To 
Be a European Muslim, but finds some space in Western Muslims and the Future of 
Islam, in a section entitled “Faith, Science, and Ethics.” Here, Ramadan recalls “the 
extraordinary contribution Muslims have made historically to scientific development and 
progress” and adds the “fact that they –more than any other civilization- have advanced 
the sciences to a higher level,” and “deeply influenced” […] “European Renaissance, 
humanism, and the Reformation.”541 He asserts that the classification of religious studies 
into various branches, as broadly depicted above, impacted all the sciences related to man 
(i.e. mankind) for “at least three reasons”:  
First, because the Qur’an and the traditions invited the human spirit to study and 
understand the world; second, because the religious sciences themselves very 
often referred to scientiﬁc discoveries (in medicine or astronomy, for example) to 
work out an aspect of practice; and third, because the framework of reference was 
so nourished by religion that the connection between ethics and science was 
immediate and natural and necessarily less at risk at that time because few 
situations were recognized as delimited.
542
 
This Islamic worldview is based on the concept of Tawhid that touches all aspects of life 
and human interaction with man and the universe. Despite such a strong link between 
different disciplines established by Tawhid, each discipline developed its independence 
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methodologically. Accordingly, two major lessons can be withdrawn from the classical 
period:  
1. The unity of the Source (God as revealed in the Texts), which is where ethics 
ﬁnds its coherent foundation, never implies a similarity of approaches or a 
uniformity of methodologies. 
2. Varieties of methodologies are constructed rationally, taking as the starting 
point the object of study, not the relation to the Transcendent or to a system of 
knowledge that He has preordained.
543
 
Methodology apart, it was consistency in the ethical and moral attitudes that the sciences 
followed that made them Islamic, and not the scientific studies/methodologies themselves 
which are “in themselves morally neutral.”544  
However, this dynamism in Islamic sciences would stagnate for internal and 
external reasons. For the internal reason that is the focus for revival, Ramadan believes 
stagnation is due to the fact that Sharia was, by time, summarized into and dominated by 
jurisprudence, instead of it being comprehensive of all the Islamic sciences, as well as the 
exact sciences that developed along with them. Though there were attempts in 13
th
 and 
14
th
 centuries by Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328), his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawwziyah (d. 
1350), and al-Shatibi (d. 1388) 
545
 to revive the spirit of early scholars, they  failed, either 
because the criteria of being a scholar and thus to practice ijtihad were high and thus 
hardly no one could  produce some colossal work again, or because the scholars 
themselves or their political rulers did not see a need for that; they depended on the 
existing schools, and solved the new legal cases basing their solutions on the premises of 
the four main schools which they did not try to reinvigorate or go beyond.
546
 It was no 
longer the spirit of ijtihad, but of taqlid. Though the Quran contains just 250 verses that 
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specify certain legalist rulings, in a sum of 6632 verses,
547
 the legalists have managed for 
centuries to make law the only manifestation and meaning of Islam and more particularly 
of Sharia. The latter lost its inclusive definition, “a way leading to the source,” which 
embraces all aspects of Islam: aqida [creed], fiqh [jurisprudence], and tasawwuf [Sufism]. 
548
 In a critical summary of the Islamic sciences, Ramadan says: 
These sciences and their typology should have been a foundation, a vivid source 
for further studies. Unfortunately, it [i.e. the early Islamic framework of research] 
has, however, very often been like the walls of an intellectual prison preventing 
the ´ulema from providing or imagining original, but still faithful, Islamic 
solutions to contemporary problems […]. Muslims have followed the path of 
blind imitation (taqlid) without being able to find again the genuine and dynamic 
Message contained in the Quran and the Sunna.
549
 
“Blind imitation” went on until contact with the modern West took place in the 19th 
century, the time when the Ottoman Empire would start to lose its power as a guardian of 
the Islamic Caliphate. The re-assertion of ijtihad and reform had to wait until the 1870s to 
take place in the Islamic main lands, at the hands of the pioneers of the Arab Renaissance 
(Arab naḥḍa).550  
 In the Footsteps of Islamic Reformists  
It is especially in Aux sources de renouveau musulman: D´al-Afghani à Hassan 
al-Banna - un siècle de reformisme islamique (The Sources of Muslim Revival: From al-
Afghani to al-Banna – A Century of Islamic Reformism, 1998) that Ramadan articulates 
the first symptoms of where he stands in the modern and contemporary Islamic thought. 
However, the main rationale behind the book is actually to situate the legacy of Hassan 
al-Banna in its reformist but non-violent tradition. al-Banna culminates a number of 
figures that preceded his socio-political activism and involvement from a religious 
perspective into the political scene of the liberating Arab-Islamic societies. The figures 
Ramadan studies in the text are among the main ones in the Arab-Islamic reformist 
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movement of the naḥḍa, without this being the only list common in reading the naḥḍa 
legacy: Jamal Eddine al-Afghani (1838 - 1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849 – 1905), 
Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935), Said an-Nursi (1878
 – 1960), Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis (1889 
- 1940), Muhammad Iqbal (1877 – 1938), and Hassan al-Banna (1906 - 1949). I prefer to 
leave Ramadan’s evaluation of these reformists to the coming section where I also refer 
to his evaluation and criticism of the literalists and the liberals. Here I content myself 
with condensing his reading of al-Banna’s legacy as a reformist and advocate of ‘social 
Islam” (for social justice, and not for socialism). 
Ramadan’s reading of al-Banna´s published and unpublished works lead him to 
the conclusion that his grandfather belongs to the “fundamentalist reformist” school 
which al-Afghani and Abduh initiated.
551
 “Fundamentalist” here means that the scholar 
relates his research and approach to the fundamental sources of religion, i.e. Quran and 
Sunna. In a radio interview in French, Ramadan identified himself as ‘salafist and 
fundamentalist.” This was used against him, because it was understood in its current 
political context as radically violent.
552
 In the book (a volume of 479 pages), Ramadan 
argue for a historical reading of al-Banna’s heritage. The rereading of al-Banna comes at 
the time when studies of political Islam and extremism refer to Muslim Brotherhood and 
its founder al-Banna without distinguishing between the ‘social Islam” of the movement 
under the leadership of its founder, and its recourse to violence under the Nasserist 
oppression when Sayyed Qutb became the spiritual leader of the movment, after the death 
of al-Banna; the two men never met and Qutb moved from literature to religious activism 
after his visit to the US and experience of the Western life, his disappointment by its 
hegemony and “jahiliyya” (ethical decadence and ignorance). Worst was his 
imprisonment for ten years in Egypt.
553
  
According to Ramadan, the two leaders (al-Banna and Qutb afterwards) framed 
two separate religious and political orientations for the Muslim Brotherhood. One, from 
1928 to 1949, the movement was engaged in socio-political change peacefully, through 
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resistance to colonial powers especially in Palestine, and through education and social 
services in Egypt. The target was the grassroots level, and there was no idea of 
establishing an Islamic state.
554
 The aim was to “realize” an “Islamic society” that knows 
well its tradition and the message of its religion, and not the seizure of power “from 
below,” while the Iranian revolution opted for seizing it “from top” as Gilles Kepel 
argues in La revanche de dieu (The Revenge of God, 1991).
555
  
Two, after the assassination of al-Banna by the Nasserist regimes that suspected 
the work of the Muslim Brothers, oppression of the movement started. From the 1960s 
and 70s, the leadership in the movement would change its social priorities and target the 
state level, violently, and call for the “reversal of the regime” into an “Islamic state.”556 
For Ramadan, this was a “grave and naive political blunder.”557 Such a fundamental 
distinction in leadership and orientation does not appear in the Western literature on the 
movement and al-Banna. More than that, al-Banna is not studied as a social reformist that 
is influenced, as he himself says, by al-Afghani and Abduh.
558
 Ramadan affirms this: 
“The thought of Hassan al-Banna is badly known in the West, though his name is 
commonly invoked,”559 “It is necessary to render justice to the thought of al-Banna, and 
with him, to all the reformist tradition: al-Banna is not the father of “contemporary 
Islamism,” the manifestations of which are violent or take reductionist and shallow anti-
Western positions.”560  
After this clarification, Ramadan makes it clear that he does not deny his lineage 
to al-Banna. Rather, seeing that al-Banna’s ‘social Islam,” and the reformers” revival 
enterprises before him, all attempt a kind of reform, which Ramadan acknowledges as 
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substantial in its time, but is now part of what he calls “adaptation reform” in Radical 
Reform as will be seen.  Without a big rupture with this tradition, he moves to propose 
“transformation reform.”  
c. Radical Reform: from Adaptation to Transformation 
What I have tried to do until now is that I have presented the three stages of 
reading the tradition in the Ramadanian texts in my own way. First, I have broadly 
presented the way he introduces the basics of Islam, particularly the comprehensive 
notion of Tawhid, the biography of the Prophet and its lessons. Second, I have given his 
broad view of the Islamic sciences and their dynamism, though my presentation of that is 
very sketchy and does injustice to his work, but it is not my intention to delve into the 
details but in his mere methodology as well as my methodology of reading him, 
gradually, to reach his reformist ideas. Third, I also sketchily introduced Ramadan´s 
reading of the Arab-Islamic Renaissance pioneers, including his grandfather al-Banna. 
These readings of the tradition cannot be isolated from the idea of reform Ramadan has in 
the background in this stage of his work. I underline this idea here before I enter into the 
next section that speaks of his “radical reform” to anticipate my later analysis that argues 
that Ramadan´s project is gradual and not abrupt or unexpected.  
Already in the early texts that introduce the Islamic sciences and the situation of 
Muslims in the European and Western context, Ramadan frequently states that the 
message of Islam is universalist, humanist, and pluralist, and thus applicable to any space 
and time particularities as long as reading it in light of new circumstances is done 
seriously and from within the same tradition. For instance, his very early work Les 
musulmans dans la laicïté is an attempt to study the Islamic presence in the laïc France. 
In the book, he finds that the problems are not always related to rights, which the 
Muslims enjoy, but of discrimination and radical interpretation of laic laws of 1905. In To 
Be a European Muslim, Part II of the work is about European Muslims and how they 
should consider their religion in Europe. Here he, for example, already engages in 
expanding the meaning of Sharia to mean the Way, proposes the concept of “The Abode 
of Testimony” (dār ash-Shahada) instead of “The Abode of War” (dār al ḥarb), and 
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suggests priorities for social engagement in Europe as European Muslim citizens. In this 
same work a call for “radical change” is already present (before it is deepened in his 
Radical Reform):  
A radical change in our state of mind is needed if we want to face, as we must, the 
world around us. To be a consistent and balanced Muslim today is difficult 
because the world around us and the parameters, in the Islamic or in the Western 
space, are no longer coherent.
561
  
In Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, the first part of which is reproduced from 
To Be a European Muslim, Ramadan asserts that his approach is both conventional and 
new: “the approach I propose is anchored in the Islamic tradition and amplified from 
within it;” “it is both classical and radically new.” Yet, he admits that there has been a 
constant work on his project since his earlier work (i.e. Les musulmans dans la laicïté). 
Such a development, he says, was enriched by three dimensions: 1) “deepening reflection 
on the sources,” 2) “bringing them face to face with the realities on the ground,” and 3) 
“analyzing the local dynamics in accordance with meetings and ex-changes with Muslim 
association groups” in the West (Europe, North America, Mauritius, Reunion, 
Singapore).
562
  
The project Ramadan is working on in these early texts can lead to “a true 
“intellectual revolution”” à la Kant “when he spoke of “Copernican revolution”” if more 
intellectual effort is exerted:  
Our sources help us in this if we can only try hard to reappropriate for ourselves 
the universality of the message of Islam, along with its vast horizon. This 
reappropriation should be of a depth that will enable it to produce a true 
“intellectual revolution” in the sense intended by Kant when he spoke of the 
“Copernican revolution.”563  
The last paragraph in his Introduction to Western Muslims is revealing, and confirms my 
methodological reading of him, i.e. his gradual reading of the tradition and work on 
reform:  
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This book is only one step more toward the building of the Muslim personality in 
the West and doubtless in the modern era, too. It will not be the last. Other works, 
insha Allah, must continue to trace the path back to the beginning. I have humbly 
tried to draw the theoretical and practical outlines of a vision for the future, full 
on. I want to engage with this in practice, and already, across all the countries of 
the West, this vision is being accomplished. The road is still long […].564  
The main work that comes after this note, five years later, is Radical Reform, supported 
by The Quest for Meaning. This section introduces them and the advanced development 
they contain.   
 In his Introduction to Radical Reform Ramadan keeps stating that the work comes 
after “limits have been achieved” in the study of the classical and contemporary reform 
attempts in Islamic studies. The road towards this work has been “long and sometimes 
very difficult;” “we are now at a loss” and the need to “go further” is the way:  
Becoming reconciled to that rich past is the best way of devising new paths 
toward the future. For years, in the course of my work on law and jurisprudence, I 
have been reading and analyzing reference works on the fundamentals of Islamic 
law (usûl al-fiqh) and their concrete and practical implementation in different 
historical periods (fiqh), with the aim, of course, of finding new answers to the 
new challenges faced by contemporary Muslims—and, among them, Western 
Muslims. Many fields have been investigated by contemporary Muslim scholars, 
many proposals have been drawn up and the reform of reading and understanding 
as well as the exercise of ijtihâd have been a continuous practice. Today, 
however, we seem to have reached a limit, so that we shall have to ask ourselves 
precisely not only what meaning we give to the notion of reform […] but also 
what its objectives must be. To put it clearly, what reform do we mean?
565
  
Based on his earlier works, Ramadan seems to have gone through the ordinary path of a 
scholar in Islamic studies. From reading the Quran and the Sunna, to the classical schools 
methodologies, and reaching the naḥḍa reforms and contemporary debates, Ramadan 
feels “this is not sufficient.”566 The Copernican “true intellectual revolution” referred to 
in Western Muslims is developed here to face the “growing complexity of the real.” What 
further reform is needed and for what objectives are questions to be dealt with here. The 
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background for that will be re-stated briefly, initially, and case studies will be left for the 
next sections.   
  To present his “radical” step, Ramadan again goes through some main scholars of 
early Islam to present the dynamic ijtihad that culminated in the foundation of various 
legal schools. In his synthesis of the Prophet´s Companions period, and the flourishing 
legal schools that developed from the 9
th
 up to the 14
th
 century, which culminated in the 
school of objectives of al-Shatibi, fed by high knowledge of the sources, perfect 
knowledge of the sciences of the time as well as the socio-political context. So, their legal 
opinions went in parallel with society’s evolution.567 High understanding of the 
objectives (maqāṣid) of the Sharia, and real proficiency of deduction and extraction 
methods were, following ah-Shatibi´s argument, the main pillars of  ijtihad. These 
objectives were/are generally summarized in the protection of human life, religion, the 
intellect, honour, and property, were guided by strong faith, dynamic and autonomous 
reason.
568
 The context was always taken into account, but was not centralized, as part of 
the fundamental sources of jurisprudece, uṣūl al-fiqh.569  
 The naḥḍa period since 1870 tried to shake the stagnation of about five centuries. 
Ijtihad was revived to keep up with the rapid changes that had taken place after the 
encounter with the West.  Since naḥḍa, Ramadan recognizes three categories of scholars 
of religion that try either to progress or regress, by being protective. These three 
categories are 1) the reformists of the naḥḍa - as well as some contemporary reformists - 
a category to which he feels close to, 2) the literalists that he distances himself from, and 
3) the liberals whose methods of research he questions. These three categories are not 
referred to all in one text, but are found mainly in Aux sources du renouveau musulman 
and Radical Reform. I outline his views of the three in the following paragraphs. 
First, for the literalists, according to Ramadan, they have three failures to 
overcome. The first is the failure to distinguish between what is immutable (thabit), 
transhistorical, and what is changeable (mutaghayyir). Pillars of Islam and pillars of faith 
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are immutable. The Medina state model is historical and thus the state model for Muslims 
is changeable. Even the immutable can have different manifestations in their 
implementation. The second concerns the confusion between principles and models, 
between a rule and its form. For instance, decency in clothing is the prescription for both 
men and women, but its form is left open for personal choices according to the context. 
The Salafists who see the Arabian clothing style of the Prophetic era as the only suitable 
attire do mix the rule and the form. The third concerns the inability to distinguish 
between legal methodologies related to the creed (aqida) and worship (ibadat), and social 
affairs (mu´amalat). The basic principle in social affairs is permission (al-asl fil al-ashya´ 
al-ibaha), and not “only what is written can be done.”570 These literalists fear reform, lest 
it 1) changes the message of religion, 2) loses its substance as has Christianity done, and 
3) loses its timeless teachings that, the literalists claim, are relevant for all times and 
places.
571
 
Second, for the “fundamentalist reformists,” or “mujaddidun wa islahiyyun” of 
the naḥḍa, the Quran, the Sunna, and the ijtihad are their fundamental references of 
reform.
572
 These reformists, from al-Afgani to al-Banna, as studied in Aux sources 
renouveau du musulman, can be featured in three moments and characteristics. One, al-
Afghani and Abduh: they are the pivotal axis of the modern thinking in Islamic thought; 
profoundly, they have “renewed the intellectual dynamic” at the time of colonialism and 
fight for liberation. All those who come after them refer to their “theoretical” 
contribution. For instance, al-Afghani refused to stick to the main Islamic legalist 
schools/madahib that developed in the formative years of Islam and fall into the mistake 
of formalism and taqlid; he preferred to go directly to the sources and practice al-ijtihad 
anew, though its gates for him were never closed.
573
 Though he searched for a way as a 
unifying force to uphold liberation from colonialism, and back up reforms, he still 
considered the umma as united spiritually and not simply politically.
574
 In science, he saw 
the revival and role of philosophy, “the mother of science,” as that of guidance, 
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consciousness, and its revival as the revival of nations. Reason and faith for him go along 
and solidify each other for human liberation from material dependency.
575
 Abduh, the 
disciple of al-Afghani, known for some as a ‘salafi rationalist”576 focused on education as 
a priority over politics; “education is everything;” he was very critical of al-Azhar 
educational system, and when he became a Mufti he implemented substantial reforms to 
revive the tradition of reasoning and opening up to the modern sciences. For him, the 
Quran was not a historical nor a scientific book, but a guiding book. Sharia for him was 
“the way.” Socially, he saw a needed reconsideration of the situation of women, and was 
critical of the authority of man over women in certain hadiths. Economically he took the 
view of allowing interest banks.
577
   
Two, Rashid Rida, an-Nursi, Ibn Badis, Iqbal: this group expresses a “real 
reformist evolution,” reflected in ‘social and political action.” Rida, the disciple of 
Abduh, Ibn Badis, influenced by Rida, and an-Nursi were more into the social and 
political activism for liberation, and against the cultural European influence. Besides the 
exegeses and newspapers they wrote and disseminated, with frequent references to their 
predecessors al-Afghani and Abduh, they gave much attention to the language as well, 
Arabic, for its importance in reforming education, and impacting understanding of the 
Quran. From India-Pakistan, the poet-philosopher Iqbal called for the revival of the spirit 
of dynamic ijtihad as a way for a reconstruction of Islamic thought. The democracy he 
envisioned for Islamic countries was a ‘spiritual democracy” where an “active 
spirituality” accompanies modernity, unlike the European model where the ethical has 
distanced itself from progress.
578
 Three, al-Banna stands as a figure that epitomizes 
‘social Islam” which caters for the grassroots level aspirations, through social services 
and education, always based on the religious reference.
579
  
In synthesizing the reformists past references and practices, Ramadan outlines six 
features: 1) permanent reference to the Islamic sources in light of the sociopolitical  
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context; 2) liberation of reason to stimulate new answers through ijtihad; 3) the attempt to 
unite the Muslim societies despite the differences that characterize them and their 
religious school/madhab reference; 4) sensitization of people socially and politically; 5) 
respect of peoples´ choices in politics through the shūrā principle of consultation; 6) 
refusal of submission to foreign powers politically, economically, socially, and 
culturally.
580
  
Third, for the liberals, Ramadan names some of them in Aux sources du 
renouveau musulman. They are also depicted as the ones that approach the West, use its 
civilization, culture, and values to reform Islam for a renaissance as that which the West 
went through; they expect an Islamic aggiornamento. For Ramadan, Qasem Amin (1863-
1908), Ali Abd ar-Razeq (1888-1966), Taha Hussein (1889-1973), Mohamed Arkoun 
(1928-2010), Abd Allah Laroui (b. 1933), Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935), and others, are 
examples of scholars that have tried to modernize Islam in light of Western history of 
ideas. “These scholars benefit from a favourable readership in Europe and the US” 
because they are the ones made and helped to be heard. “They use the same rational 
categories, the same terminology, the same rapport to the sciences and rigorous deduction 
and found their authority on applied rationalism, away from the manifestations of faith 
and the respect of the overall sacred.”581 They claim to save Islam from fanaticism. They, 
too, like the Western literature on political Islam, use socio-political approaches, and not 
historical ones in understanding the intellectual history of modern and contemporary 
Islam.
582
  
 In Radical Reform, which comes ten years after Aux sources du renouveau 
musulman, Ramadan develops his criticism of the liberals, without mentioning names 
(maybe because he realizes that some of the scholars he earlier called “liberal” are not 
very much so, and are not “Westernized”!). So, in his new critique he finds that the 
liberals are present in the debate over reforming Islam in three basic points. These points 
manifest their different conception of 1) the Quran, 2) the Sunna, and 3) the claim of 
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one´s ability to practice one’s own ijtihad. The first point concerns the scriptural sources, 
the Quran and the Sunna, which Ramadan strongly sticks to. In this first point he first 
refutes the idea of reading the Quran as a human text, as some Muslim and non-Muslim 
scholars tend to do, mostly influenced by Protestant Reformation and Vatican II 
proceedings, to solve its legal issues in which it is wrongly summarized. Such scholars 
expect “a real aggiornamento, or update, of Islam.”583 He also faces these claims by 
presenting the classical methodologies as a form of “applied hermeneutics” that 
integrated the scholar, the context, as well as the divine text in the reading. For Ramadan, 
as for any concerned Muslim, it is one of the pillars of faith to believe that the Quran is 
the Word of God and the Last Revelation, and considering it as a human text betrays this 
teaching and pillar. As to the Sunna, the second note, he equally stresses its importance as 
a secondary source, besides the Quran, and disagrees with those who call for doing 
without it in reforming Islam.
584
 For the last note, which is the practice of free ijtihad, 
individually, with no methodological constraints, here, too, he disagrees, and defends the 
idea that ijtihad is not unrestricted.
585
 Below I try to elaborate on these three points: the 
Quran, Sunna, and ijtihad.  
For the first point, Ramadan stresses the idea that the real problem is not the 
Quran, and thus it is not in studying Quran as a human text that will solve the problem. 
He labels this intellectual enterprise as a “dangerous shortcut”:  
People tend to believe that dogmatic or literalist approaches are caused by the 
nature of the Quranic text, and that ascribing a human origin to it would suffice to 
open the way to a historical and contextualized reading. However, this statement 
involves two dangerous shortcuts.
586
  
The first “dangerous shortcut” in such a reading is the assumption that reading the text 
alone will determine the approach in interpretation. He believes that such free 
interpretation has historically brought about dogmatic ideologies and in contemporary 
Islam this freedom of interpretation has led fundamentalists to read the text in a way far 
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from its objectives. His fear is that the interpreter will take the text to where he wants by 
projecting his own ideas on it: 
The first [dangerous shortcut] is in assuming that the status of the text alone 
determines its readers” mode of interpretation, although this is far from obvious 
or inevitable. The history of religions and ideologies is filled with examples of 
texts produced by guides or thinkers, texts that have been, and still are, read in a 
dogmatic way by their adepts or followers. The status of the text can indeed 
influence the modalities of reading, but in the end, it is the mind and psyche of the 
reader interpreting it that project its categories and the modalities of its 
interpretation onto the book.
587
 
The way out of this first risk is to take a number of elements into account: the attitude of 
interpretation, psychology, and the frame work of interpretation the interpreter has in 
mind: “What must be assessed and questioned is often the outlook, the psychology, and 
frame of reference of interpreting scholars, and the debate over the status of the text falls 
far short of resolving the issue of historical and contextualized interpretation.”588  
 The second “dangerous shortcut” concerns the projection of the Christian 
theological development on the Islamic one which is different. Unlike its Christian 
counterpart, which integrated the human source early in its scriptural production, the 
Islamic revelation developed its own methodology of being read in context, though it is a 
divine text. That is to say, the Word of God remains untouchable, while the interpretation 
was understood according to the context in which it descended, and later on according to 
the various methodologies of interpretation which remain human. More clearly, the 
divine and the human remain separate though interdependent. This long passage clarifies 
it in Ramadan´s wording: 
The other shortcut is methodologically more serious and its consequences are far 
more harmful. It consists in importing the experience of Catholic theology into 
the Islamic tradition: because the historicocritical approach was only possible in 
the Christian tradition, after the human source of the New Testament had been 
acknowledged, it is assumed to be the same—by natural induction—for the 
Islamic legal tradition. However, this exogenous imported viewpoint fails to do 
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justice to the great legal tradition of Islam that has never, since the beginning, 
linked the status of the Quran (as the “eternal word of God”) to the impossibility 
of historical and contextualized interpretation. Indeed, quite the contrary has 
occurred: from the outset, the Prophet’s Companions (as-sahâba), the following 
generation (at-tâbi”ûn), then the scholars, the leading figures of the various 
sciences and schools of law, kept referring to the context, causes (asbâb), and 
chronology of revealed verses. The sciences and commentaries of the Quran 
(“ulûm al-Qur”ân and at-tafâsîr), the study of the Prophet’s life (as-sîra), and the 
classification of Prophetic traditions (“ulûm al-hadîth) are areas of study that 
were set up while taking into account the historicality of the revealed Word as 
well as of the Prophet’s speech and action.589 
What is said above, besides the clear cut distinction between the divine and human, is 
that “Human intelligence alone, then, can determine the contents of the timeless principle 
drawn from the text, while necessarily taking into account its relation to the social and 
historical context of its enunciation.”590 In more contemporary scholarly terms, the 
human interpreter of the divine is an old practice in the Islamic tradition, and is a form of 
“applied hermeneutics.”591 What went wrong with time is not this very approach, which 
takes the context into account, but “the norms and limits of such contextualizing.”592 
(Integrating the context again falls within Ramadan´s reform.  This will be explained 
after these preliminary notes.)  
 As to the Sunna, the second point, some liberals want to do without it in reading 
the tradition and fundamentals of fiqh. For Ramadan, the Sunna “remains an essential 
source to determining Islamic norms and practices” and disqualifying it will simply be 
rejected by most Muslims, because the Prophetic tradition explains a lot of the divine 
messages. The prayer pillar, for example, is not explained in detail in the Quran and only 
the Sunna does.  For Ramadan, these two main sources “are by no means obstacles to a 
historical, contextualized, and critical reading.” What is important to be done “is to 
determine categories and norms that must make it possible to remain both faithful to the 
creed as such and coherent as to the questions raised by intelligence when faced with the 
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evolution of sciences and of societies.”593 But these norms of intelligence and faith to be 
developed do not have to go unrestrained, through an ijtihad that ignores rigorous 
methods that stem from faith and does not deviate from it. This makes the third point, 
which Ramadan rejects from the liberals.  
 Ijtihad as an intellectual process for the interpretation of the scriptures has always 
been practiced following ‘strict, and indeed legitimate, conditions” from the outset of 
Islamic sciences.  It could “only be carried out in the light of knowledge of the general 
message, of its various levels of enunciation, of the categories of the sciences (“ulûm) and 
methodologies, and of the rules (qawâ”id) applied to scriptural texts, grammar (nahw), 
semantics (ma”nâ), and morphology (sarf).” Thus, it “has never been considered a free 
interpretation of texts, open to the critical elaboration of individuals with no knowledge 
of Islamic sciences nor of the conventions and norms that text specialists and their 
procedures are bound to follow.”594 Ijtihad has always been based on two fundamental 
bases, as the earlier story of Muad Ibn Jabal and the Prophet for example illustrates: 1) it 
could be practiced only if the scriptures do not have clear answers and are silent about 
certain issues; 2) reasoned and reasonable ijtihad has always been founded on the idea of 
remaining faithful to the message of religion, despite time and space differentials in 
which it is practiced. Its other conditions, related to the scholar and methodology as well 
as mastery of various sciences, all revolve around these two fundamentals.
595
  
 In contemporary debate on reform, three tendencies about ijtihad could be 
outlined. One tends proclaims that ijtihad is part of faith and should be practiced 
constantly. The other tends to forbid it for fear of deviating from the scriptures, and as a 
way of admiration for the early guiding schools. The third tends to deny its legitimacy 
since it is seen as a kind of rigid literary reading. The majority falls within the first 
tendency which sees ijtihad as “indispensable” to face contemporary challenges. 
Ramadan also belongs to this category. He is for constant ijtihad practice for reform, 
“necessary “renewal” and constant “reform” thus lie at the very heart of the requirement 
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of faith and faithfulness that accompanies the believing conscience through life and 
through history.”596 
 Ramadan argues against the literalists and equally against the “progressists” in 
their perception of ijtihad.
597
 Ramadan cautions against making of ijtihad an easy process 
in the hand of every ordinary reader who has not followed training in Islamic sciences. 
He puts their claim in the following: “the “reform of Islam” will only be possible when 
every Muslim (whatever his or her degree of knowledge in the matter) has the right to 
exercise their own ijtihâd […].” He then comments, warningly: “The laudable intention 
to “democratize” Islamic thought here takes on a dangerous aspect of downward leveling 
that disqualifies the basic conditions associated with the legal understanding of a text and 
the elaboration of its possible interpretations” [Emphasis added].598 Ramadan believes 
that more “open,” “progressive,” and “modern” readings, “one’s own ijtihad,” can be 
misleading, and dangerous. Some current violent extremism in interpretation are an 
example.
599
  
 The critique Ramadan launches on both the literalists and liberals, and softly on 
the reformists, is rooted in tradition. The concepts of reform and islah (innovation), and 
basically their moral meanings, are referred to in Quran and the Sunna. They were 
revived during the naḥḍa as tajdid (revival, innovation) and islah (renovation). This 
double critique does not aim at dissociating Muslims from their past, “Neglecting such a 
fundamental [i.e. ijtihad] would be not only disrespectful but also, above all, a sort of 
guilty madness, cutting off Muslims from their heritage under the pretext of having them 
“move forward” toward the “modern” […] in the name of an illusory progress removed 
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from its roots.”600 He reaches with his critique the idea of modernity that he critiqued in 
earlier books: 
If modernity, progress in any era, means “breaking away from tradition,” then 
such modernity may very well be the euphemistic expression of a state of being 
that has no landmarks, no history, no principles, no vision. A modernity that 
rejoices in its situation without really knowing what it is. That is madness, 
alienation.
601
 
It is by dints of remaining faithful to this tradition that “the best way of devising new 
paths toward the future” becomes unavoidable.602  “Radical reform” tries to build on this 
tradition but still goes beyond what the reformists have been calling for since the 1870s. 
“We have reached limits.”603 “I am not, therefore, speaking about the same reform.”604 I 
below go on exploring what I call Ramadan’s “radical reform agenda.” 
“Radical Reform Agenda” 
“Radical reform agenda” contains three basic propositions. One, the Muslim 
world, including the dispersed minorities, has to recognize the modalities of reform, and 
differentiate between “adaptive reform” and “transformation reform”: the first entails 
religious, legal and philosophic reform to adapt to the scientific evolutions of the world; 
the last entails spiritual and scientific reform to “act on the real, to master all fields of 
knowledge, and to anticipate the complexity of social, political, philosophic, and ethical 
challenges.” Two, the geography of the sources of uṣūl al-fiqh have to be reconsidered; 
this means that scholars of the context (ulama´ al-waqi´), of various sciences have to be 
integrated in the reading of the sources, along with the scholars of the text (ulama´ 
anusus), to establish together the ethical grounds of Islam´s message in the world. Three, 
which is the outcome of the first two propositions, means that scholarly authority that 
studies the maqāṣid and their ethical message have to be shared by the two types of 
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scholars; this shifts “the center of gravity of authority” from the text scholars to the 
center, where it is shared by both types of scholars.
605
  
From “Adaptation Reform” to “Radical Reform” 
In light of the three categories that receive criticism from Ramadan, I could infer 
that the reformists, to whose line of thought he says he belongs, are softly criticized, and 
that the move ahead has to be envisioned. I then believe that when he speaks of 
“adaptation reformists” he speaks of the reformists. For him, the reformists have 
attempted to revive the objectives of the Sharia, by being close to the real, but that 
reformism reached limits, because it kept just adapting, in Ramadan´s view. That era of 
adaptive ijtihad has to be overcome: 
Centuries of referring to ijtihâd certainly did make things progress, but this 
remains highly inadequate because crises are still there and are even getting 
deeper, and Muslims seem to be at a loss for a vision and projects for the present 
and future. […]606  
Why does recourse to ijtihâd, so long called for, fail to produce the expected 
renewal? Why has the innovative, bold, creative spirit of early times given way to 
timid approaches that only consider reform in terms of adapting to the world and 
no longer with the will and energy to change it? How can we explain this divide, 
this huge gap between the “Islamic sciences” (or ‘sacred sciences”) and all the 
“other sciences,” defining distinct and well-secured fields of authority, but 
making it impossible to respond adequately to the challenges of our time? 
607
 
The inability of contemporary ijtihad and tajdid enterprises to reground the Islamic 
sciences and incapacitate them for contribution, instead of mere adaptation “challenge[s] 
us to go back to the roots of problems, […] the fundamentals and sources of usûl al-
fiqh.”608  
 For Ramadan, “adaptation reform” is passive in coping with the world challenges. 
It has the capacity and attitude to keep abreast of reality changes, but it ““adapts” to what 
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the world is becoming as if that were fated.” So, adaptation scholars try “to protect one’s 
ethics in the face of an evolution one acknowledges without going so far as to dispute the 
very nature of that evolution.” It does not raise fundamental questions about the changes 
it keeps up with, but merely responds passively to protect its ethical traits.  Its “protective 
posture” is limited in scope: ““Adaptation reform” is indeed imperative, but its scope is 
limited: it means observing the world, noting its changes then coming back to the texts to 
suggest new readings, alleviations, or exemptions in their implementation.”609 With this 
attitude, scholars keep adjusting the limits of religion to the status quo of the world, by 
enlarging the formalistic permissions and prohibitions, al ḥalāl wa al ḥarām: 
The ethical demand is trapped inside legal elaboration alone (with its formalism 
and technicality), and is reduced to the formulation of fiqh, and timid judgments 
(fatwâ), formally conservative and often marginal. The inspiration of the ethical 
demand that, moved by faithfulness to conscience, questions the world’s order 
and human practices in the name of respect for nature and for men, in the name of 
justice and coherence, seems to have lost its energy or to have simply disappeared 
from a reformism that keeps adapting and eventually ends up acknowledging the 
very terms pointing to its own disqualification.
610
 
With adaptation reform, the dimensions of ethics and justice that the message of religion 
is about become lost in “protective postures” because the world order status is taken for 
granted and its basics are not questioned to be changed. Adaptation means that “Islam 
and Muslims are expected to adapt and not to contribute and propose their own 
answers.”611 At the same time, Muslims themselves find themselves unable to contribute 
a “deep and constructive “criticism of modernity, or of “postmodernity,” and in utmost 
cases they “attempt to Islamize it,” in case they don”t reject it.612 “Contemporary tajdîd 
looks for solutions to the problems raised, it follows, answers, and adapts, but it fails to 
anticipate and project into the future and it thus has neither the purpose nor the means of 
transforming reality.”613 Adaptation reform ends in becoming an “intellectual 
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assimilation” that surrenders its intelligence “to the decrees of the prevailing order,” 
headed by Western elites.
614
  
On the other side of adaptation, Ramadan suggests “transformation reform” which 
is more dynamic, more demanding, and contributive to the debate of world change based 
on ethical dimensions. Among its definitions goes this one: 
 “Transformation reform” is more exacting, in that it adds a further step, and 
condition, to the whole process. It aims to change the order of things in the very 
name of the ethics it attempts to be faithful to, in other words, to add a further step 
going from the texts to the context to act on the context and improve it, without 
ever accepting its shortcomings and injustices as matters of fate (to which one 
would simply have to adapt).
615
 [Emphasis added] 
The fact that transformation reform aims at “changing the order of things” requires that it 
acquires high knowledge of the context, as well as human and exact sciences that are 
available. “Reconciling conscience with science is imperative.”616 With such an opening, 
a “new reading of the text” becomes possible. Otherwise said, transformation reform 
touches the fundamentals: “Transformation reform thus involves questioning not only the 
practice of fiqh but also, more essentially, the sources and fundamentals of that fiqh (usûl 
al-fiqh).”617 When the text and the context – or conscience based on faith, and science 
based on ethics - converge, “a reform aiming to change the world” becomes feasible.618 
This reform will open up to the scholars of the context, instead of being based on the 
scholars of texts only, affect authority, and fundamentally trace new Islamic ethical 
objectives. These elements are discussed next. 
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“New Geography of the Sources of Law and Jurisprudence”  
 Transformation reform is based on a “new geography of the sources of law and 
jurisprudence.” This new geography has a mindscape impact on the understanding of the 
Way (Sharia) and its objectives (maqāṣid). And since the authority of interpretation is 
still in the hands of classical ulema, scholars of the text, Ramadan starts from there in 
outlining his project. He proposes three prerequisites for transformational reform: 1) the 
integration of the Universe as a second Book of reference, 2) the integration of context 
expert scholar in the interpretation of the sources, 3) and the recognition of his/her 
specialization as equal to the text scholar in authority. I start with these prerequisites in 
reverse (3
rd
, then 2
nd
, then 1
st
) to structure them according to my reading, which will end 
up with the first prerequisite as the leading one in outlining further ethical objectives of 
Sharia.   
 For authority, and since transformation reform is supposed to be radical, 
hierarchical reading authority of the scriptures is no longer supposed to be monopolized 
by the classical ulema who are experts on the so-called “Islamic sciences” that focus on 
the Quran, the Sunna, and the other developed schools of law and methodologies of 
research. These scholars lack knowledge on the complexities of the new social and exact 
sciences:   
The new geography of the sources of law that I suggest clearly and deliberately 
entails shifting the center of gravity of religious and legal authority in 
contemporary Muslim societies and communities. We can no longer leave it to 
scholarly circles and text specialists to determine norms (about scientific, social, 
economic, or cultural issues) while they only have relative or superficial, second-
hand knowledge of complex, profound, and often interconnected issues.
619
 
Authority here will not move from one axis to another. It will be shared by at least text 
and context scholars. Ramadan does not limit this authority to Muslim scholars alone, or 
to the ‘secular” or “neutral” scholars alone. Because the idea is to be contributive to the 
world at large, non-Muslim experts are also welcomed to take part. More than that, the 
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ordinary Muslims themselves have to contribute by opening up to the new interpretations 
and use of dynamic intelligence.  
For the second prerequisite, which merges the third and the first, that text scholars 
(ʻulamâʼ an-nusûs) as well as context scholars (ʻulamâʼ al-wâqiʻ) are expected “to 
participate on an equal footing in elaborating ethical norms in the different fields of 
knowledge.”620 Text scholars have to go beyond classically defined objectives of the 
Sharia and work together to draw out and conceptualize new higher objectives that 
correspond to the complexity of sciences and broad knowledge which context scholars 
have to be expert in.  This means that both have to develop double specializations, each 
has to get to know more about the expertise of the other, so that they could understand the 
levels of the debate they are involved in.
621
 They have to devise “a dynamic fiqh”622 
through “applied ijtihad.”623  
 As to the first and guiding prerequisite, it requires the inclusion of the Universe as 
a second complementary Book to the Book of Revelation. This is the case since the 
Universe imposes itself on the human intelligence as a book, with its rules, laws, 
principles, semantics, grammar, and signs,” and thus it becomes imperative to include it 
on equal footing with the Book of Revelation, as a fundamental source of law.
624
 Clearly 
said, Ramadan says: 
The point is then to clearly place the two Books, the two Revelations, the text, and 
the Universe on the same level—as sources of law—and consequently, to 
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integrate the different universes of the sciences and their various areas of 
knowledge and specialties into the formulation of legal rulings about very specific 
scientific, social, or economic issues.
625
 
The inclusion of the Universe as a pillar, and not simply as complementary element, in a 
reformed comprehension of the Islamic Revelation and Sunna, is the main contribution in 
Ramadan´s work. It is his “Copernican Revolution.” He targets revising the very 
fundamental tenets of the sources of law in Islam. Ramadan admits that early classical 
schools took the Universe as their guidance in interpreting the scriptures, but adds that 
their success in their interpretation was due to their mastery of the limited social and 
scientific complexities. This is no longer the case with the contemporary modern world 
which is beyond mastery of scholars of the texts alone. Social and exact sciences are vast 
in their horizons and understanding them needs new methodologies:  
The Universe, the social and human context, has never been considered as a self-
standing source of law and of its production. It is this status, this qualitative 
differentiation in authority—between the text and the context—that to my mind is 
a problem today. Early scholars were intimately familiar with the environments in 
which and for which they made the laws, and this is why they were so confident, 
creative, and pragmatic. The world has grown more complex, local practices are 
connected to the global order, all the spheres of human action are interdependent 
and interconnected, and it is impossible for scholars today to grasp this 
complexity with the same confidence as early scholars.
626
 
 Ramadan goes back to the sources to solidify his project from within. “We should 
therefore go back to the beginning and ask ourselves what scriptural sources ultimately 
tell us about the role of the Universe, creation, and the human and social contexts in the 
elaboration of law and jurisprudence.”627 He heavily uses Quranic verses and Prophetic 
hadiths to argue that the Islamic faith is based on a profound conversation with the 
universe. This conversation is called for through the contemplation of creation, nature, 
and humankind, and through the understanding of the idea of Tawhid, history of previous 
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nations and prophets, willed diversity among nations and cultures, and the need to 
understand them as His ‘signs” (ayat) to understand Allah and his omnipresence: 
The Universe is a space that speaks to the mind and heart and reveals the meaning 
of Creation. […] The Heavens and the Earth, night and day, space and time, 
testify to the presence and infinite generosity of the One who has laid out the 
Universe like an open book pervaded with ‘signs” offered to people’s minds and 
hearts. The notion of ‘signs” (âyât, sing. ayah) is essential and from the very 
beginning it establishes a correspondence between orders.
628
 [The order of the 
written Revelation and the Revelation of Universe] 
Though he stresses that “The written Revelation is a teaching,”629 Ramadan 
simultaneously stresses that the fact that the universe is an open book that the written one 
complements “is not, however, a teleological approach where the world’s supposed goals 
would confirm, a posteriori, the existence of divine intents.” Though it contains certain 
scientific and historical references, Ramadan denies that the written Revelation, the 
Quran, could be considered a book of science or history. It is a book of guidance. It 
“neither stifles nor directs the mind, it liberates it at the heart of the Universe: the world 
speaks by itself, autonomously, and it is human intelligence’s task to understand its 
language, its vocabulary, its semantics, its rules, its grammar, and its order.” What the 
written Book strongly recommends is that “it calls on the human mind to engage all its 
critical, analytical, and scientific potential in its quest for knowledge.”630 The first word 
of revelation on the Prophet was “iqra´” (read).  With this reading of the universe, 
Ramadan moves away from the orthodox idea of Islamic sciences that prove, a 
posteriori, what the written Revelation contains. This is a practice of adaptation reform; it 
goes from the scientific findings that the universe reveals with time, adopts them, and 
Islamizes them. He considers these readings “inoperative,” “counter-productive,” 
“dangerous” in the long run, and are a failure.631 What harmonizes the two orders and 
Books is the ethical reference.  
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The “ethical reference” in Islam is based on the harmony of the same orders 
invoked above, the two Books. The “ethical conscious” reconciles the “why” the ethical 
heart raises and the “how” the intelligent mind invokes.632 Ramadan admits certain 
possible confusion between orders and how to proceed, but proposes a way out. It “of 
course establishes a priori causes, called postulates in philosophical terminology,” but 
that does not mean it creates barriers to research; its postulates aim at preventing 
dangerous consequences and manipulation of its achievements (e.g., genetic 
manipulations).
633
 For clarity, Ramadan suggests methodological separation at work in 
various fields, but union in prospecting the outcome, which should be ethical:  
There are, properly speaking, no “Islamic sciences,” nor “Islamic medicine,” nor 
“Islamic economics,” but “Islamic ethics” assists in the treatment of texts, study 
of the human body, or in the conduct of commercial affairs. To avoid being 
misled by formulations that connect without harmonizing, it is imperative to 
distinguish ethical goals from scientific methods, not to divorce them but to 
unite—to reunite—them as we should, in an approach that integrates higher 
objectives and scientific techniques while avoiding the dangerous and 
counterproductive confusion of the religious, ethical, and scientific orders.
634
  
The integration of the universe as “an autonomous and complementary source of legal 
elaboration”635 has positive consequences on the list of the objectives the Sharia has to 
account for in its reform. 
 Ramadan is not satisfied with the five-six main objectives of the Sharia which 
first came into use by al-Juwayi, al-Ghazali, Imam Malik, and later by al-Shatibi, as 
referred to before. This dissatisfction was echoed already in the 13
th 
and 
14th
 century. For 
instance, The Maliki jurist, Shihab ad-Din al-Qarafi (1228–1258) added a sixth to the list 
of the five objectives of Sharia, namely the protection of ʻird (honor). Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263–1328) was probably the first scholar to depart from the notion of confining the 
maqāṣid to a specific number. Ibn Ashur (d. 1973) has opened the scope of the maqāṣid 
to include the preservation of the social order, promotion of the wellbeing and 
                                                          
632
 Ibid., 99-100 
633
 Ibid., 128-131 
634
 Ibid., 128 
635
 Ibid., 102 
200 
 
righteousness (ṣalāḥ) of the community, preservation of the family, etc. The renowned 
contemporary scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) has extended the list of the maqāṣid 
to include human dignity, freedom, social welfare and human fraternity among the higher 
maqāṣid of the Sharia. Ahmed Raysuni (b. 1953) develops others, and calls for “ethical 
necessities” (aḍarūriyāt al-akhlāqiyya). Ramadan acknowledges these early and current 
developments.
636
 Still, for his project, he distinguishes between two axes of objectives: a 
vertical axis that distinguishes objectives according to their global or more specific 
character; and a horizontal axis that establishes a separate list of objectives for each level 
established on the vertical scale.
637
  
On the first level, “the most important purpose and objective of the Way” is 
twofold: “the protection both of ad-dîn—in the sense of a conception of life and death 
stemming from recognition of the One and of the Way—and of al-maslahah—in the 
sense of the common good and interest of humankind and of the Universe.”638 This, all in 
all, makes of the Way a holistic approach to life and death. On the second level, which 
makes the pillars of the first, it is composed of “three fundamental objectives”: respecting 
and protecting Life (hayâh), Nature (khalq, tabî”ah), and Peace (salâm).639 If the first 
two could be understood from the details provided above, the pillar of Peace is added to 
emphasize that without it neither dīn/ religion nor the common good/ maslaha could be 
achieved. To establish peace, ethical jihad on all levels has to guide the path towards 
establishing peace, against oppression and injustice.
640
 On the third level, it is 
humankind´s being and action, as individual and as groups that are targeted. The list of 
objectives here could read as follows: “promoting and protecting Dignity (of humankind, 
living species, and Nature), Welfare, Knowledge, Creativity, Autonomy, Development, 
Equality, Freedom, Justice, Fraternity, Love, Solidarity, and Diversity.”641 
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For the sub-levels, the individual is centralized. The objectives Ramadan 
enumerates involve “promoting and protecting Physical Integrity, Health, Subsistence, 
Intelligence, Progeny, Work, Belongings, Contracts, and our Neighborhoods.”642 With 
regards the group, he says that the classical scholars did not pay attention to this category, 
and its growing importance now needs considerations and recognition. For the group, it is 
essential, within the Way objectives, “to promote and protect the Rule of law, 
Independence (self-determination), Deliberation, Pluralism, Evolution, Cultures, 
Religions, and Memories (heritage).
643
 These objectives, on all levels and axes, are 
fundamentally encircled by “ethics of the heart.” The Way nurtures “ethics of the heart” 
through “Education (of the heart and mind), Conscience (of being and responsibility), 
Sincerity, Contemplation, Balance (intimate and personal stability), and Humility.”644 
The ethical reference is, for Ramadan, a sign of being faithful not only to the written 
Book but also to the open Book, the universe, which requires equal care and 
consideration; that is why it cares more about the scientific quality before its quantity.
645
  
From the classical five to six objectives he reaches forty one in his categorization. He by 
no means intends the list to be limited. His idea is that with specialization and 
involvement of scholars of the context, minute details could lead to elaborating other 
objectives. 
The ethical reference may seem like a limitation in Ramadan´s project, for it 
broadly questions modern achievements as well as classical legacy. Ramadan is aware of 
this challenge. He affirms that “the reform I call for is difficult.”646 I refer to two notes 
here, among others: modernity, and shared responsibility/pluralism. For modernity, over 
and again, Ramadan says that the fact that the ethical is stressed upon is not a limitation 
to human progress and research, or an aspect of antagonism with modernity. Rather, it is 
a way of rendering the modern times more cognizant of humankind´s dignity, which has 
to be preserved. Ramadan is aware that he is read as a “threat to the West” and as a 
reformist who adds nothing new to the debate apart from aiming at “Islamizing 
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modernity” in a “reconquest agenda.” Ramadan refutes these claims as superficial, 
political “caricatured relationship of otherness or, most often, of confrontation, distrust, 
and power”647: 
More ethics in science, politics, and economics at the heart of the modern era does 
not mean refusing “modernity” but calling for the dignity of humankind in history 
[…]. I am far from wishing to “Islamize modernity” […]. It [his work] does not 
consist in refusing “modernity” nor in resisting the West (which is a construct that 
does not exist) but rather in striving to promote a global Islamic ethics aiming to 
regulate human action: such ethics can only be nurtured by the input of all the 
world’s civilizations, and it must certainly contribute to an open and pluralistic 
reflection.
648
 
Ramadan disagrees with his detractors that see in any reformist effort an attempt either to 
Islamize modernity or to merely adopt modernity fully. For him,  
Not only is this double reduction (modernity is Western and only the West 
produces the universal) groundless philosophically, historically, and scientifically, 
its binary character (the “West” versus “the others”; “modernity” versus 
“tradition”) is also deeply ideological, particularly arrogant, and, in the long run, 
dangerous.
649
  
The Western appropriation of the modern is also a way of saying that any attempt by a 
non-Western religion or civilization to find its own answers to contemporary challenges 
means refusing universals and resisting modernity.
650
 So, whether the project will end in 
traditionalism, modernity, or postmodernity, Ramadan says that it is based on “mature 
thought” and can take from any of these what serves its dynamic ethical reference, 
without being purely a closed system (traditional), an imitating one (Western modernity), 
or a “rootless/soulless” one (postmodernity).651  
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Ramadan´s project, based on the ethical reference, is also rooted in dialogue 
among civilizations, and shared responsibility. The project requires joint, pluralist, 
efforts.  Reform here does not wait a charismatic leader or a particular scholar; it is the 
responsibility of everyone, including non-Muslims.
652
 This means that reform requires 
readiness of the intellect. Three Intellectual dispositions are underlined here to pave the 
way for an acceptable and open reform: humility, and that means that the universals are 
not exclusive to a particular religion or civilization, and “good modernity” cannot be 
monopolized; respect, and that means taking equality of and among the others as 
fundamental; and coherence, based on “constant critical assessment” of one´s outlook of 
the world.
653
   “Global Islamic ethics” is founded on “an open and pluralistic reflection” 
which individuals as well as groups share: ““Reforming Islam” is a meaningless formula; 
what matters is to know what Muslims—reforming their understanding—can contribute, 
without dogmatism and in collaboration with other traditions, to the ethical reform of the 
contemporary world.”654 Ramadan´s pluralist view becomes clearer in The Quest for 
Meaning. 
The Quest for Meaning is pluralist in references and universalist in outlook. 
Broadly, it merges the religious with the philosophic and centralizes the human. No 
particular religious or philosophy is focalized. They are considered as one, because they 
all have to serve the individual in achieving an understanding of the self in the pluralist 
universe. It bridges gaps and seeks meaning of the self in the diverse universe. It raises 
existential questions in the modern area which experiences “conflicts of perceptions” and 
“lack of meaning and confidence.” Meaning, The Universal, Toleration and Respect, 
Fraternity and Equality, Faith and Reason, Ethics, Tradition and Modernity, Belonging 
and Civilizations, Emotion and Spirituality, Female and Male, Love, Forgiveness are the 
themes of The Quest´s fourteen chapters. The Quest for Meaning could be read as the 
highest stage in Ramadan´s thought. More particularly, it works consequently as an 
explanation of his work on the Islamic tradition which he tries to bring back to the 
universal, by always referring to it, and world religions and philosophies. In my reading 
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here, I focus on his idea of “meaning” as a way of rendering “peace” back to the 
individual and thus to the world,  “for the quest for meaning is indeed a quest for 
peace.”655 It should be remembered that he makes “peace” stand third in the order of the 
objectives of Sharia, after the protection of “life” and “nature.” 
Summarizingly for my purpose, I sketch the philosophy of the whole book 
through its opening and ending sections, where the “ocean” and “window” terms come to 
signify “wide” and “narrow” perceptions of the world, respectively. The idea is to 
journey, to go out, sail, and fail, but to discover the self, the other, and with the discovery 
of the other, to discover the plurality of man and the pluralism of the world, far from any 
religious and philosophical basis and bias: “We have to set out, ask the essential 
questions and look for meaning. We have to travel towards ourselves and rediscover a 
taste for questions, constructive criticism and complexity.”656  
Ramadan claims that, because of the lack of genuine “projects” and a lack of 
“confidence […] in ourselves, confidence in others, confidence in God and/or man, 
and/or the future [….] fear, doubt and distrust are imperceptibly colonizing our hearts and 
minds.”657 This fear builds false perceptions of others and of the unknown world around 
us, and starts “projecting” itself on to, instead of having projects with, other subjects or 
objects. A true beginning, Ramadam claims, is that of “humbly […] admitting that we 
have nothing more than points of view, in the literal sense, and that they shape our ideas, 
our perceptions and our imagination.”658 The ways out, then, are two: to keep the window 
perspective on the world, by describing it from where we are, the window, or to go out 
into that world, that subject or object, and plunge into it, know it, and know ourselves 
through it, and then look back to the window to find out how ignorant we were of the 
world ahead of us. This second view is “oceanic,” vast, and full of humanity, while the 
first “window” view is individualist, reductionist, and exclusivist. The second way, which 
Ramadan takes, is to heal the “conflict of perceptions” that some cultures may have over 
others. As he writes, “This is what I call a philosophy of pluralism, which states that, by 
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immersion in the object per se, we will be able to meet human beings, or subjects, with 
their traditions, their religions, their philosophies, their aesthetics and/or their 
psychologies.”659  
For Ramadan, the need for genuine pluralism requires a journey towards meaning, 
meaning that also finds its significance in pluralism itself. It is a circle of thoughts where 
pluralism and meaning are in a process of give and take, and where the dilution of one 
means the shallowness of the other. To set off for meaning, and thus for pluralism, one 
must not carry with oneself any religious or philosophic weight, for they imprison the 
journeyer in an established, presupposed set of mind, while the quest is for a “new we.” 
In finding this “new we,” one finds “a shared universal,” “the universal can only be a 
universal that is shared.”660 This means that exclusivism and self-standing as unique for 
particular human groups or civilizations does not make sense, and as individuals interact, 
so do civilizations, “Just as there is no such thing as an exclusive or pure identity, there is 
no such thing as a uniform or homogeneous civilization.”661 For such a realization “We 
all have to learn to bring about a real Copernican revolution within ourselves,” based on 
“humility, coherence, the ability to listen, respect and love.”662    
 What I have tried to do until now is that I have followed the development of 
Ramadan´s thought from his earlier works until the recent ones. I consider what I take 
from his books to be the gist of his work. What I do not stress in a book I leave to the 
next one because I see it stressed there, which is how and why I have structured my 
reading of him accordingly, moving from the specific, the Islamic, to the universal, from 
the legal to the ethical and humanist. All the work done until now is theoretical. The next 
part of the work is practical. It concerns case studies that involve Muslims in general, and 
European Muslims in particular, though in many books Ramadan speaks to both as if 
they were one category, for they both need to participate in the “Copernican Revolution” 
envisaged in transformation reform. This is the case since he considers that reform needs 
to touch all Muslims, be they a minority in the West or a majority elsewhere. Reference 
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in the practical cases is on issues that concern European Muslims, without being limited 
to them: secularism, citizenship, political participation, women rights, education, 
environment, economics, science, all stamped by the ethical reference.  
2. European Islam within Radical Reform   
 The reform Ramadan suggests touches all the “concerned Muslims,” the ones who 
still believe in it be they practitioners of its five pillars of Islam or just believers of its six 
pillars of iman (faith), wherever they are. Yet, two main geopolitical areas seem to take 
priority over others, i.e. the countries that are composed of majority Muslims, or the West 
where they make a minority that has intensified the debate for the last thirty years or so, 
mainly in Europe. It is to the latter that I turn the focus to in this study.  
Based on the previous theoretical introduction, I argue that three main concepts in 
Ramadan´s project are essential in understanding his approach to the idea of Islam and 
Muslims in Europe. These concepts are 1) Sharia as the Way, 2) dār ash-Shahada, and 3) 
Ethics in face of formalistic jurisprudence. These concepts have been present in all his 
works from the early 1990s up to his recent works. The difference is in the degree of 
stress they receive in each book. Though there is a development in methodological 
considerations, the conceptualization of this development is not different throughout the 
texts he has written over the last twenty years or so. This means that the reader cannot 
feel a rupture or sudden break at a certain stage in his interpretation of practical issues in 
light of his theoretical framework. Yet, he underlines a note before tackling case studies: 
his reform agenda in its case studies is preliminary and needs expert scholars to be 
involved to push this work further, a note which saves his theoretical work from being a 
mere talk-show as case studies may be read. The three concepts influence the 
conceptualization of the practical issues to be referred to here: Muslim in Europe, in 
laïc/secular societies, citizenship, loyalty, human/woman rights, political participation, 
education, environment, science, arts, and ethics. Since the core of the content of 
Ramadan´s message is presented already in previous sections, here I will try to be brief, 
when I could, by making links between those general notions and the European context. 
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a. Sharia as the Way: beyond Formalistic Legalism 
In To be a European Muslim, where he goes through various scholastic 
interpretations of the Islamic jurisprudence on matters of Muslim minorities outside the 
land of Islam, Ramadan does clearly not do without the Islamic sciences. What he does is 
to call for reading them in the European context in light of the Islamic global vision. The 
passage below is long but it summarizes his vision of a possible European Islamic 
perspective: 
For Muslims living in Europe, it is of the greatest importance not only to know 
what these [Islamic] sciences actually are –and how they are interconnected- but, 
more deeply, to be able to re-read the Islamic message with its original life force 
and acquire a global vision of the fields, studies and means at their disposal so 
that they can face their current situation. So that they cannot confuse one moment 
of their history with the essence of their Religion since, by means of the latter, the 
means are numerous and Islam´s global rulings offer a wide field of exploration 
and investigation. It is necessary to master these juridical instruments and, at the 
same time, know and understand the European context so that it is possible to 
answer the question, ever the same question: How to maintain a vivid Faith and 
be faithful to the Quran and prophetic teachings in Europe, in our new historical, 
social and political situation? In other words, how to be a European Muslim?
663
 
[Emphasis added] 
Ramadan is interested in developing independent Islamic sciences at the heart of a 
“materialistic environment” and without borrowing from the lands of origin, the lands 
from which the new European Muslims come from. He envisions an approach that goes 
beyond the science of minority fiqh which looks at Muslims as a “diaspora,” minority 
jurisprudence (fiqh al-aqalliyat).
664
  
  Initially, it is the concept of Sharia that receives more focus especially in Europe. 
It is generally defined as Islamic law and jurisprudence, which is reductionist for 
Ramadan. “In the West, the idea of Sharia calls up all the darkest images of Islam: 
repression of women, physical punishments, stoning, and all other such things.”665  In To 
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Be a European Muslim he presents it as “the way leading to the source,” and that includes 
the branch of the creed (aqida), worship (ibadat), public affairs and personal laws 
(mu´amalat and hudud), and mysticism (tassawuf).
666
  In other words, if the Shahada 
(Testimony, first pillar in Islam) translates the idea of “being Muslim,” “the Shari’a 
shows us “how to be and remain Muslim.””667 He clarifies this point this way: 
Being a Muslim means testifying that one believes in God in one´s heart and mind 
and that one recognizes the truthfulness of the Quranic revelation and of its 
Messenger.
668
  
How to be a Muslim covers all the dimensions of action which enable us to 
remain faithful to the testimony of faith, as well in the intimate sphere of spiritual 
and mystical approach and in that of law and jurisprudence at the individual and 
collective levels; it is the Shari’a, the way, the path to how to remain faithful to 
the source.
669
  
By “being Muslim” one is already in the realm of Shari’a, and s/he tries to live it as far as 
s/he can, in daily life, and beyond the constraints of time and space. The “how to be 
Muslim” depends on the individual in his/her context, and that means that its 
implementation is “flexible,” “regresses and progresses.”670  
Being based on the three main sources (Quran, Sunna, and the Universe), 
distinguished as two books (written and open, text and context), the Sharia is 
“universalist,” based on “rational investigation” and “constant dialectical movement” to 
match the real, the temporal, with the ideal, the divine: 
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Sustained by faith, strong in reasoning ability, and guided by ethical injunctions, a 
believing consciousness must live within his own time, at the heart of his society, 
among other human beings, and put his energy into this constant dialectical 
movement between the essential principles determined by Revelation and actual 
circumstances. In practice, the “Way to faithfulness” teaches us that Islam rests on 
three sources: the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the state of the world, or of our society 
(al-waqi).
671
 [Emphasis added] 
The Sharia as a dynamic notion based on reason aims at the preservation of the human 
maṣlaḥa, the common good, and the fact that “it touches all the aspects of existence”672 
makes of it universal (shumuliyat al-islam) and doable anytime, and anywhere, 
“Faithfulness in time is possible only if human reason, using the instruments put at its 
disposal [ijtihad methods, etc.], is active and creative in putting forward original 
proposals in tune with the time and place.”673 Sharia´s dynamic can lead to the 
“Copernican revolution” aspired to.674 Europe, as the abode of testimony (dār ash-
Shahada), makes no exception in this aspiration.  
b. The Abode of Testimony: beyond the Private Sphere   
 As a second complementary book, besides the written one, the universe is a space 
of testimony (dār ash-Shahada) to the Oneness of God. Europe is part of this universe 
and professing Shahada is witnessing that this world makes part of the Islamic world. 
“The whole land is a land of testimony”675 since the Prophet taught us in a hadith that the 
“the whole world is a mosque.”676 The universality of Islam, through the notion of 
Shahada makes of Europe a world of Islam, too. The abode of testimony comes as a 
result of Ramadan´s re-reading of Islamic minority fiqh which is known to have 
distinguished between the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the abode of infidel or war 
(dar al-kufr or dār al ḥarb) since its early development. The concept of war here does not 
necessarily mean a real state of war, but a definition to state that the land is not Islamic. 
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 Classically, the four main schools (madhahib) had very divergent views on a 
number of legal issues in minority jurisprudence, and no unanimity could be traced. 
Diversity marked this discipline. However, broadly, Muslim scholars, after the death of 
the Prophet, defined a land, or abode, according to four conditions. These are (1) the 
religion or culture of the population living in the land, (2) the ownership of the land, (3) 
the nature of the government, (4) the laws applied in the country. Henceforth, if the 
majority of the population is Muslim, the land was seen as part of the Islamic abode. If 
the majority of the land belongs to the Muslims, it is also Islamic. If the government is 
Islamic, at least the head of the state, and the Islamic reference in laws is present, the 
abode is again Islamic. Though the head of the state or the governing elite may be corrupt 
or unjust, the land can still be Islamic because the religious reference is not denied, but 
merely not respected.
677
 Focus on the main traits of the abode of Islam was made on the 
legal reference, whether it is based on the Islamic reference, and on security and peace, 
i.e. whether Muslims are in peace and live safely. This means that the opposing aspects of 
the abode of war are when the Islamic religious reference is absent and/or when security 
is not granted to the practicing Muslims.  
Ash-shafi´i (767 – 820 CE) referred to the land of war as a land of treaty (dar al-
ahd), when Muslims have a treaty of peace with the non-Islamic lands.
678
 Faysal 
Mawlawi (b. 1941) preferred the concept of dar ad-da´wa, the abode of invitation to God 
and profession of Islam in public to remind people of God and spirituality.
679
  For 
Ramadan, the world now cannot be reduced to these binaries. The global movement of 
people as well as changes of Muslim as well as Western people makes this binary 
division of the world ‘simplistic” and “reductionist.”680 The current world is no longer 
based on relations of “abodes” but on relations of “different civilizations, religions, 
cultures and ethics, […] and citizens.”681  
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In the West, and particularly here in Europe, Muslims have to change their 
mindset and read their tradition differently. They have to live their faith in public. They 
can do that through shahada. That makes the European space an abode of shahada, of 
testimony. Shahada in Ramadan´s conception stands first for the “Muslim identity,” or 
the “Muslim personality,” and for his/her responsibility before humankind as a believer: 
In light of the universal message and teachings of Islam (alamiyyat al-islam), we 
might fairly, I believe, consider the notion of shahada (testimony), insofar as it 
takes two important forms. The first goes back to the shahada that every Muslim, 
in order to be recognized as such, must pronounce before God and the whole of 
humankind, and by which he establishes his identity: “there is no god but God and 
Muhammad is His messenger.” The second is connected with the responsibility of 
Muslims, according to the Qur’anic injunction, to “bear witness [to their faith] 
before humankind.” [Emphasis added]682  
This “double function of shahada” manifests itself on the impact it is supposed to have on 
the individual and his/her involvement in society, the universe s/he lives in. Its features 
make the “Muslim personality.”  
Features of the “Muslim Personality” in the Abode of Testimony  
Ramadan develops the seven principles about “the Muslim personality” to show 
that the abode of Testimony/Shahada in Europe secures the Muslims the basic 
fundamentals to live their faith. Shahada first identities one as a Muslim who belongs to a 
community of faith (umma). Second, it prescribes to him to practice certain basic worship 
rituals. These first two make what he calls faith and spirituality fundamental principle 
[his italics]. Third, practice principle: once Shahada is professed, one is consciously free 
to practice it, and if not allowed, then freedom of conscience is denied him. Fourth, 
protection principle: in society, Shahada means to act in respect of God´s creation 
through respect of agreements and contracts with His creation; this means recognition of 
socio-political and economic rights of human dignity, and that makes part of the bond 
(amāna) the Muslim has towards God and His people. Fifth, freedom principle: to be able 
to speak of God is also part of the idea of sharing the idea of God through shahada; it is 
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an invitation to the world to witness God and remember Him; it is a public, and not 
secret, da´wa based on communication and is not forceful; Islamic education is part of 
da´wa. Sixth, participation principle: as a testimony in society, one has to be engaged in 
all fields that need human contribution, and work ethically for the reign of justice, for 
“God commands justice” (Quran, 16:90).683 Seventh, in Musulmans d´occident, he adds 
the principle of justice, i.e. participating in society, and defending justice. “If they 
[Muslims] are really with God, then their life must be a testimony to a permanent 
involvement and an infinite self-sacrifice for social justice, the welfare of mankind, the 
environment, and all forms of solidarity.”684  
The seven principles above correspond to five fundamental principles that the 
European context secures for the Muslims. These are: the right to practice Islam, the right 
to knowledge, the right to found organizations, the right to autonomous representation, 
and the right to appeal to law.
685
 These make a Muslim at home in Europe, and his 
belonging to the Muslim umma remains intact, for belonging to the Muslim umma is 
spiritual, “a community of Faith”686, and not political. Spirituality answers existential 
questions of “why?” while political questions are based on “how?” Asking Muslim 
citizens whether they are Muslim first or French or British, etc. first is thus irrelevant.
687
  
Suspecting the loyalty of some Muslims, and welcoming others whose Islam is 
invisible or light, is part of the colonial mindset.
688
  Sharia in the abode of testimony 
makes the Muslim a responsible citizen, loyal to where he belongs geographically, thus 
politically: 
Implementing the Shari’a, for a Muslim citizen or resident in Europe, is explicitly 
to respect the constitutional and legal framework in the country in which he is a 
citizen […]. Loyalty to one´s faith and conscience requires firm and honest 
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loyalty to one´s country:  the Shari’a requires honest citizenship within the frame 
of reference constituted by the positive law of the European country concerned.
689
  
This understanding of religion makes the (especially French) allegation and suspicion of 
Islamic “communitarism” and “integrism” invalid, according to Ramadan. In all his texts 
he affirms that Muslims have nothing against the laic law of 1905; on the contrary, they 
ask for its just application among all religious denominations. For him, la laïcité is 
instrumentally ideologised to serve certain parties and ideologues that rekindle the 
“politics of fear.” He believes that such a discourse is the one that is “communitarist” and 
“paternalist” because it considers its Muslim citizens unequal and thus in need of 
improving their citizenship and learning more about it.
690
 He warns Muslims against 
falling into this binary debate, and even says that la laicite, if well interpreted, grants all 
the rights Muslims aspire to.
691
 The case of the law of 2004 against the veil is a wrong 
reading of the principle of la laïcité.
692
 The Muslims are not asking to change the laws; 
they [radical laïcists
693
] are the ones who change laws.
694
 Ramadan calls for “a more 
open laïcité” in the interpretations of laws so that integration moves from its old debates 
to “post-integration” based on “equal citizenship” and a “responsible contribution” in 
society, and this ideal breaks away from the minority mindset, “The minority concept is 
inoperative: there is no such thing as “minority citizenship.”!  They (Muslims) must 
therefore overcome this “minority” mind-set and fully participate in society on an equal 
footing with the “majority.””695 A “French Islam,” as well as a “European Islam” are 
possible, are not a contradiction in terms, and are already in the making.
696
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c. Between the Ethical and Jurisprudential: in the Status of Continuum?  
In light of the above mentioned aspects of a “European Islam” main rights and 
duties, it seems that there is not much left to worry about! In Ramadan´s words, “It 
appears, then, that a great many of the legal conditions we have formulated are already 
fulfilled and that the Muslims – to a large extent – are allowed to live as Muslims in 
Europe.”697 So where is the problem? Ramadan adds that there are still profound 
problems to study. For example, the confusion on the notion of neutrality of public space 
persists; some read neutrality as a total absence of religiosity. Moreover, the suspicious 
image on Islam and Muslims is over-mediatized and politicized, and this nurtures “patent 
discrimination.” More importantly, and this may be among the main reasons of fear and 
suspicion of Islam and Muslims in liberal and secular societies in Europe, some legal 
aspects related to social affairs in Islam (marriage, inheritance, trade interest, etc.) are not 
implemented and there should be a profound dialogue on how they could be read in the 
European context and in the modern area.
698
 Some of the most controversial legal issues 
are going to be shed light on to see how Ramadan considers them in his project of radical 
reform, though again, he notes that these are preliminary interpretations and other 
scholars of the field have to be integrated in the debate over these issues.
699
 I refer to this 
stage of Ramadan’s thinking as a status of “continuum” because his agenda tries to go 
smoothly over the jurisprudential towards the ethical, till the latter finds its clear shape 
upon which agreement becomes wider, particularly among Muslims conservative 
scholars.  
 Sharia and Shahada concepts are the base for the “ethical.” In totality they 
confirm the universality of Islam. From the basics outlined before, besides the 
objectives/maqāṣid referred to also earlier, case studies emerge in the debate, and 
Ramadan does not shy away from that. Up to now, initially, Ramadan does not reject any 
particular field of study nor any narrow interpretation of the religious texts. What he calls 
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for is to listen to every religious, philosophic, and scientific discourse and analyze it 
according to ethics that preserve dynamic faith, human dignity and the cosmic balance. 
He localizes himself in the Islamic “universal universe,” as it were. In his discourse, he is 
critical of the seemingly reached finality of modernity, and its crises, and enjoins that 
criticism with a rejection of the defensive attitude of the Muslim mindset. To face the 
new challenges in a universally intertwined world, the ethical has to be restored. The 
ethical is “responsible” and “dynamic.” “Ethics of transformation” are the base for 
“radical internal reform.”700 The ethical in Ramadan´s view is not loose, relative, and is 
not non-rooted; it is rooted but open to the world. It is “pluralist” and “universalist” 
without meaning that the individual melts in the world and becomes ‘soulless.”701  
 Ramadan avoids making a distinction between ethics and morality, the ethical and 
the moral. He prefers “ethics” and the “ethical.” He does not make any difference in his 
earlier books between the two terms (ethics and morality), and only in The Quest does a 
distinction appear to be soon put aside. He refers to Kant´s moral axis, “Act as though the 
maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature,” as well as 
to Paul Ricoeur´s distinction of the moral as a universal binding right on the collective, 
and the ethical as an individual aspiration towards the good at the level of action.
702
 
Ramadan tries to “ethicize” morality to make the universal the responsibility of the 
individual. In a way, he is bringing responsibility very close to the individual, despite its 
(i.e. ethics) origin, place and time of development:    
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Ethics is born in a thousand ways; it comes from different universes and finds its 
true independence from both the subject who elaborates it and the object to which 
it is applied. And yet, in the name of that very independence, its full rigour must 
be applied – independently – to both its subject and its object.703  
Here, once the good of ethics is recognized, it becomes binding to whoever enters its 
realm, and “consistency” in preserving it and securing it for the individual and common 
good becomes the very ethical act to highly consider. “Consistency,” even in cases of 
going against the stream, and the common good, has to be preserved, for the ethical act 
demands that consistency. In simple terms, the values one defends have to become his or 
her real behavior and not mere ideals to speak of.
704
 It is here that appears the reason why 
he does not make a big difference between ethics and morality, and opts for using them 
interchangeably. By this he recognizes the universal sources of ethics and thus the 
collective responsibility to uphold them individually as well: 
The principles of ethics can be derived from what is considered to be a universal 
moral law (to use Kant´s terminology), but we must all be aware that there are 
many different philosophies and spiritual and religious traditions, and that we 
must therefore debate and exchange different points of view and determine the 
status and nature of the values we share. Those values do not belong to us alone, 
and nor are they the property of a religion or philosophy that can be imposed on 
others. They are the common property of the social or human community 
(depending on whether the question is discussed in national or international 
terms). 
705
 
Ramadan´s emphasis on the universality of ethics finds its sources in the Islamic 
tradition, as seen above, and since the Islamic tradition cannot be lived in isolation of the 
world, it has thus to find common grounds to cooperate and contribute to society. 
Ramadan brings the ethical up to the doors of Islamic jurisprudence and classical 
legalism. In his reading of the sources in light of the new universal changes, he prioritizes 
ethics over legal rules. This can be seen mostly in cases of individual liberties and rights.   
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Society, Education, and Citizenship  
Based on the role of testimony, shahada, the Muslim citizen is by definition a 
social being. After he/she has gone through internal jihad, which serves the individual in 
conceptualizing life, s/he becomes necessarily aware of the social world which s/he has to 
contribute to along with others: “This intellectual position, beginning with oneself and 
one’s responsibilities, should immediately commit the Muslim citizen to promoting 
respect for the rights of every person in Western societies […]. All people, as citizens, are 
responsible for claiming their rights and gaining respect.”706 Social commitment becomes 
a moral responsibility: 
Social commitment is a moral commandment, and reform is an obligation of 
conscience that, in the mind of the Muslim citizen, determines a “moral 
responsibility.” […] Muslim morality is entirely based on awareness of one’s 
responsibility before the Creator and among humankind. To be with the One is to 
serve one’s fellows. In the Muslim mind, this is the root of the idea that Muslims 
have a mission of social reform to accomplish, wherever they are, in their society, 
with their fellow citizens.
707
 
In Europe, this moral responsibility is shaped by the objectives of Sharia and 
solidified by the national laws in each country. This means that the Muslim community 
has to embrace society aspirations. His “A Manifesto for a New We,” written in 2006, 
goes in this line of thought.
708
 For this responsibility to be profoundly established, it 
should stand on solid shared “ethics of citizenship.” The latter, because it is shared, 
adopts the main aspects of Sharia, and makes what Ramadan calls “A Theory of the 
Seven Cs,” grounded on confidence, consistency, contribution, creativity, 
communication, contest, and compassion.
709
 This makes Muslims contributors and not 
“communitarists.” Ramadan opposes the idea of lobbying to defend the interests of the 
community in society. He rejects the idea that some propagate: to lobby as the Jews lobby 
in the US and Europe. He believes that the Muslims´ history is different, and the time 
now is not for isolationist attitudes:  “The role of Muslim communities in the West is to 
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defend principles, not interests, and if it transpires that it is in their interest to have their 
universal principles respected, it should be clear that their fight for these principles serves 
society as a whole.”710  
In the political and associational life, the Muslims are supposed to seek 
representatives that defend principles and interests of the community. Defending the 
minority alone is a wrong entrance into the game of politics, which some politicians use 
to gain more votes in election times, and which some others use to accuse the Muslim 
community of isolation and communitarism, “It is no good to become citizens by any 
means and at any price […] To vote is not enough, how to vote is important.” “True civic 
ethics” speak against isolation and manipulation of citizenship ethics. “Integrity, ability, 
and willingness” are prime conditions that should guide the choice of a representative, 
and not the religion of the representative, or the concerned socio-political body.
711
  
Education is of vital importance for “ethics of citizenship.”  In this regards, 
Islamic schools, “after-school schools,” have become common as an alternative for many 
Muslims who want their children to be aware of the religious message of Islam. Yet, 
there are problems with these schools. First, they are expensive, since most of them up to 
now, do not receive State funding, and thus many Muslim families cannot afford them.  
Second, their faculty, generally, is not well trained and open to both Islamic tradition and 
the new sciences. The new context is not included as a field of study. Third, 
consequently, the pupils grow up torn between two realities, the ideal one learnt at 
school, and the lived world with its socio-political and scientific challenges. Ramadan is 
critical of isolationist syllabi and school environments, and suggests that it “would be 
better to avoid involvement in such projects” if their content as well as the manner of 
functioning is not revised.
712
 
Ramadan proposes “a complementary, not parallel,” educational approach to cater 
for the Muslims´ need in Europe. This makes it financially accessible, and more 
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importantly it allows the pupils to study in public schools, live a harmonious life between 
what is in society and what is taught, and also harmonious life when it comes to 
interaction with the rest of society, which is divers in faith and beliefs. The 
complementary aspect of the Islamic schools can be developed as additional courses on 
Islamic basics, and on partial times in weekends not only as classical courses, but that 
could be developed into solidarity work, like assisting the elders, the disabled, visiting 
prisoners, etc. Parents and association representatives should be equally involved, and 
follow up both the public and private schools activities, and see if they answer the ethical 
objectives aspired to.
713
 Educational systems, currently, generally, opt for giving the 
intellectual and professional expertise needed, and the ethical aspect is not stressed; 
success is measured more by certain selection and examination procedures, profitability 
and material social success afterwards; much attention should be paid to this aspect, 
which needs ethical revisions.
714
  
Since education here impacts the “integration” issue of Muslims, the content of 
history courses has to be scrutinized by parents and the ones concerned with true 
pluralism that is based on recognition and respect, which are part of the ethical:  
If one looks at history (and sometimes geography) programs, one finds that they 
include representations of the world that are open to debate. The history of 
colonialism, parents” experience of exile, the newly plural nature of Western 
societies, and some of the information provided about other civilizations as they 
are presented in most Western educational programs need some serious revision. 
Being interested in one’s children’s school also means being concerned about 
it.
715
  
More particularly, Ramadan defends the historical negligence the Islamic heritage has 
received by the constructionists of European identity, which is reduced to the Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian contributions: 
The scientific, legal, philosophical, and religious input of Muslim scholars and 
intellectuals has been overlooked to such an extent – both in the collective 
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memory and in school syllabi – that one cannot but see this as an ideological 
choice in the process leading to self-construction. […] Islam is “the other,” even 
when present among us. 
716
  
Recognizing the historical contributors in the building of Europe, and the West, is part of 
recognizing the identity of the current generations of the new citizens of these societies. 
New historical syllabi have to be worked on:  
We need an official history (national, European, and Western) that integrates the 
plural memories of the citizens (new or not) who are part of it: it is important to 
mention them, to shed light on their cultural and intellectual wealth, and to value 
their contribution and presence. No feeling of belonging to a social structure can 
develop if it does not acknowledge the value and the (historical and present) 
contribution of its members, of all its members.
717
 
This social non-recognition is powered by “media politics” that “culturalize,” or 
“Islamize” social issues. Pluralism and ethical citizenship aims at reforming all these 
aspects and giving them a more open dimension founded on “common belonging.”718 
Women rights 
 Connected to the question of individual liberties in secular and liberal democracies is 
the issue of women in Islam. The human rights enjoyed in Western democracies are not 
what Islam objects to. “Islam has no problem with women, but Muslims do clearly appear 
to have serious problems with them.”719 Discourse about women, according to the studied 
scholar, has been widely influenced by patriarchal cultures, so that some cultural 
practices that were not “Islamic” have come to be justified. Accordingly, Ramadan says, 
We should indeed return to the texts and the modalities of their reading and 
interpretation in the light of the environments in which they were revealed. 
Islamic legal thinking about women is certainly the field that has suffered most 
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from the two phenomena already mentioned: literalist reduction and cultural 
projection.
720
 
Early interpreters could not go beyond the cultural atmosphere they lived in, though the 
Quranic message came first as a liberating message and addressed women and man on 
equal footing, equal rights and duties.
721
 For instance, female excision, forced marriages, 
and honor crimes, are not Islamic even though certain scholars may have attempted to 
provide religious justification for them.
722
 Imposed veil (hijab) and niqab/burqa are also 
cultural practices, and are not Islamic. However, for decency in attire, it is prescribed 
mainly for women, but is never detailed. It is up to the believer woman, according to the 
context, to preserve it as she sees fit. It remains not to be a forced act. For sports, athletic 
woman, as in swimming, Ramadan does not drop the decency aspect, but at the same 
time leaves it up to the Muslim practitioner to decide it over. Mixing and shaking hands 
are also not issues for Ramadan, and are up to the believer to decide.
723
 
 Muslims also are more familiar with Sharia through the family law, i.e. heritage law, 
where women portion is generally less compared to that of men. Historically, that has 
been justified by the fact that it is man who takes care of the household, so most of the 
time division of heritage, as prescribed in Quran, prioritizes man. Even against the 
Quranic clear cut (qat´i) division of heritage, Ramadan raises the possibility of re-reading 
the text in light of the overall objective of the message of Islam:   
Such issues as the right to work, polygamy, divorce, or inheritance cannot be 
approached only through the study of what the texts allow or do not allow. The 
approach can only be holistic and elaborated in the light of higher ends; otherwise, 
the very essence of the ruling (hukm) may be betrayed.
724
 
Against this misrepresentation of the Islamic message of social justice, Ramadan suggests 
some kind of institutions that defend women in cases of abused divorce and misfortunate 
heritage division. The aim is for more equality among the two sexes. Family law has been 
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among the most abused sections of the Islamic law, and it is time to change the way they 
have been considered and practiced.
725
 Women, along with men, have to fight against 
patriarchal patronizing discourses that belittle womanhood, to bring back meaning to 
“being, dignity, development, freedom, equality, justice, balance, love, and welfare.”726 
At home, at work, inside or outside, equality has to be visible, and autonomy established. 
“Islamic feminism” has to “re-appropriate” Islamic teachings and the early example of 
women participation in society along man. “A discourse on womanhood” based on 
“feminine philosophy of being” has to be integrated into Islamic reform and dynamism, 
in private as in public, through education, the media and politics, in all fields that man 
occupies, including mosques and  religious councils.
727
 That should take place with 
dignity, autonomy, and responsibility, within the ethical frame that binds both man and 
woman:   
Women should not wait passively for something to happen: they must look after 
themselves and develop new approaches in the light of higher objectives to 
protect their being, their integrity, their femininity, and their rights. They must 
struggle against all formalist dictatorships, both that which imposes the headscarf 
without belief in the practice coming from the heart and that which imagines all 
objectified female bodies fit into a size six dress,
 
that which compels women to 
stay at home for religious reasons and that which sends them back home after the 
age of forty-five for aesthetic reasons.
728
 
Ramadan is critical also of the Western representation of women issues in Islam. 
He reminds the West that it used to picture the female East as that of desire and sexuality 
in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, and now it is doing the opposite. The “female liberation” he 
proposes finds its roots in the Islamic texts and early formative context, but he opens it up 
further not only towards the “modern” as mediatized in the West but more towards the 
ethically universal, where the future cannot be but built by both man and woman, based 
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on intellectual maturity, contribution and not on binary differences that both religion and 
the market have produced: 
A woman and a man are both beings who are on a quest for the same justice, the 
same truth and the same peace. Once they have got beyond naïve talk of equality 
and made a critical analysis of the logics and structures of powers, they will reach 
– together – the shore of philosophical, spiritual or religious questions.729  
 The “many illusory freedoms” the current world speaks of cannot be true freedoms 
unless they are based on awareness, questioning, and intelligence that universally ethical 
education teaches.
730
  
Besides, Muslim women are classically not allowed to marry non-Muslim men, 
for fear that the latter influence the education of their children to be non-Muslim, while 
men are allowed to marry Jewish and Christian women (People of the Book). In the latter 
case, the non-Muslim woman (wife) can keep her religion, but the Muslim husband is 
supposed to bring up the kids as Muslims, for the household is under his responsibility. 
Ramadan opens the doors of personal choice and responsibility of the Muslim woman to 
marry who she wants.
731
  
Apostates and Homosexuals  
 Still in human rights context, and this time for the case of homosexuality, Islam, like 
the other divine religions, does not allow it, chiefly because it would be against the 
normal course of nature and destabilize human continuity and social stability. The Quran 
warns against homosexuality, but does not prescribe the stoning penalty which was 
developed by classical Islamic jurisprudence. However, because the law grants 
homosexuals their rights to parade and associate in many Western countries, this right has 
to be respected. More importantly, it is the human relations that should be valued most, 
even before the law, as argues Ramadan, and society has to develop adequate measures to 
integrate individuals who affiliate themselves with such a group: “Though I have 
reservations about homosexual couples marrying or adopting children, I do not hesitate to 
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fight against the homophobic discourse or measures of which they may be the victims 
and to get involved in all common causes by their side.”732 Apostates or renegades (al-
murtaddun), like homosexuals, have been also harassed and threatened sometimes by 
death in Europe and Islamic countries. Such acts of threat do not abide by the law nor do 
they respect individuals” choices, which the Quran grants, “No compulsion in religion” 
(Quran).
733
 
 The Moratorium:  Freezing the Islamic Penal Code (Ḥudūd)  
 As to the debated issue of legal punishment for adultery, treason, apostasy, 
homosexuality, and robbery, in a seemingly unprecedented move in Muslim scholarship, 
Ramadan called publicly for a moratorium on the death penalty, corporal punishment, 
and stoning in the Muslim world in March 2005.
734
 Though the “Call” concerns the 
Muslim world, yet its effects would have positive influence on some literalist imams who 
preach in European mosques.
735
 Despite this daring step, Ramadan’s France 2 TV debate 
with Nicolas Sarkozy on the topic of “God and the Republic”736 rekindled the storms of 
criticism the former has been showered with, and pushed many to accuse him of 
doublespeak, ambiguity, and inconsistency in his reformist ideas. What his critics were 
expecting was a total rupture with the scriptures on those matters; freezing (ta´liq) the 
penal codes did not seem sufficient for most Westerners; banning them once for all was 
what some of the critics of Ramadan expected from him, which he did not do simply 
because his call was a fatwa, a mere opinion by an Islamic scholar who studies the 
objectives of Sharia behind prescribed punishments in context, an opinion to open a 
debate from within, as he says, and “improve mentalities.” In an interview with Aziz 
Zemmouri Ramadan says that it is not the West or Western readings that should impose 
the total banning of the hudud; this should happen gradually from within the Islamic 
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tradition. As for his personal opinion, he tells Zemmouri that at the end these hudud 
should be definitively banned. 
 Ramadan says that the hudud legal punishments are now practiced in some limited 
number of countries (Taliban Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, part of Nigeria and 
Soudan) to the poor, and it is only the lower classes that are victim of it, while the 
governors are secure from it. The aim of rendering justice here is betrayed and the 
contrary happens:  
The proposal [of the moratorium] was not directed against Islam’s teachings or 
against the texts—quite the contrary. In the name of the higher objectives of the 
message that call for respect for the life and dignity of women and men, equality, 
and justice, it was urgent to put an end to an instrumentalization of religion through 
literalist, formalist implementations that continued to affect poor people, women, 
and political opponents who have never had the means to defend themselves and 
who are punished for example’s sake and without justice. It was therefore a Call, a 
stand taken from within, in the light of the texts and of social and political contexts, 
taking into account higher goals, determined to achieve the suspension of unfair 
implementation while calling upon fuqahâ’ to debate the issue.737 
Ramadan discussed the Call with a number of scholars in the Islamic countries, and they 
agreed to it, yet could not speak their support publicly, either because they could not dare 
to deny prescribed rules in the Quranic text, though they are not applied in their 
countries, or feared the public opinion, or because of mere antagonism with the West. 
The Mufti of Egypt, Ali Jum´a, for example, replied to the Call, recognizes its substance, 
but objected to its form.
738
 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the “global Mufti,” endorses similar views 
as those expressed in the Call; his TV show on Aljazeera Channel in Qatar records this on 
02 January 2011.
739
 Internationally speaking, and more particularly for death penalty, 
Ramadan invokes the call of Jacque Chirac, President of France then, who called for a 
moratorium before heading to China in October 2004. The international community, 
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Ramadan remarks, did not complain about the idea of “moratorium” proposal of Chirac 
but complained about his; the same remark goes for the Italian initiative that called for an 
international moratorium in December 2007 at the United Nations General Assembly. 
Like them, too, Ramadan says, his Call was a step to ban the penal code, but that had to 
go through an internal debate of all the scholars concerned.
740
   
 Medical Ethics 
In his reading of the historical Islamic medicinal thought, Ramadan argues that 
“the approach of Muslim physicians fully agrees with the substance of all the landmark 
oaths in the history of medicine.” Medicine ethical oath, for instance, builds on 
Hippocratic Oath that goes back to the 4
th
 century BC. During the heydays of Islam, 
especially since the 9
th
 century, Muslims added the Islamic character to it. Ishaq Ibn Ali 
Ruhawi’s Practical Ethics of the Physician (Adab at-Tabib) is the earliest surviving 
document in the field in Arabic. In contemporary medicinal work, the First International 
Conference on Islamic Medicine, took place in Kuwait in January 1981 and updated the 
Code of Islamic Medical Ethics. Early Islamic thought, for instance, did not base 
treatment on the gender, race, or religion or the patient.  Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdissi 
(d.1223) saw no problem in a male physician treating a female patient, as some salafists 
call for now. Saving life, and treating it, is the primary objective of Sharia. “In the course 
of therapy, patients have no religion, social status, or gender, and the only dimension that 
must motivate a physician’s commitment is the sacred character of the patient’s life and 
the protection of his or her welfare.”741 
For abortion, Islamically, it is not allowed. Preserving life is always a prime 
objective of Sharia, especially if the embryo is already forty days old, the time in which 
the soul is blown into the body.  However, pregnancy that results from rape, accidental 
pregnancy, risky pregnancy on health, and unwanted pregnancy that keeping it would 
lead to extreme family poverty are now cases that are being allowed, case by case. 
Contraception was permitted from the Prophetic era. Sexual pleasure was more discussed 
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in the classics than it is being done in contemporary thought. Woman sexual satisfaction 
was extensively discussed in al-Ghazali´s works and others in the 12
th
 century.
742
 
Regarding euthanasia, especially its direct, active form, it is also forbidden since life is 
given by God and only Him can end it. Yet, the use of morphine not to accelerate death 
but to ease suffering is now generally being accepted.
743
 Organ transplantation is allowed 
as long as it is not turned into trade, and with the exception of donating genitals.
744
 For 
serious illnesses like AIDS,  no value judgment should be expressed to the patient; rather, 
treatment should be provided, with solace and humane interaction, against any 
discrimination and isolation.  International sensibility should be raised to speak against 
unethical global injustice, social disparities, and push international medicine companies 
to lower the prices and make treatment more accessible particularly to the needy 
societies.
745
 
Ecology 
Ramadan affirms that “reflection about respecting the environment or about how 
animals should be treated is virtually nonexistent in contemporary Islamic intellectual 
discourse.”746 The sources which stress the relation of humankind to the universe refer 
constantly to the protection of the environment, nature, and good treatment of animals. A 
number of Quranic and Prophetic stories are provided as examples. “A believer’s 
relationship to nature can only be based on contemplation and respect.” There is “an 
ecology at the source,” which the London-based Foundation for Ecology and 
Environmental Sciences” newsletter label as “Ecoislam.”747 Unlike the field of medicine 
which has tried to keep up with world changes and challenges, contemporary Islamic 
thought seems absent in envisaging solutions to global ecological problems. Certainly the 
majority Islamic countries are not industrial, but they are part of the world order and their 
consumption mode is increasing, and is also lacking ethical considerations. For instance, 
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for the case of animal slaughtering, mainly in Europe, Muslims are more concerned 
whether it is ḥalāl or haram (allowed or not), and not much is said about the bringing up 
of the animal, and its treatment all the way up to slaughtering time. Ramadan calls for a 
more serious understanding of the ethical, instead of stopping at the ritual that is not 
profound:   
Proposing breeding techniques on a small, medium, or large scale; developing 
new types of slaughterhouses allying respect and efficiency; issuing legal rulings 
(fatâwâ) that, in some areas, more clearly encourage monetary compensation 
rather than ritual sacrifice (which remains a recommended act—sunnah) are all 
initiatives that may help the Muslim world to reconcile itself with the higher 
objectives and meaning of its ethics rather than hiding behind insistence on norms 
and means that guarantee only false respect of the requirements of Islam’s 
message.
748
 
Considering other ways of practicing the ritual, without abolishing it, is part of the 
contribution the Muslim has to consider for sustainable development and charity. The 
month of Ramadan of fasting is another example from which spiritual and ethical 
dimensions should be learnt and from which other ways of facing contemporary 
ecological challenges can be generated.
749
  
Economy 
 Though “Islamic economics” seems to flourish in the face of the current world 
financial crisis, Ramadan is skeptic about it. Ramadan says “There is no “Islamic 
economy,” just as, as I said, there is no “Islamic medicine.” He adds, “What can be found 
in the Islamic Universe of reference is a series of principles outlining an ethics, a general 
philosophy of the economy’s goals, but there is no such thing as an economy that is 
“Islamic” by essence or through some specific disposition.”750 The world capitalist world 
has permeated every part of the world, including the Islamic world, and the Muslim 
perception of economics. For Ramadan, the Islamic criticism of the capitalist system 
(high interest rates, manipulation and speculation of currency, injustices in international 
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trade, imposed conditions on funding, etc.) is generally imitating the very same system it 
criticizes: “There is today no “Islamic” alternative to the dominant neoliberal economic 
model.”751  
 Considering the status quo, Ramadan finds that the Muslim oil countries richness 
uses the label of “Islam” but works within the capital system, and injustice of this 
“Islamic model” has produced no justice or good alternative. “Islamic economics,” 
except for few serious attempts, is generally an “Americanized” Islam and “Islamized 
capitalism”: 
This global “Islamized” capitalism, as it can be seen on the African continent, in 
Arab countries, or particularly so-called emerging Asian countries as in Malaysia, 
or today in Dubai, results in an Islamized Americanization under a coat of very 
halâl terminology and financial techniques […]. Fast food is profitable, therefore 
Islamic, halâl fast-food restaurants are put into operation, from McDonald’s to 
other famous brands. Coke dominates the soft drink market, so a line of products 
labeled as “Cola” emerges (Mecca Cola, Zem Zem Cola, Medina Cola) to recall 
the “taste” of the parent company’s product while they are alleged to resist the 
actions of the foreign company or constitute an alternative! There is no resistance 
in this, no alternative thought, and indeed no originality.
752
  
It is the consumption mode that Ramadan questions in Islamic practices and economic 
interpretations. “Whenever they can, Muslims consume with the same frenzy as 
others.”753 
“Ethical Arts” 
Islam is a religion, and not a culture. Yet, no religion finds expression outside a 
culture in a particular society, and vice versa. “There are, therefore, no religiously neutral 
cultures, nor any cultural-free religions.”754 It is the ethical that links the two spheres. 
Religious permissibility, imagination, and human creativity touch all aspects of human 
life: architecture, music, television, film industry, entertainment, etc. For instance, in 
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Europe, films, music and songs do not have to remain oriental, nor do mosques have to 
be like the ones in the Islamic lands. There is remarkably a lot of uncritical and 
consumerist artistic industry produced worldwide, and to make it ethically artistic does 
not mean to include religious or Islamic verses, hadiths, or words in it to show that it is 
Islamic. Art in itself has ethical goals, and constant questioning and improvement should 
lead to that, without inferring to the religious always. Faith itself needs questioning, 
freedom, imagination, before it improves and elevates the human taste from degradation 
to dignity and responsible freedom: 
The Universe of art is a Universe of questions rather than answers, and it should 
not be reduced to conveying only religious answers. Artistic expression precedes 
such answers and the accompanying norms: it seeks to reach and convey the 
essence of emotion and meaning, and any attempt seeking to reduce it to a strictly 
religious or Islamic message would naturally leave people unsatisfied. Art asks 
questions, faith supplies answers: it is important for faith to allow the heart a 
space where it can express with freedom and dignity its simple, human, painful 
questions, which may not always be beautiful but are never absolutely ugly. 
Moreover, as I said, faith needs it, for such an experience enables it to gain depth, 
substance, and intensity.
755
 
“There are higher ethical goals in art” which a “critical mind and a good taste” should 
develop by “inviting the heart and mind to transcend the worst degradation.” “Ethical art” 
is part of the quest for meaning, and by thus it transcends narrow religious boundaries to 
the universal human being.
756
 
Recapitulation 
In this part I have tried to condense the thought of Ramadan into two sections, 
each divided into three sub-sections. The first section has introduced the concerned 
scholar, his early study of the Islamic worldview, in comparison with the modern 
Western view. In the early texts Ramadan affiliates himself with the main sources of 
Islamic law, and affirms his belonging to the reformist trends of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, i.e. naḥḍa movement. However, a development in this thought 
                                                          
755
 Ibid., 202 
756
  Ibid., 205-206 
231 
 
starts to take place with Western Muslims and takes its clear shape in Radical Reform, 
and The Quest for Meaning. In Ramadan’s “transformation reform” focus is mostly given 
to the universal values that Islam shares with the world, mainly the Western world with 
which the debate seems tense. Leaving behind the classical divisions of the world into the 
abode of Islam and the abode of war or of the infidel, Ramada goes back to the sources to 
come up with the connection the Quran and the Sunna have with the natural world as “a 
mosque” where Islam could be professed beyond borders, and as a ‘sign” which speaks 
of the Oneness of God. Sharia here becomes the way, instead of being narrowly defined 
in its legalist prescriptions. This makes all of Earth an abode of testimony, or Shahada of 
the Oneness of God. With this belief goes the idea of respect of all God’s creatures, 
despite their religious or philosophic beliefs, for they are part of the ‘sign” of diversity He 
wills. For this belief to take place in actual life and preserve both Shahada and diversity, 
shared values based on “civil citizenship” and “ethical reference” are pivotal for the well-
being of the individual, the group, and society at large. The ethical becomes the basis for 
“transformation reform” that targets not only the Muslims.  
 Ramadan´s ethical peregrination over various issues aims are reconciling Islamic 
past juridical codes with societies´ historical evolution and context. Starting from the 
Islamic universe, he moves to make it, once again, open to the world as a shared heritage, 
and ready to contribute, besides other world religions and philosophies, especially in the 
West, to overcoming the trap of modernity and the malaise it suffers from, “Muslims can 
show, reasonably and without polemics, that they share the essence of the values on 
which Europe and the West are based and that their own religious tradition has also 
contributed to the emergence and promotion of those values.”757 As vicegerents on Earth 
(Khulafa´, or Caliphs of God on Earth), Muslims have to go beyond past normativity that 
is not close to reality, and turn the moral into ethical action. This brings back the note I 
started this sub-section with, i.e. the note on morality and ethics, and how Ramadan tries 
to merge both and make the ethical, which touches the individual´s action, more 
responsible of agency in society. This comes clear in this note: 
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In our present Islamic Universe of reference, which is muddled with often 
misleading normative formalities, one should recall that the morality of means is 
never sufficient guarantee of the ethicality of ends. That is indeed why the human 
conscience must never stop questioning means and ends and adding soul to 
knowledge, science, and economy. Only through this effort can we eradicate 
poverty and preserve the planet’s future: that is what being stewards on earth 
(khulafâ” fî-l ard) requires.758 [First emphasis added]  
For fear that the universal moral law may be misused by elites, weakened, or not taken 
care of by the collectivity, as he explains in The Quest for Meaning, more responsibility 
is individual, through the ethical. That is where the spiritual, the soul, comes in to remind 
and encourage the individual actor for the good. In all, he sees Islam and Muslims 
contribution to the world and the societies they inhabit in the improvement they can add 
to the world: “If Islam can provide a meaningful contribution today, it lies in questioning 
the goals of life and in the requirement of improving its quality.”759   
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Part Three: 
Tareq Oubrou and Abdennour Bidar – 
Theologico-Philosopic Justifications for European Islam 
 
My hope is to see Muslims feeling fully European and notably French, thus contributing 
to this great civilization and human enterprise, and this without putting aside their 
spirituality, and on condition that their religiosity acculturates and Occidentalizes. 
Theologians, intellectuals, and other actors, coming from all Muslim communities have 
to take part in this. Muslims have to do their best to avoid a religious or cultural fracture. 
They have to be a bridge between the western world and the Muslim world. I especially 
remind all the Muslim responsible bodies and representative institutions to communicate 
to the Muslims the mission that consists in assuring the West by considering it part of 
them, by working for its good and prosperity, and particularly not to feel as “foreigners 
within.” The feel of love towards our France and our Europe has to be the engine-factor 
that reconciles Islam as spirituality and the West as a civilization. Intellectually and 
religiously, a theological secularization of Islam appears necessary to realize this 
marriage canonique of Islam with the West without divorce. This is what I modestly try 
to think for a Western Islam.  
Tareq Oubrou, Profession imam, interview with Cedric Beylocq and Michaël Privot, 2009, 216 
 
The question then is to know whether we can dare an existentialist reading of the Quran 
without this being an expression of a metaphysical revolt against the will and 
predestination of God. Can we give to Islam the necessary theological resources to 
replace submission, not by a non-submission marked by the Satanic experience, but by a 
human liberty that is expressed with the consent of God? 
 
 Abdennour Bidar, Islam sans soumission: pour un existensialisme musulman, 2006, 23.  
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To pursue my comparative interest in the emerging European Islamic thought, and 
after having introduced and advanced a preliminary critique of what could be called 
avant-gardists of European Islam discourse (Tibi and Ramadan), I now turn to shedding 
light on two other scholars and discourse. I do need to note again that the two other 
scholars I refer to are based in France. It is true that the debate in France over religion 
and secularism is very tense, but this does not mean, at least in my approach, that it is this 
particular country that I am interested in. My interest is more into new theoretical 
approaches of Islam in Europe, be they in France or other European country. Yet, one 
cannot deny the fact that it is the context where the debate is tense that intellectuals are 
“forced” to generate ideas to challenge themselves and their detractors. Muslim 
intellectuals in France seem to belong to this category. From within a secular context they 
try to re-read their Islamic sources to defend Islam, or refute it, or mostly in the cases I 
study to find a midway where secularism, and European values in general, are justified 
and endorsed by Islamic texts, past or present, with particular agendas of reform.  
The other two scholars to be referred to here at this stage are defenders of Europe 
and Islam equally, and certainly each with a particular emphasis on certain priorities in 
methodology. My interest, again, is basically at that level of interpretation that attempts 
to fuse Islamic and European values. If Tibi has come to the debate, as seen earlier, from 
political science perspectives, and Ramadan from jurisprudence and broadly theological 
perspectives, the two scholars Tareq Oubrou and Abdennour Bidar approach the debate 
from theological and philosophical perspectives respectively.  
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1. Tareq Oubrou: Geotheology and the Minoriticization of Islam  
Tareq Oubrou was born in Agadir in 1959 in Moroccan. He came to France at the 
age of 19 to pursue his academic studies in medicine and biology. At that age he realized 
the “intensity of faith.” So, he started working as imam in Nantes, Limoges, Pau and now 
in Bordeaux´s al-Huda mosque. As a French citizen, Oubrou officiates as an imam. He is 
a religious activist and public intellectual who is present in the media, in seminars, in 
organizing imam-training sessions, giving religious advice, and engaging himself in 
debates with Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals. He did not go through an academic 
religious studies curriculum as would do most public Muslim scholars; he is a self-made 
theologian. Oubrou is an old and active member of the Union of the Islamic 
Organizations of France (UOIF), first set up in 1983. The UOIF was first influenced by 
Muslim Brotherhood in its beginnings in the 1980s but it now claims to stand 
autonomous and it distances itself from it. It has cooperated with the French authorities 
over a number of issues and mainly for the creation of the French Council of Muslim 
Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman, CFCM), set up in May 2003. Oubrou coined 
the term “chari‘a de minorité” (“Sharia of the Minority”) in a famous article published in 
“Islam de France” in 1998, which was expanded in 2004.760 In 2006, his first volume, out 
of ten, was out. L'Unicité de dieu: des noms et attributs divins [The Unicity of God: 
Names and Attributes, vol. 1/10].
761
 In 2002, he co-authored a lively debate with a secular 
French Muslim intellectual of Algerian origin, Leila Babès, on liberty, women and 
Islam.
762
 Tareq Oubrou combines mastery of classical Islamic sciences with a strong 
grasp of European past theological debates and debaters (like Aquinas and Levinas), and 
contemporary hermeneutics.
763
  
                                                          
760
 Tareq Oubrou, «Introduction théorique à la charia de minorité» ["Theoretical Introduction to Sharia of 
the Minority"] in Islam de France, n. 2 (1998) 27-41, made available online on 25 August 2000 at : 
http://oumma.com/Introduction-theorique-a-la-chari 
761
 Tareq Oubrou, L'Unicité de Die : des noms et attributs divins (opuscule 1/10) (éditions Bayane, 2006); 
762
 Leila Babes and Tariq Oubrou, Loi d´Allah, loi des hommes: liberté, égalité et femmes en islam [Law of 
God, Law of Man : Liberty, Equality, and Women in Islam] (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002). 
763
 Joselyne Cesare, et al., “Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe,” European Commission – DG- 
Justice and Home Affairs, Final Report October 2004, 87.  
236 
 
In narrating his personal as well as career developments as a man of faith, Oubrou 
says that he cared a lot about faith when young. With adolescence came the questions of 
spirituality and how to reconcile them with the mundane world: 
I cared a lot about my faith, and my practice [...]. It was very difficult for me to 
reconcile my spirituality and the current age. Many questions went into my 
mind….how to integrate one´s spirituality in this world, how to live the mundane, 
here, while being in permanent touch with the other world.
764
 
In France, he got involved in the community affairs while in his early twenties. Choosing 
not to follow a promising academic career in medicine and biology, he remained close to 
the spiritual life he has chosen for himself. As a part time job, and sometimes as a 
volunteer, Oubrou would fall at times into misery life in cold winters, without money in 
the pocket nor heating in the room he had to rent or which was rent to him for solidarity. 
“This poverty I did not choose as misery, I chose it though I could have continued my 
academic studies and professional career […] I was personally in a full mystic phase.”765 
These preliminary notes aim to contextualize, though briefly, the case of Oubrou as a 
believer in Europe, before being a self-made and engaged theologian. His engagement 
into the debate of Islam in Europe then has personal aspects into it.  
a. Geotheology for an Islam of Context  
 
 As to Islam and its scriptural sources, Oubrou is critical of some of their current 
rigid interpretations, but he is far away from denouncing the tradition. For the Quran, the 
main Islamic source, it remains divine as the Word of God, but its interpretation is 
human. Oubrou argues that the Quranic message is primarily about the meaning of life, 
though this has a lot to do with the ethical mannerism it advocates, “I assume that the 
question of meaning is much more important than the question of law, and much more 
important than the question of ethics itself.”766 This way Oubrou denies the aspects of 
Statehood or Caliphate from a political perspective to be the aim of Islam.
767
 He says: 
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We [Muslims in the West] are not representatives of Muslims of the world. We 
think our religion in our history, and our Western societies. We are making this 
work. We do not have political projects; we do not have projects of domination 
over society, or over the State.
768
  
For this reason, he calls for a contextual interpretation of the Scriptures and their 
relevancy. He emphasizes the Arabian Peninsula cultural aspects in which the divine text 
descended on the Prophets and the mentality of the period. In his debate with Leila Babes 
about revisiting the sources, he says that he is aware that any interpretation now is 
human, not divine, but still shows no fear of losing the divine intent, for he considers the 
liberty of conscience of the believer a religious value in itself and thus part of the process 
of faith.
769
 This brings up Oubrou´s call for a new Islamic theology, with the auspices of 
hermeneutics.  
 Oubrou believes that “We need a theological reading of God which passes by a 
theological reading of Man and his real condition, because we cannot know God without 
Man.”770 The theology advocated here has to take time and space into consideration. This 
impacts the interpretation of the divine texts on three main levels: national, transnational, 
and global. This new theology, which he also terms “geotheology,”771 is mobile, for the 
geographical impacts and is equally impacted by the temporal, and religion has to be well 
aware of these differences if it aspires to be constantly abreast of world changes and open 
to be revisited. Oubrou puts it this way: 
A theological reading worthy of the name has to integrate space and time, society 
and the State…un théologique pensé… [In this globalized world] there is a need 
for an Islamic theology, for our case with ethical implications on three relative 
levels: national, transnational-regional, and global.  This said, sharia norms have 
to adopt, following derivative/continuous epistemology, the physical theory of 
relativity, taking into account three indicators which are unstable: the national, (la 
France), transnational-regional (Europe), and globalization. Things cannot be 
conceived but in this complexity which I find intellectually passionate. A 
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theologico-jurisprudential mobile approach which has to be constantly 
revisited.
772
  
Oubrou believes that “the world has changed.” “We are in a stage of perpetual 
overcoming: religion is overcome, even modernity is overcome; nation-states are 
overcome: we are in a phase of extraordinary turbulence.”773 Modernity is overcome 
since it has belittled religion and overlooked spirituality, but it still can help Muslims re-
read their theological, jurisprudential, ethical, as well as mystical traditions and 
experiences.
774
 It is the age for “a necessary operation of deconstruction for new 
reconstruction.”775 For a valid deconstruction, the synthesis has to be both intrinsic and 
historic: intrinsic with formal mechanisms of interpretation that remain valid for all 
epochs, and which we can also apply to our epoch, for they are part of a heritage and of 
this Islamic reasoning that does not change and is perpetual; historic because knowledge 
not only expands but also creates new disciplines, techniques, perceptions, methods, and 
logics in light of our age.
776
 Hermeneutics for him can help in synthesizing the tradition 
and reconstructing it.  
 Oubrou´s advocacy of the use of hermeneutics as a device of deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the tradition, especially the divine texts, stems from his belief that it 
allows reason to expose their (i.e. divine texts) meaning and recognize their mysteries.
777
 
However, Oubrou stops here and makes this note “Hermeneutics is not a direct reading of 
the Texts.”778 That is, Hermeneutics is an interpretation, a translation of signification 
related to a cultural context into another according to rules that preserve the equivalent 
meaning. So, hermeneutics is not a start from scratch, but a reading of the past into the 
present. It is a matter of continuity and not rupture. Oubrou further explains it this way: 
The Islamic discourse has now to build a new discourse that is continuous to the 
original discourse of the Scriptures (Quranic and Prophetic) […]. It is about 
reproducing, in the context of modernity, the original discourse which is, 
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however, inseparable from the Quranic text, not dissociated from it, but also not 
confused with it [i.e. not replicating the exact past context in the modern context]. 
So, it is not the substance –the literal – of the scriptural teaching which is 
systematically universal, but the form –the interpretation- which it may take that 
is so […] Otherwise said, interpretation re-approaches, and renders contemporary 
the religious discourse by renewing the Quranic and prophetic significations that 
appear historically and culturally distant or foreign [to us now].
779
 
What Oubrou is saying is that hermeneutics, against the way some secular liberals want 
to drive it to, does not cut links with the divine, not does it make an epistemological 
break with the past. Most importantly, he does not imprison God in the Quranic Text, nor 
does he confuse God, His Word, the Quran, and does not, henceforth, consider them all 
as one, but both the latter (Word and Quran) as manifestations of the former, God. He 
does so through what he refers to as “double reflection” by which the divine Texts and 
socio-historical laws are capably managed to be separated in theory so that what is sacred 
remains sacred, and what is mundane remains so:  
Double reflection (double reflexion, nazar): one reflection is on the Texts 
themselves, and the other on natural laws, and historical, social, anthropological 
laws…we can effectively conceive of Islam as a religion that “read” [verb read in 
the past] God through the Quran. At the same time, God should not be identified 
with Quran, nor as nature. God is not imminent in Quran or nature. Whatsoever 
can be the sacred and transcendental level of the Quran, it cannot, in its essence, 
be identified as God. It is an established and immanent sign of the Essence of the 
Divine, but it is not God. It is not God that took the shape of Verb [Word of 
Quran], but His Verb took the written form, which is the Book. The confusion 
between God, His Word, and the Quran can never happen because there has 
always been in Islam a distinction between the symbolic sign (aya) and the 
ultimate Truth […]. The Quran in this sense is venered, sacralized, but not –
religiously- worshipped.
780
  
Oubrou saves the sacred from being desacralized through this hermeneutical reading. 
What the Quran stands for then is the divine ultimate Truth, which is summarized 
through broad ethical dictums, historical events, and prophetic happenings of the pre-
Islamic period. These details in the Quran are not God but a manifestation of Him, and it 
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is up to human reason to exert itself constantly to reach it, or part of it. There is a 
movement in conceptualizing the divine here; the human beings have to keep the search, 
and thus no one interpretation is the best or the final, but each remains one way among 
others.  For Oubrou, “the Quran exposes the universal values of justice, equality, respect 
and dignity of humankind;” “the Quran does not present a formalistic and predetermined 
normative doctrine.” 781 As an inclusive value system, its coherence does not stem from 
its formalism and stagnation but from its mobility. He calls this process “mobile 
coherence” (coherence mobile).782 
The Sunna as well as the jurisprudential tradition are also included in this study, 
to be revisited, reinterpreted, but not to be dismissed altogether. Oubrou´s hermenetutics 
travels to the present and future, but also crosses the bridge of the past as a connection. 
Hermeneutics then is but another name for the classical term of ijtihad. “Ijtihad as 
hermeneutics show that the cultural and temporal distance is a desert to be crossed, but 
also a bridge to go through.” 783 
 Regarding the Sunna, it is also important in the eyes of Oubrou. It is explanatory 
it its realization of the divine message in what he calls the “Quranic moment.” It is 
relevant to show the contextual that can help the contemporary Muslims in Europe to 
distinguish between the cultural, which is temporary and spacial, and the divine which is 
universalist, atemporal, aspacial. Reviewing the hadiths, their validity, weakness, or 
invalidity, is also possible through a methodological reading of the Sunna, in light of the 
universal divine message and the current human circumstances. Like the Quran, the 
Sunna also goes throught he deconstruction and reconstruction mechanisms, processed 
hermeneutically according to the world changes nationally, transnationally, and globally, 
and as part of ijtihad practice.  
 Regarding the traditional jurisprudential/canonist schools (madhahib), Oubrou 
recognizes their authority, past contribution and the inspiration they can still contribute, 
“I assure you there are things said by early classical scholars in the early centuries of 
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Islam which could destabilize the contemporary believers.
784
 Muslims of these times 
were more open than the contemporary ones.”785 He believes that religious knowledge 
and authority is needed at a certain stage of religious intellectual development, and the 
believer, especially if in a position of “authority,” is supposed to be immersed in these 
schools, their differences, and disciplines before practicing independent ijtihad/ 
intellectual exertion. Free access to the Scriptures without going through scholarly past 
contributions can be dangerous, and breed “Catastro-fiqh,”786 “What threatens Islam is 
this open access to the Texts, without this culture of scholarly intelligent mediation.”787 
For him, he is well acquainted with them, but he exerts his intellect in light of the context 
he is in, mainly France. He argues that contemporary Muslims are not obliged to 
thoroughly follow one madhab, as is practiced in Muslim majority countries, but can use 
the old practice of eclecticism, or talfīq, according to the context, and there is no betrayal 
of the tradition in this, since it was used in the past and it has its basis with the tradition 
as a whole. Being situated in the traditional premise, Oubrou then moves to propose his 
“Sharia of the minority” or “minority Sharia.” 
b. Sharia of the Minority for the Relativization of Sharia  
 Oubrou bases his approach on the philosophy of religion of “easiness” (yusr). For 
him, “Too much of religion kills religion” for “Religion should be an added value, which 
brings more benefits, and not a collection of chains/setbacks.”788 Like classical scholars, 
he distinguishes between 1) the creed or aqida, 2) Sharia law, and 3) the mystic “tariqa” 
way. For his approach of “Sharia of the minority,” which will be clarified as I proceed, it 
recognizes these differences of levels in religiosity but does not stop there. It tries to 
overcome them to make Islam reachable and accommodative of world changes. It is good 
to remember what Oubrou says: “The theory on which I am currently working is a global 
religious theory.”789 It cannot be global if it is not accommodative. Yet, he defends his 
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methodology by saying that his approach derives from the Islamic sources themselves: “I 
do not content myself with principles, I also give other possible orientations and I make 
the practice accessible to everyone. This method I did not invent; it is that of the Quran 
and the Prophet: a lenient method (douce), which some have not recognized.”790 For 
instance, for the five daily prayers, Oubrou says that if someone cannot, for some 
reasons, pray five times a day, he or she can pray less than five times, according to his or 
her ability, or to what his circumstances allow. He is also lenient with the practice of 
Ramadan fasting: instead of stressing that one has to fast the whole day and all of the 
month, the Muslim believer, if he cannot but still wants to try, he or she can, as much as 
they can. Oubrou considers that a Muslim, practicing or not, is already in the premise of 
Islam as long as they profess and believe in the first pillar of Shahada/ Testimony, which 
is about Oneness of God and His omnipresence. Within this premise, the non-observant 
of the classical rituals of, say, prayers or Ramadan, is a Muslim, for religiosity here is 
also practiced, invisibly or visibly, through ethical behavior, solidarity, generosity, etc. 
So, there is no “non-practicing Muslim for Oubrou. Here, he is in the same line of 
thought as Tariq Ramadan about “ash-Shahada,”  “living as a testimony.”791 This is about 
the creed, but what about Sharia as law, which is more visible and “disturbing” for the 
liberal and secular societies of Europe?     
 Sharia of the minority has to be situated in the framework within which Oubrou is 
working: theology. It certainly can have political manifestations; for it is part of what was 
referred to earlier as a step towards “geotheology” or “a global religious theory” which 
takes into account the national, transnational and global. In light of the previous 
highlights, and borrowing Alexando Caeiro´s reading, Sharia of minority enjoys its 
novelty mainly on three levels which are manifestations of what Oubrou refers to as the 
“ethicization of Sharia” or “relativization of Sharia.”792 This relativization touches the 
three main levels or layers of the Islamic tradition and sources: the Quran, the hadith, and 
jurisprudence as developed by Muslim scholars.  
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First, the significance of the normative dimension of sharia law is minimized by 
subordinating sharia to theology. Through hermeneutical devices, the meanings of the 
source Texts have to be updated, according to time and space, without losing the high 
significance of the divine intent fused in the “Quranic moment.” Mobility in 
interpretation, as seen above, is emphasized. More than that, emphasis on questions of 
free will and destiny - [here is an invocation of the Mu´atazilite rational tradition]- are 
vital in the reconstruction of sharia; human freedom and rational agency would impact 
the legal interpretation, and pave the way for rehabilitating the distinction between the 
unchanging Islamic intrinsic and universal reason and the historical, expandable Islamic 
knowledge. This allows for moving from the Text to the Context, without losing track of 
the Text. 
Second, sharia is ethicized. “Ethicization of sharia” denotes that Islamic legal 
norms are reduced to the ethical dimension, and thus able to be shared by non-Muslims as 
well. Here, room is given to the host country´s institutions and legal system - France in 
this case. Leila Babes asks Oubrou, in their book debate exchange, whether Muslims will 
need independent or private legal system if it is reformed, and he replies that his idea is to 
“incorporate French law into the metabolism and the economy of the sharia.” He also 
replies to her question as follows, “The issue is about elaborating a law from our own 
references, our culture, our intelligence, while at the same time opening up positively to 
contemporary human experiences without any complexity.”793 He adds that any ethical 
system, as is the case of ethicized sharia, necessitates a legal system that protects these 
ethics. What Oubrou is saying is that he is against having two different laws in the same 
national legal boundaries. Eclectically, and hermeneutically, he aims at finding Islamic 
laws that correspond to the French laws, and thus legal conflicts would disappear, though 
the sources of the two value systems remain different. This is part of his philosophy of 
law within the Islamic framework and rule of moderation and ease, “Law has no sense 
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unless it leads the soul to interior happiness, and spiritual satisfactions, which the prophet 
calls ḥalāwat al īmān [The Pleasure of Belief].”794     
Third, the theory of Sharia of the minority makes a substantial use of the fatwa 
practice. A fatwa is classically a legal opinion over a particular issue in particular time 
and space; it is not binding, but a mere legal opinion. Classical jurisprudential schools 
diverged on certain topics and their details, and each school would give its legal opinion 
according to its methodology of interpretation of the references, in light of time and space 
circumstances. The General principle about fatwas is that “most of them remain 
“biodegradable,” self-destructive, in the sense that their articulation is bound to a 
particular context, time and place and circumstances of the individual, and when these 
circumstances change, the fatwa expires.”795 Oubrou uses this flexibility in Islamic law 
and makes of it a central element in his theory.  Fatwa here serves well the eclectic 
approach, known as talfīq (jurisprudential eclecticism) among legalist scholars. More 
clearly, he elaborates his methodology as a “typology of fatwa” by means of which he 
distinguishes between two main types of fatwas: positive and negative. He elaborates this 
typology to suit the European/ French legal system(s). 
Positive fatwa by pronouncement or articultation is based on articulating some old 
verse or hadith or fiqh classical view, as long as it does not contradict French law. It is of 
two types: common positive fatwa and individual or situational positive fatwa. Common 
positive fatwa concerns all the Muslim community, or at least those that are practicing 
Muslims, the French Muslims and by extension the European Muslims. It targets an 
average or minimal orthopraxis. It integrates the real religiosity of the Muslim 
community and its various possible practices (ritualist and moralist) to the Sharia 
premise; this way no Muslim can feel s/he is missing his spiritual and moral duty, 
whatsoever the level of his or her religiosity is. This norm has to be integrated in the 
French juridical law. Overall, “it remains theoretical.”796 As to the individual or 
situational positive fatwa, it takes into account the majority and dominant culture. The 
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first form of fatwa aims at maintaining public order, and this one aims at avoiding social 
fracture in the life of the Muslim in his daily life and his social environment. It concerns 
individual and concrete cases. This type of fatwa necessitates from the mufti knowledge 
of society, its mentalities, its different work conditions, etc. It refines, adapts, attenuates, 
suspends or annuls the first fatwa, the collective one, according to the cases of individuals 
that raise it. “It can be valid for one Muslim person but invalid for another, valid for the 
same person in one circumstance and invalid in another.” This type of fatwa is “dialogic,” 
and “participative” (his words). It concerns the individual and involves the mufti scholar, 
and there is a need for the scholar to know more details about the case of the individual, 
and the latter has to interact with the mufti while finding out a solution that still preserves 
the minimum of religiosity.
797
 Particularly for the mufti who is capable of giving a 
religious legal opinion [and not the imam], he should not detail the 
canonic/jurisprudential norms, seeing the modest spiritual and moral level of Muslims in 
Europe/ France.
798
  
The second type of fatwas is the negative fatwa by voluntary omission, or 
principial jurisprudential silence. For Oubrou, this form of fatwa is very important in our 
age. It consists in abstention from confirming some laws, including the Scriptural ones, 
that have just one meaning, which some practicing individuals call for. “This posture 
allows for the contraction of Sharia, by simplifying it to its basic levels. It is an aware 
silence, or thought-silence, a canonical absence, doubly necessary: for an essential 
religiosity of society and for a laïc equilibrium in the French society.” It is a passive 
silence to counter fatwas market common amidst the community. This type of fatwa 
prevents the loss of religious sense of authority, either by not rushing to give a fatwa to 
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counter other fatwas, or by not giving in to the political demands that press for fatwas 
frequently.
799
  
This said, the following question remains valid: what is Oubrou driving at behind 
the theory of Sharia of the minority? Three main aims are targeted in Oubrou´s work: 
living a simple Islam with its ethics and spirituality, secularizing Islam and making it 
Western, and considering the West and Europe a space of testimony where Muslims feel 
home and contribute to the prosperity of their societies. For reclaiming the simplicity of 
Islam and secularization, he says the following: 
 It advocates a simple Islam in its visible practice via minority sharia. This simple 
fact will help Muslims to access this socio-economic level which will help them 
in turn, once settled with a comfortable intellectual stage, to seize the subtleties of 
the profoundness of their religion. And, instead of consuming modernity, they 
become contributors to it. They will contribute on the large universal level. In 
sum, the approach I propose is of two levels: a discourse that calls for a simple 
religious return, but which passes through another discourse of 
decomplexification which is in itself complicated in its search for the simple, 
because the simple in religion is never simple to find. The second level is a 
universal discourse which is more secular. For me, the moment to disclose this 
discourse has not come yet.
800
  
Still about secularization, he also notes the following, “intellectually and religiously, a 
theological secularization of Islam appears necessary to realize this marriage canonique 
of Islam with the West without divorce. This is what I modestly try to think for a Western 
Islam.”801 Otherwise said, Sharia of the minority aims at emancipating Sharia a priori 
from all political systems [Islamic State, Caliphate] as a condition for its elaboration. 
This gives back to Islam “its original, and essential, religious dimension, to allow it to 
have a laїc form as is our case in France.”802 Being immersed in European sociology and 
theology, Oubrou believes that “Muslims can learn from the Catholic experience.”803  
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With his theory, Oubrou also hopes that it can give confidence to Muslims so that 
they feel home in Europe and the West, and thus feel contributors to their modern 
societies, and be a bridge between the Western and Islamic world: 
My hope is to see Muslims feeling fully European and notably French, thus 
contributing to this great civilization and human enterprise, and this without 
putting aside their spirituality, and on condition that their religiosity acculturates 
and Occidentalizes. Theologians, intellectuals, and other actors, coming from all 
Muslim communities have to take part in this. Muslims have to do their best to 
avoid a religious or cultural fracture. They have to be a bridge between the 
Western world and the Muslim world. I especially remind all the Muslim 
responsible bodies and representative institutions to communicate to the Muslims 
the mission that consists in assuring the West by considering it part of them, by 
working for its good and prosperity, and particularly not to feel as “foreigners 
within.” The feel of love towards our France and our Europe has to be the engine-
factor that reconciles Islam as spirituality and the West as a civilization. 
Intellectually and religiously, a theological secularization of Islam appears 
necessary to reach a jurisprudential marriage between Islam and the West without 
divorce. It is this that I modestly try to think of for a Western Islam.
804
  
Oubrou is aware that ‘This type of work aims at changing mentalities in the long term. It 
is not easy.’805 With this theoretical preamble, I refer below to the repercussions that it 
brings about, moving from ‘geotheology’ and ‘Sharia of the minority’ in praxis.  
c. Implications of Sharia of the Minority in Europe  
 In the well circulated debate/ exchange between Babes and Oubrou, published as 
Loi d’Allah, loi des homes: liberté, égalité et femmes en islam (2002), the two scholars 
raise most of the issues that Muslim jurists are struggling with both in Islamic majority 
countries and Europe. Though I consider this debate very relevant and worth practicing 
among Muslim scholars of diverging intellectual trends, and though I also see that 
Oubrou not only knowledgeably defends his methodology and argumentation against a 
number of historical errors Babes brings up, John Bowen, in Can Islam Be French? 
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(2010), thinks that the debate was engineered by the latter (Babes), and Oubrou was 
mainly in the justificatory and defensive position:   
The mainstream setting ensured that Oubrou would lose the debate. Effectively 
the senior editor of this book by a mainstream publisher (Albin Michel), Babes 
sets the agenda and Oubrou remains on the defensive: the question is never, “Do 
your ideas, Mme Babes, conform to God´s words?” but rather “Do your ideas, M. 
Oubrou, conform to the demands of freedom and equality? Oubrou must deliver 
apologetics: Yes, some Muslims believe this or that, but look, the Caliph ´Umar 
did not cut off hands, and many of us now think that scripture must be adapted to 
new times and places.”806 
In the debate, Babes defends the natural rights of wo/man, clings to the universalists 
interpretation of human rights, and seems, as Bowen remarks, to be asking Muslim 
citizens to choose between the two sources of law, the Republican and the 
Scripturalist/Islamic, while Oubrou tries, through his approach, to ask citizens to 
reconcile them.
807
 Throughout the debate, Oubrou does not relinquish from reminding his 
interlocutor that his approach does not start from the external projection of “modern” 
concepts like “equality” on the divine texts. Rather, his approach targets fathoming the 
intentions of these texts, in light of their “Quranic moment” (temporal and special 
circumstances), and only then move to the contemporary circumstances to work out a 
“consensus” among the various interpretations that transpire, the modern concepts and 
their interpretations included. He says that his approach does not aim at merely satisfying 
the modern and universalist concepts of natural rights, as Babes does.
808
 This said, he still 
searches for theological justifications for such concepts that modern Europe is founded 
upon. Without much theological and scriptural details, I refer to his main views on 
controversial issues that concern Muslims in Europe: laïcité and/or secularization, 
citizenship and loyalty, liberty and equality of women, the veil, polygamy, ḥalāl 
marriage, and equality among Muslims and non-Muslims (dhimmis).   
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 Laïcité and secularization. As mentioned earlier, Oubrou has moved from the 
early ties he had with the Muslim Brothers network and its early impact on UOIF (Union 
des organizations islamiques de france). For him, “Islam should not be identified with a 
State.”809 For the case of the French laicite, he is for the preservation and respect of the 
law of 1905, though he sees that much of the current French interpretation of the law, and 
lacite in general, is more of a historical residue and reaction to an established religion 
(Christianity). Liberty in the French context, he argues, is mostly linked to liberation 
from religiosity. He considers the Anglo-Saxon model of secularization more open than 
its French laïcist version. Moreover, the fact that laïcité is a historical constructed 
juridical-ideological concept, rather than “a philosophy that was created in the abstract,” 
makes of it philosophically contingent, ‘relative,’ and ‘revolutionary’ as he says. It 
remains “indefinite.”810 This critical point aside, he admits that “If Muslims live in peace 
now in the West, it is thanks to laïcité and secularization.”811 He also contends that 
modernity is a chance to rethink Islamic jurisprudence and ethics. He refers to Islamic 
rulers over the centuries. He does not consider their reign purely clerical or religious; he 
considers them politicians who use religion for political ruling as long as that serves the 
State. They were a political corps partly separated from the religious scholars.
812
 “In fact, 
there is a possibility for secularization in Islam. Theologically, it is possible.”813 
 Citizenship and loyalty. Oubrou defends the equality in citizenship that the 
modern national and secular state guarantees. Thus, the notion of dhimmitude that 
concerns Jews and Christians in classical jurisprudence is no longer applicable now, 
though it had its advantages for these minorities. In its context, dhimmitude was an 
advanced right.
814
 He also defends the conception of “double citizenship.” “To love one´s 
religion and one´s country, France, is not only possible, in this case, but totally natural, 
human, legitimate, and religiously justifiable. It is about having a big spirit and a big 
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heart to realize this double citizenship, celestial and terrestrial.”815 He dissociates himself 
from preachers and imams that preach “their simplistic Arab Islam,” and by which they 
“spoil our work.”816 For him, imams who are closer to the public have to be well 
immersed in the culture of the society they live and work in. Their preaching has to 
answer the needs of the believers in this particular society. For instance, he is against 
preachers who insult Jews and Christians in the sermons.
817
 He demands of European 
Muslims not to confuse the current political realities with the textual narratives of the 
Quran that have their particular causes of revelation – asbāb annuzul. By way of 
illustration, he asks the Muslim youth not to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians 
themselves when it comes to defending their rights, “I don’t see any use for the French 
Muslims in tying their destiny to the Palestinian cause.”818 Violence is abhorred in Islam, 
and jihad “is inscribed in the Quran for a just cause,” for defence.819  
Hiding behind Islam, as a way of victimization or resistance to socio-political 
problems in society is not a sober way of approaching religion. Islam should not be used 
as the religion of “the wretched of the earth.”820 Oubrou defends a French Islam, and a 
Western Islam whereby Muslims feel they belong and contribute to the countries where 
they belong. A previous long passage was quoted in this regard, from which I re-cite this 
short statement: “My hope is to see Muslims feeling fully European and notably French, 
thus contributing to this great civilization and human enterprise, and this without putting 
aside their spirituality, and on condition that their religiosity acculturates and 
Occidentalizes.”821 
The issue of daʻwa, or prozelytization, is invoked in Europe as controversial. 
Should it be allowed as part of freedom of expression and religious belief or not? The 
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controversy on daʻwa stems from the fact that it brings fear of Islamization of Europe, 
seeing that Islamization here is linked with what the concept of Sharia law (mainly 
huddud sanctions, women issues, and polygamy) brings about. For Oubrou, the idea of 
daʻwa is to serve society for the good. Its ideal of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa annahy ‘ani 
lmunkar (promoting the good and forbidding the bad) should not be used to nurture 
hatred and divisions in family and society, and thus interrupt stability. Its 
“communicational aspect” for the transmission of the religious message of Islam bases 
itself on “love of the other,” without which the intention of this transmission is void. It is 
the realization of the good demeanour of the Muslim in his society, while living the 
Testimony/ Shahada, that answers the ideal of daʻwa.822 “The best way to honor one´s 
religion is to live it fully but intelligently, in harmony with one´s self, the others, and the 
world.”823 
 Liberty and equality. Women. Oubrou’s book-debate with Babes is on the issue of 
women in Islam. To condense the detailed accounts here, Oubrou first and foremost 
defends the ontological equality of women and men from a Scriptural perspective. (Babes 
is also for the same argument). He prioritises this ontological view over the modern view 
that advances natural human rights. As noted earlier, he avoids a projectionist 
methodology in which modern concepts are forced on the tradition.  “God created man 
and woman equal.”824 “There is equality between man and woman in Islam.”825 Oubrou 
and Babes discuss many verses and hadiths, the causes of their revelation, the way they 
were first interpreted and applied, and how they have been also conceived or applied 
historically by Islamic jurists. Oubrou seems well immersed in the history of revelation 
and Quranic-and-hadith hermeneutics, tafsīrs. Though challenged on various issues by 
Babes, he challenges her back on a number of historical errors that she either 
misinterprets or simply misses. Simultaneously, she finds him resistant to 
accommodating natural rights for equality without going through socio-political 
justifications and explanations of various verses-hadiths that speak of, or hint at, the 
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inferiority of women as has been interpreted by the dominant orthodoxy, or as has been 
translated in European languages. Below I refer to his views on the points indicated 
earlier. 
 The ontological equality of woman and man justifies, for Oubrou, the expansion 
of equality to other aspects of male-female relations. First, for the question of the highest 
socio-political position that has been dominated historically in most cultures by men, 
Oubrou believes that woman can head the State, as a Caliph or Imam as traditionally 
named. Like some earlier scholars (e.g. some Hanafites, al-Tabari, Ibn Taymiyya), he 
sees neither a scriptural nor a historical proof that Muslim women were deprived of 
heading states, or being interpreters of the Quran, judges and jurisprudence scholars, or 
imams in leading prayers for both males and females (e.g. Um Waraqa was ordered by 
the Prophet to lead the prayers for both males and females). Two of his wives, Aysha, 
and Um Salam, were religious scholars and were consulted by male scholars. Plainly, “I 
am for the access of women to all leading political positions, cultural and religious 
responsibilities, against all jurisprudential or canonist obstacles; at the same time, I am 
also for thinking this access in light of the specificity of woman [nature], and for studying 
it from a biological, psychological, and sociological perspective.”826  
Oubrou does not abrogate the seemingly masculinist verses or hadiths without 
trying to capture what he calls the “Quranic moment,” which may, in light of modern 
sciences, be examined not only from ideological-political-philosophic perspectives, but 
also from biological, psychological, and sociological perspectives. As an illustration of 
his point about the integration of biological considerations of difference and/ or parity 
between man and woman, he refers to some scientific findings about the brain weight of 
woman which is about 10 to 15 % less than man’s, and their neurological system 
vulnerability to oblivion is possible since they may not concentrate on two tasks at the 
same time as men are capable of doing – it is about memory and not intelligence, as he 
emphasizes. He does not say that this is why the Quranic verse decrees that two women 
witness equals one in the court. He (simply) says that verifying the reasons behind such a 
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decree, which does not look egalitarian in modern societies, should be studied from a 
number of perspectives, including the exact sciences, besides the socio-political 
circumstances that necessitated such a decree. His sociological justification for the 
requirement of two women witnesses as equal to one man in administration (commerce 
and courts mainly) goes as follows: Arab women doing trade and accessing 
administrations was new with Islam; so, as a new practice, they may have needed to take 
time and learn the details of business, and that could lead to some mistakes in contracting 
for instance; as a secure way the, two women were required so that if one forgets, the 
other can remind her. Oubrou looks for ways to clarify controversies, though they can be 
easily used against him, for such arguments sound masculinist and archaic for some, like 
Babes, his interlocutor.
827
  
Inheritance. Oubrou applies the same socio-cultural paradigm of analysis on the 
issue of inheritance which Quranic verses have clearly established in a mathematical 
way. From a modern egalitarian perspective, these verses are highly non-egalitarian. In 
most of the divisions the woman receives less than man. Again, Oubrou does not 
abrogate these verses but reads them in context, following his “double movement 
approach” to serve his project of “geotheology.” He brings up the advantages the Arabian 
woman gains, compared to the man’s household responsibilities which are fully his. For 
instance, as a wife, woman has no obligation to take care of the household finances, even 
in cases she is rich and her husband is poor. He, for example, has no right to ask for her 
financial support, or oblige her to take care of the household financially. The mahr, the 
dowry, is also for her alone, and its sum is up to her to decide – at least legally; in a 
patriarchal society this can also be decided by the males of the family or the tutor. For her 
jewellery, for her beauty, she does not have to pay zakat annual tax on them. As a sister, 
or mother, or close relative, woman is also taken care of financially by one of her close 
male relatives. As an heir, in some cases, through very rare, she can receive a higher part 
from the inheritance. Such a socio-cultural condition was taken into account by 
revelation, that is why the Quranic verses advantage man on the matter of inheritance. 
For Oubrou, such injunctions are not constant, nor are they normative. Rather, they are 
                                                          
827
 Ibid., 321-323. (The same point is expressed in Profession imam, 64-65) 
254 
 
applied cases of the general message of Islam which is equality and social justice. When 
the context changes, they can change, too. He says, commenting on inheritance 
discussion with Babes: That is why I have spoken about the ethicization of Sharia, which 
consists in modulating the application of laws on moral bases by bearing in mind the 
major principles of equity.”828  
What I see Oubrou pushing for is not an easy admission of natural rights and 
passive cancelation of some divine injunctions (like women’s inheritance, witness in 
court, mahr/ dowry). Though he defends equality among the sexes, he at the same time 
defends what he considers natural/ biological dispositions of man and woman, 
“humanitude masculine,” and “humanitude feminine.”829 He defends women freedom to 
access all jobs, and at the same time he defends laws that can preserve family stability 
and childhood rights: for example, he backs up the once suggested European law to 
advantage women not to work at night, as a way of preserving the right to family, and the 
right of the child. Oubrou defends equality of rights, freedom, and autonomy of women 
as long as they do not harm her “biological, psychological, and sociological” rights, 
which he sees are still male influenced even in modern societies. Equality between the 
sexes for him does not mean uniformist parity that some egalitariste feministe discourse 
calls for: 
In spite of my reservation regarding the consequences of certain egalitarist 
feminist discourse, no canonist [i.e. scriptural or jurisprudential] mention of 
gender should be made to access to any position, or to public function, or...I do 
not find any clear and precise text, neither in Quran nor in hadith, that reserves 
power uniquely to the masculine gender.
830
 
Babes, his interlocutor, does not accept these arguments of “humanitude feminine” and 
considers them masculinist.    
 With regards to the case of Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim, which is not 
allowed by unanimity among classical scholars, Oubrou says that the high conditions of 
male dominance of the household is not applicable in Europe, and the condition that 
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Muslims were a minority in the early formative era and thus Muslim women, who were 
mostly housewives, were vulnerable to non-Muslim males non-Islamic practices, which 
justified the prohibition of such a marriage – practices like the non-Muslim man forcing 
his Muslim wife to have a sexual intercourse during the day of Ramadan, or forcing their 
children to be reared up as non-Muslims. Now, if such a prohibition of not marrying a 
non-Muslim is forced on a Muslim woman, that could just lead to break ups in family 
ties, which is not what Islamic jurisprudence aims at. In such a situation, and also because 
not all Sunni jurists emphasize the presence of a wali (guardian of the woman or her 
tutor), such a condition of not marrying a non-Muslim is not an issue, as long as the 
freedom of the girl, as well as her rights are guaranteed. Marrying a non-Muslim does not 
make her an apostate.
831
 Even in cases of apostasy (announced by male or female), 
freedom of religion is guaranteed. The Prophet never applied death penalty of 
apostates.
832
  
The wilayat (guardianship) aimed at securing woman rights in a patriarchal 
Arabian context. For Oubrou, the wali was like a spokesperson for the lady that is getting 
married for the first time. The customs of the time required her decency (la pudeur, al-
hishmah) in speech and appearance amidst men, so a wali had to facilitate the process of 
marriage. Now that such a condition of woman frequentation of the public 
administrations is not longer a space dominated by man, and where the woman does not 
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have to feel obliged to be escorted, the Muslim woman can conduct a marriage without a 
wali.
833
  
Related to the question of marriage, and while Muslims are demanding tribunal 
courts that take care of the registration of what is commonly known in Europe as ḥalāl 
marriages (and resolve family disputes), Oubrou takes the view that marriage is Islam is 
civil, and aims at securing rights of both man and woman, and their children, and if a 
civil (or secular) administration does this, there is no need for a religious court that 
simply does the same work. As to the idea that divorce is always in the hands of man, and 
woman is always a victim, Oubrou replies that Islamic jurisprudence has given the right 
to woman to list her conditions in the marriage contract. She can ask to reserve the right 
of marriage in her hands. She has the right of khul’, i.e. the right to ask for divorce. If 
divorce is a right for man, woman has then the right of khul’.834  
Among the other rights of woman in marriage is mahr, dowry, which is also 
prescribed in the Quran. The latter did not bring it as a new custom, but was already 
practiced in Arabia, but simply made it clear as a right of woman in contracting for 
marriage, to be given either before or after marriage, in case of divorce. (In some Arab-
Islamic countries, the mahr to be given as a gift to the bride can be so high, beyond the 
financial ability of the groom, as a way of securing some finances for the woman in case 
of divorce. Sometimes the mahr is decided by the males from the side of the woman/ 
bride, for they consider themselves the ones responsible for her in case of divorce, and 
they have thus to secure that at least she gets some money in that case.) However, Oubrou 
states that “mahr is not part of the pillars of marriage in Islam. A woman may do without 
it if she wants.”835 With this view on the mahr, Oubrou distinguishes between what is 
religious and what is cultural, facilitates marriage for man, gives freedom of choice to 
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woman, and paves the way to avoid, or at least reduce, Sharia courts or counselling in 
cases of family disputes and divorce.
836
  
 As to polygamy, Oubrou is for its abolition, as an answer to the Quranic emphasis 
that monogamy is the just alternative, even though it (the Quran) allows it (polygamy), 
and restricts it. As with previous examples, he does not condescend on the Quranic 
injunctions because modern concepts have to prevail. He is critical of the unrestricted 
extra-marital affairs more practiced in the West, while restricted and canonized polygamy 
is diabolized.
837
 He goes through sociological, anthropological, and also biological 
justifications of polygamy. Not to go through a lengthy argumentation on the issue, as 
found in the book exchange with Babes, Oubrou endorses the view of some of the 
Hanbalite school (madhab) which does not allow polygamy once monogamy has 
prevailed in society, for that is the norm the Quran also prefers.
838
 He says, “For my 
personal point of view, I do not admit it [i.e. polygamy] neither for me nor for my 
children. At the same time, I consider it a Quranic permission that cannot be abrogated 
irrevocably. It can be valid exceptionally, and limited in time.”839 Its permissibility is 
applicable, for him, is cases of war or natural catastrophes in which society may lose 
more man, and the State should consequently intervene to adjust the sexes equilibrium for 
the well functioning of society. (He refers to the examples of wars in Chechenya, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo).
840
    
 Regarding the polemics over the veil, particularly during-and-after their ban in 
France in 2004, Oubrou considers this law a “moral censorship,” “an unfit demeanour 
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from a big civilization,” and “a mistake.”841 He defends women’s right to belief, as long 
as that does not endanger public security. He is not favourable to the full veil, the 
niqab.
842
 For the veil, the hijjab that covers the hair, he reads the sources as decreeing it 
primarily for the wives of the Prophet, and not the all Muslim women. The Caliph Omar 
ordered it as a public practice. After the law passed in France against the veil, he asked 
the Muslim girls to respect it. He recognizes that more Muslim girls and women, 
including converts, have opted for the veil after the media and political disource assault 
on Islamic symbols. The practice has become “more or less now a cultural ethic.” “The 
veil is not part of belief. It is not even part of the ‘ibādāt. It is part of ethics.”843 
 With these various views on jurisprudential issues as inscribed by the Quran, 
Sunna, or jurisprudence schools, Oubrou validates his statement that “law is made for 
man,”844 and that the hermeneutical approach he follows serves man, “I advocate 
moderate and just hermeneutics.”845 “I fight the norm that poisons the life of people.”846 
With the views he advances, Oubrou does not expect a total harmony on the intellectual, 
theological and jurisprudential level all around Europe, but at least wishes that an 
agreement concerns the rituals of religion, like the religious ceremonies of Ramadan start 
and end, and Eid days.
847
 On the other hand, he considers that education and the school in 
Europe, France in his particular case, has to recognize the Islamic presence and 
contribution both historically and contemporarily, and avoids considering Islam a 
“civilization” of the Middle Ages, and not a “religion” that is now also European.848    
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2. Abdennour Bidar: from Self Islam to Overcoming Religion  
 
An interesting version of European Islam emerges with Abdennour Bidar. Bidar is 
a young French Muslim (b. 1971), philosopher by training and profession. Since 2003 he 
has entered the public debate on Islam, reform, and Europe, with his first long 
letter/article entitled “Letter of a European Muslim: Europe or the Renaissance of 
Islam.”849 His public engagement has grown since then. Bidar´s intellectual production 
and interest in the debate originates from his French Islam, the way he experienced it in 
his childhood and adolescence, up to his mid-20s, characterized by extreme internal 
dilemma, before this dilemma develops into a philosophico-theological approach, which I 
refer to as theosophic.
850
 In reading him, I will not bind myself to the chronology of the 
texts. As I have done with the previous scholars, chronology helps to trace the socio-
political circumstances in which the scholar emerges, but it is the intellectual 
development stages and their major thematic drives that are of interest in my reading.  
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I divide the work of Bidar into three stages, which I follow in introducing him 
here.
851
 The first stage refers to the experience and concept of self Islam as it develops 
from his personal experience as a young European Muslim. Self islam: histoire d’un 
islam personnel [Self Islam: Story of a Personal Islam] (2006) catches the early seeds of 
an intellectual believer who lives his faith in a liberal context. At this same stage, Bidar 
also shares his Sufist concerns for a version of a reformed Islam under the conditions of 
modernity and human rights (liberty, equality, fraternity/ dialogue). This concern is 
presented in his short book Un Islam pour notre temps [An Islam for our Times] 
(2004).
852
 Bidar’s second stage produces an “existentialist” reading of the Quran in which 
the “immortality of man” becomes its axis.853 His book L’islam sans soumission: pour un 
existentialisme musulman [Islam without Submission: for an Islamic Existentialism] 
(2008) becomes, in my view, his most important contribution to the contemporary 
Islamic scholarship on reform. Self Islam approach re-appears again as an expression of 
rational, and not only personal, spirituality in which the individual is the “heir of God” on 
earth where he gains infinite presence and secures historical immortality beyond the 
metaphysical classical interpretations.
854
 Bidar’s third stage moves from what could be 
called the “classical dichotomy of thinking” (like religious versus secular, Islam versus 
West) to a more “expanded view of the sacred,” to call it so. This current stage of thought 
brings Bidar’s critique of Islamic thought and Western thought together, and fuses them 
both in his approach of “overcoming” classical views on religion, secularism, and 
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atheism. About this stage he says, “I do not want to be enclosed in the category of “New 
Muslim intellectuals” just because I have initially started from studying the Quran.”855 
a. Self Islam: Pathways for Spiritual Modernity  
Personal Journey towards Self Islam  
 Bidar is the son of a French convert doctor, and a Moroccan step-father. He was 
born Muslim from his mother side. He lived his childhood between Christianity and 
Islamic households. He spent a lot of time, until the age of twenty four, with his atheist 
grandfather, from the maternal side, in his vineyard. When in the “wine farm,” he would 
ask “Where is Islam?”; he answers himself as such: it is “in my heart.”856 “I had the 
faculty to feel Muslim more or less in any context, even in the contexts, situations, and 
companies where Islam was totally absent.”857 With his grandfather, as he retells in his 
biography, Self Islam, he learnt a great deal about man, humanism, and life without God. 
He was very close to his grandfather, though they never had a discussion on Islam. 
Bidar´s mother was his “spiritual initiator.” He speaks of after-dinner family sessions 
reading and discussing spirituality and world religions, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, 
etc. He says she taught him the greatness of man in Islam, dignity, and humanism, “The 
education I received seems to me priceless because it did not force me to respect man: it 
invoked him in me by giving me a high idea of the human kind. Respect for mankind 
came, henceforth, from itself [human being]; it imposed itself.”858 
Bidar says that Self Islam aims at narrating his youth tough times between two 
worlds before managing to unite them in one, “this book is the story of a slow and 
obstinate construction of my unity.”859 He does reveal the dichotomies he used to feel as 
a French Muslim when young boy and adolescent, Muslim at home and in the mosque, 
and French outside, where religion is not only not spoken of, but also suspected and 
considered backward. With his djellaba in the school bag, he would visit the mosque on 
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Fridays, and feel security, quietude, and energy. Outside, he would see Arab youth 
reciprocating discriminatory language with their French peers. With these scenes and way 
of life, between two worlds, he would feel mature at an early age, raise questions, and 
decide to work out ways to demolish the wall that stood between these two worlds. 
860
    
Bidar aspired to identify himself as a French Muslim but did not have the 
common features of the mainstream French. His name had frequently to be explained, 
and with it he had to explain that his name, which in Arabic means The Son of Light, 
does not mean he is not French. Sometimes he had to say that his name was “Pierre” and 
sometime he had to eat pork at school to avoid the looks of his peers, and the 
justifications of not eating it if he had not.
861
 The early internal divisions were then on 
identity: how to feel a French Muslim, without being considered of another foreign 
ethnicity. “I was a Muslim of nowhere.”862  
With high school grades, Bidar managed to make it to the elitist ENS (Ecole 
Normal Superieur) in Paris. There, with his religiosity, spirituality, as well as philosophic 
studies, he would realize that his peers spoke just Western philosophy, believed in reason, 
had little curiosity level, and did not worry much about life, the metaphysical worlds, as 
he did. He lived “a kind of disgraceful Islam.”863 He prayed clandestinely. “My Islam 
became clandestine and furtive.”864 “I found myself exiled in my own country.”865 That 
was the first disillusion in Paris, in France, in the West. At this stage, wrath against the 
West reached its peak. Those were the years of “internal division.” He felt rejected by his 
own society. “I felt profoundly denied, rejected, insulted. And I found myself in a violent 
reaction […] against my own Western identity.”866 Bidar felt he was carrying inside him 
the conflict of religion and reason that the West has been in, “[T]he conflict between 
philosophy and religion, reason and faith, which has preoccupied all the Western 
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civilization for centuries became my own interior dilemma.”867 In ENS philosophy class, 
he once intervened and suggested to enrich Western philosophy with Islamic spirituality. 
His professor received that with a kind of sarcasm. Bidar decided to leave the prestigious 
ENS.  
With his spiritual wife, a convert to Islam and classmate in ENS, he entered a 
renowned Sufi path, tariqa Boutchichiya, in Morocco at the age of nineteen, and stayed 
as a disciple in the Sufi school for seven years. Those were years of enlightenment and 
mystic experience. However, they were in a different world. The Western world and the 
Oriental spiritual world were both inside, but they did not converge; they kept apart, the 
first for social life, in its minimum, and the latter for profound spirituality. With time, 
Bidar says, he realized the enclosure of the group, its sectarianism, its feeling of 
superiority, its genders no-mixing rules, and would experience the hierarchy some leaders 
of the Sufi tariqa wanted to build among the practitioners. It was this enclosure, lack of 
liberty, that would entice him, and his wife, to leave the Sufi order, in rebellion, in 1997, 
“The West woke up in me: my critical spirit, my desire for liberty, and also maybe the 
French character of independence and insubordination.”868 That was the second main 
illusion he had to go through in his story with personal Islam: the Sufi path was not a 
final answer for his personal quest. He quit the ENS and the Western temple, and now the 
Oriental temple quit him; he felt he belonged nowhere, “I was then from neither the 
Orient nor the Occident. I had no place anywhere.”869  
Back in France, he started to prepare for the “agregation” tough exams of 
philosophy and to study at La Sorbonne, while living with his kids in a small city in the 
middle of the woods. This period of silence, with his wife and kids, was happy, but also 
torturous. Feelings of “depression,” “absolute void” tormented him; still, he had hope and 
patience. His name, Abdennour, gave him “inner light,” and the divine still lived in him, 
through his long contemplation times.
870
 It was “dark light” for him, “I was not spiritually 
dead […]. I continued to see the universe in the Light of Allah. Outside any particular 
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path, I remained a Sufi by heart, in the sense that I always lived my Islam as 
contemplation with the universal Life (la Vie universelle).”871  
After these years of “inner division” Bidar still keeps the divine light with him, 
but in its new shape. He has sieved the West and Islamic tradition, and now he seems 
confident that he has  not lost his faith, but he got rid of the dilemma it has caused him, 
and lost with it part of its rituals. He recounts it this way, “I no longer knew where the 
right and the wrong were, nor did I know if these terms still had some sense. I was 
henceforth in a totally flat world […]. The principles of Islam, too, seemed relative to 
me.”872 The consequences of the experience is that the ‘ibādāt/worship rituals are also 
questioned, “from then,  my religious practice has nearly entirely faded […]. I nearly left 
all these practices […] now, I am no longer pious, after I have been so for long. I no 
longer consider the Quran as an absolute truth.”873 He then wonders, “Am I still Muslim 
then?” He confidently answers he still is, for the Islam he has found goes beyond rituals.  
Bidar’s realization is summarized in the idea of wahdat al-wujud, Oneness of 
God, which one recognizes in the first pillar of Islam, Shahaha/ Testimony. This 
realization would be the pivotal axis on which Bidar builds his idea of Self Islam, Islamic 
reform, and the theory of immortality as will be explained afterwards. He says:  
What is left to me of my Islamic tradition is the essential, which we call 
Testimony: there is of reality but Allah and Mohammad His Messenger. Allah as 
a name for the Great Life. […] and Mohammad as the symbol of man who brings 
the message and responsibility of this Life, who contemplates it and works for it 
to make existence multiple, and to make men themselves […].874  
He adds that the Islam he has discovered, which he pictures as the Grail of the era, is 
more universalist, and compatible with the European/ French context he for long 
considered not hospitable to him: 
When I realized this, I knew I have discovered the Grail of our epoch. Because in 
this Islam that celebrates diversity, richness, and profound signification of all 
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world differences I also regained the Islam I was taught [], the values of France 
and modernity: liberty, equality, fraternity. Actually, it is Allah the Great Life that 
manifests itself in all existences […]. Harmony between the mystic vision of 
Islam and the moral values of the Occident.
875
 
What Bidar is reactivating with more emphasis here is the perception of the 
universe as a manifestation of God, without this being an Incarnation, but just part and 
parcel of Him. Bidar is sacralizing the universe, and shattering the walls that separate the 
sacred and the profane, and it is this that would have repercussions on his perception of 
the whole Islamic tradition, including its basic pillars, the pillars of Islam, as well as the 
pillars of faith. (I will be back to this later). The passage below illustrates his key thought: 
There is no longer a separation between the sacred and the profane, neither is 
there any longer what is sacred and what is profane. The Great Life of Allah (La 
Grande Vie d´Allah) is at the same time all that is sacred, all that is profane, all 
our beliefs, and all our atheisms. For my part, I do not consider that praying is an 
act more sacred than speaking, nor that the mosque is a sacred place while the 
street is profane. I live in a world where the sacred has trespassed its old limits, 
like a stream that drifts everything [...]. Making love is sacred, laughing is sacred, 
sharing is sacred, like meditating or fasting. And I have realized in these 
conditions that I can lead any particular way of life without stopping a second 
from feeling being Muslim: whether I pray or not, whether I eat pork or not, has 
strictly no importance.  
My Islam has nothing more of the religious. It is not an Islam of rituals, but of 
vision, of contemplation of Allah in the diversity of the world.
876
  
 
Bidar has peeled off Islam of its layers, and argues to have found the essence of it, which 
is the conception of all the world as a sacred place, and this way the antagonism of sacred 
vs. profane vanishes. Allah as the “Great Life” (La Grande Vie) manifests itself in every 
sight, act and thought. With this realization, Bidar feels “liberated, free of my previous 
contradictions.”877  
With such an existentialist found peace, Bidar gains back his energy, starts his 
engaged public and intellectual life, establishes al-Mamoun think tank to observe the 
evolution of Islam in Europe, and first becomes into public lights with his long article, 
Lettre d´un musulman European (“Letter from A European Muslim,” 2003). The idea in 
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the article would become the axis that he worked out in more details in his later books, to 
be referred to. In that early article he argued that “Islam as a religion, as a system of 
truths, is behind us.”878 For him, this applies to all religions, “I wanted to say that religion 
as a religion is going to die, and it will not be born again.”879 What Bidar sees emerging 
is another phase of religiosity, mostly expressed spiritually, “I do not believe in the 
resurgence of religion in the future centuries. The spiritual dimension of man is taking 
another face.”880 This spiritual dimension is the crux of the matter in the concept of Self 
Islam.  
 Self Islam is founded on deep meditation and questioning of the meaning of life, 
and the sources of its values. It is based on liberty and responsible freedom of conscience. 
Bidar regrets the lack of freedom of conscience of the Muslims, even in Europe, which 
the community shapes and influences. Bidar challenges every Muslim to think 
autonomously and to listen sincerely to his “own conscience” and to put everything under 
the liberty of every Muslim,” for  
In a “global civilization” founded on liberty, every Muslim conscience has to be 
left entirely free to choose its code of belonging to the Islamic culture. What the 
Book forbids or prescribes are but possible prohibitions and obligations. It is up to 
every man to decide what to do with these possibilities the Quran offers. The Text 
proposes, man disposes.
881
 
Bidar calls for an Islam of conviction, adopted consciously, willingly, and not 
submissively. “Personal responsibility” is stressed. Every individual has the right to take 
of Islam according to one´s level of responsibility and spiritual need which “the interior 
voice” communicates, “God does not want slaves, but responsible men. Islam does not 
mean submission, but obedience: we are forced to submit, but we choose to obey.” 882 
Otherwise put,  
Spiritual responsibility of every Muslim is to find his [or her] own way, his Islam 
– which I call Self Islam, personal Islam, that means the adequate way of each to 
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attach to Islam, and to Islamic culture […] according to a principle: “take of 
Islamic obligations just what you need for your spiritual path. […] This has to 
correspond to an interior status.
883
  
“Spiritual responsibility” is the base for autonomous Self Islam. From his 
personal experience, Bidar now prays, reads Quran, and fasts just when his inner status 
requires more of spiritual exercise, but he is always in communion with Allah through the 
means of munajat, i.e. constant thinking of the divine. Whatever he does, the divine is in 
his mind, for there is no longer any separation between the sacred and the secular.
884
 He 
experiences “lived spirituality,” where the public and the private no longer count.885 It is 
here that the first signs of the existentialist approach develop. Self Islam is an approach to 
trespass Islam as submission towards Ihsan, “excellence,” which is like Aristotle’s’ arête, 
the virtue of being the best you can be, and act according to profound nature of the 
self.
886
 To realize this “profound self” individual liberty is a requisite.  
After four years of first writing the autobiography and introduction of the concept 
of Self Islam, Bidar feels that he is still misunderstood. His Self Islam and the notion of 
liberty he annexes to it seem to have received a lot of criticism, especially from some 
conservative Muslims. Here, Bidar says that liberty is still understood by Muslims as a 
rebellion against God, which is not what he intends. He is critical of the submissive 
mindset, “it is easy to obey without questions.”887 So, in Islam without Submission (2008) 
he clarifies his concept. Self Islam is defined then as the adhesion of the individual to the 
fundamental principle of personal liberty of thought and the conscience, for the self and 
the others. More interestingly, it is an “Islamic existentialism” (un “existentialisme 
musulman,” come foi existentialist), and not as a mere theological servitude to God or a 
“social fact” based on mores and imposed laws.888  
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For more clarity, Bidar defends his concept of Self Islam against two 
misunderstandings: a “self-service-Islam,” and an “individualist Islam.” First, Self Islam 
does not mean “un islam à la carte,” a “self-service” by which the Muslim, the self-
mouslim, enters the Quran as he enters the supermarket, taking what suits him from what 
attracts him from the divine teachings. That would mean a tragic ignorance of the 
meaning of the word “liberty,” though no liberty is free from the chances of being 
blinded or driven from what it is supposedly about. An authentic self-Islam, well-fed by 
the idea of liberty and what that stands for, signifies an “Islam of autonomy”; i.e., “to 
give to oneself (auto in Greek) one´s own law (nomos in Greek).”  Consequently, it is an 
Islam of personal responsibility centred on a double question. Firstly, it is centered on the 
question of meaning or the right form (sense ou la forme propre) that each wants to give 
to Islam to which he belongs. Secondly, it is centered on suitable means (l´utile propre), 
following the meaning the philosopher Spinoza gave to this notion in his Ethics (1677), 
by writing that “under the direction of Reason […] we have to seek the suitable means 
that is adequate.”889  
Second, Self Islam is not “an individualist Islam” by which the Muslim who 
chooses his own way of living it in isolation from the other Muslims and thus loses the 
meaning of belonging to the community (umma), for one can be one´s self without being 
individualist. Simply, belonging to the community changes, becomes more critical: one 
continues to share a common or collective identity, but it is now enriched by another 
identity, which is the condition of personal liberty, for one becomes here part of the 
community without being part of his or her own self – a key to belonging without 
alienation. Self Islam produces a new meaning of the community and Islamic culture. It 
in fact becomes more tolerant internally and externally, instead of being a monolithic 
block where everyone is like everyone else through the collective obedience to the 
religious ritual and customs. “Self Islam engenders a diversified community inside of 
which grows a culture of liberty, and not a culture of judgment and censorship.” 890 
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What Bidar is doing here is making Self Islam look both as an existentialist 
enterprise based on autonomy, and also as a spiritual responsibility based on profound 
consciousness of the nature of the self and other.  It is existentialist, and historical, and 
not merely theological and metaphysical. Bidar is trying to bring Islam back to the world, 
this world, and thus challenges its metaphysical interpretations and its tradition which 
have subjugated the Muslim without liberating him enough to live this historical life as 
the beginning and end of life, and not a mere passage to the Hereafter. Bidar is threading 
here in muddy waters, and to come out of this quagmire he moves to propose reforming 
Islamic thought, in light of modernity values of Europe. At the same time, he does not 
give in to radical secularism or to atheism. He is critical of his European heritage, too. 
Next, I present the reform agenda he has for Islam. Until now, it is still his first stage of 
intellectual development that is being introduced.  
Reforming Islam: Modernity as an Unprecedented Event of the Sacred   
I select points that are essential in this part of reform for a modern Islam, “an 
Islam of our age,” using Bidar’s phrase. The first one concerns the fertility of Europe for 
such a reform of Islam. The second one concerns the modern values of human rights 
which Bidar considers essential to live a profound Self Islam that is not only Islamic but 
universal. The third one considers the limitations European Enlightenment has reached, 
both in their secular and atheist versions, and the pathways a “new Islam” of Europe can 
contribute to this “European” tradition. I try to read Bidar in light of these three points for 
now. These three points corresponds to these three key phrases: reforming Islam, 
embracing modernity, contributing to the modern age.  
First, for the first point of reforming Islam, Bidar believes that Europe is a 
suitable soil for that process of reform for two main reasons. One, because in the Islamic 
countries progress is very slow, reform can be even slower. There, political, economic, 
social, and cultural circumstances imprison Islam in its religious [i.e. ritualist] form. It is 
then here in Europe, in the vicinity of the Muslim world, that its status can evolve, 
because individuals live in free and secular societies where the spiritual life of man is a 
personal affair – not to say “private” in the sense of keeping it home.  Two, because 
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Europe itself is an exception in the Occident, it is more accommodative to Islamic 
reform. Europe seems the only space in the world truly secular; that is, it has overcome 
religion. “It is then here, and only here, that a non-religious Islam can develop […] this 
new Islam, as if this genius of non-religious Islam has waited for the genius of Europe to 
manifest itself!”891 Reformed Islam then, in Bidar´s view, can be best expressed through 
Self Islam. His experience of Self Islam becomes a model of his version of European 
Islam. Otherwise said, as will be clearer gradually, the three terms of “new Islam,” 
“European Islam” or “Islam of Europe,” and “Self Islam” can be used interchangeably 
when speaking of Bidar´s approach. Though he hopes that the new Islam he envisages in 
Europe can be exported to the Islamic world, he also makes it clear that it could be quite 
possible that reforms of Islam in Europe and the reforms in the Islamic world take 
different paths, especially that Europe has for long already enjoyed the values he 
espouses to new Islam, i.e. modern values of human rights, “We hope that European 
Islam helps Islam in Islamic worlds. It is also possible that a division happens, between 
European Islam and other Islam.”892 Now I turn to this second point of Islam and 
modernity.  
Second, Bidar hankers for a marriage between the “lights of modernity” and the 
“lights of Islam.” He uses the expression of “light upon light,” which is a Quranic verse, 
“nour ´ala nour,” to speak of “confluence.”893 According to him, “modernity has to be 
embraced, especially its humanist values (liberty, equality, and fraternity). These are the 
supporting elements that can give to Islam means for its renaissance. There is spiritual 
light in modernity which Islam has to use. For such an enterprise, two steps are necessary 
to undertake: 1) sacrifice all that is not compatible with human rights, 2) contribute to 
solving the modern problems of man, including the “disenchantment of the world.”894 He 
argues that Muslim theologians do not want to admit that Islam and Muslims are 
gradually changing and secularizing, but religion in its traditional form is still 
“untouchable” theologically. Now that “we are all modern,” Islam and Muslims have to 
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“contribute to global civilization or perish.”895 Modernity, for Bidar, unites human 
diversity and has the potential for constructing an ideal world, a “super-civilization.”896   
Henceforth, the task of Islamic reformists is not to limit but to affirm 
theologically and philosophically what Muslim believers already do. For this radical step 
to be taken, reform has to happen at the metaphysical level, and has to be legitimated 
theologically-philosophically. The task then is to “consider modernity as an 
unprecedented moment of spirituality,” and to “make religion and modernity cooperate, 
as if they were one.” 897 It is in this perspective that Bidar locates the reform of Islam: to 
“invent a spiritual attitude which reconciles tradition and modernity” to show that the 
latter can be a space in which emerge realities that are most sacred, and not be reduced to 
an absurd and empty world.
898
 It should be remembered that already in his Self Islam 
experience he realized that all the world is sacred, so modernity is sacred, too. He 
sacralizes it. He works to smash the dichotomy of Islam vs. modernity. He puts it in plain 
terms: 
The responsibility of reformation thought is from now on clear: to give to the 
changing Muslim experiences a theological legitimation, that is, to update, amidst 
these metamorphoses, where God manifest Himself – to show God in the present. 
This way, what Muslims experience in their daily life will not be seen as 
blindness but as a veritable spiritual revolution, i.e. the emergence of a new form 
for man of being in contact with the secret of his existence. We have to help 
believers to sieze the value of the moment they live, or the value of the changes 
they bring to their intimacy with Islam. We are not here to tell them “this is good, 
this is bad,” but simply “here is the treasure in what you do.899 
Bidar is inciting Muslim reformists, as well as lay believers, to pose this rhetorical 
question: “when shall we understand that modernity is not a mere “environment” for 
Islam, but an event to be embraced wholly as a will of God himself?” More than 
embracing modernity, he is first of all asking reformists “to analyse the profound 
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meaning of modernity so as to reflect on the renovation of Islam.”900 That is, instead of 
living in a dichotomous world, Islam vs. modernity, Muslims now have to live with 
modernity, and see what is and where is the sacred in it, if not all of it is already sacred 
and has to be accepted as such. Explicitly, by studying modernity, by embracing 
modernity as a sacred and spiritual event, and part of the divine will, Bidar is urging for 
questioning every fundamental piece of Islam, without exception, “It has to be accepted 
now that critical questioning penetrates to the heart of Islam, and obliges it to redefines 
even its most essential aspects.”901  
 To rethink Islam in modernity is to reform it in light of its values. Three of them 
appear decisive for Bidar: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Sometimes he refers to 
fraternity as tolerance or dialogue. In light of them he proposes “new fundamentals of 
Islam”: the affirmation of liberty of spiritual choice among all its practices and beliefs, 
strict equality of all these choices, and the making of a community that embraces their 
difference. For Bidar, these values are not only social values, but sacred ones as well. 
“Beyond their moral and political application, already considerable, they also redefine 
totally the relationship between man and God. With them, spiritual destiny of humanity 
leans towards a new era.”902 Because “only the sacred can change the sacred,”903 
modernity has to be thought of as such. The same applies to the “new” era that awaits 
birth. Below are the three main values of modernity in light of the sacred interpretations 
he gives them.  
The principle of spiritual liberty. The place of the individual is pivotal in the 
approach of Bidar. Later I will speak of the individual as the heir of God, but here I will 
be brief, to serve the current point. The individual is central in the divine text of the 
Quran, but always has a subordinate position of the submissive “slave/ ´abd” of God. 
With modernity, the individual is at the center of the world, the subject, the master, and 
not the slave. In classical theology, the individual has to follow rules and abide by what 
religious authorities interpret. At present, the Quran has to be put in the hands of every 
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Muslim. God is with man anywhere and everywhere. This also means that every 
individual´s spirituality corresponds to the essence and multiple presence of God. If the 
world is sacred, then whatever level of spirituality one confesses is accepted as a 
presence of God in that level of spirituality. “The individual liberty of man is the wish of 
God himself.”904   
But liberty has to be based on reason and thinking. Before speaking of the three 
conditions of this liberty, it is important to understand what Bidar means by reason. Bidar 
is against the Ash´arite dominant tradition in Islamic theology which uses reason just to 
justify the divine rule and existence, without going up to the level of questioning it or 
challenging it, or overcoming its metaphysical heritage. He considers this the “original 
sin of Islamic thought.” He says: 
In Islamic civilization, human reason has never been defined as “critical faculty,” 
“instrument of debate and questioning.” Far from being so, it has remained in the 
service of Revelation, that is, in charge of only commenting it instead of 
contesting it […], philosophy in the service of theology […], human reason has 
remained in this frame. It is still under the tutelage of Revelation: it explains the 
Quran, seeks interpretations, but does not critique it. It is out of question that it 
approaches the revealed text on equal footing. Here lies the original sin of Islamic 
thought, which has condemned it to repetition and stagnation.
905
 
Bidar also accuses the Muʻtazila, considered the most rationalist in Islamic intellectual 
thought, with the same way of considering reason in the service of the divine, “We find 
similar affirmations strictly illogic with Mu´tazila who consider that man can and has to 
be considered responsible for his acts and at the same time submissive to God.”906 He 
claims to go beyond this perception of reason and liberty of conscience. He traces three 
certain conditions for that.  
 Three conditions are necessary for the maturity of liberty: authenticity of choice, 
sense of responsibility, and dialogue. Authenticity of choice, condition one, means that 
revelation does not have to be left irresponsibly to inacceptable ideas that cater for the 
whims of some individuals. “Free usage of Quran does not mean giving permission to all 
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kinds of instincts.” There are strict limits to impose on personal choice; there is “no Islam 
outside the Quran.” Authenticity to revelation has to be guaranteed. For instance, one 
cannot recite Taoist text instead of Quran while praying.
907
 This condition is imperative.  
The sense of responsibility, condition two, means that “each individual has to 
determine his Islam according to his proper spiritual needs.”908 Even when one opts for 
an “educated choice,” it still has to be constantly re-examined, according to needs. 
Authenticity of choice makes one responsible of what he chooses and thus in constant 
questioning, improvement and modification. “Behave always spiritually to the extent that 
your choice of practice becomes motivated exclusively by your desire for the supreme 
presence [of God].”909 Intimacy with the Infinite, munajat al-huwa, is essential for 
spiritual energy. At this level, religious laws can be kept but their application are up to 
the individual. Sharia becomes “interiorized” as “personal law.”910 Even ´ibadat rituals 
are negotiable, “hierarchy of the principles of Islam [i.e. ‘ibādāt] have to become strictly 
a private affair.”911 This condition is imperative, too.  
Dialogue, condition three, means that one can join the community of believers for 
spiritual comparisons and revisions. “It would be illusory to think that the believer alone 
can have the faculty to find his own Islam.”912 Dialogue and debate with others is a kind 
of consultation (shūrā) about one´s choices. The community is an instrument of spiritual 
discrimination [i.e. differentiation] which helps one form his own choices. Community 
life is helpful to face individualism, learn pluralism, and avoid communitarism (in its 
French meaning of ghettoization and sectarianism). Difference helps to find the self, and 
integrate consciously in the global society.
913
 This condition is not imperative. One is not 
obliged to speak about one´s spirituality to others.  
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The principle of equality. There is no clergy in Islam, but historically it has 
developed one through classical interpretations that have been elevated to the clergy 
status. The clergy (imams, for example) does not have to be abolished, but its place has to 
be redefined; it role has to be that of consultation only. Women equality with man has to 
be theologically admitted; the same applies for non-Muslims. Verses against non-
Muslims for instance have to be abrogated. Equality has to be regained. The variety of 
ways people live are multiple faces of spirituality and God.
914
  
The principle of fraternity. Fraternity and love grow out of this dialogue among 
the community of believers to measure one´s spirituality and open it up to global society. 
Here also grows the idea of difference and pluralism, and respect for global society.
915
 In 
the new conception of God and the sacred, everyone has to search “for the sacred in the 
variety of the world,” for “God has metamorphosed in each of us.”916  
 In sum, it remains Islamic any individual attempt that desires to remain in touch 
with the Absolute, and that makes liberty engulfed with spirituality. Bidar calls it the 
“desire principle,” namely the desire to be in constant communion with Allah through 
spiritual behavior. It is also Islamic that path which exhausts all possible Islamic beliefs 
and rituals, and remains guided by the Quran; this is referred to as the “limits” principle, 
since it keeps the basic text of the Quran as its guide; any path taken in this direction (like 
choosing some rituals over others) are still equal. It is also Islamic the path that keeps in 
dialogue with the other believers (and global society); this is referred to as the “support” 
or “fraternity” principle. What this means, from Bidar´s Islamic perspective, is that 
“modernity […] shifts the place of the sacred,” for “God has joined us [on earth], which 
makes of this “the major and profound event of our civilization.”917 Modernity is a 
“purifying acid” (Acide purificateur) of religions and obscurantisms. Even Sufism is 
classic and has to modernize.
918
 
Having dealt with the point of reforming Islam and embracing modernity human 
rights values, the third point is about the contributing to the modern age that Islam can 
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offer. Bidar wonders whether Islam of Enlightenment is the way out and answers his 
wonderment in the negative, for Enlightenment ideals have to be revisited, reinvented, 
too, for a new discourse on man. The lights of Enlightenment are switched off; Islam 
should not depend on them to reform itself.
919
 The humanism of Enlightenment has let 
loose the dignity of man, and that has to be rebuilt again. It has fallen into absurdity, 
nihilism, and abstraction. For Bidar, the West has missed overcoming religion without 
sacrificing God. With such a closure of the infinite horizons of the divine, the modern 
man has found himself without any hope vis-à-vis his finitude, without a discourse on the 
sense of life and death. There is “a massive loss of hope in the transcendence of human 
life, and the overcoming of our finitude.”920 Humanism has built itself on a moving and 
uncertain spirit, the individual; it has witnessed just depression, despair, and void in its 
exhaustion of human energies. The tragedy of morality is that it does no longer 
communicate with the heart, and does no longer explain why the human being is worthy 
of respect. It lacks a dimension superior to moral education.
921
 The new man, after having 
inherited God´s infinity and eternity, will not fill in this void, since its energy is that of 
the immortal. The way out is to sacralize man: 
Islam can thus lead Europe to give birth to what in my view is the key to the 
future: the experience of our human liberty, always more vast, the exploration of 
our possibilities of life, always more multiple and diverse, which link us to the 
Great Life [i.e. Allah] and the entire universe.  Seeing this link between man and 
the universe, celebrating this unity of Life, giving extremely profound and 
enthusiastic meaning to most of our prior actual morals, preserving life, 
recognizing difference, protecting nature, etc., for now, we do not know 
sufficiently on what basis we cling to these principles, what makes their value, 
their grandeur. On what to found our morals? It is here that Islam can inspire us, 
and help us find this profundity. Why offering to life new spaces and new 
territories? Why working so that the world be always multiple?
922
  
By the sacralization of man and the universe Bidar is not for the resurgence of religion in 
its classical way. He works out a reconciliation between man and God without the former 
feeling submissive, slave to the latter. Rather, it is a “new era” in which man becomes the 
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“heir of God,” and with that label, man gains also the divine attributes of infinity and 
immortality which modernity as narrowly understood has so far deprived him of. This is 
the contribution of Islam Bidar speaks of. It renews existentialism, and overcomes both 
religion and atheism – while considering radical secularism within the premises of 
atheism. In his reading, Islam seems a “religion for overcoming religion.”923 It is on this 
contribution that the next stage builds to elaborate on the notion of Islamic existentialism 
and theory of inheritance of the divine infinity and immortality.  
The Future Man as an Heir of God: for Quranic Ethics and Rational 
Spirituality  
It may still be unclear how Bidar treats the sacred Book of Islam, the Quran, and 
the personality of the Prophet Muhammad, after having introduced his approach of Self 
Islam and its espousing of modern values. Muslims may not listen to his “intellectuality” 
if they do not hear how he treats their most sacred text, and their most exemplary figure 
the Prophet, especially that he addresses them, addresses Islamic intellectual history and 
how Islam can be lived in modernity and the future. In light of what has been said up to 
now it should be clear that Bidar aims at putting most, if not all, of Islamic tradition, i.e. 
the various interpretations developed over the centuries, into a file of archive, which the 
modern Muslim can learn from but without it being central in such a decision. It was 
made clear enough that he challenges all jurisprudential and legalist interpretations in 
light of modern human rights values. It was also made clear in a passage where he attacks 
the “most rational” school of thought in Islamic history, i.e. the Mu´tazila, for he 
considers them to have put the divine above reason, while his approach goes beyond that, 
as he claims and as will be clarified below. More than that, he also criticized the 
limitations of Sufism which privatizes Islam, does not speak of the infinity of man, does 
not challenge the external world nor gets involved in it, and thus remains wrapped up in 
its metaphysical world and avoids the historical one. So, against some reformsits who see 
in Mu´tazila and Sufism pathways of reforming Islam, Bidar tries to go beyond them. 
Besides that, he does not stop at modernity either. He criticizes its fading Enlightenment 
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ideals, its impoverishment of man and his dignity, and the absence of the substance on 
which morality stands. Atheism that limits the energy of man and leads him to depression 
is not the way Bidar wants to pursue either. So, what is he claiming? What is he leading 
to? How does he treat the Islamic basic sources (the Quran and the Prophetic tradition)?  
Bidar, in brief, is looking for a theological legitimation of Self Islam. He argues 
for that theologically-philosophically. Bidar is looking for an existentialist reading of the 
Quran without a metaphysical rebellion. At the end he launches the metaphysical 
rebellion, but without assassinating God. The immortality theory he ultimately speaks of 
is a metaphysical rebellion. He creates a peaceful Islamic Prometheus who rebels against 
God. The “Muslim Prometheus,” to use the name, politely asks Him to allow him the 
torch without fighting for it, or stealing it, and thus avoids going into an eternal discord 
between man and God. This rebellion is also non-Satanic. The Muslim Prometheus does 
not defy God. He just claims that he has now realized what he missed to realize: to act as 
a fully free individual that recognizes the divine source of humanity but still enriches 
himself by the divine attributes of infinity and immortality.   
The Quran as an “instrument of liberation” 
Bidar contends that “only the sacred can change the sacred.”924 I start from a note 
he makes by the end of Islam without Submission. He states that, possibly coincidently, 
after its collection as Musḥaf/ Sacred Book during the reign of the third Caliph, the Quran 
starts cosmologically and ends anthropologically. The first verse of al-Fatiha (The 
Beginning) praises the Lord and His Lordship over the universe. The last verse of An-
nass (The People) concerns the nature of human beings. He argues that even the sacred 
has not been understood by Muslims, and it had to wait Western modernity to rekindle it 
by centralizing man. Though God has been very much studied, He has remained a God, 
far from man, in most classical exegeses. Bidar believes that this means that the sacred 
has not finished with its circle of teaching man yet. Only when there is no distance 
between man and God could the sacred be understood. Not all the universe, including 
man, has been sacralized, and that is where his approach lies. Thus, for him, the Quran is 
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a modern anthropological text to study man and free him from the finitude, and fear of 
life and death. It is “an instrument of liberation of ultimate possibilities of human nature,” 
“an instrument which teaches man that it is created to be infinite, and to be gradually an 
exceptional being in a universe where the power of being and doing will not stop from 
increasing, to the point in which it cannot be threatened even by death.”925 Bidar´s 
enterprise is ““searching for possible foundations of a new Islamic anthropology.” For 
him, “this is a Quranic proposition for a new meaning of man, a new meaning of human 
liberty, which still has to be clarified and lived, and which I would like to characterize 
with a formula that would come up often: man, the heir of God.”926 
Bidar symbolically considers the Quran as an “umbilical matrix.” What Does that 
mean? He speaks of four main matrixes (plus one) in the Quran which man has to be 
conscious of for self-realization. The first matrix is that of God, “the Great Life.” He is 
the Creator and Merciful who sacrificed His infinity and attributes to man. He created 
man in the best shape, made him a unique creature among others, and gave him Earth to 
live in and rule. God has elevated man, and preferred him to angels, and that is why Satan 
refused to kneel to Adam, when all angels accepted to. Bidar also refers to Ibn Arabi´s 
image that man was created as a powerful small dot, like the letter “n”  in Arabic (“noun” 
ن): God carried man in His matrix, his womb, in Heaven till He made him perfect and 
able to govern earth, then sent him down. God is given a female role, the Merciful 
(Rahim ميحر), as mother would be to her son. God gave birth to man only when the latter 
was ready, able to grow up and be independent, exactly as the mother would do with her 
embryo: she gives birth to it only when it is ready to come to life, to grow up gradually 
independently. A mother loves her baby, and so does God. For this reason of care and 
love, the son is not supposed to be ungrateful to the mother, and the same applies to man 
towards the Creator. Bidar calls this “eternal gratitude” that shapes a good relation 
between man and God. (I say more of this in the section when I speak of man as the heir 
of God.)   
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The second matrix found in the Quran is Creation. After having been given 
infinite energies in the matrix of God, the Universal matrix, with all Creation in it, is 
another space where man is allowed to fulfill his nourishment from this Creation, which 
is also sacred. The previous interpretation of the universe and modernity as events of 
spirituality and spaces of sacredness go along this line of interpretation of Creation as 
another matrix for human maturity, nourishment, and action.  
The third matrix is that of the Prophet Muhammad. On the personal level, as 
narrated in Self Islam, “the intuition and message of Mohammed saved me [Bidar] from 
falling”927 when lost with conflicting worldviews in France. On the theological level, for 
Bidar, Mohammad is the symbol of man who brings a message and lives it responsibly; 
hr contemplates it and works for it so that man realizes his ultimate being capacities. By 
extrapolation, “Whoever enters this Life and contemplates it “is a New Mohammed,” “un 
mohammed,” that is a lover of life and a creator of life, because Muhammad is in fact the 
name of a particular view of the world, a way of living in the universe.”928 Each new 
form of him and his life is part of the multiplicity and diversity of the universe. Sent by 
the Merciful, Muhammad is a matrix of mercy for humanity. For Bidar, Muhammad´s 
life symbolizes “divine individuality,” and “divinity of the prophet is his humanity.” He 
had no other mundane perfection to envisage (power or charisma for instance), for the 
least of his aspirations are for God. Everything of him is permanent prayers, silent and 
invisible: to stand up, to sit down, to drink, to eat, to like, to greet. “In this sense, 
Mohammad is the first kind of men of a new era, which civilization enters into now 
wholly. Time has come in which Muhammad will be the name of all men.”929  
The fourth matrix found in the Quran is the Quran itself. In Bidar´s perspective, 
the Quran is the umbilical cord of the divine matrix; it is the link between God and man. 
It is thanks to it that man can access the divine function of the matrix and know about his 
sovereignty. The function of the Quran here is to make man realize God and all that 
comes through Him: Creation, Messengers, and divine Books are nourishments that feed 
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man in his gestation and increase gradually the infinity of his nature. “It is the mediation 
through which we can feed ourselves of the substance of God;” “The central call of the 
Quran is then to prepare us to the infinity.”930  
To reach the level of God´s infinity which He has given to man through the 
Quranic message, the individual has to have the attributes of God´s infinity. What the 
Quran contains then are ethics that humans need to develop and evolve. “The Quran 
seems to me a Book for our time.” It is a book of reflection and meditation, a “book of 
the future.” 931 Quranic ethics affects the psychology, and impacts the ethical evolution of 
the believer: 
The Quran is a text of spiritual pedagogy which makes of the complete realization 
of our nature a question of responsibility, personal and collective. Succeeding to 
God is not carried out automatically. The more we evolve, the more consciously 
we have to direct this evolution. We do not inherit unless we make of this 
inheritance our aim the most conscious.
932
  
In his call for a “dynamic anthropology” of man, Bidar finds that the Quran announces 
the progressive substance of an “infinite human being liberated from his limitations,” and 
“communicates a description of the man of tomorrow,” man as an incomplete being, in 
the process of “evolution” and “becoming.” It is a book of direction (houdan), and 
discernment of objectives (fourqan).  
There is another image Bidar constructs of the Quran, besides the image of ethics 
and guidance for humanity since it speaks constantly of the future man of high attributes. 
This other picture is that of chaos. Modern chaos is reflected in the illogical order of the 
Quran. He does not develop much this point, and he cannot, seeing that the Quran has 
been studied for centuries the way it has been compiled by the Caliph Othman. Yet, 
symbolically, he correlates modern disorder with the disorder of Quran, i.e. Quran´s lack 
of a logical order that may be found in a scientific text. The idea behind this symbolism is 
to give confidence in modernity and human civilization. It also serves the idea of 
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diversity advanced in this new perception of “new Islam,” “new man,” and “new 
anthropology of man,” which Bidar is advancing. “To clarify the contemporary world 
disorder we have to reflect on the model of disorder the Quran offers.” “Chaos principle 
in Quran” offers a “sacred model” that “can help us relativize the image we have of 
ourselves, and not fear the dispersion of lives nor their non-achievability.”933 This way, 
absurdity, nihilism, and “derealization” of the world, as pioneered by Nietzshe, Freud, 
Marx, Kafka, Camus, and Heidegger, do not become worrisome. This perception of 
Bidar, again, falls within his sacralization of modernity and all its achievements, even the 
worrying achievements. It is a discourse of hope and optimism from his side to show that 
the infinity of man can always mend disenchantment and nihilism man encounters. “The 
Quran here looks more modern.”934 It gives infinite energy to man through hope and the 
invitation to action and creativity.  
The fifth, and last, matrix communicated through the Quran is that of the oumma 
(umma), or community of believers. Here, also, Bidar infers the feminine aspect of it, 
from the Arabic word “Oum,” mother, to speak of the passion, love, and mercy that 
should surround it. Though the oumma may concern just the believers, its communication 
with Creation and the world is part of the sacred; its difference as a community of 
believers should equally recognize the difference of the others. In light of the previous 
principles of modernity (liberty, equality, and fraternity), dialogue and tolerance are 
imperatives in the new world, and the community has no right of pressure over the 
individual or non-believers. Self Islam and modernity values of human rights are very 
against that – as seen earlier.  
All in all, these five matrixes stem from the first one, God´s matrix. The other 
matrixes are nourishments of the same man that was first created in the matrix of God. As 
man grows up, he is supposed to show “eternal gratitude” to this matrix, simply by being 
consistent in realizing his infinite energies that correspond to the energies of the 
Father/Mother. Bidar at a certain point says that God could be both male and female. Out 
of these matrixes grows what Bidar calls the “heir of God,” the Caliph, the future man.  
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b. Islamic Existentialism: the Heir of God and the Immortality of Man    
 Bidar aims at the “sacralization of man.”935 He puts man (back) to the central 
stage of the world as the heir/ Caliph of God. His idea of God is that of love and mercy. 
Such a God is not “narcissist” and does not enjoy enslaving man. He created man to be 
free. It is the Muslim mind that has been imprisoned in an “ethos of theological 
slavery.”936 “The central Quranic proposition in my [Bidar] study is this one: “I will 
establish a Caliph on earth” (inni ja´ilun fi al-ardi khalifatan).937 This will be argued for 
through what Bidar calls “anthropocentric humanism,” unlike theocentric humanism that 
individualizes God, which exalts man and his own faculties, through the philosophy of 
subjectivity whereby man is seen as sovereign.
938
  
 Bidar goes through classical interpretations of the term “Caliph” as appeared in 
the Quran. Briefly, and as a way of exemplification, in reputed interpretations (tafsīrs) 
like those of al-Tabari (d. 923 CE), al-Razi (d. 925), al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), al-Qurtubi 
(d. 1273), and Ibn Khatir (d. 1373), the meaning of man as a Caliph is compared to other 
creatures and thus his elevation is realized. Or, the term is interpreted as succession of 
man, generation after generation, and thus the continuity of the human species. Ibn 
Taymiya (d. 1328) is reported to have argued that God cannot have a successor; man 
assumes the presence of God on earth, a God of earth. Ibn Arabi (d. 1240) divinizes 
human´s soul through the mirror metaphor: God wants to manifest His own essence to 
portray His mystery to Himself. Thus, the concept of the “perfect man” or “universal 
man” is awake and dynamic to realize this supreme spiritual destination which is the 
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infinity of God; the ultimate thing the Caliph achieves is high divine knowledge. This has 
been the Sufis path, too. The Mu´tazilla, according to Bidar, also do not go beyond the 
interpretation of reason as a free means to reach the divine. In some modern 
interpretations like those of al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Abduh (d. 1905), and Qutb (d. 1965), 
the Caliph(-ate) is interpreted as the ability of man to domesticate civilization with 
reason, with the permission of God. Man has no moral power, which God has already 
decreed, but the authority to execute only. In all these views, Bidar argues, man remains 
subordinate to God; he is a Caliph only in as much as he can use reason to realize the 
divine and execute His divine orders.
939
 In this sense, the Caliph is always behind God, 
subordinate, “inferior ontologically.” Bidar moves from these lines of interpretations, 
which he considers to have limited ontologically the freedom and autonomy of man on 
earth.  
 Bidar, in line with the contemporary scholar Wadad al-Qadi, adopts the 
interpretation of Khalafa that means “definitive succession” of God. It also corresponds 
to Jean Grosjean´s translation of the Quranic term “Caliph/Khaliph” as “heir,” heir of 
God on earth. This denotes a move from spacial to temporal khilafa/ succession/ 
inheritance. This adopted view is a radical move among the contemporary interpretations 
of the concept of Khilafa. The spacial interpretation is static or synchronic, because it 
occurs at a specific point in time, and by implication freezes movement and change or 
independence and dynamism of the human agent. The temporal interpretation, however, 
is dynamic or diachronic since it denotes the status of change with time; it makes the 
process of “becoming,” as interpreted from the Quran.940 This new interpretation of 
inheritance and perpetual change that accompanies it stands for the fact that man´s 
agency is active and evolutionary, and on the move. It speaks of autonomy and ability of 
the act of doing. In Bidar´s words, the interpretation of man, the Caliph, as an heir to God 
is a “true theological seism.”941 It actually is. More precisely, what does this inheritance 
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imply? Does it mean the incarnation of God in man as is the case with Christianity? Or, 
does it mean the death of God? For Bidar, it means none of these.  
 Following this “theological seism,” man´s inheritance is God´s sacrifice. It is an 
act willed by God. It is ontologically present. The previous five matrixes have to be 
remembered here (God, Creation, Quran, Muhammad, and Oumma). Mostly, the dynamic 
nature of Creation, as narrated in the Quran justifies it: man is first created, then made 
perfect; the soul of God is whispered to him afterwards (“fa lam-ma khalaqtuhu wa 
sawwaytuhu fa nafakhtu fihi min rūḥu ”), and ultimately he is made respected and 
dignified through the prostration of angels to Adam in a historical and ontological scene 
whereby man is taught names (divine knowledge) and made descend to earth as an heir to 
rule.
942
 Not recognizing this major event means that humans are afraid of being left alone 
on earth. They do not want to take benefit of God´s gifts. At some points, as was hinted at 
earlier, Bidar says that this interpretation needed time to mature, it needed man to reach 
maturity and realize his liberty. The modern age offers this, so it is now high time to 
welcome the interpretation of inheritance. More importantly, God did not leave man 
alone; He equipped him with what he would always need, and then left him to his 
choices: “The God that has left us is a God that has left us everything.”943  
Prophecies and Books like the Quran are what He left for humanity for guidance, al-
hudda. Like the contemporary reformist Muhamamd Khalaf Allah (d. 1988) who believes 
that  the end of revelation gives reign to reason, and Abdelmajid Charfi (b. 1942) who 
believes that the  end of revelation is the beginning of man´s liberation, responsibility, 
and solidarity, Bidar, too, believes that inheritance interpretation “is not about total 
divorce with the sacred.” Rather, “it is about entering a new age of reasoning, ““a new 
form of sacralization of the existence of the world,” and this enterprise has to be pursued 
with extreme prudence, grande prudence.
944
 In a long passage he speaks of what God has 
left for humanity before sealing prophecies: 
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Prophecy has been sealed, but it has left behind it a new man. God has gone, but in 
conformity with His mercy, He communicated to humanity the attributes of 
sovereignty on the world. The idea of succession then allows, henceforth, to 
recognize that God who closes revelation does not content Himself with leaving and 
being silent. He does not let man to his finite condition, to his weakness and the 
misery of his created nature […]. He endows us with His gift of infinity so that we 
can achieve in the world the same function as He would have done Himself before, 
and with the same power and efficiency. From this point of view, the closure of 
revelation corresponds in reality to the expression of God´s sacrifice […]. His 
withdrawal from the world is his most elevated expression of His love to us[…]. 
Certainly God has withdrawn, proclaimed He would not speak to us again, and left us 
alone in this vast universe, but before He left He had taken care to harmonize us with 
this world, to infinitize us  in front of the indefinite grandeur of space and time.
945
  
With such an inheritance, there should be “no fear of the cosmos now.” The classical 
perfect man depends on God for his qualities – because of his inferior position. His 
position remains theoretical, metaphysical, and not historical. Bidar is proposing the 
historicization of this inheritance, “the paradigm of heir of God is historical.”946 This is 
where the shift in theology occurs: the move from metaphysics to history. Man as a 
Caliph, an heir is not only theoretical, abstract, by which the individual can always feel 
that God is far and has to work to attain Him or be close to Him, as would do the Sufis. 
The move now is to break away from this perception of God as residing in Heaven and 
man is working for Him on earth. Man is an heir, and is independent. God created Him 
and liberated him to live and rule earth. Earth and the universes man can reach are for 
man. The universe is sacred as Heaven is, so the idea of God is even closer than in used 
to be in classical interpretations.  
 The universe is a jannat (paradise), a garden of God, and man is its gardener. The 
question then is: are there limits in gardening this jannat? Grande prudence, big 
responsibility, and eternal gratitude are some of the terms Bidar uses to speak of the 
ethics that should govern man´s governance and inheritance of earth. Prophecies and 
Books like the Quran contain what God have left us when He passed on power to us. If 
they are well understood, man can reign with “no fear,” as Bidar says. To master this 
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inheritance in this “new state of nature” ethics are needed. “Spiritual maturity is needed.” 
“A new ethical responsibility awaits us […] to construct a spiritual republic without 
frontiers.”947 “Spiritual maturity” will open up “new spaces […] which we don’t master 
yet.” Through it man will learn to share, master, and render creative the energies he has 
yet to discover in light of the Great Life [Allah].
948
 Islam targets a “cosmic city,” a 
“spiritual republic” in this world; it is historical not metaphysical, and sovereignty 
implied by the notion of the Caliph will have essentially an “ethical-spiritual force.”949 If 
Bidar says that in this interpretation of inheritance of the universe, God is not killed, what 
could one understand from this? What about Afterlife and the Day of Judgment which are 
essential parts of faith in the Islamic creed? Will man still need God for Afterlife or not at 
all? After having sacralized man Bidar moves to immortalize him.  
 Having developed the idea of inheritance, Bidar then brings about his first 
concept of Self Islam as its perceivable image, where the individual is centralized. This 
individuality is ethically and spiritually regulated, to achieve its infinite energy, through 
the conditions of liberty, equality and fraternity, as previously seen. This means that the 
inheritance of earth is not arbitrary, and not everyone can access it and enjoy its infinity. 
Only those who exert themselves, following the previous descriptions, can understand 
what inheritance and consequently immortality mean. This brief recapitulation is needed 
to connect the previous thoughts with the coming one: immortality.  
The approach is historical, so there is no fear of metaphysics. “No worries about 
the interminable quest after truth, the absolute, since the absolute is in us. No fear of 
death.”950 If one has internalized the concept of God, and has lived according to its 
attributes, there is then no need to fear death. Bidar does not refute his belief in the 
Judgement Day. Instead, he considers it a metaphor, an allegory. He does not interpret it 
as a physical apocalypse, but as a “spiritual metamorphosis” that is unprecedented in 
human history. Traditionally, there is no escape from the Day of Judgment. One 
encounters God. One returns to Him. But now that he proposes a historical interpretation 
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of life and death in light of the Quranic orientation, he believes that this encounter of God 
happens already here, in this historical life. This encounter is not far any longer. This is 
the “end of time,” for time is not in space but in intimacy with God which Self Islam 
teaches. The Testimony (Shahaha) that testifies to the presence of God in the present 
makes the encounter already transpire here and now. “Presence entails an eternal 
present.”  This changes the meaning of time, life, and death. “The immediate proximity 
with Allah transforms the present into presence. Horizons [of the physical and 
metaphysical] become closer. Life is no longer that interminable trajectory.”951 If God is 
the light of heavens and earth, then existence is one; life is one.
952
  
So, “what can immortalize man?” Bidar invokes Quranic verses that speak of 
individual responsibility. Two types of actions can immortalize man: piety, or taqwa, and 
good deeds.  He invokes two Kantian questions: 1) “what shall I do with my life?” He 
provides the Quranic answer: act good, and the payoff is immortality; 2) “what am I 
allowed to hope for?” the hope he found described in the Quran is escaping death, for a 
life devoted to love develops human energy for eternity.
953
 He also invokes Mohammed 
Iqbal who believes that man´s effort is the answer to immortality.  Action of the ego 
either immortalizes it or dissolves it. By good acts one liberates himself from death, 
“[D]eath has nothing against anyone who has gone to the sources of life.”954 For Bidar, 
“terrestrial immortality” is a “rational theory of immortality.”955 Bidar goes so far as to 
say that possibly in the future there will be no death and resurrection. He gives the 
example of Jesus Christ. Jesus didn’t need to die to live eternally. Jesus is the symbol of 
future death of the future humanity. He is the first symbol of this kind of death and 
immortality because of his devotion to the good. Life and death become equal since piety 
good action make one see no difference between the physical and metaphysical. In the 
Quran, for Bidar, Jesus is given a better picture. He is not God. He is not crucified. He is 
the “perfect man” who is elevated to sit close to God as His “equal” since he lived 
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according to His attributes.
956
 Bidar also refers to Moses as the speaker of the word of 
God, and God´s friendship/Alliance with Moses and Aaron, and to Muhammad´s 
Nocturnal Journey to Heaven where he sees Gabriel and the Light of God. These are 
examples of elevation of man that comes through piety and good act. These prophets are 
examples of the “perfect man” that comes with dedication and practice to express an 
“ontological bond” with the divine.957 
 Should man be happy with this inheritance or should he consider it as a tragedy 
whereby God has left man alone on earth to face despair, finitude, abstraction and 
nihilism? Bidar argues that Self Islam and the theory of immortality that it ends with are 
manifestations of a “new existentialism,” “a radically new ontological situation in which 
man makes himself, constructs himself, without the aid or predestination of God, and 
with an infinite energy of action and in the horizon of immortality.”958 Moreover, God is 
neither killed nor rejected, but embraced as an evolutionary presence that man deals with 
in this wholly sacred universe. God is no longer far, but is present in the presence, a 
conception which sacralizes everything and makes man a responsible agent that has to 
show his eternal gratitude to the inheritance and infinity he has received from the Great 
Life. All in all, this theory, argues Bidar, overcomes traditional religions, spiritualities, as 
well as atheism. The “new Adam” (i.e. the future spiritually responsible man) is driven 
by “ethical-spiritual force” generated constantly from remembrance of God. I quote him 
in length below, as a way of reiterating these notes in his own words: 
With the Islamic idea of inheritance emerges a competitive model that may 
initiate a movement of overcoming religion that is not tragic but euphoric, for it 
does not constraint us into rupture with God […].959   
The way is also opening up for the overcoming of atheism as well. A-theism, a 
life without God. Our life as heirs will be in a way also a life without God, but not 
in the sense of negating the existence of God, as atheism implies. The heir 
certainly does no longer return to God because he has from now understood that 
in him resides all the needed spiritual power. Yet, at the same time, he remembers 
God and does not forget what that means. Far from denying Him, he vows to Him 
eternal gratitude […]; he evokes and invokes the great emotion this Being has 
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allowed him to acquire cosmic consciousness, his being, and all his powers, this 
Being from which he has received supreme adequate dignity, and which has been 
his old matrix. For a humanity that is grateful to Him for having passed on to it 
His infinity, God does not die, nor is He rejected or killed. His name has to 
become the object of a new cult which is that of remembrance and gratitude – 
God as an object of responsibility and memory.
960
  
This means that man who has become infinite and immortal as an heir to God can be 
neither a believer in the old sense (hoping for something that would never come) nor an 
atheist in the old sense (refusing the idea that human life can trespass finitude), for all 
those who believe in Heaven will find it on earth, and those who do not believe in it will 
also find it on earth. 
 Bidar´s quest for God ends in finding the Self, the natural or original Self that can, 
through its infinite energies, realize the “ultimate ego” –which is an Iqbalian term- where 
the physical and the metaphysical are united. Muhammad Iqbal has been behind the 
scenes in Bidar´s books and approach. A reader of Iqbal would find him [Iqbal] in Bidar. 
There is no wonder about that, since he read Iqbal when young and also later as a 
philosopher. In his seminal work of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
(1934), and in his seventh lecture entitled “Is Religion possible,” Iqbal speaks of three 
stages of religious life: Faith, Thought, and Discovery. Faith is the first stage of religions 
in which they develop spiritual discipline to approach God. Thought is the stage of 
rationalization of religion to understand the sources of its authority; here, it also seeks its 
foundations via metaphysics. In the third stage of Discovery,  
metaphysics is displaced by psychology, and religious life develops the ambition 
to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. It is here that religion 
becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual 
achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of law, but by 
discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own 
consciousness.
961
  
Discovery of the ultimate source of religious life (and law) depends on the endeavor of 
going into the ultimate horizons of freedom of the conscious. Bidar seems to have tried to 
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theorize and expand on this idea of discovery Iqbal spoke of in the 1930s. Iqbal was well 
immersed in both Islamic and Western philosophy. He was very critical of both 
traditional religiosity and modernity. He prophesied the return of religion not in its old 
forms but mainly in new forms, guided by spiritual ethics. Bidar has taken a lot from him 
and has expanded that in his own way. His L’islam face à la mort de dieu: l’actualité de 
Mohammed Iqbal (Islam Facing the Death of God: Mohammed Iqbal Revisited, 2010) 
illustrates my point.
962
 His latest work, Comment sortir de la religion (How to Overcome 
Religion, 2012) develops the idea of “discovery” in his version of “overcoming religion.” 
I below introduce the gist of this third stage of Bidar’s intellectual development. 
c. Overcoming Religion: the Highest Stage of Self Islam   
How to Overcome Religion can be classified as a breakthrough project that 
bridges the classical dichotomy between the divine and the sacred, which characterizes in 
particular the modern West, and which Islamic thought has not been immune from. Bidar 
says that his work is the outcome of his hybrid culture (Western and Islamic).
963
 The 
thesis of the book is that the ultimate aim of overcoming religion is to “recreate” the 
world through infinite human energy (toute-puissance humane) that stems from the 
responsibly infinite power of the model of God Who does not need to be killed to be 
overcome, “the aim is not the death of God but the second rebirth of man, a rebirth away 
from a conditioned and finite state that corresponds to his primitive status.”964  
The book’s thesis is defended on the basis of two ideas which make two parts of 
the book. The first idea is to “disoccidentalize” the project of overcoming religion.965 
Bidar argues in length that the Western project of “substituting religion” with secular or 
atheist ideas, and of “killing God” have not been humanist enough. Rather, such attempts 
have brought about new profane gods, like nationalism and capitalism.
966
 Two main 
reasons are behind the failure of the West in banishing the divine from sight and from the 
world: the first one is that the West is victim of the “Prometheus syndrome,” i.e. man has 
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to kill God to enjoy His (God’s) powers and freedom967; the second reason is that the 
West is the first to experience such an unprecedented break between historically two 
overlapping mindsets (divine and profane), and has thus to find ways of reconciliation 
between the two, or go on in its nihilist path.
968
 Overall, the West was very erroneous, 
according to Bidar, in neglecting the power of religion. The West belittled the fact that 
most past human civilizations were based on, or at least nurtured by, the mysterious idea 
of God. It has missed learning from a major factor that contributed for human flourishing 
for centuries. It is therefore high time to overcome this weak irreligious mindset that has 
occasioned “an existential winter”969 that cannot be surmounted unless it lives a “spiritual 
revolution,”970 or “ontological revolution”971, that raises the fundamental questions 
afresh, and consequently moves away from leading a mere “horizontal life”972 that does 
not look vertically (towards the divine) for infinite inspiration.  
The second idea advanced for the thesis of overcoming religion is from religion 
itself, in light of modernity achievements. The critique Bidar launches on modern 
Western philosophies does not belittle its values of liberty and equality for instance. What 
Bidar mostly opposes in Western modern thought is its inability to replace the divine it 
pretended to be able to replace. If human history was built mostly on religious ideas and 
by religious societies, Bidar says that the West has failed to build a more humanist 
civilization, void of “profane gods” that misuse “human dignity”973 even for few 
centuries. At the same time, religions as classically known, with their archaic “irrational” 
conceptions so much metaphysical in outlook are criticized, too. Religions have to 
become this-worldly, otherwise, they, too, remain unable to answer human existentialist 
and ontological questions. Is this not a paradox? How can religion be historical in its 
worldview, and still provide existential answers? Has modernity not tried to exactly do 
that? It is here that Bidar’s answer can be described as “reconciliatory.”  
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By now it should become clear that the second idea of Bidar in overcoming 
religion builds on both religion and modernity. What is kept of religion is its 
“transcendental” and “spiritual” aspects as long as they help man realize the “infinite” 
energy he is gifted with. If modernity has freed man from some archaic religious 
shackles, it has simultaneously limited him in this-worldly affairs that are “finite;” in 
trying to free him, it has imprisoned him in “finitude.” The way out of this existential 
impasse is for man to “re-appropriate what he thought belonged to the divine,” i.e. to re-
appropriate the eternal infinite power man has been granted ontologically, and which 
only now is able to realize.
974
 With such realization humanity enters its second stage of 
being as a “creative power” (puissance créatrice), after the first stage in which it believed 
that it could not create but only live and adapt to the world.
975
 What is new in this 
“creative power” or “supernatural power” is that it does not deny the divine; rather, it 
takes God and His attributes as its model for infinite energy and responsibility – unlike 
the Western way of empowering man which is built on the idea of replacing Him, without 
killing Him, reaching power cannot transpire. With the “transcendental” project976 
proposed here overcoming religion marks a “happy end”977 in which divine power is 
passed on (passation de pouvoir) to “man the creator/ L’homme createur.”978 
To achieve the stage of “man the creator” Bidar proposes three major conditions, 
the third of which is the most challenging. The first condition requires access to the 
basics for a decent life so that the individual can have the minimum means to realize and 
then develop his “infinite” energies. The second condition necessitates vital socio-
political rights in the lead of which is liberty of conscience and expression. The most 
demanding condition is the third one; it requires emulating God in His infinite power, 
mercy, benevolence, justice, and responsibility.
979
 God is “the model” for any kind of use 
of power.
980
 It should be remarked that the first two conditions are “modern” while the 
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last one is “traditional” - to name it so for understanding the project - which, again, 
testifies to Bidar’s attempt for a “reconciliatory” approach, beyond the classical 
dichotomies (modern vs. traditional, liberal vs. conservative, sacred vs. profane, secular 
vs. religious, West vs. East, etc.).   
In the project of overcoming religion, gratitude and recognition of God is 
preserved through considering His soul to have descended in the soul of man. The 
“Promethean syndrome” is overcome. (This idea is more developed in his previous book 
Islam without Submission, 2008, where he outlines his theory of the immortal man.) Man 
becomes a new Jesus, endowed with the power of God, but still human in choices and 
responsibilities; Jesus had immense divine powers, and he used them responsibly; man in 
this “second renaissance” does the same, “we are in the position of Jesus,”981 “we have to 
assimilate the nature of the divine, “swallow,” interiorize or integrate His science or His 
art. It is here that reconciliation between man and the divine is clearly inseparable; 
atheism and classical religions become old and useless categorizations, and reductionist 
in perspective. God and man are “lovers,” one cannot exist without the other.982  This 
does not mean that man is divinized, or that the divine is humanized – though that 
impression can quickly be formulated by the reader. What the idea of overcoming 
religion all boils down to is that man realizes his full powers; he simply humanizes 
powers he, until now, reserves to God only, while the soul of the latter is actually already 
in Him and he just needed time to realize it. It is only in this sense that the future will see 
“many gods,” namely many human beings acting freely, responsibly, justly, and 
spiritually, following the model of God.  
It should be clear by now that Bidar has truly moved in his intellectual journey 
from the ‘Islamic box’ to more global thinking necessitated by the pluralism that 
characterize modern societies. This allows me to note two main things. First, Bidar’s 
latest endeavour cannot be understood without keeping in mind his previous works. His 
concepts of ‘Self Islam’ and of ‘man as the eternal and immortal Caliph of God’ have 
influenced very much his latest attempt at ‘overcoming religion’. His ‘double culture’ 
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allows him to look at the Western and Islamic tradition with critical eyes. Though he can 
be studied as one of the innovative voices of the emerging European Islamic thought, that 
could be reductionist of his work if European Islamic thought is read as being solely 
Islamic. Bidar is no longer a ‘Muslim philosopher’; he is a philosopher that goes on 
charting territories that weaken the classical dichotomies referred to above. That is 
certainly not an easy job, for, sooner or later, he will be categorized. However this may 
be, considered from political theory perspectives, from a sociology of religion 
perspective or from a theological perspective, his philosophy of religion can be very 
useful.  
By way of an illustration of this usefulness, If the current educational systems 
were to integrate the idea of the ‘infinite power’ of man and his ‘historical immortality’ 
without leaving the idea of God aside, a lot of the multicultural malaise could be solved 
because both the religious and the nonreligious would be satisfied. Each hears what he 
wants to hear, without at the same time belittling the other’s option, although ideally this 
dichotomy between ‘options’ itself should be overcome. Neither religion nor atheism or 
secularism will be needed if Bidar’s approach is understood, and further developed by 
various disciplines. This is a project for the future where only man creates and rules, but 
still respects God, and God regains His ideal place as the merciful and the just, since He 
no longer intervenes in human affairs directly – with, say, His divine prescribed laws, as 
Sharia law has been understood by some literalists. God remains a beautiful idea, and any 
injustice in the world is for man to be accountable for, since He abstains from direct 
intervention in human affairs. Bidar does not kill God, but he gives Him a respectful 
place which might be metaphorically described as that of a king. The latter owns a 
palace; the managers of the palace keep it in order, not the king himself; they decorate 
and improve it, always hoping that this is the ideal picture the king would like to see, 
while he keeps silent, never replies, and keeps them working, as if all their trials and 
errors were right! For Bidar, God does exactly this: He leaves man to manage the palace 
(the world) as he wishes, after having equipped him with His essential attributes of 
power, creativity, justice, mercy, and so on. This sounds extremely idealist; but it is the 
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job of the philosopher – meaning any thinking agent – to determine how it could resolve 
real, concrete problems.  
Since the problems Bidar examines are facts, then his approach, however 
prophetical or idealist it seems, remains practical for the ongoing issue of the divine and 
the sacred, or the religious and the secular, that has tormented the human mind for 
centuries, and the modern Western mind in particular. Thus, what Bidar requires of every 
religion is not to leave God, but to overcome the narrow understandings that have turned 
Him into a sadistic God that enjoys seeing conflict among believers and non-believers. 
Religion in Bidar’s perspective is ultimately a discipline of self-criticism and deeper self-
consciousness. For him, it is only thus that it becomes truly open and spiritual in essence, 
and that without it life becomes meaningless.  
The second point I want to make is a critique. There is no doubt that Bidar has 
based his approach on the two traditions with which he is most familiar, with clear 
openings to the Eastern or Asian religions. His criticism of modernity is also a pillar of 
his project, as is his criticism of religion. A liberal critique may say that there is nothing 
new advanced here, and that a middle way does not work. Preserving the divine while 
claiming human liberty and infinite creativity simply means doing without the divine. 
Why should one think of the divine at all, if one already considers oneself an infinite 
energy that has unlimited rights to realize its energies? Doesn’t Bidar himself say that 
God is but the name of ‘future humanity’? Similar questions may be raised by a religious 
critique which claims that ‘religion is no longer religious’ and ‘God is no longer divine’ 
if the metaphysical is abolished and only this-world is emphasized in the project of 
overcoming religion. While the project claims to be ‘transcendental’, ‘spiritual’, and not 
to ‘kill God’, in reality it is against all these. I assume that Bidar would reply to both 
liberal and religious critics by first reminding them of the third ‘superior condition’, as he 
calls it, of realizing the idea of ‘man the creator’, of taking God as a model for agency, 
and then by asking them to give more weight to reasoning, for the age of ‘overcoming 
religion’ requires ‘rational faith’ and consequently surmounts the narrow differences both 
liberals and religious critics are concerned with. 
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The two criticisms are valid and challenging, especially when the project moves 
to be implemented in the real world and its complexities. It is here that one should ask 
more from Bidar. If the anthropology of man and religions can be explained in light of 
his previous works so as to better comprehend the current proposal, I think that what 
remains to be investigated further is the idea of ‘God’ itself. If both classical religiosity 
and modern irreligiosity have to change because of man’s increasing rationality, which 
makes him assume that God is always correct and just and that it is man who has been 
unable to better understand Him historically, then this same God that has busied man for 
centuries to find the right understanding of the divine has to be re-examined. That is, the 
attributes of God have to be revisited. Though Bidar calls for a new kind of religiosity 
and being in the world from a rational perspective, this same call requires new 
theological re-interpretations of the attributes of this new God that is not killed, but that is 
also not active anymore in the age of ‘overcoming religion’. Postmodern theologies – in 
the sense of theologies that are pluralist, rather than relativist – from various religious 
traditions have to be devised. Atheism and secularism are also challenged to revise their 
bases, since, with the project proposed here, religion can come back in stronger, spiritual 
and rational forms insofar as atheism and secularism may be considered the least rational, 
or even irrational, options. Rationality, like spirituality, will therefore be re-examined, 
and a new perception of the world can develop. The future man will be very different.
983
  
Recapitulation   
What I have tried to do up to now is to present my own structural reading of 
Bidar´s approach of an “Islam of Europe” as he calls it. I have tried to build a structure 
that makes sense of his works within the premise of my own approach. I have divided my 
reading of him into three main stages. The first stage is an intellectual biography of his 
mystic and philosophic experiences of Islam; it is here that the beginning of his approach 
of Self Islam takes its first phase. The second stage moves to his reformist agenda of 
Islam which he develops by embracing modernity values of human rights (liberty, 
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equality, fraternity). This stage is an explication as well as solidification, theologically 
and philosophically, of the concept of Self Islam. The latter moves from being a mere 
personal experience into an intellectual product of a reformed Islam, and enters the 
debate of Islam in Europe, or European Islam. The final stage is where Bidar´s approach 
reaches its maturity. His journey ends in God´s withdrawal and man´s inheritance of the 
universe. (No murder happens!). Self Islam here enters its existentialist citadel whereby 
the individual believer secures his immortality through his ethical-spiritual force of 
infinitude granted by God. Self Islam ends in being a “discovery” not only of God but of 
the Self, the ultimate Self of man, the infinitely energetic, which is always in the process 
of “becoming,” outside the religious versus secular dichotomy. It is the age of 
“overcoming” the classical dichotomy of the divine versus the secular, or religion and 
atheism.  
Overall, Bidar’s work can be considered a breakthrough hybrid approach that 
aims at resolving an age old debate over the sacred and the profane. In particular, it charts 
new territories for those occupied with the classical dichotomies that it attempts to 
rethink. Bidar opens a new window from which European Islam in particular and 
contemporary Islamic thought in general can be looked at.  
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Part Four  
European Islam in Context: 
Renewal for Perpetual Modernity 
 
 
Religion and ethics are one; there is no religion without ethics and no 
ethics without religion […].  
There is no man without ethics […]; there is no ethics without religion 
[…]; so, there is no man without religion […].  
 
Taha Abdurrahmane, The Question of Ethics, 2000, 52; 147-149. 
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a. European Islam and the Islamic Tradition: Revisionist-Reformist   
 
The previous three parts of this work have introduced the various versions of the 
idea of European Islam as the scholars studied conceive of it. Together they compose the 
first cognitive and methodological “descriptive stage.” They all aim at answering the first 
sub-question of this work: what is European Islam? Each part presents a version of 
European Islam. In this part (Part IV, Section 1) I go into the second methodological 
stage of my work, which is referred to as the “comparative stage.” This comparative stage 
aims at answering the following question: What is new in European Islam? The answer is 
a statement of three components: European Islam (1) “rationalizes ethics,” and in so 
doing it is (2-3) “revisionist-reformist,” or “traditional-modern.” Nonetheless, this is not 
yet the place where I provide my analytical answer to the question. This comparative 
stage precedes my analysis (which comes in Section 2, Part IV) because the answer I 
provide cannot be understood without being familiar with the classical and contemporary 
scholarship contributions to Islamic thought and theology in particular. “Newness” in 
European Islam cannot be first raised as an issue, and second cannot be detected, if 
revisiting the classical contributions as well as the contemporary debate are not examined 
even briefly. The misunderstandings and short-sighted readings of European Islam, or 
Islam in the West, do not go into such a historical revision to trace continuity, 
discontinuity, or development in Islamic thought. To avoid any short-sighted 
conceptualization of European Islam I revisit the early theological (kalam) debate on the 
place of human reason and ethics in relation to revelation and the divine in general 
(Section 1a).  
I do reiterate the idea that a number of contemporary scholars believe that it is the 
revival of kalam that can lead to renewing Islamic thought. I have taken this as an 
assumption, or a test, that any reform project has to go through to merit the label of 
reform. As will be made clearer, among the prime issues debated in kalam are the 
interpretation of God, revelation, ethics, and the place of human reason. By implication, 
any contemporary reform project in Islamic thought has to meet (some of) the standards 
kalam already established, without obviously replicating the same thoughts and work. 
Otherwise said, there is a need for new kalam in Islamic thought.  
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The Muʻtazila, with reference to the work of Qadi Abd Aljabar, is taken as an 
example of one of the most influential theological schools of kalam whose legacy –
romanticizing it as is commonly done aside – can be built on in invoking the place of 
reason in interpreting revelation (Section 1b).
984
 The Muʻtazila make the first generation 
in Islamic scholarship that I refer to in tracing continuity in Islamic thought, for their 
emphasis on the ability of human reason to objectively differentiate between the right and 
wrong in ethical values, and revelation is but a promulgation of what reason achieves. 
They are known as the rationalists in Islamic history. I will explain in due space that their 
rationalism is not identical to rationalism as developed by Euro-modernity. Readers and 
critiques of contemporary Islamic thought may hope that it is the Muʻtazila that can now 
solve the intellectual malaise of Islamic thought. That was also an idea I nurtured for 
some time before I realized that they can be a strong legacy to build on, but not the end 
where to stop or go back to, because Euro-modernity has added values and elevated the 
standards of any religious reform. European Islam has then two challenges: a challenge 
from within its religious/ Islamic tradition, and another one from its other tradition, which 
is Euro-modernity. Endorsing the Muʻtazila heritage alone, or Euro-modernity alone, 
meets the expectations of reform half-way.
985
 This being the case, I re-interpret the 
                                                          
984
 Note that the Muʻtazila and early Islamic theology/ kalam grew up in difficult political times the Muslim 
community experienced for the first time, i.e. the political first civil war in Islam over who had the right to 
rule, which culminated in the development of the two main religious sects, the Sunnis, and the Shi‘a, 
among others minor ones. The early reformists of the Arab Islamic Renaissance (naḥḍa) also grew up in a 
political context: the encounter with the modern and developed West during the colonial era. The late 
reformists, or contemporaries, also grow up in a political special era, the postcolonial era, which requires 
the building of the state and the challenges it meets in constructing the identity of society, secular or 
religious, or in between, etc.  European Islam, too, is growing up in a tense historical period of time. 
Immigration, security issues, and international terrorism with which Islam as a religion has been linked 
make the theological debate political as well. Despite the common distinction between theology and 
politics (mainly that one is metaphysical and the other is physical/ this-worldly), they necessarily 
intertwine. This work, and the argumentation it makes, has to be understood in such a politico-theological 
intertwining space.  
985
 I make two notes here. One, the work of George Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics 
(1985), is helpful in clarifying my approach on the question of ethics and reason. I just note now that
 
I start 
from where he ends: he ends in calling for the revival of the Muʻtazila heritage and in examining the option 
of “ethical reason,” which can be “objective” ontologically and “traditional” epistemologically in Islamic 
tradition.  Ontologically, “right” (vs. wrong) has an objective meaning when extrinsic or intrinsic qualities 
or relations makes them right independently of subjective desires and wishes of the person, or the 
community, that judges them right or wrong, and even independently of God Who also judges them right or 
wrong. Epistemologically, this means that man can know “right” by natural reason, independently of 
scripture. For many, it would appear that the findings of Hourani are very adequate. But they are actually 
not innovative if they remain imprisoned by the Muʻtazila thought, which alone cannot revive Islamic 
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Muʻtazila heritage in light of the adopted framework of Taha Abdurrahmane to show that 
my reference to this rational heritage is for two methodological reasons. First, this 
reference shows that the questions of ethics and reason are old in Islamic thought, and 
revisiting them show that the debate in contemporary Islamic thought in general is 
serious and intense; it resembles in its intensity the kalam early debates. Second, this 
reference is a theological justification that European Islam is not uprooted from the 
tradition and is consequently not a simple mimicry of Euro-modernity, though the latter’s 
degree of influence is certainly high.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
thought. That is why I read the Muʻtazila differently when I deal with the late reformists and European 
Islam, in light of Taha Abdurrahmane’s framework (humanization-historicization-rationalization) and his 
core idea that religion, ethics, and reason are inseparable. The Muʻtazila have never been understood so, 
and that is where I contribute my interpretation of their legacy, though in a shorter form that this space 
allows. So, Hourani’s view could only be a start; to keep the Muʻtazila entangled in the binary of 
objectivism versus subjectivism theologically is like being entangled in the binary of the State versus the 
Church politically. I think that European Islam is trying to move beyond these binaries. I clarify this note in 
Section 2b, Part IV.  Two, I note here that George Hourani’s work is distinguished in the English literature 
on Islamic ethics, a topic that has only recently attracted more attention, though the literature on this 
discipline is still very low in quantity, and even lower in quality. Majid Fakhry, the scholar of Islamic 
intellectual history, counts few titles on the topic, written in English. He refers to Rjitse de Boer’s article 
“Ethics and Morality (Muslim)” (published in the early 1920s), D.M. Donaldson’s Studies in Muslim Ethics 
(1953), George Hourani’s Islamic Rationalism (1971), the translation into English of Mohamed Ahmed 
Sherif’s Ghazali’s Theory of Virtue (1974), and Constantine Zurayk’s translation into English of 
Miskawayh’s Tadhib al-Akhlaq (The Refinement of Character, 1968). I add the recent work of Safet 
Bektovic which surveys some classic and contemporary Islamic philosophers who deal with the subject of 
ethics in various levels, thought not substantially: Bektovic, Islamic Philosophy: Classical Problems and 
Modern Trends (Copenhagen: ANIS, 2012) see the introduction for the aims of the book. In my study here, 
I mainly refer to George Hourani’s Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1985), Majid Fakhry’s Ethical Theories in Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1991), and Mariam Al-
Attar’s Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought (Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2010). Fakhry’s work tries to categorize Islamic ethics into four categories: scriptural, 
theological, philosophic, and religious. Despite this thematic appearance of the work, he at the end studies 
scholars individually, each under one of the four categories/ parts. Hourani’s work is a compilation of his 
lectures and articles; some early articles are developed and some of his early thoughts are revised; his 
attempt tries a more systematic categorization of the Islamic tradition. I take his note on the Muʻtazila and 
his conclusion that there is a way to be ethically rational in Islam without an epistemological break with 
divine abstract “all knowledge.” I have considered this point seriously. After a lot of consideration of the 
overall contribution of the Muʻtazila, the early and later reformists in light of this point, I found it relevant 
in understanding the current stage of Islamic thought, and European Islam in particular. In this sense, 
Hourani’s point has been helpful, though it was more about the classical Islamic thought, and was a 
conclusion he reached only later in his work. Hourani’s point may not be fully understood if reformist 
scholarship is not considered, which he does not do. I try to do that here. I start where he ended. As to the 
work of Al-Attar, I mostly take her moral interpretation of the five tenets of the Muʻtazila, and find them 
relevant for the framework I develop for the idea of European Islam (world-society-ethics), the skeleton of 
which –and not the content- I borrow from Taha Abdurrahman’s The Spirit of Modernity: an Introduction 
to Founding Islamic Modernity (Casablanca and Beirut: al-markaz at-takafi al-’arabī, 2006). All my 
subsequent references to these books are to the same editions.  
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In this comparative stage I also refer to the second and third generation of 
scholarship in Islamic thought which I see European Islam building on. The second 
generation is that of the “modernists” of the Arab-Islamic Renaissance that I prefer to call 
“early reformists.”986 This generation is marked by some distinguished reformists who 
emphasize the role of reason in reviving the tradition, but remain limited in their scope of 
revival by the Sharia classical prescriptions. Their call for the revival of reasoning 
faculty, through the practice of ijtihad, is made with succinct reference to Jalal Eddine al-
Afghani, Mohamed Abduh, and Rachid Rida. This section is the briefest among the three 
generations because most of the reformists of this generation were busy in liberating their 
countries politically than in theorizing for substantial reform theologically; their 
theological contribution remains adaptive and limited within the Sharia (law) 
prescriptions. Human agency and the faculty of reason are allowed to interpret only the 
divine silence or ambiguity on matters not clearly resolved by Quranic verses or Sunna 
hadiths. The importance of these early reformists may be lying in their opening up to the 
Western modern ideas and sciences, and in urging the Islamic societies to realise first 
their political freedom and right of expression. This major achievement paves the way for 
the next generation, the late reformists/ contemporaries, to develop their own new 
interpretations that give human agency the leading role in reading the sacred texts and 
rationalizing its ethics.  
The third generation I refer to with emphasis in Islamic scholarship is the 
contemporary one, which I refer to as “late reformists.”987 I tentatively classify the late 
                                                          
986
 See the following note.  
987
 Instead of going into a long discussion about the difference between the early reformists (referred to also 
modernists) and late reformists (referred to interchangeably as contemporaries) I content myself with this 
note here: The main difference between the two will become clearer as I refer to the approach of some of 
these scholars, with my commentaries all along. The difference between modernists and contemporaries is 
not only chronological; it is also cognitive. By the modernists I mean the early avant guardists of Arab 
Renaissance who first encountered the West during the colonial era, and whose Islamic reform did not go 
that deep to touch upon the sharia law and the consideration of the Quran as a text, which the 
contemporaries, after the colonial era, since the 1950s and 1960s,  have dealt with as such. By modernists is 
not meant total endorsement of Euro-modernity; what is meant is mainly the first opening of the Muslim 
mind to the modern world by the 19
th
 century. As to the contemporaries, they are the later generation of 
these modern openings; unlike the avant guardists, they use more modern social and critical theories of 
approaching the sacred texts; they do not reject revelation but they are more critical and analytical of the 
way it has been interpreted traditionally. They may be closer to the West through the modern approaches 
they borrow from it, but they are also still rooted in the tradition, since they keep analyzing it, without 
denying it. They are also modernists in that sense, and naming them contemporaries or late reformists is 
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reformists I refer to into three main categories: 1) “hermeneutists,” or “ethicists-
textualists” (exemplified by the work of Fazlur Rahman, Mohamed Arkoun, Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zayd, and Hassan Hanafi), 2) “egalitarianists-legalists” (Fatema Mernissi and Amina 
Wadud, and Abdullahi Ahmed An’naim), and 3) “neo-rationalists” (Mohamed Abed 
Aljabri and Abdulkarim Soroush). More on this classification will be said on due time.
988
  
The contemporary stage of Islamic thought use modern methodologies and 
achievements in re-approaching the sacred texts in radically various ways. Not to go into 
details here, they, however, all claim not to deny the divine in their reform projects. They 
all emphasize the place of human agency and reason. They give ethics the primal place 
among the classical Islamic sciences and branches of approaching and studying texts. 
European Islam emerges in this context, with these scholarly generations that precedes it. 
European Islam’s claims of defending human agency, the faculty of reason, and 
endorsement of modernity values in light of religious ethics, with denial of the divine, are 
the aspects that make it revisionist or traditional, and thus continuous of previous reforms 
in Islamic scholarship. What, however, makes it reformist-modern is the fact that it opens 
new pathways outside what could be termed “classical dichotomous mode of thought” 
(divine versus secular, revelation versus religion, Church versus state, etc.) that has 
characterized European interaction with religion for long, which Islamic thought has not 
avoided though it claims to be immune against it.
989
 The new direction European Islam 
(along with a number of projects in contemporary Islamic thought) seems to be heading 
to is to restore the “original” communion between the divine and the secular, the source 
of ethics and the ethics of reasoning. I will revisit these scholarly generations in light of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
more of a methodological nomenclature for chronological classifications in “Islamic” thought. Charles 
Kurtzman, for instance, says that the modernists have mainly gained freedom of expression, and that the 
next steps which later Muslim reformists would take would be the modern values. I do not object so much 
to this view, but I do not say much more on this here either. Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-
1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), see the introduction. 
988
 I do not aim at going into a long argumentation about why I classify these scholars the way I tend to do. 
I will say few words about that when I deal with them in Section 1c of this Part IV.  
989
 An example of “classical dichotomous thought” from the issue of the source of ethics and the place of 
reason in interpreting revelation can be that of classifying the source(s) of ethics, whether this source is 
pure revelation, which largely corresponds to what Majid Fakhry refers to as “religious ethics,” or pure 
reason, which he refers to as “philosophic ethics,” or reason supported by revelation, which he calls 
“theological ethics,” or revelation supported by reason, which matches his “scriptural ethics.” Majid Fakhri, 
Ethical Theories in Islam (1991). 
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Taha Abdurrahmane’s analytical framework (humanization-historicization-and-
rationalization), in Section 2a, Part IV.  
 
a. On Islamic Theology: Kalam, Reason, and Ethics 
 
 
In this first section (Part IV, S1a) I present the first generation of the three 
scholarship eras of Islamic thought, namely the Muʻtazila theological doctrine. Their 
contribution to Islamic theology is eminent in Islamic history. The current calls of 
renewing kalam (Islamic theology) stem from the fact that the Muʻtazila were among its 
leading schools. Before I refer to the Muʻtazila, I note the importance of kalam, and its 
potential contribution to the contemporary debate on reforming Islam. Two main reasons 
are behind my emphasis on the importance of this school in relation to my work on 
European Islam. First, though they could not live as a dominant school, compared with 
the Ashʻaria (to be briefly reviewed), the Muʻtazila remain a distinguished contribution to 
the Islamic kalam. Their distinction originates from the importance they gave especially 
to human reason and free will in developing a rational ethical theory, which is their “most 
important contribution to Arabo-Islamic thought,” in Mariam Al Attar’s words.990 
European Islam, in my reading, underlines the same faculties (human reason and free 
will), and can thus trace (part of) its discourse to this early Islamic school. This does not 
mean that the Muʻtazila is the (only) solution for reforming Islam, or for European 
reformist Islam; the contended idea here is that there is an intellectual link with the early 
Islamic tradition which European Islam can also use in justifying its theological 
adaptations to the modern age; this intellectual link is the place of reason in 
understanding revelation. Second, their rationalisation of ethical values apart, I am 
interested in knowing whether reviving the Muʻtazila’s heritage is enough at the age of 
modernity. I will stop at their objectivism approach of the nature of values and its 
traditional epistemological match which keeps the approach “friendly” with the divine. 
To clarify this delicate appoint about the Muʻtazila, I will use Taha Abdurrahmane’s 
critical framework in which he equates reason with ethics and religion/ revelation. That 
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 Al-Attar, Ethical Theories, 45 
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is, I will show that the classical reading of the Muʻtazila (as George Hourani reads them 
for example) may not be enough in reviving Islamic thought.
991
 
The Importance of Kalam in Reviving the Place of Reason in Islamic 
Thought  
The reformist debate for the last two centuries has centered on the applicability or 
not of especially Islamic laws, mistakenly commonly referred to simply as “Sharia.” 
“Sharia law,” “Islamic (positive) law,” or “fiqh” (and not uṣūl al-fiqh which is the 
equivalent of legal theories) are the right names for it, to be more specific.
992
 Thus, the 
necessity to re-read the tradition to distinguish between, or build anew, moral theology, 
legal theory, and positive law in Islam becomes a requisite. Such an endeavour, however, 
may not succeed if reference to early kalam is not revisited as well, for it is during this 
formative period of Islamic theology that such distinctions flourished, before they waned 
away soon afterwards. Kalam legacy cannot be renewed in a mimetic format, for its first 
realization in the formative period of Islam had its own socio-political environment, 
which may not be copied or lived again unless that environment repeats itself, mostly 
partially, and never fully. The current context of Islam in Europe, in light of the global 
movement of human beings and ideas, makes such an environment partially possible, as I 
presented that in the detailed introduction of this work. I do not claim to conduct a 
thorough theological and jurisprudential research in this Section. Yet, referring to their 
broad guidelines for the purpose of this work is very helpful in reading the directions 
European Islam may take. Without these steps, understanding European Islam merely 
from political perspectives remains reductionist and limited.  
Since the formative years of Islamic thought until now, ethics in Islam has been 
influenced mainly by what Majid Fakhry refers to as “scriptural ethics.” That is, it has 
been dominated by the “Koranic ethos,” and the Sunna teachings, as narrated and 
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 This point (second reason) will be dealt with in Section 2a, Part OV, on “Conceptualizing the Idea of 
European Islam.”  
992
 In this differentiation, I follow, among many others, Mohammad Fadel  who distinguishes among 
scholastic theology, moral theology, and substantive law, though I do not detail these differentiations 
further here. My point above is enough for my purposes. Fadel, “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: 
The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 21,No. 1, 2008, 1-66, downloadable from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085347  
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commented upon by the exegetists, al-mufassirun. The Greek influence on the ethical 
debate was accommodated during the Islamic intellectual high days (mainly between the 
9
th
 and 11
th
 centuries), but that soon faded away. What has remained then is the 
“scriptural ethics,” based on religious teachings that are comprehensive in nature but are 
not formulated into an independent and full fletched analytical theory of ethics.
993
 This 
has been the concern of some contemporary scholars who recognize this deficit in Islamic 
thought. The Indian pioneering reformist Sir Ahmed Seyyed Khan (d. 1898) was among 
the first “early reformists” to call for a “new Islamic theology of modernity” (jadid ‘ilm 
al-kalam).”994 Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) worked on that level, too,995 and so did his 
compatriot Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) who believed in the necessity of renewing kalam 
heritage and building an independent discipline of Islamic ethics.
996
 A passage from 
Rahman corroborates my point. In his book entitled Islam (1966) he says, “a systematic 
attempt must be made to elaborate an ethics on the basis of the Quran, for without an 
explicitly formulated ethical system, one can never do justice to Islamic law.”997  He 
blames Muslim scholars for that in Islam and Modernity (1982): 
Muslim scholars have never attempted an ethics of the Quran, systematically or 
otherwise. Yet, no one who has done any careful study of the Quran can fail to be 
impressed by its ethical fervor. Its ethics, indeed, is its essence, and it is also the 
necessary link between theology and law. It is true that the Quran tends to 
concretize the ethical, to clothe the general in a particular paradigm, and to 
translate the ethical into legal or quasi-legal commands. But it is precisely a sign 
of its moral fervor that it is not content only with generalizable ethical 
propositions but is keen on translating them into actual paradigms…..The Quran 
always explicates the objectives or principles that are the essence of its laws. […] 
The Muslims’ failure to make a clear distinction between Quranic ethics and law 
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 Fakhry, Ethical Theories, 11, 31.  
994
 Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1978) 307-32. 
995
 See mainly his Reconstruction of Islamic Thought referred to when introducing the work of Bidar, in 
Part III, Section 2. Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Iqbal's  Approach to Islamic Theology of Modernity,” Al-
Hikmat, vol. 27 (2007) 1-36; see also Iqbal's reference to “new theology” and kalam in his letter 
to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, of the Muslim University of Aligarh, on 4th June 1925, available at: 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct62/1.htm   
996
 See mainly his Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), Islam and Modernity: Transformation 
of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Major Themes of the Quran 
(Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980). I will refer to these works in brief when I introduce the 
reformist project of Rahman in the following sub-section.  
997
 Rahman, Islam, 256. 
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has resulted in a confusion between the two. Neither ethics nor law ever became a 
discipline in itself.
998
 [Emphasis added] 
 
Mohamed Arkoun has also repeatedly brought the idea up but kept himself busy 
developing linguistic tools for “decoding” the orthodoxy texts, initiating two fields of 
study (Applied Islamology and Critique of Islamic Reason), and left the project of 
developing an independent ethical system unaccomplished. His main work on Islamic 
ethics was his PhD, later published as a book, on the 11
th
 century renowned ethicist Ibn 
Miskawayh (d. 1030), followed in 2005 by Humanism in Islam.
999
 Hassan Hanafi (b. 
1936), and Abu Ya’rib al-Marzzouki (b. 1947)1000 have also strongly called for the rebirth 
of kalam, as a way of reinvigorating Islamic thought.
1001
 Taha Abdurrahman (b. 1944), 
who seems to have given the question of ethics more substantial space during the last 
decade, makes of ethics the basis of human existence and thought. Abdurrahma says that 
human existence, religion, and ethics are one; they are not separate entities.
1002
 Without 
“fixing” this “intellectual deficit” no reform is possible. According to these reformists, it 
appears that any claim of reform based on the Islamic message of ethics (and justice 
according to some) without developing an independent ethical system of thought remains 
a mere adaptation and not a reform.  
But why am I concerned with linking kalam, with ethics, and reform? As my 
description of the comparative stage illustrates, the three (kalam, ethics, and reform) need 
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 Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 154-155  
999
 I take it that by “Islamic ethics” he means what Majid Fakhry calls “scriptural ethics.” See: Mohamed 
Arkoun, L'Humanisme arabe du IVe/Xe siecle: Miskawayh, philosophe et historien [Arab Humanism in the 
4
th
/10
th
 Century: Misikawayh, Philosopher and Historian] (Paris: Vrin, 1984); Arkoun, Islam to Reform or 
to Subvert? (London: Saqi Books, 2007) 356-368.   
1000
 See, for example, Hassan Hanafi: Islam in the Modern World, vols. 1 and 2 (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian 
Bookshop, 1995); Ya’rib al-Marzuki, Philosophy of Religion from an Islamic Perspective (Beirut, Dar Al-
Hadi, 2006) see Part I of the book.  
1001
 Hanafi and Marzzouki, see above.  
1002
 I consider Taha Abdurrahman's project of renewing Islamic philosophy, and building a new theory of 
ethics among the most interesting  and genuine projects of the contemporary scholars in the Islamic world. 
However, I reserve working on him for my interest in ethical issues for future projects for the Islamic 
majority countries context. I see that he is not heard of  here much in the West yet, though he has been 
developing his line of thought since the 1970s on logic and linguistic renewal first.  Being less involved in 
issues mostly related to politics may have played a role in making him less known to the Western 
scholarship until now, though he is well read in Islamic philosophy departments in the Arab-Islamic world.  
Summarizing his logical analysis and philosophy of religion which I introduce in due time in this work, he 
argues for his approach as follows: “there is no man without ethics”; “there is no ethics without religion”; 
“there is no man without religion.” Abdurrahmane, The Question of Ethics, 52; 147-149.  
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theological justifications to be “Islamic.” Genuine reform requires an ethical theory, 
which the kalam, with its diversity, can encourage in reshaping, henceforth the 
importance of the kalam. For the latter to be even more trusted, it should show strong 
signs that it grew from within the Islamic creed and believer theologians. This the 
Muʻtazila, among the other common kalam schools, provides.  
There is a strong argument that goes that kalam grew up about a century earlier 
before the Greek philosophy was translated into Arabic during the Abbasid era (750-
1258). In his interesting work Reason and Revelation in Islamic Ethics (1985), George 
Hourani (d. 1984) argues that kalam is genuinely Islamic, though it had some Greek 
influence, and this, for him, is a plus for philosophy in general, and Islamic philosophy in 
particular, to investigate again this heritage and realize its energies now that there is a 
need for that in Islamic thought. He puts it this way:  
Kalam literature […] owes little to the Greeks except in an indirect and diffuse 
way. It is original in Islam, and grew quite naturally out of the early theological 
and juristic debates among Muslims. It appears to me as chronologically the 
second major occurrence in history of a profound discussion on the meanings and 
general content of ethical concepts, the first being that of the ancient Greek 
sophists and Plato. If this is a sound judgment, it gives an importance to classical 
Islamic ethics in the general history of philosophy that has not been realized up to 
now.
1003   [Italics added]
 
Like some Islamic reformists, Hourani also believes that “what has been written 
has a certain relevance because they [Muslims today] face essentially the same problem 
about value as their classical predecessors.”1004 In a passage that comes near the end of 
his work, he makes the earlier point even clearer with reference to the Muʻtazila whose 
heritages he aspires to see rekindled in Islamic thought: 
If I had a choice of what intellectual path Muslims should follow – a choice which 
I do not have, looking at Islam from outside – I would start over again at the 
points where the early jurists and the Mu´tazilites left off, and work to develop a 
system of Islamic law which would openly make use of judgments of equity and 
public interest, and a system of ethical theology which would encourage 
judgments of right and wrong by the human mind, without having to look to 
scripture at every step. The Mu´tazillites were correct in their doctrine that we can 
make objective value judgments, even if their particular theory of ethics had 
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 Hourani, Islamic Ethics, 21 
1004
 Ibid., 66  
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weaknesses, which would have to be revised by modern ethical philosophers and 
theologians. So I think this is the best way for Muslims to revive Islam, and I wish 
them success in a formidable task.
1005
  
 
The relevance of kalam then lies in the fact that it raises questions that are most 
profound. In his attempt to construct an Islamic philosophy of religion in The Quran and 
the Secular Mind: A Philosophy of Islam (1998), Shabbir Akhtar, like Hourani in this 
point, demonstrates that early kalam theology was internally stimulated, as early as the 
mid-and-late 9
th
 century, before and during the early beginnings of the Abbasid 
intellectual era, for Muslim theologians had questions which needed to be faced. The 
dominant part of these questions was related to fiqh (law) so this early theological phase 
depended heavily on the scriptures, and the use of reason for the Maliki school, for 
instance. Going on with Akhtar's reading of early Islamic theology and philosophy, he 
says that with the Abbassid's openings to the Greeks, the Muslim theologians had to 
defend faith using reasoning, logic and dialectics of the Greeks to encounter mainly the 
Muslim philosophers that were Greek-minded (especially al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, 
and Ibn Roshd later); this phase he calls “dialectical theology.” For Akhtar, the Muʻtazila 
belong to this category.
1006
 And seeing that Islamic philosophy did not live long to 
flourish, and was criticized by Hassan al-Ash'ari (father of Ash'aria dominant school), 
and later on crushed by, among others, al-Ghazali's critique,
1007
 what remained of Islamic 
intellectual life was a “theological philosophy,” for these dominant philosophers turned 
Greek secular reason into a means to prove and serve divine truths.
1008
 What I mainly 
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 Hourani, for example, categorizes them as philosophers in light of their methodology of argumentation 
basec on dialectic as well as logic, and so does Majid Fakhry. I do not get into this debate here, for it 
depends on how each defines the term theology, kalam, and philosophy. 
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 What is meant here is al-Ghazali’s famous critique of early Islamic rationalist philosophers, which is 
believed by many historians to have influenced the later development of mystic and orthodox Islam, instead 
of going on with the early rationalist tradition of, for example, Al-Farabi. Al-Ghazali’s critique is 
condensed in his tahafut al-falasifa [Incoherence of Philosophers]. The renowned Ibn Roshd (Averroes) 
would reply to such a critique in his famous work tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). 
Ibn Roshd softens the rationalist views of the early Islamic philosophers, and crititicez Al-Ghazali’s mystic 
tendency, and defends what he is famous for now as the “double truth,” i.e. both religion and philosophy, or 
revelation and reason, as two separate but complementary paths of realizing the truth. See: Abu Hamid al-
Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Lahore, Pakistan Philosophical 
Congress, 1958); Simon Van Den Bergh, trans. Averroes’ tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the 
Incoherence) vol. I & II (Cambridge: EJW Gibb Memorial, 1978).  
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 Shabir Akhtar, The Quran and the Secular Mind: A Philosophy of Islam (Oxon: Routledge, 1998)13-22 
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take from Akhtar's account is his point which is close to Hourani's; it concerns the 
internal aspect of the basic ontological-epistemological questions raised by early Islamic 
theology.
1009
  
Hourani says that two kinds of questions busied the early Muslim minds, one is 
ontological, and the other is epistemological. The first was posed as follows: “What is the 
nature of ethical value concepts such as the good and the just?” That is, more simply put, 
the question tries to arrive at whether ethical values are “objective” and worth what they 
are intrinsically, or whether they are “subjective” and need a Lawgiver and agent to make 
them meaningful. The second primal question was posed as follows: “How can man 
know the presence and force of these concepts in particular situations?” The answer was 
either of the two: man can know that through reason (rationalism) or through revelation 
(traditionalism).
1010
 Mariam al-Attar invokes Euthyphro’s dilemma, uttered through 
Socrates’ tongue, in summarizing the early Muslim theologians-philosophers questions: 
“Is the pious and holy beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is 
beloved by the gods?” For al-Attar, the Muslim jurists in particular would have phrased 
the question as follows: is what is good commanded by God because it is good, or is it 
good because it is commanded by God? Her answer goes as follows: “certainly the 
answer would be that what is good is commanded by God because it is good, especially 
when we take into consideration that they considered maslaḥa and the welfare of human 
beings the ultimate purpose of revelation.”1011  
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 There is a general agreement on the great philosophical influence of the Greeks over the Islamic 
philosophy; such an agreement is not always found when the question touches Islamic theology, or kalam. 
Some, as Hourani in this case, argue that kalam emerged before the Greek texts were translated; when they 
were translated, they just added intensity to the kalam which theologians solidified using Greek logic and 
dialectics. This historical debate of recognition and influence may have a further impact on European 
Islam, but I do not go further in this historical debate here. What has to be stressed in this stage of my 
reference is that the Muslim mind was open to various intellectual trends, be they Greek, or not. Emphasis 
has to be on the fact that before one mode of thinking dominated (i.e. the Ashʻari in the majority Sunni 
world), diversity characterized the formative period of Islamic thought. Contemporary scholars are 
interested in capturing this early moment of Islamic history, as will be shown through the work of 
hermeneutists and rationalists like Fazlur Rahman, Mohammed Akroun, and Abdulkarim Soroush (Part IV, 
Section 2-3).   
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Kalam Formative Period amidst Political Turmoil  
The development of Islamic theology originates politically from the murder of the 
third Caliph Uthman (reigned 644-656 AD), and the fourth one after him. The fourth 
Caliph was supposed to react to this murder by punishing the murderers and restoring 
justice. Part of Ali´s partisans, known since then as the Shi‘a, would secede from his 
Shi‘a (literally meaning “group” or “partisans”) and become the Seceders/ Khawārij  as a 
protest against the failure to “justly” defend the murdered third Caliph. The Khawārij  
believed that God’s judgment has to be pursued and not pursuing it makes one no longer 
a believer, mu’min;  belief has to be professed and practiced, and thus God´s rules have 
to be followed in theory and practice, otherwise the ruler/ believer can be labelled “kafir/ 
infidel.”1012 On the other side of it developed the Murji´a, or the “Postponers,” who 
postponed giving their judgment on the murder of the Caliph, and on sinning, to the Day 
of Judgment; i.e. they abstained from declaring a believer an infidel, for that is up to God 
to decide.
1013
    
This decisive political strife (fitna) in Islamic political history would fuel the 
theological debate among scholars later in what is commonly known as ´ilm al-kalam 
(kalam, or the discipline of disputing religion, based on dialectic argumentation).
1014
 
Kalam scholars, known as mutakallimūn, debated matters related to the nature of God 
and His attributes, scripture, prophets, good and evil, human freedom and responsibility, 
and the religious foundations of political authority and order. A lot of this early debate 
developed more as a reaction to external refutations of the Islamic creed advanced by 
Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian theologians, who were open to Hellenistic learning, 
before it became a central issue among Muslim theologians themselves.
1015
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 Malik Muhammad Tariq, “The Ideological Background of Ratioanlity in Islam,” Al-Hikmat, Volume 
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 The great late fourteenth century scholar Ibn Khaldun defines ‘ilm al-kalam as speculative theology, the 
“Science that involves arguing with logical proofs in defense of articles of faith and refuting innovations 
(non Sunnas) that deviate in their dogmas from the early Muslims and Muslim orthodox.” Ibn-Khaldun, 
The Muqaddima, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1958) 31.  
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 Whether there is an influence of Christian theology on Islamic kalam, and how far is that influence if 
proof of that is established is still debated among scholars. Al-Attar, for instance, in a recent work on 
Islamic ethics and theology says there is no such influence, al-Attar, Islamic Ethics, 54; On the presence of 
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To focus on the issue that matters most for this study, human freedom and agency 
in interpreting revelation and its ethics, it is mainly the Jabriya/ Compulsionism or 
Determinism, and Qadariya that initiated profound theological debates in Islam. The 
Jabriya (from jabr, compulsion) argue that no act is the doing of human beings. Allah 
does everything. Humans do perform acts but have no actual capacity (istita`a) of their 
own to do them. Human action is predestined. All human agency is divinely initiated and 
rooted in God´s qadar. Everything has been created, and nothing is created anymore. 
Allah punishes people for His own acts, not theirs. A human being earns neither reward 
nor punishment. Whoever wishes to act, let him act; the felicitous one is not harmed by 
his sins, and the wretched one is not helped by his piety. That denotes God´s 
transcendence, and the symbolic action of humans in this world. Human action is 
figurative, metaphoric. Such is, broadly, the thought of Jabriya/ Predestination or 
Determinism.
1016
 To facilitate the categorizations of these schools later, it is good to note 
now that this school is in modern terms referred to as “Divine Command Theory.” It is 
“subjectivist” since the agent is the Lawgiver, though man acts on His behalf; he follows 
what he is destined for. It is subjectivist also because the values of good and evil, for 
instance, are defined by the Lawgiver, God: good is good because God Wills it; evil is 
evil because God also Wills it. Reason follows the dictates of revelation. The Qadariya 
(from qadr and qudra, i.e. power and ability), on the other hand, argue that human beings 
are created free and they are morally responsible for their action.  
These two main trends would develop, about two centuries later, into major 
theological schools during the Abbassid flourishing era as Ash´aria
1017
 and Mu´tazilla.
1018
 
The former would dominate the “conservative” Sunni Islam, and the latter, known as the 
“rationalist” inheritance of classical Islam, would fade away after the eleventh century, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Christian doctrine in Islamic theology, see also the recent work of David Thomas, Christian Doctrines in 
Islamic Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2008), see Chapter I and VI. 
1016
 See, for instance, Nagel´s reading of Jahm ibn Safwan in Tilman Nagel, The History of Islamic 
Theology (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2000) 109-118.  
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 It is named after Abu l-Hassan al-Asha´ari  (d. 935) 
1018
 It is named after its first initiator Wasil Ibn ‘Ata’ (d. 748) who withdrew, iʻtazala, from the circle of his 
master/ sheikh al-Hassan al-Basri (d. 728) in a theological debate about sinning and punishment. 
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after only about forty years of its political implementation; it survive mainly in Yemen 
and Iran among Twelver Shi‘a and Zaydia.1019  
The debate between the Ashʻaria and Muʻtazila was over the perception of ethical 
virtues, the ontology of good and evil, and their epistemological manifestation. For the 
Ash´aria, revelation is the guiding force for human thought and action, though human 
beings enjoy a large scale of free will. Here are some of the main tenets of this school. 
One, reason is able to discover the existence of God but is not able to designate that an 
action is morally or religiously obligatory without the help of revelation. Two, human 
reason and the senses alone are unable to comprehend fully the unique nature of God and 
his attributes. Three, though human beings possess free will, they actually have no power 
to create anything in the material world, for that is in the premise of God alone. God has 
created everything in a particular time and so He has done with matters. This is the 
atomism tenet. Four, man acts, but God creates. Man is responsible for his acts but 
ontologically it is God´s action. That is what the Ash´ari term “acquisition,” or “qasb” of 
the will to act as a mid-stage. Five, as to moral truth, it is revelation that teaches it, and it 
is not known a priori or by deduction from a priori propositions or by experimenting and 
observation of the world. This means that human reason alone is unable to establish 
certainties and claims for truths, morality, the physical world, and metaphysics without 
the mediation of revelation. Only the sacred determines the good and evil.
1020
   
The Ash´aria, besides the Maturidi
1021
 and the Hanbali
1022
 schools, make together 
the major Sunni line of thought. The Quran and the Sunna are their departing references. 
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 Maturdi is a school of theology and jurisprudence that was named after Muhammad Abu Mansur al-
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Big scholars and philosophers have adopted Asharia, like al-Ghazali who would make a 
turn in Islamic philosophy by critiquing the influence of the metaphysics of ancient 
Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. His cause-and-effect philosophy (known now as 
occasionalism), and the development of his deductive and empirical approaches in the 
exact sciences (like mathematics, arithmetic’s, astrology) defended the Ash´ari recourse 
to reasoning methodology, and hermeneutical devices in dealing with the texts in legal 
matters, as practiced by most of the four major legal schools, madhabs.  
Al-Ghalazi developed (from his teacher al-Juwayni) what has become a classic in 
the objectives of Islamic jurisprudence. That is, the five objectives of Sharia, known as 
al-kulliyat alkhams: the preservation of life, intellect, religion, lineage, and wealth. As 
was referred to earlier when dealing with Tariq Ramadan (Part II of this study), he 
developed categories of differentiation and preservation of the public interest (maṣlaḥa), 
but always in light of the sacred text and the Sunna. He was reserved when it comes to 
human reason and interpretation based on the jurist´s opinion, tafsīr bi ra´y; he rejected 
the qiyās/ ruling by analogy. Imam Malik made use of al-Ghazali´s work, and focused on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
seems immeasurable since it reflects an inner conviction. Second, the Ashaari believe that human acts are 
created by God and man´s power to act can be measured only with action; i.e. there is no power without 
action. (The Mu´tazila, on the contrary, believe that power precedes action). The Maturidi here are closer 
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the maṣlaḥa as a concept for the public good. Al-Shatibi, after him, made of this a more 
thorough study to fathom the objectives of Sharia. For al-Shatibi, the intent of the 
Lawgiver is found in the Quran, and the Sunna just explicates the details, juz´iyyāt. Ibn 
Taymiya, who tried to reclaim ijtihad against taqlid during the political weakness of the 
Abbasids in Baghdad in the thirteenth century, opened Sharia to politics, through 
mu´amalat window, and developed his theory of assiyyāsa ash-sharʻiyya.  For Henri 
Laoust, Ibn Taymiya urged the use of qiyās (interpreting by analogy) a stage between 
reason and revelation.
1023
 In general, the Ash’ari scholars are seen to have allowed a large 
space for reasoning in reading the revelation, which is demonstrated by the development 
of various schools of jurisprudence. The faculty of reason is used to prove revelation, and 
to explain it. They, however, did not take the step some late Muʻtazila scholars took, 
namely to put reason ahead of revelation, without, at the same time, condescending to the 
latter, nor denying it. I now move to introducing the main tenets of this school and their 
moral interpretations.     
b. On the Rationalist Muʻtazila: Qadi Abd Aljabbar’s Theory of Ethics 
 Known as the rationalist theologians in early Islamic thought, the Muʻtazila kalam 
scholars (mutakallimūn), first appeared as defenders of Islam against the external 
debaters. The fitna event, which Tilman Nagel calls the First Civil War in Islamic history, 
between Ali´s partisans (Shi‘a) and Mu´awiyya´s partisans (mostly to be known as 
Sunnites later) would refuel the internal debate among theologians on judgment, 
determination, sinning, and God´s attributes, besides the imamate and Islamic rule.
1024
 
However, three samples of work on their doctrine present, together, a picture of the 
thought of the Muʻtazila especially for what concerns their rational argumentation and its 
impact on ethics. I first give a general idea on their emphasis on the faculty of reason in 
reaching a reasonable conception of God, approaching revelation, and thus understanding 
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the canons of existence and they interplay between them. Second, I present their five 
main tenets. Third, I end with referring to their moral interpretation. Since this is not a 
work on the Muʻtazila, this account is generic, and aims at building links between part of 
“what went in the past of Islamic thought” and “what is going on in European Islamic 
thought in the present.”1025  
In Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu´tazilism from Medieval School to Modern 
Symbol (1997), Richard Martin (et al.) present even a more rational view of the 
Mu´tazilla. They present some of its historical figures and political rise and fall. They, 
more importantly, introduce the first English translation of the book of Qadi Abd 
Aljabbar (d. 1024) who they present as the last great Mu´tazilla scholar. (His twenty 
volumes work (al-Mughni) was discovered in Yemen in the 1950s.) The book´s title is 
The Book of the Five Fundamentals (kitab al-uṣūl al-khamsa). It starts with a chapter on 
The First Principles, then is followed by five chapter titles that correspond to the five 
tenets of Mu´tazilla referred to earlier, which Abd Aljabbar calls the Fundamentals of 
Religion. Thin introductory book is in the form of question-answer, a dialectic format of 
Plato´s, which is common among late kalam scholars.  
In the “First Principles” (chapter 1) which opens the book, the idea of elevating 
reason above revelation is very clear. Below are quotations from the text, to illustrate 
without interference the priority a Mu´tazillite like Abd Aljabbar gave to reason. I 
primarily cite the first question-answer that initiates the book, and it is about Knowledge 
of God. It prioritizes reason over revelation as a way of conceiving Him rationally: 
1. If it is asked: What is the first duty that God imposes upon you?  Say to  him:  
Speculative  reasoning  (al-nazar)  which  leads  to  knowledge  of God,  because  
He  is  not  known  intuitively  (daruratan) nor  by  the  senses (bi l-mushahada). 
Thus, He must be known by reflection and speculation.
1026
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The third question is about why reasoning is important. The answer emphasises “rational 
worship” over mere “shar’/ religious worship” which may remain unsatisfactory for the 
rational believer: 
3. Then if it is asked: Why did speculative reasoning become the first of the 
duties?  Say to him:  Because the rest of the stipulates of revelation (shara'i, pl. of 
shari'a) concerning what [we should] say and do are no good until after there is 
knowledge of God.  Do you not see that it is no good for us to pray without 
knowing to whom we are to pray?
1027
 
 
As to how man is able to reason and for what purpose, Abd Aljabbar recites the 
classical natural abilities God bestowed on man, which make him stand able to live 
rationally in the world. As a way of recognition, the rational believer shows gratitude and 
thanks through worship rituals.
1028
 In the sixth question-answer, as another example, 
reason is again given the first place, and only afterwards comes the orthodox sources of 
the Islamic tradition as proofs of God´s existence: rational argument first, the Quran next, 
followed by the Prophetic tradition, and then the classical scholarly consensus (ijmāʻ).1029 
These examples show that Abd Aljabar adopts a high esteem position for reason, 
and considers revelation an advantage, a plus, granted by God to perfect the status of 
man, his autonomy, free will, and moral responsibility, which capable human beings can 
reach rationally. More importantly, he argues that revelation just supports what reason 
realizes in nature. If revelation contradicts what is reasonable and natural then that means 
that there is either a misinterpretation of revelation, or that God would be disrupting the 
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 To avoid long citations in the text, I refer to the passage here:  
Then if it is asked:  What is the first grace bestowed upon you by God?  Say to him:  That is 
something that I cannot account for.  In general, however,  He created me a living  [being], and  
provided  me with  power (al-qudra)  and  physical  means (al-ala). And He perfected my nature 
(khulq) and gave me passions and enabled me to enjoy a variety of pleasurable things. Then, He 
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toward Him. (Ibid.) 
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Then if it is asked: What are the proofs?  Say to him:  There are four:  rational argument (hujjat al-
'aql),  scripture (al-kitab),  the example [of the  Prophet]  (Sunna),  and  the  consensus  [of  the  
community]  (ijmāʻ). Knowledge of God can only be gained by  speculating with  rational  
argument, because if we do not  [first] know that He is truthful we  will  not know the authenticity 
of the Book, the Sunna and the communal consensus. (Ibid., 90-91) 
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evidence on which human reason about this world is grounded.
1030
 This last option is not 
valid, because divine justice tenet would be henceforth nullified, and the principle of 
Tawhid itself, which aims at liberating man, is weakened by the same omnipresent 
power.  
 For Abu L-Hudhayl al-'Allaf  (752-848), an earlier Mu´tazilite well immersed in 
Greek philosophy, reason can be used in searching for answers to two basic types of 
questions which arise in every religion: those concerning God and those concerning the 
problem of good and evil. He affirms that human reason can: 1) discern the existence of 
God; 2) discern the duty for humans to give thanks to God; 3) distinguish between good 
and evil; 4) and discern the duty for humans to do good and avoid doing evil.
1031
 Abd 
Aljabbar is not far from this frame of thought. Proving the existence of God apart, 
assuming that it is believed in also by the rationalists according to the Muʻtazila, it is the 
moral questions of good and evil, and human responsibility that take prime concern for 
him. He believes that humanity is obliged to three moral obligations or actions: 1) actions 
that are obligatory “by virtue of an intrinsic property,” like being kind, protecting the self 
from injury, showing God´s gratitude for his kindness; 2) actions for God´s grace, lutf, 
which are the only non-rational-category, like worship rituals; and 3) the obligatory 
actions that performing them brings good and pushes evil.
1032
 These three moral 
obligations are dispersed among the five basic tenets that he sees as components of the 
“fundamentals of religion.” To these tenets I turn now.  
As to their doctrine, the Muʻtazila are broadly distinguished by five main tenets: 
1) Tawhid or uni(-ci)ty of God, 2) al-´adl, i.e. divine justice, 3) al-wa´d wa al-wa´id, 
promise and threat, 4) al-manzila bayna almanzilatayn, the intermediate position, and 5) 
al-amro bi alma´ruf wa annahyu ´ani al-munkar, commanding the right and prohibiting 
the wrong. From the first two tenets, unity and justice, the Muʻtazila received their name, 
ahl attawhid wa al‘Adl, People of Unity and Justice, or Defenders of Unity and Justice. 
William Montgomery Watt considers the last three principles as minor, compared to the 
first two, since they are mainly the outcome of the theological debate in a political era of 
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turmoil.
1033
 In my perspective, they are not minor, since they actually help in explaining 
the two first prime tenets. Because of the logical order I see in them, and unlike Watt, I 
present them as the Muʻtazila scholars themselves do, and add to them their moral 
implications.  
For the Tawhid tenet, like the majority of Muslim schools of thought, the 
Muʻtazila strongly believed in the oneness of God. They confirmed this tenet through 
denying 1) God´s essential attributes such as knowledge, power and speech, 2) denying 
the eternity or uncreatedness of the Quran as the speech of God (i.e. they believed the 
Quran was created by God at a certain point of time, khalq al-qur´an), and 3) through 
denying anthropomorphism (tashbih or tajssim), i.e. any resemblance between God and 
his creation. One, for the denial of the attributes of God, the Mu´tazilla argued that 
speaking of knowledge, for example, as an attribute to God makes it (the attribute) 
ontologically equal to God, and that would lead to atheism, i.e. that there exists two gods, 
co-eternals, God and knowledge. For them, attributes are not distinct from the divine 
essence. This is very connected to their non-atomist view of God. God is the only being 
who does not consist of atoms and accidents; all other beings and things are composed of 
atoms, jawahir, and accidents, a´rad. The essence of God, henceforth, is not subject to 
change; change in this theological view transpires through the succession of accidents in 
the body, which is a human characteristic and not God´s. This way God´s transcendence 
is preserved.
1034
 Two, for the createdness of the Quran, they argued that it was created 
before laylat al-qadr, the day of its descent, in the Divinely Preserved Tablet (fi allawh 
al-mahfuz) and that it is protected by God who says that fallacy does not come neither 
before it nor after it, which is for them a proof that it was created at some point of time, 
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and thus it is limited and finite. More, to say that the Quran was not created would mean 
that it is equally eternal as God Himself, which is against the idea of Tawhid. The 
Mu´tazilla stood against the Ash'arite separation between the eternal speech of God and 
the created words of the Qur'an, which made God's will unknowable, according to the 
Mu´tazilla. Three, for the denial of anthropomorphism, the Mu´atazilla resorted to 
metaphorical interpretations of the Quranic verses or Prophetic hadiths that contain 
linguistic expressions of resemblances between God and man, using the Quranic logic, 
rational methodology and the use of pre-Islamic Arabic lexicon to defend their 
arguments.
1035
 What are the moral implications of these three essential thoughts of the 
Muʻtazila?  
The idea of the uniqueness of God and His attributes were advanced to liberate 
human beings from subjugation and subordination to any other being or matter which 
alleges power and authority over mankind. All humans are equal, and the supreme 
transcendental power is one. This means that political and religious authorities that 
claimed divine authority to rule or guide Muslims undermines the idea of Tawhid 
authority itself, which is unique to God. The Muʻtazila in particular opposed the 
Ummayad oppressive ruling practices: some of the Ummayads claimed to be “God’s 
vicegerents/ Caliphs,” and claimed predestination to justify their rule. The Muʻtazila also 
defended the tenet of Tawhid against the Shi‘a who believe in the infallible imam who 
can rule in God’s name. With such a belief, the imam claims knowledge and other 
attributes that are divine, and thus relegates the faculty of human reason to the margin. 
Against both the idea of God’s Caliph and the infallible man, the Muʻtazila were 
defending human free will and responsibility. More than that, with the idea of the 
createdness of the Quran, they defended the Quranic narrated stories as historical, and 
thus their possible changeability. If Quran were eternal, it meant that it was equal to God 
in existence/ essence, and what it decreed were eternal, predestined obligations. The 
Muʻtazila were not for this view of an eternal Quran and predestination. If it were eternal, 
that would endanger God’s attribute of omnipresence and ability of creation of believers 
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and non-believers, for instance. Broadly, with the tenet of Tawhid, the Muʻtazila were 
defending the idea of divine justice, which they considered a universal value and viable 
idea.
1036
  “The Muʻtazila assumed that the welfare of human beings was the ultimate purpose of 
revelation.”1037 
It is in the tenet of justice of God that human action and responsibility is mostly 
raised and made obvious. Here, the Mu´tazilla reinterpret the predestination concepts that 
other schools, like the Jabria earlier, defended. The Mu´atazilla believed in total human 
freedom and thus responsibility. Man is given guidance signs (idlal through Prophets, and 
divine books like the Quran and the stories it contains about this world and the other 
world), and power (istita´a or qudra) to act freely. God helps man just in what is good, as 
to evil it is not from God but from man himself. God may have power to move or power 
over evil but he does not move nor does he enact evil; man moves and does evil. God´s 
existence is necessary in itself. It transcends benefit and harm, so He cannot be moved to 
do good or bad. He could have created a different world, but creation arbitrarily 
(´abathan) is not His quality. Even for the case of unbelievers, God made man able to 
believe, and if he (man) does not, it is then his responsibility; he has the “power of faith” 
and “power of unbelief.” For the Muʻtazila, power, or the ability to act, precedes action. 
Man is given this power and he either enacts it or not; he is mukallaf, given power, the 
substance to be rational, autonomous, and responsible and thus deserves merits, reward 
and punishment. This means that God is bound by the rule of justice and right action.
1038
  
Henceforth, unlike the orthodox Ash’ari conception of the justice of God which is 
given to whatever is done or commanded by God, the Muʻtazila’s conception of divine 
justice is limited to the right that promotes the good. Divine justice is compatible with 
human reason. More interestingly, and to invoke the moral aspect in this conception of 
justice in light of the late Mu’tazzila scholar Qadi Abd Aljabbar, an act of justice is not 
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only that which does good to the agent. Rather, a just act, if it harms someone, it should 
do so “in a way that is good.” He says,  
The act which is distinguished by this attribute [justice] is every act which is done 
to benefit or harm someone in a way that is good (‘ala wajh yahsunu), where what 
somebody does for himself to benefit himself or to repel harm is not described as 
such. For that reason it is not said that Zayd, by eating or drinking or doing what 
is religiously necessary (wajib) or recommended (nadb), is being just. When he 
benefits or injures someone else in a way that is good, it is said that he is being 
just to him and that what he did was just.
1039
 [Emphasis added] 
What I want to stress without further details is that the conception of divine justice in 
Muʻtazila tenets impacted their view of social justice and human agency, and freed the 
divine from responsibility for social injustices, without ending in disbelieving in Him.  
The promise and threat means that the Quranic declarations that God deliver His 
promise of punishing the sinner and rewarding the pious are right. The moral implications 
of this tenet emphasize the certainty of rational knowledge in ethics advanced by the 
Muʻtazila, which will become clearer below. Because of this rationality, good actions 
cannot be neglected or interchanged or made equal with the wrong ones; if that is so, then 
reasoning is arbitrary, and God’s judgements are so, too. Wrong cannot become right; 
punishments cannot be annulled, and rewards are emphasized, otherwise the theory of 
ethics the Muʻtazila advance remains weak.1040  
For the intermediate position, the famous story of Wasil Ibn Atta and his 
abstention from declaring whether Ali, the third Caliph, or his opponents in the battle of 
Camel of the first civil war is considered the right position. It is a theological 
postponement (irja´) of deciding over a political issue; the believer, Ali or his opponents, 
here is not being judged and an event in early Islamic history is being compromised by 
theological silence. “It was a form of political compromise, but it was too negative to be 
satisfactory,” as Watt comments on this position.1041 Mariam al-Attar explains this idea of 
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postponement from a moral perspective. It either means postponing judgement on 
humans to God who knows best, or postponing judgment in acts and considering deeds 
less important than belief. This implies that either human beings are not always able to 
make ethical judgements, but mere value judgements, or that only God is able to know 
the degree of one’s faith in one’s heart. From this perspective of postponing judgment - 
endorsed especially by the early Murji’a/ Postponement school - actions are not always 
considered the final measurement of one’s faith, though they remain important for the 
Muʻtazila (and the Khawārij / Seceders before them). A wrong doer, or a sinner, from the 
Muʻtazilite perspective is not considered apostate (murtad), infidel (kāfir), faithful 
(mu’min), hypocrite (munāfiq), but is a wrongdoer (fāsiq), and his final punishment is for 
God to decide.
1042
 
As to commanding the right and forbidding the wrong tenet, it is highly 
recommended in the Quran, whenever there is an opportunity to advocate the good by 
hand, tongue, or at least by heart. Moral exhortation is a duty, which explicitly means that 
banishing evil is also a moral duty.
1043
 Watt’s choice of the translation of the words 
(“right and wrong,” for “ma’ruf and munkar)” differs from the translation of al-Attar who 
uses “good and evil.” Al-Attar’s translation is more adequate to the Muʻtazila doctrine of 
ethics, since the “good” here refers to the rational consequences derived from an act or 
value, and does not limit itself to the normative judgement as established by the religious 
doctrine.
1044
 This is further explained further.   
The Muʻtazilite Abd Aljabbar’s twenty volumes work found in the 1950s in 
Yemen is interestingly studied by Mariam al-Attar in Islamic Ethics: Divine Command 
Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought (2010). This work defends the idea that the Muʻtazila, 
in light of Abd Aljabbar’s voluminous work, believe in the objectivism of moral values, 
and the power of reason in reaching them. Abd Aljabbar critiques two main theories of 
values: the subjective theory of value and the divine command theory. First, he argues 
against the subjectivist theory. Concisely, the latter advances the idea that values are 
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determined by human attitudes and preferences, which make them subjective and 
relative. For him, good is good despite people’s difference in their attitudes and opinions 
about it. The same applies to evil. Abd Aljabbar rejects the view that the value of an 
action is dependent on the state of the agent. It is harm and benefit that constitute the 
ultimate meaning of good and evil, and the grounds of any normative judgement.
1045
 An 
act can be once good and once evil.
1046
 It is only the circumstances and consequences of 
these and other actions (e.g. physical actions, pain, entering someone’s house, and 
bowing down to someone) that can determine their moral value. In Abd Aljabbar’s 
words, “each act that is beneficial to its agent, and is not harmful, and has no aspects of 
evil, should be considered good.”1047 “Knowing the rights of others is the base of all 
obligations.”1048 In al-Attar commentary, whatever is beneficial for oneself in the long 
run, and at the same time not harmful to others is obligatory. Anything that is harmful in 
the long run is forbidden. While benefiting others is not obligatory but recommended, 
observing their rights is obligatory.
1049
  
Second, Abd Aljabbar also argues against the divine command theory advanced, 
among others, by the Ashʻaria. In his view, revelation comes to promulgate ethical values 
that reason proves. He says “God is promulgator and not creator of morality.”1050 This 
shows the epistemological and not ontological aspects of the good and evil, “al’shar’ 
[revelation] discloses what is already established in the intellect (al-‘aql),” says Abd 
Aljabar. That is, revelation comes after actions to command or prohibit them.
1051
 What 
this denotes is that moral theory should be cognitive.
1052
 The reasons behind divine 
commands and prohibitions must be intelligible and related to human morals. This makes 
the divine commands merely normative judgements, which are themselves grounded in 
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moral values. Otherwise said, ideally, there is supposed to be no contradiction between 
revelation and reason, according to the same scholar. In cases of obvious contradiction, 
which may be because of linguistic complexities, the divine text has to be interpreted 
according to the public interest (maṣlaḥa) of people.1053  
More than that, the fact that divine commands are normative and cognitive makes 
non-believers able to perceive God’s commands, and are thus worthy of reward even 
though they are not believers. Such moral non-believers who, for instance, refrain from 
injustice and return deposits are called “obedient” (muti’) since they perform what they 
know by reason to be good, “a responsible human agent (al-mukallaf) might rightly obey 
God, even though he does not know about him. Hence the obedient (al-muti’) is actually 
obedient by his conduct.”1054 He calls this kind of “obedience” to rational morality 
“rational worship,” be it practiced by believers or non-believers. Believers can also call it 
“religious worship” (al-’ibādāt al-shar’iya), if it rationally embraces practices like 
praying and fasting that can enhance the morality of the individual.
1055
 
The above views establish Abd Aljabbar as being very able to distinguish between 
what is right and what is good, a distinction of vital importance for a genuine objectivist 
ethical theory. For him, what is right, commanded and praised, is based on what is good. 
All that is right is by definition good, but not every good is right. What this means is that 
normative judgements are distinguished from value judgments.
1056
 If I simplify it further, 
and use terms common in Islamic jurisprudence, he distinguishes between uṣūl al fiqh 
and fiqh, or, more simply, between moral theory and positive law. For example, believing 
in God and in the Day of Judgement does not necessitate rightful behaviour, nor is 
rightful behaviour necessary, though recommended (mustahab) to prove belief and 
behave according to presupposed good standards. That is, there is a distinction between 
the agent, and the action, between the normative value and the value judgement. External 
factors have to be considered when examining the action of an agent, instead of judging 
him (the agent) just based on a particular behaviour; his actions may not necessarily be an 
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activation of his normative ethics, which may disapprove of what he did at a certain point 
of acting. Following this argumentation, moral behaviour is independent of religious 
sanctions.
1057
 Such a distinction, teleological as it is, could, if followed, have been able to 
answer the needs of Muslim societies as they have developed historically, according to 
time and space requirements. Summarizing Abd Aljabbar’s work, al-Attar writes the 
following: 
            Moral values are not established by what is commanded or prohibited by God. By 
his commands and prohibitions He merely indicates normative judgments which 
are themselves ultimately grounded in moral values. Divine commands are not 
issued to change the facts of good and evil but to guide human conduct. Law (al-
shar’) as asserted by Abd Al-Jabbar, “does not change the facts” as “will or 
intention also has no effect upon the truth of things.” Thus obligations (al-takalif) 
imposed by Allah presuppose moral truth and do not create morality. In other 
words divine prescriptions provide the epistemological aspect of morality and do 
not change the ontological aspect of good and evil: “al-shar’ discloses what is 
already established in the intellect.”1058 [Emphasis added] 
However, al-Attar notes that Abd Aljabbar himself did not live fully according to 
his rational moral theory. For example, he held that slavery is not rationally acceptable, 
but is allowed by al- shar’ (religious law), and so is the case with inheritance law. Al-
Attar assumes that he had to live with the norms of his days, which served the public 
common good (maṣlaḥa), conventionally established mostly by the elite of the time. She 
also quotes him saying that “if a rational human being errs, the reason for his error is 
other than his intellect (sababu al-khata’ ghayr al-‘aql),”1059 meaning that there are other 
circumstances that intervene in applying, or not, one’s rational ideas. Overall, al-Attar  
ends her work by stating that the Muʻtazila teleological (partly consequentialist) ethics, 
though it did not have long socio-political impact in Islamic history, it still influenced the 
late Ash’ari scholars like al-Razi and al-Ghazali who integrated some of Mu’tazzila 
rational thought in conceptualizing the notion of public good (maṣlaḥa), and the 
objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid asharia).1060  
                                                          
1057
 Ibid., 78 
1058
 Ibid., 111 
1059
 Ibid., 78 
1060
 Ibid., 142 
328 
 
In summary, ontologically, for the Muʻtazila (like the Ashʻaria) an ethical value 
or act is objective in nature, which for them does not contradict natural law as established 
by God and realized by man, independently of their (God and man) desires. The right is 
right because it is right and not because God Wills it or man wishes it; a right is objective 
because its qualities and results are good; if revelation and man approve of a right act it is 
because it is beneficial, that is why the Muʻtazila believe that though a value or an act is 
objective it is also divine because the divine is just and does not decree what is wrong 
and unjust. Epistemologically, an ethical value or act can be known by human reason, 
and revelation confirms what the human intellect discovers by its own through reasonable 
justifications (adilla ´aqliya). Human beings are thus free and morally responsible for 
their actions.  
This view appears to elevate reason above revelation. That is how the Muʻtazila 
have traditionally been interpreted, a view I have reservations about, seeing that they 
denied the divine. The point is not about who is above or below the other; the aim is to 
preserve belief by always assigning just and good attributes to the divine. Human agency 
has to work to balance this challenge. Neither reason nor revelation denies the other; they 
are complementary. The Muʻtazila adopt the views of natural law, but natural law, though 
reached and developed by man, is God-given, and is not an independent force; “all 
knowledge” is God’s, but specific knowledge is human, to put it so. Saying that natural 
law is man’s, and also God’s, means that man always considers another superior power 
which has created man himself; the origin of power is divine, but its application and 
development is left to man’s reason, that is why ties with the divine are not cut, and God 
is not “killed.” This makes the Muʻtazila differ from the European view of natural law, 
which is not only ontologically objective but also epistemologically purely rationalist. In 
my view, then, the Muʻtazila natural law is divine. That is why Albert Hourani calls 
Muʻtazila rationalism “partial rationalism.”1061 That is why also the Muʻtazila seem close 
to “contemporary liberalism” of 19th century Europe, in Watt’s view,1062 and close to 
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Enlightenment ideals, in Martin’s view.1063 That is the case at least in theory. It has to be 
remembered that Islamic jurisprudence and kalam theology were independent disciplines, 
which means that the Muʻtazila theories were generally not tested on the ground, and 
were hardly endorsed by the political will, except for forty years of unsuccessful period 
that ended with the return of the dominant Ash’ari doctrine.1064  
Although the Muʻtazila were not welcomed by most Ashʻaria partisans because of 
their theological/ theoretical advances, it is less clear if they could have implemented 
their theories in practice, especially in law matters on which the Quran and Sunna were 
very clear. The fact that the Mu´tazilla did not live long to have political impact made 
their rational and theoretical advances remain out of touch with society.
1065
 The high 
kalam theories and their impact on legal theory seem to have little impact on positive law 
(or fiqh) which was, and still is, seen as sacred, the Word of God as written in the 
Quran.
1066
 This does not mean that the Muʻtazila heritage had no impact or minor 
presence even in the work of influential Ash’ari scholars, like al-Razi and al-Ghazali. Al-
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Attar believes that the ethical thought of the Muʻtazila was used in formulating theories 
on maqāṣid asharia (objectives of the Sharia) developed by the Ash’ari school.1067  
With Abd Aljabbar, then, much of Mu’atazilla would wane away after the mihna 
of takfir (Inquisition-like) era, initiated by the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma´mun (813-833) to 
establish the Mu´tazilla doctrines among all the judges and jurists of the Abbasid rule as 
the only voice of Islam. The Ash´aria did not keep silent, and Imam Ibn Hanbal was their 
most outspoken. The Mihna was soon reversed during the reign of al-Mutawakkil (847-
861). The Mu´tazilla survived afterwards among some Shi‘a sects, like the Twelver Shi‘a 
and the Zaydi (Fiver) in Iran, and Yemen where the 20 volumes of Qadi Abdel Jabbar’s 
work was found in the 1950s. Its voice would re-appear by the nineteenth century, among 
both occidental scholars and reformist Muslims, sometimes referred to as modernists, not 
in the sense of giving in totally to Euro-modernity, but as reformists who have opened up 
to the West and have tried to integrate some, if not much, of its political and philosophic 
achievements. To this stage of the moderns (early and late reformists) I move now. I 
focus on their aspirations to revive the use of the faculty of reason in conceiving the 
objectives of the Sharia for the common good (maṣlaḥa ‘āmma). Their efforts, as will be 
seen, would be more politically centered, henceforth unable to reform the Sharia law and 
develop an ethical theory or directly invoke the Muʻtazila heritage.  
c. On Early Reformists: Political Reforms within Sharia Law 
Prescriptions    
The colonial encounter with the West since the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt 
marked a new era of relations between the West and the Islamic world.
1068
 “Christian” 
Europe, according to Charles Kurzman´s Modernist Islam (2002), threatened Islam in at 
least five registers: militarily, economically, cognitively, politically, and culturally.
1069
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“In sum, the challenges of modernity appeared to threaten the very existence of 
Islam.”1070 Muslim intellectuals and scholars had to face this challenge. According to 
Kurzam, the modernist, or early reformist, movement among Muslims of the Arabo-
Islamic Renaissance (naḥḍa) took three forms: first, it read classics and madhahibs and 
learnt from all of them without being stuck there to seek ways out of the impasse. 
Second, it reached the fundamental sources directly, Quran and Sunna. Third, it tried to 
reconcile the sacred with human reason.
1071
  
These three forms of understanding modernity in light of the tradition debated 
five general topics which were consumed and heavily dealt with: religious interpretations, 
cultural revival, political reform, science and education, women´s rights.
1072
 These were 
the main challenges scholars like Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India (d. 1898), Rifa’a Rafi’ el-
Tahtawi (d. 1873), Jamal Eddine al-Afghani (d. 1897), his student Muhamad Abduh (d. 
1905), and, in turn his student Rachid Rida (d. 1935), had to grapple with in the Arab-
Islamic world since the mid-nineteenth century.
1073
 Below I refer to the last three 
reformists’ views especially on reason. The first section of these early reformists is the 
briefest among the three generations I discuss (in this part IV Section 2) because most of 
the reformists of this generation were more occupied politically than devoted to 
constructing new theological readings of the tradition. As will be noted, their calls for the 
revival of reason in understanding the tradition remains limited to the Sharia classical 
prescriptions, compared to the late reformists/ the contemporaries who go beyond that.  
Jamal Eddine al-Afghani (d. 1997) is called by Muhammad Imara the “awakener 
of the East and the philosopher of Islam.”1074 Leaving apart his highly committed 
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political work in struggling against imperialism and working for pan-Islamism, it is his 
views on religion and reason that are of interest here. Afghani has a reconciliatory view 
of religion and reason. In his arraḍ ‘alā aadahriyyīn (Refutation of the Materialists, 
1955), firstly written against the Indian reformist Ahmed Seyyed Khan who was fully for 
the adoption of the European version of using science and practicing reasoning, Afghani 
opposed the evolutionary theory of Darwin, and defends God’s creation of the universe. 
He also opposed the materialist legacy of atheists like Epicurus, but highly esteemed its 
deist and rationalist contributors (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle).  
Afghani saw religion as a plus for the welfare of humanity; it should serve and 
equally be served by human reason and intelligence. In his historicist philosophy of 
religion, he contends that religious beliefs have to be grounded on sound demonstration 
and valid proof. He fought fatalism,
1075
 superstition, illiteracy, especially among women, 
and considered religion an extra force for social development and morality. He argued 
that religion has taught humankind three vital teachings: spirituality, since man has a 
spiritual nature which encourages people to rise above egotistical and “bestial” impulses, 
and try to live in peace with others; competition among religious groups which pushes 
them to seek knowledge and further progress; and belief in afterlife which is based on 
reward, and motivates ethical behavior and causes people to want to live a life of love, 
peace and justice eternally. More precisely, he believed that religion teaches three 
fundamental values: modesty (alḥayā’), honesty (aṣidq), and truthfulness (al-amāna). 
Historically, for him, these values were behind the Greatness of the Greeks, the Romans, 
the Persians, and the Muslims, but they all declined when they left them. Religion is the 
source of human happiness and perfection.
1076
  
Afghani defended the Quranic injunctions on the use of reason, and the Prophetic 
teachings for knowledge and learning, which he believed other religions did not advance. 
He believed that Islamic renaissance is possible, as long as philosophy is revived to go in 
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parallel with the rational spirit of Islam, and its Tawheed ethos that signifies, besides 
divine unity, justice and equality among people. In a lecture in Calcutta, India, in 1872, 
Afghani expressed his view of philosophy as “a mother science.” In his reply-letter to the 
French Orientalist Ernest Renan in 1883, he expresses a view which the latter also 
adopts: that religions generally oppresses free thought, while philosophy encourages it, 
since human reason requires it for demonstrative proofs. He, however, As to why then the 
Muslim world is in regress, his following reply/ statement has become famous:  
If someone says: If the Islamic world is as you say, then why are the Muslims in 
such a sad condition? I will answer: When they were [truly] Muslims, they were 
what they were and the world bears witness to their excellence. As for the present, 
I will content myself with this holy text: “Verily, God does not change the state of 
a people until they change themselves inwardly.
1077
 
 Overall, Afghani is mostly seen as a leading revivalist of Islamic perceptions of 
reasoning, and the place of philosophy for the well being of the Muslim intellect and 
society. For this reason, Albert Hourani considers his thought to be closer to philosophy 
than to theology.
1078
 Ibrahim Kalin says that “[H]is role in the revival of the study of 
Islamic philosophy in the Arab and Indian worlds [...] remains unmistakable.”1079  
 Muhammad Abduh (d. 1906) seems to have gained a special status among the 
early reformists in the Arab-Islamic world. He benefited a great deal from the early study 
missionaries that were sent by Mohammed Ali to Paris to learn the European sciences. 
Rifa´a al-Tahtawi (d. 1873) and his sojourn in Paris from 1826 to 1831 had its impact on 
him and the generation of intellectuals that read his translations of European modern 
thought and sciences. Abduh is one prominent figure among them. The latter studied in 
al-Azhar, but seeing that it did not teach philosophy and theology he left. He met the 
religious reformist and political activist al-Afghani and was influenced by his views on 
modern science and reason. Abduh received the instructions on rationalism of early 
Islamic thought from him. Later, he returned to al-Azhar as a lecturer and Mufti. He tried 
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to introduce educational reforms to the university curriculum (sciences, philosophy, and 
theology). He sojourned in Beirut for some time and lectured on theology.
1080
 
Like the Muʻtazila, Abduh also believed that reason guides humans in following 
what the divine reveals. If reason contradicts revelation, then most probably it is the first 
that has not elevated yet to the stage of the latter. This made Harun Nasution (d. 1998), an 
Indonesian neo-Mu´tazillite scholar, consider Abduh a Mu´atazillite.
1081
 Yet, Albert 
Hourani thinks that Abduh, whom he describes as “a systematic thinker,”1082 avoided 
delicate theological debates.
1083
 In his first version of risālat attawhīd (Treatise on 
Oneness or Theology of Unity, 1897) he defended the Mu´tazilla doctrine of the 
createdness of the Quran, but this was withdrawn in later versions, as Albert Hourani 
remarks, after the controversy it may have caused him.
1084
  
 For jurisprudence and the role of reason, according to the reading of David 
Johnson, Abduh argued that the principles of Sharia can be summarized in the concepts 
of justice and equality of rights for all. Abdhu assumes the independent ontological status 
of good and evil and the human moral ability to execute these values by means of ijithad 
and opinion/ ra´y. He is close to adopting natural law perspective. He is close to the 
Mu´tazilla on this matter. Johnson refers to Malcolm Kerr´s Islamic Reform (1966) in 
which he (Kerr) distinguishes between two models of natural law among reformists: 1) 
the model in which reason and revelation are seen as separate spheres of competence, and 
2) the model in which they work together with no distinction. Abduh, according to Kerr, 
belongs to the second model, for he divides law between the individual sphere and the 
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group sphere. He does so to make it clear that the ability to distinguish between good and 
evil is an obligation via religious reasoning. As for the group, it is reason, collective 
reason, alone that should govern the public affairs, and the group can be punished for 
that.
1085
 
 David Johnson, following Malcolm Kerr, also refers to Abduh’s disciple Rachid 
Rida (d. 1936). Rida lists ten objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid). Three of them are relevant 
here: religion brings happiness, Quran is the source of religion, Sunna rules are 
Muhamamd´s ijtihad and the later generations of Muslims may not follow them in civil, 
political and military issues. Rida discusses the sources of jurisprudence and defends 
qiyās, ruling by analogy. Johnson says that Rida builds on the work of Afghani and 
Abduh´s “eclectic theology” in which the Sharia is equivalent to natural law (with the 
exception of religious rites).  For him, “the resulting  hermeneutic  of  legal  rulings  is 
based not  so  much  on  specific  rules  spelled  out  by  the  text,  as  it  is  on  the ethical  
principles  revealed  as  God's  purposes  behind  the  text.”1086  Otherwise said, public 
interest (maṣlaḥa ‘āmma) can surpass ruling by analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijma) in 
matters of social affairs and morality.
1087
 Hourani says that Rida urged the ulema of the 
time to come together to produce a book of laws based on the Quran and hadith, but 
without being it stuck within the limits of the four main juridical schools. Like Abduh, he 
wanted to find answers to the new social problems using eclecticism (talfīq) as the way 
out. Talfīq was practiced before, but he wanted to use it more systematically and 
rationally to make the Muslim modern life accommodative of social changes.
1088
  
 The idea behind such sample references is to trace how the issue of reason and 
revelation are invoked in modern times of Islamic thought. That is, I wanted to see first 
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whether kalam-theological issues are invoked the same way as was the case with the 
Muʻtazila examples I referred to earlier, or whether it is the political and legal issues that 
have to do with applied social Islamic codes that are more stressed at this age of 
reformism. According to the scholars cited above, it seems that it is socio-political 
implications of Islamic law that is more stressed and being debated. Reason is being 
invoked as a confirmation of revelation, or that revelation is not, principally, in 
contradistinction with rational interpretations of matters related to socio-political life. The 
invocation of reason to understand revelation does not seem to revise profoundly the 
basic fundamentals on faith, or to interpret them through a rational, objectivist ethical 
theory like that of the Muʻtazilite Abd Aljabbar.  More precisely, and importantly, the 
human free will, or the nature of good and evil, are generally not revisited from a rational 
perspective. This makes the reforms called for more reforms of adaptation to socio-
political pressures of the colonial era and encounter with the developed West; they are 
not reforms of radical transformations in the Arab-Islamic thought. The Syrian 
philosopher George Tarabeshi (b. 1939) says that it is too much for a mindset to fight 
both for independence and for renaissance: 
The modern Arabic renaissance project has developed under a heavy effect of 
colonialism in our area [...]. Consequently, the renaissance intellectual had to 
build and deconstruct himself at the same time. He had to fight colonialism and 
build renaissance. As a result he was lost between the two issues. He couldn't 
overcome colonialism, nor he could build a real intellectual critical renaissance 
thought [...]. For me, I have discovered later on that we are in urgent need to 
criticism [...]. But I discovered also that a self-defense mental complex has been 
formed in our unconsciousness as a result of the colonial period, and that such a 
complex increases by time.
1089
 
The tendency among the so-called Renaissance reformists is more adaptive, defensive, 
and not profoundly innovative, because “self-criticism” and “reason” are still absent from 
the contemporary Arab thought, “rationalism, which is the essential condition for the 
birth of philosophy, is still far from possessing top priority in contemporary Arabic 
culture [....] The authority of the Arabic culture is still crowned by the authority of 
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religion.”1090 I do think that when the Indian early reformist Sayyed Ahmad Khan (d. 
1898) called for a “modern theology” to overcome the impasse of Islamic thought and the 
challenges of modern sciences and their foundations,
1091
 he did not mean adaptive 
theology on matters related to law only, but he meant profound rehabilitation of Islamic 
theology so that accommodation of modern life is founded on a new, clear and 
harmonious ethical theory that justifies, for example, the need to change Islamic penal 
code and family law, among other issues. Contemporary reformists that I turn to now still 
go on with evolving intellectual endeavours to develop rational bases for understanding 
especially the mundane socio-political matters. Rationalizing the ethics of Islam goes on 
among Muslim reformists in the postcolonial era, amidst the development of Salafism 
and even violent fundamentalism. The dilemma of reform in difficult times goes on, 
sometimes under a colonial situation, and at others under international pressure, 
postcolonial dictatorships and violent fundamentalisms.       
d. On Late Reformists: Theological Reforms beyond Sharia Prescribed 
Law  
The third generation I refer to in defending my idea of European Islam as 
“revisionist-reformist” in its move to the “rationalization of ethics” for a substantial 
reform is the contemporary one, which could also be called the generation of “late 
reformists.” I called the reformists of the Arabo-Islamic Renaissance “early reformists” 
because they paved the way for the currently profound debate on reform, re-reading the 
tradition and the sacred texts.  If the early reformists had political priorities that 
preoccupied their work on envisaging radically new pathways for Islam in the modern 
world, the contemporaries (late reformists) are doing exactly that: deepening the debate, 
opening new pathways for Islamic thought. I daringly call them “late reformists” not 
because I think their reformist projects are perfect and thus no further projects will be 
needed in the future. I call them so because I see that their projects are radically new and 
                                                          
1090
 Ibid. 
1091
 Sayyid Ahmad Khan says:  “Today  we  are,  as before,  in  need  of  a  modern  theology  ( 'ilm  al-
kalam), whereby we should either refute the doctrines of modern sciences, or undermine  their  foundations,  
or  show  that  they  are  in  conformity  with Islam.” Qtd in Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 217 
 
338 
 
revolutionary in Islamic intellectual history. The Islamic world –assuming that there is 
such a homogeneous entity which is willing to endorse these radical projects on the 
ground- cannot be modern in the European classical sense, i.e. rational and “nearly 
irreligious” in its version of secularism. The Islamic world can be modern in a new sense 
of the term, which is still in progress, and which I will be referring to as “perpetual 
modernity” (or ḥadatha mustamirra or mawsūla in Arabic, vs. “discontinuous 
modernity,” hadath munqati‘a).1092 That is, it is a version of modernity that does not de-
divinize; it does not negate the divine, or kill God. It does not live with dichotomies, 
either the rational or the divine, the political or the religious; it lives with both. It is a 
midway, a peaceful transition of overcoming both classical religiosity and classical Euro-
modernity. European Islam goes in the same direction of endorsing “perpetual 
modernity.”  
The scholars I refer to here are icons of substantial reform projects in 
contemporary Islamic thought. Any scholarly work on contemporary Islamic thought 
refers to some, if not most, of them despite their background disciplines and 
methodological concerns from which each starts his (or her) reform project. Because they 
all emphasises human agency and the faculty of reason in re-reading the tradition, they 
can all be called “rationalists.” Because they endorse most of European modernity values, 
following different justifications that stem from their methodologies of argumentation, 
they can also be called “modernists,” “liberals,” or “secularists.” However, none of them, 
according to my reading and understanding, has chosen one of these “labels” and 
cornered himself (or herself) within that premise. It is the researchers who read them that 
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try to categorize them, for various reasons (chronological, thematic, methodological, 
etc.). 
For my side, my reference to these reformists below has taken into account the 
chronological order since they are considered a third generation in focus in this study. It 
is difficult to deal with them thematically because of, again, their different backgrounds. 
Treating them one-by-one is the most convenient way to grasp their main reformist 
points, and I have followed this option, as I have done with the scholars I treat to describe 
the versions of European Islam, in the descriptive stage Part I, II, and III.  Most 
importantly, my selection of these scholars has kept in mind the sub-question this 
“comparative stage” (Part III, Section 1) deals with: what is new in European Islam? I 
had to refer to some important stages in Islamic history before I answer this question. I 
had to refer to the first generation of scholarship, exemplified by the Muʻtazila, then the 
early reformists or modernists of the Arabo-Islamic Renaissance, and now late reformists. 
Only when the previous contributions are brought to the fore can one then feel to have 
responsibly approached the question of newness, otherwise injustice is done to previous 
contributions. This methodological point is of high concern in understanding European 
Islam. Without it, the reader of only European Islam literature would say that it is 
“radically and totally new.”  
In my search for “newness” in European Islam I have found more developed 
approaches that call for reforming Islam in projects of scholars based mostly in the 
Islamic majority countries. Immersed in these projects I had to keep in mind the triadic 
framework I have devised to conceptualize my understanding of European Islam, i.e. 
“world-society-individual,” endorsed by Abdurrahmane’s critical framework 
(humanization-historicization-rationalization). The projects in various ways and generally 
indirectly fit this framework. I explain what I mean, before I refer to each project 
separately, with reference to three axes, or main points, these projects share. These axes 
could be termed “cosmic wellbeing,” “social wellbeing,” and “individual wellbeing.” 
These axes match a methodologically thematic classification of the late reformists I refer 
to. This classification goes as follows: 1) “hermeneutists,” or “ethicists-textualists” 
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(exemplified by, and not limited to, the work of Fazlur Rahman, Mohamed Arkoun, Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd, and Hassan Hanafi), 2) “egalitarianists-legalists” (like Fatema 
Mernissi and Amina Wadud, and Abdullahi Ahmed An’naim), and 3) “neo-rationalists” 
(like Mohamed Abed Aljabri and Abdulkarim Soroush). Below, I explain with brevity the 
three axes the late reformists seem to share, and how that matches the classification I 
have resorted to for methodological concerns.  
The three axes I see focalized by the late reformists can be illustrated in the 
following manner. First, the first axis or point is measured through how these projects 
treat the divine text (the Quran) and the Prophetic experience (the Sunna), in light of the 
historical period of the 7
th
 century Arabia. This question is vital since it is the cornerstone 
upon which further socio-political implications can be based. This focalized element 
summarizes the worldview Islam advances. Understanding the Quran and the Sunna, 
according to these projects, means understanding that Islam – and religion in general- is 
made for this world, and the “cosmic wellbeing” of man in it. There is an attempt by 
these reformists to understand the philosophy of religion in general, and the existentialist 
paradigm in Islam in particular. Not to narrow it down just to them, nor to summarize 
their work just in this element, the “hermeneutists,” or “ethicists-textualists,” are very 
concerned with reading the main sources of the tradition for the sake of getting to the 
heart of the matter in the religious message. Rahman and Arkoun, for instance, emphasize 
the ethical élan of Islam which has been lost through the officialization of religious 
teachings in “Orthodox Official Corpuses” – to use Arkoun’s term. Arguing in the same 
line of thought is Hannafi who sees in hermeneutics a means to social justice and 
understanding of the divine message for worldly well being. He argues for engaged 
hermeneutists and “progressive hermeneutics” that work against social oppression and 
injustice.  
 The second axis focalized in referring to these reformist projects is their reading 
of the accumulated scholarship from the 8
th
 to the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries (the 
time of encounter with the modern Western world). My categorization of these reformists 
below will clarify what kind of scholarship is meant – ethical, jurisprudential, 
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hermeneutical, etc. This second point, based on the first one that tries to revisit the 
message(s) of Islam, centralizes the implications of the religious message on society. 
That is, it underpins the “social wellbeing” of man as advocated by religion/ Islam itself, 
in light of social evolution and growing demands. By way of exemplification, the work of 
Mernissi, Wadud, and An’naim can be helpful in understanding this axis. Classical Sharia 
law aside, they either refer to the Mekkan period as a more universal and egalitarian 
aspect of Islam, or to more general prescriptions of equality in the texts. The focus of 
these scholars is the achievement of the ontological equality human beings are endowed 
with for social justice which women and non-Muslims, for example, have not always 
enjoyed equally with Muslim men for various socio-political reasons and methodological 
interpretations of the texts.  
The third axis I see shared by the studied reformists is human agency and its 
pivotal role in understanding the religious message and interpreting it according to human 
needs in different times and places. This axis emphasizes the individual moral 
responsibility and rational faculty. It is about the “individual wellbeing” which it tries to 
realize by means of the faculty of reason, without the denial of the divine. As an agent in 
a cosmic order, the individual is the one mostly concerned with the comprehension of the 
divine, but also in communion with the social and world orders. Aljabri and Soroush are 
considered here as examples of reformists who insist on reviving the rationalist tradition 
in Islam, be it the Averroist tradition in the case of Aljabri or the Muʻtazila in the case of 
Soroush.  
Overall, the three reformist groups proposed above share concern for the deduced 
axes – cosmic wellbeing, social wellbeing, and individual wellbeing. The three groups 
are all based on reading the same sacred text, and all call for a responsible and ethical use 
of human reasoning faculty in grasping the divine teachings that are destined for this 
world first. The three end in calling for the “rationalization of ethics” beyond the 
classically prescribed Sharia law that has been historically interpreted as the basis of 
Islamic ethics. The reformists’ preservation of the divine in conceptualizing approaches 
to ethics for human worldly good, and textualist readings of divine texts, makes them 
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rationalists that humanize the divine text and its intent, without humanizing the divine 
itself, or taking its place in a form of revolt over the master to rule in his place. No 
“Promethean tragedy” occurs in contemporary Islamic thought as presented by the 
studied projects. 
Accordingly, and following my framework “world-society-individual,” the world 
is for man to use and contemplate. It is man’s “inheritance.” However divine it could be, 
it should be “humanized,” in the sense that the rules that govern it should bear in mind 
that they are directed to man who inhabits the world, and are not directed to God Himself. 
Society has to be worked for in light of the historical evolution of man, human diversity, 
and human growing faculties of discovery and invention. Classical fiqh is no longer the 
only eternal norm to follow to be Muslim or Islamic. Classical fiqh is no longer seen as 
the only manifestation of Islam; it is just a part of its historical manifestation. “Practical 
fiqh” is the way out to “historicize” divinity. Historicization requires human agency that 
“rationalizes” the ethical message of Islam, and makes faith a “rational” private 
matter.
1093
 
The Hermeneutists: Rahman, Arkoun, Abu Zayd, and Hanafi  
Fazlur Rahman: towards an “ethical system” through “purely cognitive    
effort” 
The Pakistani Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) continues the reformism that grew early 
in the Indian continent with Sayyed Ahmed Khan and Muhammad Iqbal.
1094
 Rahman 
                                                          
1093
 All the terms between inverted commas are briefly introduced in the main introduction of this work 
(Introduction, Section 4). They are mine, unless otherwise indicated. They are deduced from my reading of 
both European Islam literature and Muslim reformists literature in the Islamic majority countries or in the 
broader West. Some of them are Taha Abdurrahmane’s critical concepts, also introduced in the 
introduction (like humanization, historicization, and rationalization). They will be examined in length in the 
section devoted to them “Conceptualizing the Idea of European Islam,” Part VI, Section 3. I tend to drop 
the inverted commas as I procede, assuming that they are by now kept in mine by the reader. At times I use 
the inverted commas even at the end of this work as a way of emphasizing a term or idea.  
1094
 Trained in traditional Islamic subjects, Rahman grew up to experience an intellectual crisis which 
Martin, et al. liken to that of St. Augustine and Al-Ghazali. Rahman appreciated some Western scholars´ 
readings of Islam – scholars like Hamilton Gibb, Wilfred C. Smith, and Kenneth Cragg. In Oxford he 
studied the impact of Greek philosophy on early Islamic thought. He returned as an advisor to his country´s 
government in the 1960s, but his reformist ideas on Islam, particularly on socio-economic matters, were not 
343 
 
believes that the prime message of Islam is that of “social justice.” This message lived for 
a very short time, during the Prophet´s life and two first caliphs, which experienced 
homogeneity and strength of the State. Since then, the message went unrestored. Yet, 
since this message was realized once, Rahman strongly believes that it can be realized 
again. For this to happen, “Islamic intellectualism” has to be recovered, rehabilitated, 
through “higher Islamic education.” In Islam and Modernity (1982), Rahman devotes 
himself to studying educational systems in the Islamic world. The results are not 
satisfactory. Stagnation, mimicry/ taqlid of the early scholars of Islam, repetition, self-
centered Sufism, which he calls in Revival and Reform in Islam (1999) “spiritual 
smithery,”1095 and deterministic attitudes are what these studied curricula teach. Few 
regions kept the philosophical and theological debates alive, and those are mainly among 
the Shi‘a. Turkey has tried to modernize, but still “Islamic intellectualism” he hankers 
after was still nowhere to be seen for him. So, the reform he suggests has to be 
theological-philosophic, based on “intellectual jihad,” and “moral jihad.”1096    
Rahman is critical of the later Ash´aria, Mu´tazilla, Sufists, neo-revivalists, and 
modernists. For the “new Ash’ari,” he believes that they developed a theology of pre-
destination and the ethics of predestinarianism, irja’ (vs. qadar, and responsibility), 
which means that humans can only act metaphorically, and thus they are stripped of 
responsibility for their action. “This attitude  was  bound  to  do  severe  damage  to  the  
human  self-image  as  a repository  of  initiatives  and  originality  and  harmed  the  
assumptions underlying  law,  which  considered  human  beings  as  free  and  
responsible agents.”1097 Rahman admires the Muʻtazila, though he is critical of extreme 
rationalists. The latter built a theory of rational ethics on the grounds that good and bad 
are knowable by natural reason without the aid of revelation. For “primary” or general 
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ethical truths about right and wrong, they are rationally discovered by intuitive reason, 
while for “secondary ethical truths, humanity needs revelation.”1098 As to Sufism, he 
believes that “Sufi influence brought about a vicious dualism between the "inner life of 
the heart" and the "actions of the limbs."”1099 Sufis neglected this world and busied 
themselves with their inners and God. This is against the inter-human (social) morality 
that the Quran is about. He calls this “spiritual smithery,” yet recognizes that not all 
Sufists are of the same type.
1100
  He is partially critical of al-Ghazali, too, for having read 
the Quran through mere Sufi perspective.
1101
 As to the neo-revivalist and 
fundamentalists, he criticizes them, though they managed to protect the Muslims against 
the modern secularists, for not being able to build a clear reformist “method;” they suffer 
from “intellectual bankruptcy,” as he calls it. He adds,  
The new revivalist is […] a shallow and superficial person – really rooted neither 
in the Quran nor in traditional intellectual culture, of which he knows practically 
nothing. […] The essence of the matter is that the neorevivalist has produced no 
Islamic educational system worthy of the name, […] has been unable to devise 
any methodology, any structural strategy, for understanding Islam or for 
interpreting the Quran.
1102
 
The Islamic modernists, for him, also lack a clear “enough method for reform.”1103 
Though he was open to Western philosophy, he took from it just what served his 
approach.
1104
 He was very critical of Western scholarship on Islam in general. He was 
also very skeptic of secularism which “destroys the sanctity and universality 
(transcendence) of all moral values,” for it is “necessarily atheistic.”1105 Earle Wugh says 
that Rahman “disagreed with both liberals and conservatives.”1106 
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The vacuum Rahman speaks of has to do with the lack of an independent ethical 
approach of the Quran that distinguishes between the moral and the legal. He believes 
that no such approach has been developed yet. The available approaches are “atomistic” 
in the sense that the unity of the Quranic message is not understood; this approach 
resulted in interpreting Quranic verses as having a legal intent, an approach he does not 
agree with.
1107
 What forced such interpretations is the lack of a Quranic approach that 
interprets it according to the reasons of descent of the verses, hasaba asbāb annuzūl. A 
correct interpretation that answers the social message of the Quran, and the development 
of “inter-human morality,” becomes his preoccupation. This becomes his aim: “a 
systematic attempt must be made to elaborate an ethics on the basis of the Quran, for 
without an explicitly formulated ethical system, one can never do justice to Islamic 
law.”1108 To reconstruct such an ethical system requires a “purely cognitive effort.”1109 
Rahman proposes a hermeneutical approach in reading the Quran for a 
theologico-ethical reform. This approach “is exclusively concerned with the cognitive 
aspect of the revelation,” and is fully concerned with values.1110 “The basic élan of the 
Quran is moral.”1111 The basic élan of the Quran – the stress on socioeconomic justice 
and essential human egalitarianism - is quite clear from its very early passages.
1112
 As the 
essence of the Quranic message, ethics becomes, in Rahman´s reading, “the necessary 
link between theology and law,” between the cognitive and emotive faith that can give 
guidance and meaning to the individual and collective believers.
1113
 
Rahman, like the Mu´tazilla, believes in the createdness of the Quran. He 
recognizes its divinity and that it is “verbally revealed,” but argues that this revelation 
took place in a particular period of time, in a particular linguistic and cultural context. For 
any update reading of the sacred text, so that such an innovation affects the other sectors 
of social and individual life, the text has to be re-interpreted. For this reason Rahman 
                                                          
1107
 Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 2-3 
1108
Rahman,  Islam, 256. 
1109
 Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 4 
1110
 Ibid., 4 
1111
 Rahman, Islam. 33. 
1112
 Islam and Modernity,  19 
1113
 Ibid., 154 
346 
 
attempts a revolutionary reading, and among the modern reformists, he could be 
considered the first one to advance it.
1114
 He argues that though revelation is divine, the 
wording is most likely to be that of the Prophet Mohammad, for the relation between the 
divine inspiration, the feeling of the Prophet, and the wording is very tight. He puts it this 
way, 
The Quran is, therefore, purely divine. Further, even with regard to ordinary 
consciousness, it is a mistaken notion that ideas and feelings float about in it and 
can be mechanically “clothed” in words. There exists, indeed, an organic 
relationship between feelings, ideas and words. In inspiration, even in poetic 
inspiration, this relationship is so complete that feeling-idea-word is a total 
complex within a life of its own. When Muhammad’s moral intuitive perception 
rose to the highest point and became identified with the moral law itself […], the 
Word was given with the inspiration itself. The Quran is thus pure Divine Word, 
but of course, it is equally intimately related to the inmost personality of the 
Prophet Muhammad whose relationship to it cannot be mechanically conceived 
like that of a record. The Divine Word flowed through the Prophet’s heart. 
In this sense, Rahman is going beyond the Muʻtazila idea of the createdness of the Quran. 
The createdness was by God, in their view, but Rahman’s view does not stop there. 
Though it is created and decreed by God, he is saying that the linguistic wording in the 
Prophet’s. That is, he is proposing a historicist view of the linguistic production of the 
Quranic message, taking into account the Prophet’s socio-cultural and political context. 
This hermeneutist, textualist, and contextualist view is very innovative for the orthodoxy. 
It can have immense impact on the way Islamic law has been interpreted historically for 
socio-political management of the Muslim community’s affairs.  
In his theological advances, Rahman lists three major themes of the Quran:  
monotheism, socio-economic justice, and the Last Day, i.e. the final accountability of 
man.
1115
 Monotheism or Tawhid aside here, socio-economic justice and free will are of 
particular concern for the ethical system he calls for. He proposes “double movement” as 
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the way to go in understanding the message of the Quran as interpreted by the Prophet in 
history.
1116
 By “double movement” he aims at deducing general principles in light of the 
overall message of the Quran, and not by stopping at particular verses that have been 
interpreted legally: 
In building any genuine and viable Islamic set of laws and institutions, there has 
to be a twofold movement: First one must move from the concrete case treatment 
of the Qur’an – taking the necessary and relevant social conditions of that time 
into account – to the general principles upon which the entire teaching converges. 
Second, from this general level there must be a movement back to specific 
legislation, taking into account the necessary and relevant social conditions now 
obtaining.
1117
 [Emphasis is original]  
This means that the Quran cannot be interpreted literally now, otherwise its ethical and 
social message can be thwarted. For example, the Quranic injunctions about inheritance, 
polygamy, penal code, and ribā/ usury, have to be read in light of this backward-then-
forward looking “double movement.” For a better historiographic interpretation of the 
Prophetic Sunna, Rahman makes this distinction between the “Prophetic Sunna,” which 
is ideal and exemplary, and the “living Sunna,” which is historical and temporal. He 
argues that the ijma´/ consensus among the Muslim scholars about the Sunna was about 
the “living” one which is historic, while they should have considered the ideal one, the 
“Prophetic” one which interpreted the Quranic message in correspondence to that 
particular historical unique period.
1118
  
 Rahman elevates human intellect and responsibility to high levels to match the 
moral weight of the revelation. He says that revelation has to be interpreted constantly so 
that laws match morality, otherwise it becomes a mere emotional and abstract system, or 
falls into secularism; and secularism for him, though it pretends neutrality, is atheist in its 
aim. These views are well expressed in this clear passage where ethics are seen as the 
priority over law: 
A God that speaks neither to the intellect of man nor to his heart, nor yet can 
generate a system of values for man, is considerably worse than nothing and is 
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better off dead. The moral values are the crucial pivot of the entire overall system, 
and from them flows the law. The law is therefore the last part in this chain and 
governs all the “religious,” social, political, and economic institutions of the 
society. Because law is to be formulated on the basis of the moral values, it will 
necessarily be organically related to the latter. But because it governs the day-to-
day life of the society, with necessary social change it has to be reinterpreted. 
Should the process of reinterpretation stop, obviously the society must either 
stagnate or else rebel and take the road of secularism. In either case the whole 
structure of theology, morality, and law will eventually collapse.
1119
  
This means that moral values, though intellectually perceived and morally adopted, take 
root in the divine. What Rahman is saying is that re-reading revelation in light of human 
socio-political changes does not mean laxity or loosening what seems tight in it. Rather, 
since it is the ethical approach that he targets in the Quran, and its impact on social 
justice, it is human responsibility that governs this ethical system at the end. As a 
philosopher, he certainly stresses the role of reason, but unlike Kant for the modern 
Europe, he believes that morality can be stabilized and preserved through believing in the 
divine.
1120
 Morality here is not separated from reason, but they are tied together: the 
experience of the divine is not lived separate from the moral code that governs the 
individual in society. Divine morality in this system is espoused to reasoning; this way no 
gaps develop in society between what is divine and what is not divine, for reason thinks 
divinely. This is what can be inferred from this passage: 
The central concern of Quran is the conduct of man. Just as in Kantian terms no 
ideal knowledge is possible without the regulative ideas of reason (like first 
cause), so in Quranic terms no real morality is possible without the regulative 
ideas of God and the Last Judgment. […] God exists in the mind of the believer to 
regulate his behavior if he is religiomorally experienced, but that which is to be 
regulated is the essence of the matter. The bane of later medieval Islam […] was 
that what was regulative, namely God, was made the exclusive object of 
experience and thus, instead of men’s seeking values from this experience, the 
experience became the end in itself, […] it was mostly either neutral to social 
morality or even negatively related to it.
1121
 [Emphasis added] 
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Human freedom in this ethical system then takes a “middle path,” using Rahman´s word, 
since the moral code remains divine and not purely human based. “Values cannot be 
made and unmade by man at his own whim or convenience and should not be misused or 
abused for the sake of expediency.”1122 Since the individual is the “vicegerent on earth,” 
it is his “taqwa,” piety, that makes him responsible of the ethical code that is divinely 
transmitted. For Rahman, “taqwa” is a central ethical concept.1123 In sum, Rahman´s 
rational aspects in his interpretation aim at preserving the ethical wealth of the Quran, or 
the Quranic normativeness, and its social justice message.
1124
 What I see in Rahman’s 
interpretation of the Quranic text, its ethical message, and socio-political implications is 
that ultimately he wishes to see the secular and the divine merging as if they were one. 
Thus, neither the divine would lose its central contribution in polishing the conduct of 
man, nor would the secular lose its mundane interests that serve this same ethical man.
1125
   
His three leading themes of the Quran make his approach harmonious and relevant for the 
divine and mundane marriage he seeks to develop. Belief in 1) Tawhid, work for 2) 
socio-economic justice, and remembrance of 3) the Last Day build an overlapping ground 
between divine ethics and secular practices. 
 Mohamed Arkoun: back to the “Quranic event” to unveil an “open Islam” 
 Mohamed Arkoun (d. 2010) belongs to a different category of Islamic scholars. 
His background in philosophy from his early training in Algeria has influenced his 
approach in reading the Islamic tradition and obsession with revitalizing Islamic reason. 
His long sojourn in Paris where he spent the rest of his life made him a heavy reader of 
the French Annales historiography school, and the school of poststructuralists, 
deconstructionists, semiotists, psychoanalysts, and postmodernists, led by scholars like 
Claude Levi Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Michel 
Foucault, Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. Arkoun can be read as a 
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modernist, since he belongs to the modern schools of thought from which he learnt the 
tools to critique the Islamic texts, but his approach is very radical to be called modernist 
in the sense of Euro-modernity. Arkoun´s work is based on reading all the sacred texts 
(Quran, Bible, Torah) historically, sociologically, and anthropologically in light of what 
the modern social sciences have achieved.  Divinity aside, the sacred text itself can be 
read like any other text produced in particular period of time, in a particular space and in 
a particular language. All these aspects influence the divine text and its interpretation. For 
him, every text is political, and thus an instrument of power. This makes Martin, et al. 
classify him as a “postmodernist.”1126 Arkoun is simply radical in his approach in the 
sense that he calls for an epistemological break with the tradition. This break is not to 
negate revelation per se but to deconstruct the way it has been hegemonically interpreted 
by what he calls the “official closed corpus.” His Rethinking Islam (1994), and the 
Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (2002) have become iconic titles for new 
approaches among Islamic studies scholars.    
 Arkoun detects three developments of the Quran. The first is the “Quranic fact/ 
event”; it is the moment of revelation itself, and it lasted between 610-631. It is God´s 
appeal to human consciousness, has an existential meaning, and is linked to Arabic 
language. It is oral. It is also transhistorical since its appeal is atemporal and goes beyond 
the demise of the Prophet. Such a revelation is open to various horizons of interpretations 
and realizations. It is not systematized, and does not logically distinguish between the 
mythical and rational. Arkoun calls this stage the “Quranic discourse” or “fact/ event.” 
The Prophet, as the champion of this stage, made it a successful stage because of his 
ability to merge sublimation with socio-political factors, using particular heuristic 
devices, like metaphors, parables, symbols, and dialectic devices.
1127
  
The second development or phase is that of collection and canonization of the 
Quran in a book called the Musḥaf (between 632-936). This marks the beginning of the 
“Islamic fact/ event,” or “Islamic discourse” which establishes itself historically on the 
basis of the Quranic discourse. Here, the Quranic fact was used as a pretext for the socio-
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political context that was developing as a power. Some aspects of the Quranic discourse 
are used, selectively, to serve power purposes that the orthodoxy provides. Here, 
revelation is no longer open but narrowed down to the Arabic linguistic understandings 
the orthodoxy constructs.  
The third development is that of the “established orthodoxy” (since 936). Here a 
new imaginaire within the Islamic community emerges. This imaginaire shapes what is 
thinkable, what is unthinkable, and with it also remains hidden what is unthought in 
Islamic thought. Arkoun strives to fathom the archeology of the imaginaire of the 
tradition, to find what the orthodoxy left out in historicizing revelation. The total of the 
unthought makes the unthinkable.
1128
  
 The imaginaire that develops from orthodoxy impacts three levels: the religious, 
social, and individual imaginaire. For the religious imaginaire, the orthodoxy is taken for 
granted, without critical thinking. The social one combines the orthodox imaginaire and 
the ideological forces and discourses to maintain the idea of unity and nation. 
Mythologization of the Golden Age of Islam and the Medina prophetic experiences are 
examples of this social imaginaire. The individual absorbs these imaginaires and they all 
become his own, without critical thinking. For example, “the faithful still perceive 
religious law (shari´a) as a Divine Law rooted in revelation. That is why people demand a 
political regime that protects and applies this law and rejects all legislation of human 
origin.”1129  
 The critique of Islamic reason Arkoun launches starts from the “hegemonic” and 
“logocentric” “official closed corpus” set up by the orthodoxy after the Mu´tazillite 
rationalism and Averroes´ ordeal and death, “After the death of Ibn Roshd (d. 1198), the 
creative interface between theology, religious law and philosophy was disrupted.”1130 
Arkoun speaks of the “emerging reason” which can deconstruct the “Islamic fact” that 
grew up from an “official closed corpus” and “dogmatic” reading of the “Quranic fact.” 
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Now, an archeology of religious texts has to be developed in light of sociological, 
anthropological, linguistic, and semiotic studies of the texts to unearth the potential truth 
in the divine message. This enterprise can also be nourished by comparative studies of 
the three divine religions to unveil the unthought in revelations, beyond dichotomies that 
modernity has fallen into (secular vs. profane, state vs. Church, etc.). A more plural 
reasoning paradigm has to match the “emerging reason.” The “Historical epistemology” 
approach in Arkoun´s project aims at deciphering the structures and forces that 
eliminated the philosophical standpoint of reason in Islamic thought.
1131
 A “historical 
discontinuity,” an epistemological break with such a tradition, on the methodological 
level, becomes imperative for Arkoun, by the utility of the “emerging reason.” The latter 
is not stable. It is analytical, deconstructionist, and constantly on the move. It is on 
constant analysis of any religious orthodoxy, philosophic postulate or ideological 
discourse. He defines it as follows: 
It is concerned with the philosophical subversion of the use of reason itself and all 
forms of rationality produced so far and those which will be produced in the 
future so as not to repeat the ideological compromises and derivations of the 
precedent postures and performances of reason. In that sense, E.R. [Emerging 
Reason] will be continuously emerging to reassess its critical function.
1132
  
The emerging reason, or “emergent reason,” is “reason in crisis.” It is so because its 
meaning does not seem to emerge, or it emerges to subvert a particular discourse. It is 
primarily against the “hegemonic reason,” like the Western logocentric reason, or the 
Islamic orthodox reason. The “emergent reason” helps the subaltern voices to speak up, 
“we have to be able to hear voices reduced to silence, heterodox voices, minority voices, 
the voices of the vanquished and the marginalized, if we are to develop a reason capable 
of encompassing the human condition.”1133 This would shatter the walls of orthodox 
certainties and hegemonic reason. It leads to the end of certainty-based science, or ´ilm 
al-yaqin, “from ´ilm al-yaqin to the end of certainties.”1134 
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 Because of the established orthodoxy, its official closed corpus, and the 
imaginaire it has hammered in the minds of its believers for centuries, political theology 
and political philosophy suffered immensely to the extent that they vanished from Islamic 
reasoning and became among the unthinkable. With the “managers of the sacred,” Islam 
has developed a weird combination that suffocates its reform. Arkoun puts this in a good 
comparative statement: “Islam is theologically Protestant and politically Catholic.”1135 
The first part of the statement means that “the right of examination of the Scriptures 
belongs to any adherent duly prepared to enter a doctrinal controversy with his peers,” 
while the second part means the “absolute authority and power of the caliph or the imam 
vertically given coverage by doctors of law (Sunni) and clerical hierarchy (Shi‘ite 
hierarchy).”1136 In between the two much of orthodoxy and hegemony complexifications 
have taken place historically, through the three Ds, the trilogy of Din, Dunya, and Dawla 
(Religion, Life, and State), and how they have been connectedly been interpreted. This 
has immensely impacted the “Quranic fact.” The latter has to be regained; it resists the 
Islamic orthodox discourse.  Arkoun believes that the Quranic fact has instinctive 
resistance devices, and they are the wealth that has to be explored to regain, besides its 
cognitive capacities, the “spiritual ethos of the Quran.”1137  
 Arkoun is for the development of “spiritual responsibility” that caters for the 
emancipation of the modern “human spirit.” More precisely, Arkoun is critical of the 
orthodox marginalization of the “person” from the focus of Islamic theology and political 
philosophy. He is critical of the centralization of the male and the marginalization of the 
female and child, from classical thought. Equal critique is launched against Judeo-
Christian traditions and modern secular and material philosophy that has categorized 
Islam outside of the traditions that can contribute to the emancipation of the human 
condition.
1138
 Western philosophy now shies away from debating the human condition. 
Western philosophers avoid measuring the ethical debate starting from personal 
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experiences.
1139
 For these reasons, Arkoun recognizes the “need to rediscover what I 
[Arkoun] venture to call “spiritual responsibility,” as a means of resistance, on the part of 
the human spirit, against the operations of reason itself as the latter works with the 
“unthinkables” and “unthoughts” of each socio-cultural environment and each historical 
period.” He does not mean archaic religious self-centered spirituality, but that which 
revisits the debate on the “dignity of man,” “I am introducing the concept of spiritual 
responsibility, not to reactivate the idealistic claims for religious spiritualism, but to 
problematize the current reference made to the “dignity of man.”1140 The “person” or the 
“human spirit” Arkoun wants to see developing is that which liberates itself from any 
orthodoxy whatsoever, be it religious or philosophic. Such a person is simply pluralist, 
epistemologically able to see what goes on in building a particular tradition, philosophy, 
or worldview. He provides a heuristic definition for it, which goes as follows:  
For the human spirit, assuming a spiritual responsibility means providing oneself 
with all the means, and at all times the necessary conditions, for resisting all 
activities (once they have been duly identified) that aim to alienate it (the spirit), 
enslave it, mutilate it or mislead one or several of its faculties in an attempt to 
achieve an end contrary to what makes it the seat, the agent and the irreducible 
sign of the eminent dignity of the human person.
1141
 
Arkoun cautions that he is not calling for a return to “mythologized values” but to 
“opening new spaces of intelligibility and more reliable possibilities for the emancipation 
of the human condition.”1142 He says that religions have for centuries guarded values for 
societies, but with time that turned into control of these values. So, “secular religions” 
have started to propose themselves as the alternative. He does not blame religions per se 
but the human interpretations that imprison them. “Spiritual responsibility” is in the 
hands of the person, more than it is in religions’ control, “It is illusory and dangerous to 
ask of religions more than they can give. Only human beings, with their creativity and 
innovative boldness, can constantly renew and augment opportunities for their own 
liberation.”1143 From Arkoun historiographical perspective, Islam has this potential of 
                                                          
1139
 Arkoun, Islam: to Reform or to Subvert? 292; 359. 
1140
 Ibid., 284 
1141
 Ibid., 284 
1142
 Ibid., 294  
1143
 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 113 
355 
 
rehabilitating the debate on the dignity of man and human emancipation. “There exists a 
liberal, critical Islam open to change, an Islam still little known and rarely taken into 
consideration.”1144 
 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd: “Rethinking the Quran as a discourse” 
The Egyptian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (d. 2010), who is the student and colleague 
of the famous scholar Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935), adopts a literary-critical reading of the 
Islamic sacred text in light of modern discourse analysis tools (semiology, hermeneutics, 
linguistics, stylistics and science of narration).
1145
 Initially, he reads the Quran as “text” – 
before he considers it later a “discourse” about the “meaning of life.” The Quran becomes 
like any produced text and the available devices of analysis can be projected on it. Like 
Arkoun, he differentiates between the divinity of the Quranic moment of revelation, and 
the Quran as compiled in the Musḥaf [i.e. compiled in a book format, after it had been 
memorized orally and preserved in the hearts of believers].
1146
 Because of its oral 
originality, the Quranic discourse is then polyphonic, and not monophonic; and this 
makes of it open to various interpretations. More, Abu Zayd speaks of (six) axioms that 
impact the production and dissemination of knowledge. The idea of the axioms is that 
knowledge, through the production of texts, cannot be isolated from its linguistic and 
socio-political contours that form them. Subsequently, he differentiates between two 
main texts, the Quranic text, which is “primary,” and the Sunna text, “which is 
secondary.” The latter explains the former. But since the latter (Sunna) is itself explained 
and expounded upon by scholarly jurists and commentators that came after the Prophet, 
then by implication this impacts the first text as well, i.e. the Quranic text.
1147
  
Abu Zayd grounds his approach in the idea that there is no innocent text. In 
Reformation of Islamic Thought (2006), he says, “Studying the history and methodology 
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of classical exegesis, I became aware of the fact that there is neither an objective, nor an 
innocent interpretation.”1148 This made him realize that “the Qur'an became a battlefield 
for the adversaries to situate their political, social and theological positions.”1149 This 
means that the hermeneutical devices used by various early Islamic scholars move from 
being a mere “textual authority” that the “text” establishes epistemologically to a socio-
political authority that controls and influences. It moves from being a mere process of 
knowledge production, an epistemic basis for thought, to a political force of power. After 
having considered the Quran as a text to be analyzed as a literary “text,” he, around 2002-
2004, moves to considering it a “discourse” that has horizontal, and not only vertical, 
dimensions in society; i.e. if moves from being a text from God-individual relations 
(vertical relation) to involve more agents and intermediaries in society, and becomes 
horizontal, a relation like God-society-individual. This he explains in Thinking in the 
Time of Excommunication:  
Because of this, we differentiate between “the texts” [and its epistemic authority] 
and authority, which is enforced by the human mind, not emanated from the text 
itself. And because of this, the call for “freedom for the authority of the texts” is 
in reality a call for freedom from absolute authority and overall reference of 
thought, which exerts coercion, hegemony and control when it imposes on texts 
meanings and connotations outside of time, space, circumstances and context.
1150
 
Such advances on the Quran, especially when first considered as a text, forced Abu Zayd 
to leave his country, Egypt, to the Netherlands where he exiled himself and researched till 
his death. Al-Azhar scholars opposed his views, accused him of apostasy, and appealed to 
divorce him from his wife, for an apostate, or unbeliever, cannot be married a Muslim 
woman!  
If textual analysis bases itself on demarcating the canonization processes of the 
Quranic and Sunna texts, discourse analysis of the Quran goes further than that. It has 
direct impacts on society, instead of remaining a more abstract/ textual analysis. Quran as 
discourse targets “open, democratic, humanistic hermeneutics,” says Abu Zayd, because 
the Quran is about the “meaning of life.” To understand this meaning, its horizontal 
                                                          
1148
 Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
UP, 2006) 93 
1149
 Ibid.  
1150
 Abu Zayd, Thinking in the Time of Excommunication, 138. 
357 
 
dimensions as lived and expressed in daily life have to be examined.
1151
 It happened in its 
early period and it has to be revived, “remembered”; the Quran is not only a text, but a 
discourse that engages in debate, argues, accepts, and refuses. It can cope with modernity 
and face its challenges. This Muslims have to do, to “rethink the Quran,” “without 
relinquishing their spiritual power.”1152  
Having approached the tradition from textual analysis lenses, Abu Zayd says that 
he does not aim at de-sacralizing the divine. Rather, since the tradition was developed by 
human interpretation, following rigorous hermeneutiocal devices that served the purpose 
in the past, he now calls for doing the same in light of the new socio-political changes 
and scientific and analytical advancements. “Such a call for freedom doesn't stand upon 
discarding religion or its texts, but it stands upon understanding religious texts a scientific 
understanding.”1153  
In his approach, late Abu Zayd
1154
, like Arkoun, is considered to be radical in his 
epistemological stand towards the tradition, compared to other scholars. There is no 
doubt that a clear epistemological break transpires with the tradition in his humanistic 
and hermeneutical approach. This epistemological break does not go so far as to break 
ties with the divine – at least not directly. It just gives much space to human responsible 
manoeuvre. He does not believe that the Quran was created, as the Mu´tazilla, for 
example, do. He believes that it is the Word of God, and it was created eternally. Yet, this 
note of the Quran´s creation apart, he agrees in his interpretation with the Mu´tazillites: “I 
believe that in order to make sense of the Qur’an, we need to understand the text 
metaphorically rather than literally. I also believe that it is essential to interpret the text 
by taking into account the social-cultural context in which it was received.”1155 This said, 
Abu Zayd never doubted his belief in Islam. His criticism of the tradition is not degrading 
or condescending. It is for renewed confidence in this faith. In an interview he says: 
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I am sure that I am a Muslim. My worst fear is that people in Europe may 
consider and treat me as a critic of Islam. I am not. I am not a new Salman 
Rushdie, and don’t want to be welcomed and treated as such. I am a 
researcher, critical of old and modern Islamic thought. I treat the Qur’an as 
a nass (text) given by God to the Prophet Muhammad.
1156
 
My reference to Abu Zayd is to show that re-reading even the fundamental 
divine text of the Quran through new hermeneutical devices is a stage that is 
reached among contemporary Islamic reformist scholars, unlike the early Arab 
Renaissance scholars who did not go into that level. The divinity of the message is 
not questioned, and its spiritual power and humanist contributions to face 
modernity are not denied. Yet, the status of the scholar vis-à-vis the divine message 
is being re-positioned, always spiritually and responsibly.  
           Hassan Hanafi: “Hermeneutics is Hermeneutics for use”  
 The prolific Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935)
1157
 believes that 
Islam´s core message is that of global ethics and social justice. He believes that Islam, as 
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the third synthetical phase of revelations after Judaism and Christianity, has contributed 
to world history and civilization and can still play that role in the curernt world malaise 
on ethics and global injustice. Hanafi’s call for the rebirth of kalam is very relevant to my 
work, since it ends it conceiving revelation anthropologically, historically, and thus for 
this world. Its ties with the divine are not cut but are condensed in the way human beings 
interpret it for their worldy matters. 
Hanafi's philosophical method of dealing with revelation is grounded in 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. He applies this method to Islam and its historical 
development. According to him, Islam is not merely a religion, but above all a worldview 
that connects the temporal and the sacred. Thus the outward (social and practical) and the 
inner (conscience) dimensions of human reality are but two aspects of the same 
phenomenon. Theology must become anthropology in order to allow humanity to make 
faith the tool of transformation of economic and social relations. The translation of 
theology into anthropology needs firstly the Husserlian concept of epoché or 
bracketing
1158
 on God's essence; and secondly a new orientation of the object of 
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theology. The center of revelation as the science of God is no longer God but humanity. 
Revelation is the science of humanity because humans are its objects and 
interlocutors.
1159
 In this transformation of theology into anthropology, God keeps his 
value as telos, the goal of human activity in front of which all are equal. God is not logos, 
but praxis, not an idea, but a form of practice. Consequently, in Hanafi’s view, Islam is a 
religion of revolution and justice, stimulating everybody to refuse any subordination to 
oppressive power and to claim the liberation of the world and its people in the name of 
God.  
In his first volume of Islam in the Modern World (1995), Hanafi speaks of 
“Society and Social Justice” and the role Islam can play for both social justice and global 
ethics, “Islam as Universal Code of Ethics,” based, among others, on the leading pillar of 
Islam, Tawhid: 
Since God is One, submitting one’s will to God’s Will is submitting all human 
wills to one Principal. Therefore, double standard ethics: freedom, peace and 
justice for oneself, servitude, war and justice [sic, injustice] for the others, is 
completely contrary to Islam. The other has the same right as the self if not even 
before.1160  
 
Hanafi defends the rights of man, for God is able to defend His. In From Creed to 
Revolution: the Just Man (1988) he lengthily, through a profound theological analysis, 
tries to equate Tawhid with Justice.
1161
  In another volume entitled Faith, Work, and the 
Imamate he sees man as the historical agent that executes the divine message, whereby 
faith and work intertwine and make the essence of human existence, and without it, 
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without the active man, this divine message, remains unhistoricized.
1162
  Below I refer to 
some of his main thoughts on hermeneutics and the treatment of texts.  
In his second volume of Islam in the Modern World (1995), Hanafi advocates 
hermeneutics as a means of revolution, “Hermeneutics and Revolution,” and as a form of 
“Liberation Theology.”1163 By revolution he means social change for justice, especially in 
the Arab-Islamic world that has been under dictatorships and earlier under the colonial 
rule. For Hanafi, Hermeneutics in unjust social systems is not a theoretical exercise 
reserved for bourgoies intellectuals. Rather, it is a means to read justice into genuine texts 
that have the potential for it. Hermeneutics is used by social classes either to rule and 
oppress or to overthrow this rule and restore justice.  He puts it as follows: 
There is no Hermeneutics per se, absolute and universal. Hermeneutics is 
Hermeneutics for use. It is part of the socio-political struggle. Since both 
Tradition and Revolution are legal, Hermeneutics becomes the legitimizing device 
for each one. It justifies the legality of both Tradition and Revolution. Since the 
upper and middle classes identify themselves with tradition while the lower class 
identifies itself with revolution, the interpreters of each class produce their own 
Hermeneutics, a passage from Revolution to Tradition by the interpreters of the 
upper and middle classes, and a passage from tradition to Revolution by the 
interpreters of the lower class. The quarrel of interpretation indeed is a social 
conflict between classes.
1164
 [Emphasis added] 
 
Hermeneutically, then, the text moves from being a historical material, into being a meta-
historical product that is able to be refilled with meaning by means of new experiences 
the reader and interpreter live. Experiences become its source of everlasting value and 
universalism: “The text is born in history but lives in meta-history. It begins in historical 
contingency and ends in ideational necessity. The text switches from the relative to the 
absolute, and from the particular to [the] universal.”1165 To realize such a reading, the 
interpreter of the text has to manage a “double movement” between the text and reality. 
From the text he can use language devices to make it closer to reality. From reality he can 
use the worldview he perceives or believes in, Zeitgeist [German term for “the spirit of 
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the times”], and reads its feeling in the historical text he has got: “To interpret is to make 
this double movement from the text to reality and from reality to the text.
1166
 The first is 
realized through amphibological [i.e. ambiguous] principle of language. The second is 
through the feeling of the Zeitgeist.”1167 This means that reality uncovers a lot of its 
mysteries through language, and so does language through its reinvigoration in a 
particular reality and historical moment.  
 The double movement required to understand the text is bound by the social 
forces that govern a particular reality. The social structure is equally double. The 
governors and the governed use their source texts as each needs to either keep its 
governing place or change its governed position. Assuming that the interpreter is on the 
side of the oppressed, he then has to serve their cause:  
The social structure is also double: rich and poor, oppressor and oppressed, 
authority and opposition, minority and majority, elite and masses, ruler and ruled, 
etc. The interpreter’s role is to change the status quo namely the domination of the 
first on the second and to generate a power-struggle between the two poles in 
favour of the second against the first for the sake of social change as a peaceful 
and gradual revolution.
1168
 
The double structure of the text and of society engenders a double function of 
Hermeneutics. One function is to preserve the status quo of injustice for the governors, 
and the second is to struggle for change, for revolution, for justice. The first is 
“conservative,” “dogmatic,” and “theocentric,” and the latter is “progressive,” “social,” 
and “material”:  
Conservative Hermeneutics begins by the text considered as on [sic, an] 
independent and literal meaning, a norm according to which reality is measured. 
Progressive Hermeneutics begins by reality itself and accommodates the text 
according to it. Conservative Hermeneutics considers the text as a value per se 
and an end while progressive Hermeneutics considers the text only as a tool, 
human life as an absolute value to be preserved. Conservative Hermeneutics is 
formal, void of content, mystic, dogmatic, theocentric and historical while 
progressive Hermeneutics is material, full, social, open, anthropocentric and 
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meaningful. The conflict between these types of interpretation is indeed a struggle 
between two social forces.
1169
 
It should be clear by now that Hanafi’s Hermeneutics as a science of interpreting texts is 
very close to the human needs on the ground. It is the realm of justice that preoccupies 
the hermeneutist. Linking this to his Islamic scholarship, Hanafi tries to update the 
reading of uṣūl al-fiqh texts by renewing the discipline of religious dispute, ´ilm al-
kalam, theology. His many volumes speak in length of his approach. I refer below to his 
“method of thematic interpretation of the Quran,” which links his hermeneutical approach 
to the Islamic main source, the Quran.
1170
 
Hanafi’s ”thematic method of interpretation” is based on certain premises, which 
define its aim as well as limitations.  Primarily, revelation is put in brackets; it is neither 
confirmed nor denied; it is suspended for the sake of methodological analysis.  The 
interpreter deals with the Quran as a text, and what it contains, and does not go into its 
origin, its creation, and the question of how. The method asks the question of essence and 
that of genesis, and origin. Second, the Quran is considered to be like any other text. 
Though it has classically been considered unique in production and style, as a new genre 
never known before literally or philosophically, in this approach the Quran is considered 
like any text, of some kind, historical, literary, poetic, philosophic, etc. Hermeneutically, 
all texts are subject to the same rules of interpretation. Third, there is no true or false 
interpretation, right or wrong. The interpretation is an effort from a particular angel and 
for a particular purpose. Fourth, it follows that there is no single interpretation of a text. 
The interpreter fills it with content from what he experiences in time and knows in space. 
Fifth, various interpretations reflect socio-political conflicting interests. “The conflict 
over interpretation is a conflict of interest. [...] Each interpretation expresses the socio-
political committment of the interpreter.”1171  
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 The following “premises” are rules of the thematic approach. I condense them 
here. One, socio-political committment. There is no neutral interpreter. An interpreter 
must be committed to a cause, a crisis, he sees in society. The interpreter is a 
revolutionary social actor. Two, looking for something. The interpret goes into a text for a 
reason, asbāb annuzūl. “Reason is interest.” The stimulus is antecedent to the response to 
be offered. There is priority of reality over the text.
1172
 Three, synopsis of the verses 
concerning one theme. This rules mean that all the verses of the Quran that share a theme 
are collected and arranged accordingly. Four, classification of linguistic form. Linguistic 
forms that are similar have to be compiled together for content analysis. Five, building 
the structure. Here the interpret has to find correlations between meaning and the object 
to the extent in which they become one, each reflecting the other. At this stage the 
thematic structure becomes theoretically clear, deduced by content analysis. Six, 
analysing the factual situation. Here starts the move from the ideational structure to 
reality on the ground. The use of social sciences, statistics, figures, etc. becomes a 
necessity to match theory with pratice, on issues like poverty, oppression, wealth, etc. 
Seven, comparison between the ideal and real. Comparing the theoretical structure with 
the data from reality is focalized in this stage/ rule. What follows this comparison is point 
eight, which is about description of the mode or action. Here, the interpreter moves from 
text to action, to materialize the outcome of his theory and reality findings. This needs 
time. It is the stage of revolution, which is not violent. The text no longer stands alone, in 
the abstract, but responds to the needs on the ground. Reality, too, no longer stands in 
isolation; it has a theoretical/ textual frame that guide it. It is an organized work for social 
change for the better.
1173
 These interpretative rules in the thematic approach are not toally 
new from the Islamic tradition, as Hanafi says. Diverse disciplines used them, but now 
the need for them seems higher.
1174
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 Overall, Hanafi sees three cirlces as the frame of this interpretation method. These 
circles are: Being, Being with others, and Being in the world.
1175
 One, Being, the 
individual consciousness is the core of the world. Individual consciousness is related to 
time, and is an interior feeling of awareness, enlightenemnt and being. Its material 
manifestation is its external version in space where cognitive faculties as well as senses 
cooperate for the realization of this Being. Two, Being with others indicates the 
intersubjective relations with the human world through various relations of family, 
marriage, paternity, economic relations, social affaires, political arrangements, etc. These 
relations carry the various values humans know of (honesty, friendship, justice, equality, 
ownerhsip, etc.)  Third, Being in the world concerns the individual conscioussness and its 
relation to nature and the world of things, everything there is outside. For a meaningful 
existence, reigned by ethics and social justice, the individual conscious has to understand 
the signs and significance nature offers and unfathoms gradually to man.
1176
  
 The relationship between man and land is an example referred to in the thematic 
approach. It centralizes both man and land, al-ard, meaning earth. Its message 
corresponds to the Islamic message behind the creation of these two components in the 
universe: man and land. Hanafi states that “Nature is full of signs denoting its origin and 
its significance. It is subjected to man.” He adds, “man is responsible: he has a vocation 
to fullfil on earth. [...] Man is the vicegerant of God on earth since God does not interfere 
directly in the world.”1177 Man’s succession and inheritance, which is based on ”good 
deeds,” on earth is fullfilled here, and not in the hereafter. Henceforth, the interpretation 
of the Quranic text “has the practical purpose to change society for the better. [...] The 
validity of a [sic, an] interpretation lies in its power. There is no theoretical validity, the 
proof of an interpretation is its power. [...] Thematic interpretation of the Quran begins 
with this reality.”1178  Such a pragmatic view of the Quranic text gives to man space to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 1997) 
1175
 In connection with these three circles, I recall my three framework elements that I use for the 
conceptualization of European Islam (world-society-individual) to be kept in mind while reading the work 
of these reformists.  
1176
 Hanafi, "Method of Thematic Interpretation of the Quran,” in Wild, The Quran as Text, 206.  
1177
 Ibid., 206-207. 
1178
 Ibid., 211-212. 
366 
 
interpret the message of Islam according to socio-political necessities. It seems that with 
Hanafi, interpretation of the Quran is no longer a top-down approach whereby the 
interpreter applies the divine message literally or by applying God’s words on reality. It 
seems now that the approach is bottom-up, i.e. the interpreter has to fundamentally raise 
the reality issues to the divine message and make the latter respond in a way that answers 
the reality needs of the heir on earth. It is not about annihilating God, but about freeing 
the interpreter from the theological debate, which is another level of interpretation of the 
divine, to focalize his concentration on the mundane issues. It is a move to smash the 
walls of abstraction that characterize a lot of divine jurisprudential laws that are still 
interpreted literally. Hanafi’s approach is rooted in what he believes to be the spirit of 
Islam, life itself, “The spirit of Islam is life,” and from it stems the priority of reality on 
the text, and the priority of public welfare.
1179
 Hanafi’s hermeneutics is practical, and 
revelation, however divine it may be, is interpreted for the good of this world. 
The Egalitarianists-Legalists: Mernissi, Wadud, and An’naim 
Female voices among the Muslim reformist intellectuals are not absent, but are 
not so many yet. Still, they have managed to exert a remarkable weight as speakers of the 
female voice from within the Islamic tradition. They are located in the Islamic world and 
in the West. I briefly refer to Fatema Mernissi (b. 1940), the Moroccan sociologist, and 
the American hermeneuticist Amina Wadud (b. 1952), who caused a controversy among 
Muslim scholars when she led a Friday prayers in the USA in 2005. 
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Fatema Mernissi:  unveil patriarchy and “walk into the modern world with 
pride” 
Mernissi’s first monograph, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Muslim 
Society, was published in 1975; many revisited revisions followed since then. It has 
become a classic on Arab-Muslim-and-Mediterranean socio-anthropologic work on 
women. Its first edition was very anti the “misogynist message of Islam.” Mernissi 
received tough criticism on that. Later, with more sociological and historical studies, her 
view of religion per se would change. Most of her studies are sociological-
anthropological and thus aim at unveiling the patriarchal and cultural additions that have 
burdened the Muslim message on man and woman. She is very critical of the authority of 
some Prophetic narrated hadiths, and questions their validity in comparison with the 
Islamic message which she considers to have given full ontological equality between man 
and woman. She dreams of reclaiming the “second message of Islam,” which is that of 
equality and justice. In the preface to the book, she says, “Paradoxically, and contrary to 
what is commonly assumed, Islam does not advance the thesis of women’s inherent 
inferiority. Quite the contrary, it affirms the potential equality between the sexes.”1180 
Following years of fieldwork and experience of women aspirations in the Arab 
world she wrote, in 1992, in Islam and Democracy, “The Arab world is about to take off 
[…]   It is going to take off for the simple reason that everybody, with the 
fundamentalists in the lead, wants change.”1181 She meant the struggle for freedom, 
equality, and justice. In her second book, The Veil and male Elite: A Feminist 
Interpretation of Islam (1987), after she has done historical readings on the tradition on 
the position of women in Islam, and the role of the wives of the Prophet, she writes the 
following:  
Any man who believes that a Muslim woman who fights for her dignity and right 
to citizenship excludes herself necessarily from the umma and is a brainwashed 
victim of Western propaganda is a man who misunderstands his own religious 
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heritage, his own cultural identity. The vast and inspiring records of Muslim 
history so brilliantly completed for us by scholars such as Ibn Hisham, Ibn Hajar, 
Ibn Sa´ad, and Tabari, speak to the contrary. We Muslim women can walk into 
the modern world with pride, knowing that the quest for dignity, democracy, and 
human rights, for full participation in the political and social affairs of our 
country, stems from no imported Western values, but is a true part of the Muslim 
tradition. Of this I am certain, after reading the works of those scholars mentioned 
above and many others. They give me evidence to feel proud of my Muslim past, 
and to feel justified in valuing the best gifts of modern civilization: human rights 
and the satisfaction of full citizenship.
1182
 
After the election of Benazir Bhutto as a Prime Minister in Pakistan in 1988, some 
Muslim conservative scholars objected to the fact that a woman leads a country. Mernissi 
wanted to make sure that this was a mere patriarchal attitude and not an Islamic one. She 
went into history to come out with a book entitled The Forgotten Queens of Islam 
(1993)
1183
 to support her argument of Muslim women past involvement in socio-political 
and economic affairs of their societies. With her other sociological and theoretical works, 
along with her narrative-fiction contributions, Mernissi has become an icon among 
Muslim reformists for the last four decades. Many see her as having given confidence to 
the idea of an Islamic feminism in its sense of fight for social justice and equality, when 
Western feminism remained Eurocentrist and not Third Worldist.
1184
 
Mernissi’s links with the early Islamic intellectual heritage becomes clearer in her 
Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (2002). The book comes after the Gulf 
War and the rise of international focus on the debate of Islam and democracy. The writer 
goes here to situate the conflict in Islamic thought to the early history of Kharijites and 
Muʻtazilites. The former, in her reading, are labelled “rebel Islam” partisans, while the 
latter represent the “rationalist tradition.” The Muʻtazila are described to have focalized 
the utility of reason on all matters that concern human affairs on earth. They raised this 
fundamental question: “What is the purpose of our existence on earth, and to what use 
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should we put ´aql (reason), that marvellous gift from heaven?” 1185 For Mernissi, the 
Muʻtazila “forced Islam to imagine new relationships between ruler and ruled” in politics 
and daily life, based on dialectics, and their spirit exemplifies that of democracy and 
humanism.
1186
 Yet, Mernissi does not directly state that she is a neo-Muʻtazilite. She does 
not need to, since her approach in general is to reclaim the “Rissala/ second message of 
Islam” and its claim for social justice, but the reader remains curious, and generally 
unsatisfied with her use of, actually mere reference to, the Muʻtazila tradition, as also 
notes Raha Rhouni.
1187
 The continuity link Mernissi, in general, tries to work out through 
her sociological-historical approach is that the Quran and Prophetic tradition responded 
to particular social demands, which they answered in their most adequate way; now those 
social challenges have changed, but the equal Rissala/ Message of the Quran still exerts 
that ontological equality particularly between the males and females, which she is rooted 
in the creation of wo/man in Islam, “The democratic glorification of the human 
individual, regardless of sex, race or status, is the kernel of the Muslim message.”1188  
Amina Wadud: a “female jihadist” for gender equality  
Amina Wadud’s female reading of the Quran in Qur’an and Woman: Rereading 
the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (1999) has become a distinguished work of 
gender studies in Islam. Like the rest of reformists, Wadud is also driven by the 
historicist approach. Three main points are her concerns: 1) to read the Islamic main 
sources historically, 2) to decipher meanings from them according to the linguistic 
utensils they used and transfer their meaning into the present, and 3) to study the Quran 
from a female perspective, by detecting the female voice in the Quran. The hermeneutical 
path she adopts convinces her that interpretation is not objective, and it allows enough 
room for subjectivity, which makes it fallible and changeable. This means that the earlier 
exegeses of the Quran are contextual and thus changeable; they are not divine. In this 
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early stage of her enterprise, she realizes that the Quran does not speak to man and 
woman but to the human being in general. Ontologically, man and woman are equal in 
creation, in duties and responsibilities; they are different only in taqwa, God-
consciousness or piety, which is the spiritual dimension that concerns the relation of the 
individual to God.  All other social affairs concern human beings in their tasks as social 
actors. Wadud, for instance, says that the biological superiority of man described in the 
Quran, or the higher share of inheritance given to him, concerns man as a social actor, as 
a husband, and this for her does not amount to any claims of superiority as old and 
classical exegetes claim.  
From the ontological equality between man and woman described in the Quran, 
Wadud reads the rest of the details as “particulars.” “God created women fully human. 
Anything, anyone, or any system that treats them privately or in public as anything less 
than that is destroying the potential harmony of the entire universe.”1189 Socio-historical 
circumstances and linguistic monopoly in reading the original text have contributed to 
reading it solely from the male perspectives. So, to understand the ethical and guiding 
principles of Islam, “appropriate historical information” has to be summed up for an up-
to-date interpretation:  
On the ethico-religious level, the position of men and women are on equal 
standing, both as to their religious obligations towards God and their peers as well 
as the consequent reward or punishment. The moral and religious equality of the 
sexes before God represents the highest expression of the value of equality. 
Furthermore, the ethico-religious equality of women is independent of and not 
subject to, change of social situation. This value, then, enjoys a higher degree of 
priority over any value that is dependent upon a changing social context [...]. The 
attitudes towards women at the time and place of the revelation helped to shape 
the particular expressions in the Qur'an. The concerns it addressed were particular 
to that circumstance. These particulars are not meant as the entire Qur'anic intent, 
but are the means for determining that intent provided we have appropriate 
historical information.
1190
 
Wadud’s hermeneutical reading opposes the classical male exegetical interpretations. 
Women were usually told how to be and what to do and what relation they have towards 
man and God. This, for Wadud, is reductionist of the Quranic message, since it is for all, 
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males and females, and no one is the guardian of the other. The male monopoly of 
knowledge production monopolized the voice of the female, too.  
 In Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (2006), Wadud does not 
change her approach or attitude towards Islam. It just admits some facts her earlier 
hermeneutical approach obscured. In this work, she admits that there are clear emphases 
on the role of man and presence all over the Quranic text, while the female voice gains a 
lower place. The ontological equality remains, but the tone of discourse seems 
masculinist, and promotes man’s sexual dominance.  On this point she writes:  
While on the one hand the Qur’an seems to operate within a structure of linguistic 
taboo about sexuality and matters of intercourse altogether, on the other hand, it 
promotes male sexuality in particular with the following three citations: (1) 
polygyny, housed in the language of desire, “Marry those who please you,  maa 
taba lakum, of the women: two, three or four” (4:3). However polygyny is 
permitted in the text, it is also conditioned  upon almost unachievable terms of 
justice. (2) Women are designated as harth, tilth, or something to be cultivated or 
tilled: “Your women are a tilth for you to cultivate . . . as you will,  nisa’ukum 
harthun lakum fa’tuw harthakum innaa’ shi’tum” (2:223). Whether this is a 
discussion of sexual position or permissible times of male sexual satisfaction, 
according to different jurists, it is still directed toward men and men’s sexual 
desires, while women and women’s sexuality remains passive. (3) The notorious 
virginal huris [sing. houri] for men—even after they are dead, men’s pleasure 
should not be forsaken! (52:20, 55:72, 56:22).
1191
  
From here Wadud moves closer to scholars like Rahman, Arkoun, Abu Zayd and Soroush 
– referred to above. From a linguistic study of the divine text as divine, Wadud now 
embraces the idea that a divine text that is revealed in a human language in a particular 
society at a particular moment cannot be a final or Ultimate revelation. She makes it clear 
that she is not saying that revelation is not divine; it keeps its divinity, but the way it is 
expressed is not so, “If revelation through text must be in human language, in order for 
humans to even begin to understand it, then revelation cannot be divine or Ultimate. This 
is distinguished from the idea that revelation is from a divine source.”1192  
Wadud enters to the premises of the Mu’tazilites and neo-Muʻtazilites who 
believe in the createdness of the Quran, and not in its eternity. Entering this premise 
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allows her to adopt confidently the historicist view she started in her earlier work, but 
now with a more theological argument. The createdness of the Quran then helps her 
question the universality of the message of Islam, its Arabity, language and socio-
historical circumstances: 
This has already been addressed between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites by 
trying to decide definitely whether the Qur’an is eternal with God or created? 
There are other questions to ponder. Is Allah multilingual, so that She can reveal 
in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic, or is Allah meta-lingual, not restricted by any 
language. Every language is a constraint on complete divine Self-disclosure. Is 
Arabic preferable, divine, or just the most convenient tool to use with an Arab 
prophet? Is the divine message limited to (or by) words – of any language? Do 
Muslims truly recognize the presence of Allah in words, or deem themselves gods 
by enforcing their understandings and misunderstandings of those words? Is 
recognition of the presence of Allah limited to reading the words of the Qur’an? 
Since the majority of Muslims are non-Arabic speaking can they know the 
presence of Allah?
1193
  
By so considering the divine text, Wadud is giving human reason space to reinterpret the 
divine message according to human conditions. “Quran’s universal intent,” and its 
humanist and just teachings are not bound to the Arabian reality of the 7
th
 century. From 
her personal spiritual and social activism, summarized in her phrase of “gender jihad,” 
she has learnt that “One must consider oneself Allah, granting rights to all others as if 
their status is inferior to self or deviant from the norm.”1194 She does not alienate the 
spiritual dimensions that give energy and meaning to human life from involvement in 
world affairs for justice and equality, “A new impetus must be generated that applies the 
Islamic spiritual paradigms as forces of social movements. The consequences of this are a 
new world order that incorporates the meaningfulness of the lives of everyday citizens, be 
they Muslim or not.”1195  
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Abdullahi Ahmed An-na’im: “Sharia is not divine” 
If the scholars referred to until now are immersed in theoretical-textual analysis of 
the sacred Islamic text, the Sudanese-American Abdullahi Ahmed An-na’im (b. 1946) 
contributes to the debate from  legal studies perspective, which is a more practical field, 
in light of Islamic history and the application of Sharia law. In this way, referring to him 
can be considered as one of the practical manifestations of reform the other scholars 
delve into. The core idea of An’naim is that while the Quran as a realization of revelation 
is sacred, Sharia law is not. Sticking to the application of Sharia law, while neglecting 
other more fundamental and universal aims of Sharia, betrays the universality of Islam. In 
Part I of this work I referred to Bassam Tibi who praises An’naim’s early work on 
Islamic reformation (1990) but rejects his later work on secularization (2008), and 
considers it a refutation of the earlier work. I said then that Tibi misreads An’naim. In the 
paragraphs below I do not go into the legal and jurisprudential details An’naim goes into 
about the legal controversial issues in Sharia law. I give the gist of his contribution to 
what he refers to as “substantial reform,”1196 with reference to his ties with his “Ustadh/ 
revered teacher” the Sudanese reformist Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (d. 1985).  
With his initial work Toward an Islamic Reformation (1990) An’naim subscribes 
to the work started by Mahmoud Taha. The latter was the spiritual leader of the 
Republican Brothers movement which opposed the application of Sharia law in Sudan in 
1983. Taha was executed in public by the Islamist government in January 1985 for 
apostasy. Taha’s opposition of the application of Sharia law and his call for Islamic 
reform stems from his idea developed in The Second Message of Islam (1967). According 
to Taha, the Quran contains two messages, one of them is egalitarian, liberal, and 
universal, while the other is unegalitarian, coercive, and not pluralist. The first one 
corresponds to the Mekka period of revelation, while the second corresponds to the 
Medina period which saw the development of the first community of Muslims. The 
precepts of jihad, and the continuity with the practice of slavery, polygamy, gender 
inequality, gender segregation, and the veil, for example, are Medinan practices, revealed 
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and practiced during the Medina period. However, for Taha, they are not original 
“precepts in Islam” because the 7th century Arabian society could not live up to the ideal 
message of Mekka period yet. Revelation had to be gradual to take the socio-cultural 
habits and mindset into account. The Muslim early jurists saw in such a distinction 
(Mekkan revelation and Medinan one) a contradiction. To solve it, they used the concept 
of abrogation (naskh). In so doing, they kept the Medina texts that are related to 
particular social affairs, and abrogated the Mekkan ones which are more universal. Until 
now, the Muslim societies live with this abrogation fact. What then Taha calls for is to go 
back to the original message of Islam, which he sees in the Mekkan period, and which he 
refers to as the Second Message.
1197
 An’naim’s “Islamic reformation” builds on this 
heritage of Mohamed Taha. 
An’naim’s thesis urges for reformulating uṣūl al-fiqh and the exercise of ijtihad 
“even in matters governed by clear and definite texts of the Quran and Sunna as long as 
the outcome of such ijtihad is consistent with the essential message of Islam.”1198 Though 
he recognizes that Sharia law is practised in very few countries, and even so in particular 
areas of these countries (like Taliban Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Nigeria),  
An’naim is still against the Muslim scholars silence about the Quranic verses that clearly 
state certain punishments for public and private affairs.
1199
 These verses, though not 
implemented in most Islamic countries still do have an impact on the Muslim believer’s 
psychology and the policies of the State in Muslim majority countries.
1200
 He describes 
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the believer’s dilemma between living the ideals of Sharia, including law prescriptions, 
and modernity values, which they enjoy but have reservations about, since they are not 
theologically endorsed and justified yet: 
I am painfully aware that the vast majority of the Muslim peoples throughout the 
world live at a superficial level of both Islam and modern civilization. Although 
they claim adherence to Islam and exhibit apparent commitment to its ritualistic 
formalities, most contemporary Muslims fail to appreciate and live up to its moral 
and spiritual essence. Moreover, although they have grown accustomed to 
enjoying the benefits of modern technology and claim adherence to modern 
institutions, the majority of Muslim peoples have little appreciation of the values 
and ways of thinking that underlie and sustain that technology and those 
institutions.
1201
 
What An’naim does at this stage of his work is that he proposes a methodological 
justification of modern values from within the Islamic Mekkan universal message that 
endorses liberty, equality, and social justice. He does so in light of the international law 
that guarantees these universal rights for which every human being is entitled “by virtue 
of being human.”1202 Such a basis can end with the psychological predicament in which 
the Muslim believer is in, according to An’naim. It is at this stage also that An’naim 
makes it clear that “Although derived from the fundamental divine sources of Islam, the 
Quran and Sunna, Sharia is not divine because it is the product of human interpretation 
of those sources.”1203 These methodological concerns expressed in this first work are 
defended further in his following work, which integrates a historical review of the 
religious controversial legal issues. 
An’naim’s Islam and the Secular State (2008) is a historical defense of his earlier 
methodological argumentation. An’naim’s thesis is that to be truly a free believer the 
state has to be secular, without this meaning necessarily that society has to be also 
secular. Initially he affirms with historical evidence that the state has never been fully 
Islamic, “the state was never Islamic.” 1204 That does not make it secular in the modern 
sense of separation between state and religion, or in these sense he himself proposes.
1205
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By the “secular state” he means a state that is neutral regarding religious doctrine, i.e. it 
does not adopt, endorse, or impose the Sharia religious law: 
By a secular state I mean one that is neutral regarding religious doctrine, one that 
does not claim or pretend to enforce Shari’a—the religious law of Islam—simply 
because compliance with Shari’a cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or 
faked to appease their officials. This is what I mean by secularism in this book, 
namely, a secular state that facilitates the possibility of religious piety out of 
honest conviction.
1206
 
The secular state An’naim proposes is founded on 1) constitutionalism, 2) human rights, 
and 3) pluralist citizenship. It is a modern state that preserves the fundamentals of the 
Islamic faith, without making the state their guardian. It is society itself that preserves its 
religiosity and faith freely. That is why he makes it clear that he is not calling for 
banishing religion from the public sphere, “I am calling for the state to be secular, not for 
secularizing society.”1207 He distances himself from the notion of “secularism” which for 
him echoes French laϊcité, which is not the example he likes to envisage for Islamic 
societies, at least in the early transition towards his model of the secular state. For 
An’naim, French secularism is based on the separation between religion and the state, 
and private vs. public dichotomy. Religious doctrines are bashed from public policy and 
legislation for the mere reason that they are religious. He is not for this model.
1208
 He 
says, “The principle of secularism, as I am defining it here, includes a public role for 
religion in influencing public policy and legislation, subject to the requirement of civic 
reason.”1209 His concept of “civic reason” becomes vital in defining his model of the 
secular state.
1210
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 An’naim’s civic reason is based on the idea of pluralism and freedom of 
expression, as well as freedom of religious faith. He does not privatize religion just 
because the state is neutral, and there is a separation between the state and religion. 
An’naim’s secular state allows religion in the public, not only to be visible but also to be 
active in presenting its views on policy and legislative matters, and all state matters as 
long as these religious views defend the constitutional state, human rights, and 
citizenship. This means that these views have to be acceptable, but not necessarily 
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The word “civic” here refers to the need for policy and legislation to be accepted by the public at 
large, as well as for the process of reasoning on the matter to remain open and accessible to all 
citizens. By civic reason, I mean that the rationale and the purpose of public policy or legislation 
must be based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept or reject. Citizens must be 
able to make counterproposals through public debate without being open to charges about their 
religious piety. Civic reason and reasoning, and not personal beliefs and motivations, are 
necessary whether Muslims constitute the majority or the minority of the population of the state. 
Even if Muslims are the majority, they will not necessarily agree on what policy and legislation 
should follow from their Islamic beliefs. (Islam and the Secular State, 7-8) 
In the same book, he reserves a section entitled “Civic Reason and Public Reason” to distinguish his 
concept from that of Rawls, “there are also significant differences between Rawls’s concept and my own” 
(p. 97). An’naim says that Rawls’ concept can work well for the consolidated democracies where 
constitutionalism is mature, unlike the postcolonial societies like the Islamic ones. Despite his attempt to 
draw such a distinction he does not make it clear enough. What I could see he most stresses is that his 
concept is very much accommodative of religious doctrines which have still to learn to adapt to the secular 
state model and the idea of constitutionalism and equal citizenship. What this means, the way I interpret it, 
is that public reason works to allow space for reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a liberal-secular 
society, while civic reason works to allow space for liberal-secular “doctrines/ philosophies” in a 
conservative-religious society. I can put it this way, civic reason is bottom-up in its approach of pluralism, 
while public reason is top-down in its approach. Western societies for which public reason is designed have 
been too secular, and they need to give space to reasonable doctrines, while Islamic societies have been too 
religious and they need now to give space to reasonable doctrines and philosophies. That is, civic reason is 
for societies that are still undergoing socio-political and cultural-religious changes, while public reason is 
for consolidated democracies. Civic reason allows religious societies to be(-come) secular or/ and liberal; 
public reason allows secular-liberal societies to be(-come) religious, rationally religious. This can have 
profound future impacts especially for societies in transition. Civic society allows them to enter modernity 
in harmony with religion, while the West entered modernity through strong conflict with religion, that is 
why when they liberalized/secularized, they hardly left any public space for religious doctrines; they 
allowed religious practice in the private sphere, but they did not allow it to enter the public debate on state 
policies and legislation. Civic reason jumps over this big conflict moment the West, Europe in particular, 
went through, and helps societies in transition now to enter into modernity pluralistically from the 
beginning. That is my perception of the difference, which An’naim himself does not make clearer, and 
which few pay attention to and jump to the conclusion that civic and public reason are the same. They are 
the same in the aim they target, but how they do that, and at what historical moment they do that make a 
big difference between the two. 
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accepted, by the public which may be different (religious, antireligious, or nonreligious). 
This is not an easy threshold for a rigid religious doctrine to pass. What this entails is that 
religious views are welcome in public but have to go through at least two major stages. 
First, they are allowed to the public if they are constitutional in their demands, if they 
respect basic human rights, and if they value shared citizenship. Only then (second) they 
are allowed to enter the public debate on any debated issue that concern society, and they 
have to abide by the democratic rules of the game, winning or losing the debate should 
not lead to any backlashes in these religious views. In this sense, the religious doctrines, 
even if they are in majority, they cannot trespass the limits established to them by the 
same conditions that allowed them in, as I simplified them above in stage 1 and 2.
1211
  
This model of secularization protects religion only as long as the religious 
community wants it; the state does not enforce this protection if the community does not 
ask for that. Society itself is burdened with the task of protecting the religion it wants to 
preserve, and is encouraged in that through the secular state institutions the constitution 
provides for everybody. An’naim sees complementary roles between religion and state 
secularism as he defines it: 
The relationship between religion and secularism can also be viewed as mutually 
sustaining. Secularism needs religion to provide a widely accepted source of 
moral guidance for the political community, as well as to help satisfy and 
discipline the nonpolitical needs of believers within that community. In turn, 
religion needs secularism to mediate relations between different communities 
(whether religious, antireligious, or nonreligious) that share the same political 
space or space of civic reason.
1212
 
The denotation of this overall argumentation is the following. First, An’naim de-
divinizes Sharia law and its classical interpretations. Second, in light of the “second 
message of Islam” he finds a theological justification for his methodology of integrating 
modern human values into the tradition, and considers “Sharia as a concept” filled with 
“normative content”1213 that “human agency”1214 provides in context. Third, he proposes 
                                                          
1211
 See my previous note.   
1212
 An’naim, Islam and the Secular State,  41  
1213
 Ibid., 2 
1214
 Ibid., 10. About human agency An’naim says “Striving to know and observe Shari’a is always the 
product of the “human agency” of believers—a system of meaning that is constructed out of human 
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the secular state as the appropriate guardian of society’s free religiosity, and civic reason 
as the adequate concept for legitimizing the presence of the religious view in the public 
debate.  
The Rationalists: Aljabri and Soroush   
Mohamed Abed Aljabri: the “public good” as the “guiding principle”  
 The Moroccan philosopher Mohamed Abed Aljabri (d. 2010) has occupied an 
important space among Arab-Islamic philosophers since the 1970s. His Critique of Arab 
Reason (naqd al-’aql al-’arabī), which appeared in Beirut and Casablanca between 1984 
and 2001 in four volumes,
1215
 has engaged scholars researching Arab-Islamic reason. His 
dissatisfaction in the 1960s of the intellectual trends mostly (liberalism and socialism) 
common among the Arab intellectuals led him to go back to the philosophical history of 
Arab-Islamic thought and seek the routes that led it astray. His project was seeking ways 
to modernity from within the tradition. Though most of his work focused on what went 
wrong with the Arab reason, and its relation with religion, an important part of his 
thought is relevant to my work. I especially take his defence of the objectives of the 
Sharia which reason can conceive, according to the historical moment in which these 
objectives are discussed. Aljabri’s views, which reconcile reason and divine objectives, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
experience and reflection, which over time evolves into a more systematic development according to an 
established methodology.” (Ibid., 11) 
1215
 Mohamed Abded Aljabri, Critique of Arab Reason, written in Arabic in four volumes, are: naqd alʻaql 
alʻarabī I: takwīn al ʻaql al ‘arabī [Critique of Arab Reason I: Formation of Arab Reason] (Beirut: markaz 
dirāsat al-waḥda al-ʻarabiyya, 2891); naqd alʻaql alʻarabī II: binyat alʻaql alʻarabī [Critique of Arab 
Reason II: The Structure of Arab Reason] (Beirut: markaz dirāsat al-waḥda al-ʻarabiyya, 1986), naqd 
alʻaql alʻarabī III: alʻaql assiyyāssī al-arabī [Critique of Arab Reason III: The Arab Political Mind] 
(Beirut: markaz dirāsat al-waḥda al-ʻarabiyya, 1990), and naqd alʻaql alʻarabī IV: alʻaql al’akhlāqī 
alʻarabī [Critique of Arab Reason IV: The Ethical Arab Mind] (Beirut: markaz dirāsat al-waḥda al-
ʻarabiyya, 2001). The Syrian scholar George Tarabishi, after having acknowledged the great work of 
Aljabri’s Critique, devoted about twenty years to develop naqd naqd al-‘aql al-’arabī [Critique of the 
Critique of Arab Reason] also in four volumes. In the introduction to the first volume, nazariyato al-‘aql [A 
Theory of Reason], Tarabishi says that Aljabri’s Critique has missed reading correctly a number of Arab-
Islamic, Greek, and European texts, and that though he conducts a great work to deconstruct and afterwards 
construct the idea of reason in the Arab-Islamic tradition, which is existent, he, however, fails to theorize it 
clearly, and ends his project before its aim is achieved. For more on this, see the first volume, George 
Tarabish, naqd naqd al-aql al-’arabī: nazariyato al-‘aql [Critique of the Critique of Arab Reason: a 
Theory of Reason] (Beirut: Dar Saqi, 1996). In the bibliography, I cite just to the volumes from which I 
quote in this work.  
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follow particularly the footsteps of his favourite medieval philosopher Ibn Roshd/ 
Averroes.   
Aljabri grounds the modern ideas of reason, human rights and the rule of law in 
the tradition, atturath, itself. He is critical of mysticism developed in the Eastern side of 
the Islamic world (Machreq), and embracive of the Western/ Maghreb rational tradition 
of mostly Ibn Rochd to the extent that he sees no future without Averroes´ rationalism: 
“The future can only be Averroist!”1216 His work introduced these approaches/ concepts, 
among others, on which he bases his study of Arab reason: “burhan” (deductive 
reasoning), “al bayān” (linguistic analysis), and “irfan” (mystical reading).1217 He 
embraces the first two approaches and rejects the third, which he accuses of having 
“mystified” early Islamic philosophy. A passage like this one tells how critical he is of 
the mysticism of the classic philosophers Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali (versus the rationalists, 
al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Averroes, and Ibn Khaldun):  
With his Eastern philosophy, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) consecrated a spiritualist and 
gnostic trend whose impact was instrumental in the regression of Arab thinking 
from an open rationalism, spearheaded by the Mu’tazilites, then by al-Kindi, and 
culminating with al-Farabi, to a pernicious irrationalism which inaugurated the 
‘gloom thinking’ that scholars like al-Ghazali, Suhrawardi of Aleppo and others 
simply spread and popularized in various circles. Such is my judgment against 
Avicenna. 
1218
 
Against “Oriental philosophy” that stressed the ‘irfān (mystical reading), Aljabri adopts 
the mid-position of Averroes of burhān and al bayān. Averroes speaks of “double truth,” 
i.e. that religion and philosophy each seeks truth in different ways; to conflate their 
disciplines or paths risks that each annihilates the other; the right methodology of 
                                                          
1216
 That is a title of a section in his Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique, trans., Aziz 
Abbassi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999). 
1217
 These concepts are introduced in his second volume The Structure of Arab Reason, 1986.  
1218
 Aljabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, 58. (George Tarabishi disagrees with Aljabri’s classification of 
Islamic philosophy into the irrational mashriq and the rational maghrib in his third volume of Critique of 
the Critique of Reason. See, Tarabishi, Naqd naqd al-‘aql al-’arabī III: wahdat al-‘aql al-’arabī al-islami 
[Critique of the Critique of Arab Reason III: Unity of the Arab Islamic Reason] (Beirut: Saqi, 2002). On 
Ibn Sina, for instance, see chapter 1. He clarifies further his points on the mashriq vs. maghrib distinction 
in his fourth volume of naqd naqd al-‘aql al-’arabī IV: al-‘aql al-mostaqiil fi al-islam? [Critique of the 
Critique of Arab Reason IV: The Resigned Reason in Islam?] (Beirut: Saqi, 2004) 14-31. 
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reconciliation is that each has to be studied intrinsically and not extrinsically, for the truth 
they express can be understood only in this way.
1219
  
 Aljabri calls for a thorough revisit of the tradition, structurally, historically, and 
ideologically.
1220
 He calls for an epistemological break at the level of concepts and not at 
the level of knowledge itself.  By concepts he means the grammatical-juridical-
theological analogies practiced irresponsibly and in a non-scientific way. He says, “the 
epistemological break by no means takes place at the level of knowledge itself. […] I am 
by no means calling for a break from tradition – in the usual sense. Rather, we are calling 
for renouncing traditional understanding of tradition.”1221 Following rational analysis 
methods, he distinguishes between the cognitive as well as ideological levels of the 
tradition, and underlines how they have been methodologically interwoven, which ended 
in incorrectly blurring the distinction between these levels.
1222
  
 Aljabri believe in the strength of the tradition, and is critical of the scholars who 
want to reject it once and for all. He sees that the Arab reader projects his intellectual loss 
on the text and tradition before reading them. He works on the level of reconciling the 
tradition with itself first, since a lot of its potential has not been explored, and has 
structurally/ cognitively, politically/ ideologically been disregarded since the levels of 
                                                          
1219
 See Aljabri, The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construction of Modernity in the 
Arab World (London, New York and Beirut: I.B. Tauris and the Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2011) See 
section: "Ibn Rosch: Reconnecting Burhan and Bayan,” 393-409. In original, see: takwin al-aql al-’arabī, 
316-323. See also one of his works on Ibn Roshd, Ibn Roshd: sīratun wa fiqr [Ibn Roshd: Biography and 
Intellect (Beirut: Markaz dirasat alwahda al-arabiya, 1998) Chapter 11 on "Existence and Reason.” For 
more on Ibn Roshd and his positions on human reason and revelation, see the English translation of one of 
his works by Ibrahim Najjar, trans. Averroes, Faith and Reason in Islam: Averroes´ Exposition of Religious 
Arguments (Oxford: Oneworld,  2001). In the last chapter of this book, Averroes presents five levels of 
interpreting the divine message, to whom and by whom, and the way to find the adequate one, otherwise 
ambiguities and fatal errors can develop. See “Conclusion: the canon of interpretation,”  128-132. For his 
life, see Majid Fakhri, Averroes Ibn Roshd: His Life, Works and Influence (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).  
1220
 Aljabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, 28  
1221
 Ibid., 23 
1222
 Ibid., 122. In his third volume, The Arab Political Mind, 1990, he distinguishes three main political 
concepts that have impacted the evolution of a reason-based political life in the Arab world: 1) Tribe/ 
qabila political mindset, 2) Bounty/ ghanima economic mindset, and 3) Creed/ aqeeda religious mindset. 
The three have been mythologized and ideologized historically, according to diverse dynastic political 
wills, and have all produced a stagnant mindset that neglects State rule of law (vs. Tribalism), socio-
economic fairness and institutionalization (vs. Bountism), and freedom of conscious and expression which 
sectarianism and dogmatism bring about (vs. Creed). For him, the three concepts have to be rationally 
critiqued and revisited to rebuild democratic Arab-Islamic societies. This is the main ideaof the third 
volume. Read, for example, pp. 7-53; 363-374. 
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analysis have been blurred.
1223
 Among his interesting ideas about exploring Islamic 
philosophy is that its cognitive aspect has to be examined in the ideological attitudes of 
the philosophers themselves, for that hid the Islamic contribution and put it to oblivion. 
Historians of Islamic philosophy, Muslims and Westerners, focus on the cognitive level 
to see the Greek´s influences, and forget the ideological paradigms in which the Muslim 
philosophers were involved, which influenced their attitudes, focalized some, and put 
others to oblivion. That is, the ideological function that each philosopher assigns to his 
knowledge has to be re-examined, besides his epistemological contribution. Aljabri 
contends that “Muslim philosophers occupied themselves with reconciling reason with 
religion, which is why it is an ideological discourse that lacks parallel cognitive 
evolution.”1224 The only way to study the cognitive is then to study the ideological with 
adequate analytical tools.  
 Aljabri´s analytical tools in deconstructing the tradition to accommodate the 
modern challenges aim at reconciling faith and reason, following in that his “mentor” 
Averroes. Each of the two has its own path to the truth; each has its own methodology of 
apprehension, and they are complementary. This becomes clear with his views on Sharia 
law and the sources of jurisprudence, uṣūl al-fiqh, that ijtihad has to revisit, not because 
ijtihad doors were closed, but because the minds that practice it stagnated:  “It becomes 
clear that calling for ijtihad and opening its door will remain meaningless without 
‘opening’ the mind entrusted with the task of ijtihad.”1225 “The truth is that no one in 
Islam has the authority to ‘close’ the door of ijtihad.”1226 Hence, “What is needed is a 
renewal, stemming not from a mere resumption of ijtihad in the branches, but from a ‘re-
rooting of the sources (ta´sil al-uṣūl).’”1227 He refers to the project of al-Shatibi on this 
point. Aljabri contends that the epistemological frame of the past has to be revisited in 
light of the new challenges of industrialized and scientific achievements of the age:   
The foundations of the uṣūl (the jurisprudential principles) which have informed 
the Islamic fiqh up to the present time go back to the ‘Age of Historical Record 
                                                          
1223
 Aljabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, 27-28.  
1224
 Ibid.,  42 
1225
 Aljabri, Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought (Beirut: markaz dirasat al-wahda al-
‘arabia, , 2009) 80 
1226
 Ibid., 78  
1227
 Ibid.,  81 
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and Standardization’, which is at the beginning of the Abbasid Age [ca. 750CE], 
and some belong to a later era. Before the Age of Recording, there were no 
standardized principles to inform ijtihad thought. The fuqaha who laid down 
those principles were following the epistemological system current in their time, 
and the needs and interests which imposed themselves in that age. Since our age 
is different from the ‘Age of Historical Record’, whether in methods or [public] 
good, it becomes necessary to consider this difference and respond to its 
needs.
1228
 
More particularly, he argues that the sources of law themselves have to be revisited in 
this new age, because methodologies of interpretation have to keep up with society 
changes.
1229
 He elevates reason above the classical jurisprudence schools that have 
contend themselves with rulings and interpretations by analogy/ qiyās, instead of going 
back to the sources and the occasions of revelation, asbāb annuzūl– echoing, among 
others, Fazlur Rahman’s idea, as seen earlier. He says: 
To build the rationality of a shariah ruling on the ‘occasions of revelation’ within 
the scope of considerations of [public] good would open the way for the 
construction of another rationality concerning other occasions of revelation, or 
new situations. This would renew the life of jurisprudence and ijtihad, and al-
shariah would be able to cope with development and be suitable for application in 
every time and place.
1230
  
Studying “occasions of revelation” over particular rulings (like the penal code and 
women inheritance division) should be conducted on two conditions/ bases:  1) 
understanding the intent of revealed law, maqāṣid asharia, and 2) serving the public 
good, maṣlaḥa ʻāma:  
                                                          
1228
 Ibid.,  88 
1229
 Aljabri says:  
The tremendous change brought about by the industrial civilization that persists today along with 
the ‘scientific revolution’ in astronautics, atomic science, biology, economics and sociology, 
makes opening up to these disciplines, their epistemological principles and their impact on the 
human race a necessary prerequisite for the qualification of the mujtahid. Such knowledge is no 
less important than being competent in language and religion. This is the only way for ijtihad to 
catch up with life and its development. The majority of Muslim ‘ulama today lack the ability to 
exercise. (Ibid., 80)  
This passage echoes Tariq Ramadan’s call, in Radical Reform, for revisiting not only the fiqh/ law, but also 
the fundamentals of this law, the sources of jurisprudence, uṣūl al-fiqh. It also brings to mind the idea of 
Two Books (the Quran, and the Universe), as well as his distinction between Text Scholars and Context 
Scholars (as detailed in Part III of this work). 
1230
 Ibid., 85. Aljabri attempts such a reading of the Quran in one of his last works, madkhal ilā al-qur’ān I: 
taʻrīf al-qur’ān  [An Introduction to the Quran: Defining the Quran] (Beirut: Markaz dirāsat al-waḥda 
alʻarabiyya, 2006) See Part II devoted to the Quran, from Chapter 6 to 10. Chapter 10 in particular deals 
with the reasons of revelation (asbāb annuzūl) and order (at-tartib) in the Quran.  
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If we undertake a comprehensive reading of the particulars transmitted in the 
shariah rulings and infer general universal rules based on this survey, we shall 
have a foundation of comprehensive rules applicable to any particular eventuality 
that may emerge. Similarly, if we begin from the standpoint that the [legal] intent 
(maqasid) of al-shariah is ultimately, in the final analysis, in consideration of the 
public good (al-maslaḥa al-´amah), and that the shariah texts themselves aim at 
such consideration, then the public good becomes the guiding principle, superior 
to any other.
1231
 
These conditions restore rationality to Sharia. This rationality is not that of pure positive 
law, but that which stems from the Quran and Sunna, again following the intent and 
public good methodology of interpretation: “It is clear that the rationality required here is 
not the abstract rationality alone such as that which belongs to human positive law, but it 
must be the rationality behind the shariah rulings mentioned in the Quran and 
sunnah.”1232 This makes Sharia open to any space and time conditions. It leads to 
“perpetual renewal and ijtihad,”1233  with which the “dogma” aspect vanishes. Based on 
this method, jurisprudence becomes “entirely presumptive.”1234 This means that the legal 
aspects of Sharia do not necessitate an Islamic State that guards their application, seeing 
that jurisprudence has to be perpetually renewed. Aljabri does not see any references in 
the Quran or Sunna about the formation of an Islamic State.
1235
  
 Henceforth, applying Sharia can be carried out only in a “relative manner,” since its 
perpetual renewal does not allow it to settle down with a particular model. Its norms 
change as society changes.
1236
 Following this methodology, Aljabri expands the list of 
rights and objectives of Sharia, beyond the five classical ones (the protection of life, 
religion, mind, offspring and wealth). Contemporary human needs on all aspects of life, 
innumerable as they are, have to be added to Sharia objectives.
1237
 In sum, through 
                                                          
1231
 Aljabri, Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought, 79 
1232
 Ibid., 81  
1233
 Ibid., 81 
1234
 Ibid., 83 
1235
 Aljabri says, “So, there is no State governing system that Islam legislates for. Rather, it grew with the 
Muhammadan preaching, and after his death developed the example of the “Amir” of war, which time 
circumstances necessitated.” The Arab Political Mind, 371. 
1236
 Aljabri, Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought, 94-95. This is close to the 
relativization of Sharia in Tareq Oubrou’s reading, see Part III, Section I. 
1237
 Aljabri explains the point further by stating the following:  
But those interests are no longer limited to those five areas [life, religion, mind, offspring, and 
wealth]. We must also include the right to freedom of expression, the right to political affiliation, 
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restoring the place of reason to the Arab-Islamic mind, and to Sharia in particular, Aljabri 
claims modernity from within the tradition, and endorses change on multiple levels, a 
view which other scholars of his generation share in content (i.e. his emphasis on reason) 
but not in methodology, for they see in Euro-modernity the ultimate option.
1238
  
 Abdulkarim Soroush: a neo-rationalist “lighting the flame of reason” 
 The Iranian philosopher Abdulkarim Soroush
1239
 (b. 1945) receives a special place 
among the contemporary philosophers I refer to. His encyclopaedic overture to physics, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the right to choose and change rulers, the right to employment, food, residence and clothing, the 
right to education and health-care, and all the other basic rights of a citizen in present day society. 
In addition to the needs mentioned by our ancient fuqaha, there are now many new needs, like the 
need to provide for health and the prevention of disease by establishing sufficient hospitals and 
other health services, and the need for taking necessary measures to encourage intellectual 
activities in various scientific, artistic and theoretical fields, in order to acquire sound knowledge 
about reality and events. As for the improvements to be decided by our age, they are simply 
innumerable. (Ibid., 92) 
Tariq Ramadan enlarged list of Sharia objectives goes in the same line of thought, see Part II, Section 2. 
1238
 I think here of at least two philosophers that started writing also in the late 1960s, and early 1970s as 
Aljabri, the Moroccan Abdellah Laroui (b. 1933), and the Syrian Sadeq Al-Azmeh (b. 1934). In azmatu al-
muthaqqafīna al‘arab: taqlīdiyya am tārīkhiyya? [The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or 
Historicism?], translated from French into Arabic by Zuqan Qarqut (Beirut: al-mu’assasa al-‘arabiya li al-
nashr, 1978), Laroui studies the Arab crisis following a historicist-Marxist perspective.  His other various 
texts have generally classified him in the corner of Euro-modernist intellectuals. As to Al-Azmeh, his 
earlier controversial works naqd al-fikr addīnī [Critique of Religious Thought] 2nd ed. (Beirut: dar at-tali’a, 
1970), was very critical of fundamentalism, and the involvement of religion in politics and science, 
thoughts which brought him a lot of criticism from some of his contemporary intellectuals but much more 
from the conservatives, who at some point considered him an “apostate.” Moreover, after Said´s book of 
Orientalism in 1978, he wrote back his renowned booklet/essay, al-istishrāqu wa al-istishrāqu maʻkūsan 
[Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse] (Beirut: dar al-ḥadātha, 1981), to depart from the critique Third 
World intellectuals and especially the Arab-Muslims among them, launched on the West through 
postcolonial studies. Al-Azmeh remains critical of any involvement of religion in politics and science. 
Bassam Tibi endorses the views of Aljabri, for his emphasis on reason, but still his (Tibi’s) methodology is 
not based on the tradition in its details and is Euro-modernist, as I conclude in Part I of this study.  
1239
 Soroush started his academic training in Tehran in Chemistry, which was followed by studies in the 
University of London on Analytical Chemistry. But he soon changed to study history and philosophy of 
science, and from it entered to the arena of Islamic philosophy. On his return to his country by the late 
1970s, he worked for the Cultural Revolution Council that aimed at reforming the university curriculum 
after the Revolution. After three-four years, he resigned, and since then his focus has been on developing a 
new philosophy of religion and a new theology in Islam. Since the 1980s, he has become a leading public 
intellectual in Iran, replacing by his popularity Ali Shariati’s (d. 1974). See chapter five: “Post-
Revolutionary Religious Intellectualism and Democracy: Abdulkarim Soroush,” in Forough Jahanbakhsh, 
Islam, Democracy, and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953-2000): From Bazargan to Soroush ( Leiden: 
Brill, 2001) 140-171. My access to Soroush’s work is limited to two main texts available in English 
language, besides his personal website: Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential 
Writings of Abdulkarim Soroush, eds. & trans., Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2000); Abdoulakrin Soroush, The Expansion of Prophetic Experience: Essays on Historicity, Contingency 
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philosophy of science, epistemology, hermeneutics, and Sufism makes him stand high 
among the Islamic modern and contemporary philosophers. My immense esteem of his 
revolutionary contribution to Islamic thought may be because of his ability to link his 
scientific knowledge, with philosophy and spirituality. That has undoubtedly contributed 
to making his philosophy of religion a real breakthrough in Islamic thought. It is because 
of this reason that I give him more space compared to the other philosophers. His rational 
philosophy of religion could embrace within its premises a lot of what the previous 
scholars advanced. Forough Jahanbakhsh introduces him as follows, “He is undoubtedly 
one of the most systematic architects of the Neo-Rationalist Islam, and one whose ideas 
have introduced a paradigm shift in Muslim religious thought.”1240  
 Soroush’s philosophy of religion is historicist. In studying religion he takes into 
account its internal dynamics and external influences. There is no pure religion, and no 
pure Islam. Between 1987 and 1989, he developed his theory The Contraction and 
Expansion of Religious Knowledge, which is an epistemological and hermeneutical 
theory about understanding religion as a form of human knowledge that is vulnerable to 
fallibility and evolution since it is based on human interaction and human learning. It is 
only out of this human interaction and evolution that one can understand religion. 
Between 1997 and 1999, he developed his theory of The Expansion of the Prophetic 
Experience in which he deals with the historicity of the Prophet´s revelatory experience, 
the Prophet’s impact on revelation.1241 These two theories would impact the outcome of 
his overall project: the world is a priori pluralist, and he terms this “negative pluralism,” 
and a posterior also pluralist, and he terms this “positive pluralism.” With these concepts 
(to be explained below), Soroush arrives to the fact that human beings or believers do not 
have to expect too much from religion, and he terms this “minimalist religiosity” against 
the “maximalist” one, for history and believers themselves add to religion “accidentals,” 
which cover the “essentials.” To uncover the “essentials” of religion then means 
uncovering the beginnings of a revelation and its later developments in light of the 
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Prophetic experiences, historical exigencies, and human interaction. The outcome of the 
study of the history of religion is knowledge about this religion and not necessarily pure 
religion itself. Before I explain his approach and its basic concepts, I first trace his 
belonging to the Islamic tradition, mainly that of the rationalist Muʻtazila. I then 
introduce his approach to 1) the Quran, 2) the Prophetic experience, and 3) the impact of 
these two approaches on religion, its essentials and accidentals.  
 Soroush affirms that “many of my [his] views are rooted in medieval Islamic 
thought.”1242 Though he acknowledges the Ash’ari main Sunni trend that has dominated 
Islamic thought for their revelation-empirical view of the world, he still feels closer to the 
Mu´tazilla in theological matters, like the use of reason to understand revelation, the 
createdness of the Quran, and the objective value of values. Whether moral values can be 
discovered by reason alone or have to be realized by reason and through the mediation of 
revelation.  He believes reason can discover them independently, “Like the Mu’tazilites, I 
believe that human reason discovers them as evident and can, therefore, establish a 
revelation-independent reason.”1243  
Soroush trusts reason, and speaks of levels of reasoning for the establishment of 
justice and freedom.
1244
 For him, those who fear reason fear freedom. Those who fear 
freedom, have no other alternative to their archaic and dogmatic ideas. Consequently, 
they prefer enclosure to openness that reason and freedom exert. The use of reason is 
vital for “this-world,” because man lives here and now. There is no higher morality 
[super-human, or metaphysical]; morality is active morality that caters for the needs of 
this world; he believes the divine message adapts to human needs, “It is not the human 
morality but the divine morality and justice that adjusts itself to all societies. It behooves 
us, fallible creatures, to act as fallible creatures not as infallible gods. One should leave 
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God's work, God's morality, and God's affairs to God.”1245 Still, Soroush does not claim 
that reason a priori flushes out everything right or good. He gives space to experience, 
which can be derived from various ways of life, to give meaning to this reasoning. He 
takes this esteem of experience from the Ashʻaria to measure rational advances, which 
the Mu´tazilla do not esteem high. He is critical of philosophers who use reason to 
distance people from spiritual experiences, “by emphasizing rational analyses, 
philosophers distance people from and make them oblivious to spiritual experiences. 
They close people’s eyes to insight and open them to learning.”1246 In sum, the rational 
heritage of the Muʻtazila on which he builds opens, as he says, new pathways out of the 
limited circle and debate of tradition and modernity:  
Everyone speaks about tradition and modernity as if they were closed chests, and 
then they try to describe their similarities and differences. I think that this is out of 
keeping with the analytical approach. We have to open the chests of tradition and 
modernity, take out their components and demonstrate the link between them. 
Speaking in this closed way is not going to take us anywhere. I started the 
Mu’tazilite project in order to breathe new life into tradition and modernity. 
Rereading, reconsidering, renewing and assessing the views and ideas of the 
Mu’tazilites and their school of thought, which are hefty components of tradition, 
can bring new gains, and truly show us the way both to using tradition and to 
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extricating ourselves from tradition. This is the kind of potential I see in the 
Mu’tazilite project and I’m trying to take advantage of it.1247  
Following the context that brought about the rationalist heritage of the Muʻtazila and 
other schools, Soroush, like some other prominent reformists cited in this work, calls for 
the revival of “theological dialogue” which develops pluralism in thought and “reasoned 
religion,” and leads to “epistemological pluralism.” Rekindling the flames of “rational 
and theological religion” would shatter certitudes through skepticism and doubt. One 
certitude and truth bring about dogma and intolerance. Needless to say that certitude here 
is not compared to scientific certitude/ truth. It is of a different genre. “Reasoned 
religion” or “theological religion” is pluralist: 
By lighting the flame of reason, theologians rescue believers from the chilling 
aridity of mindless dogmas and contribute to the warmth of wisdom. Theological 
religion is a hundred times better and sweeter than common, emulative 
religiosity, and it nurtures within it a plurality of which there is neither sight nor 
sound in the parched desert of common religiosity. This is a plurality that is built 
on doubt, not certitude, and it is a pluralism that is negative, not positive.”1248 
[Emphasis added] 
As will be illustrated below, Soroush builds on classical rationalist thought of the 
Muʻtazila, and goes further in the way he conceives the Quran and the Prophetic 
contribution to interpreting religion.  
Soroush’s philosophy of religion is composed of three main principles: 1) the 
Quran which includes the essentials of revelation (the core message), 2) the Prophetic 
experience, which expresses revelation internally through the personal life of 
Muhammad, and exposes some of it as the believers raise issues and the community faces 
socio-political circumstances, and 3) the accidentals, which are historical, evolutionary, 
dynamic, local, temporal, like Arabic language, Sharia law, and morality stories narrated 
in Quran. Thus, to go to the essentials of a religion, Islam in this case, the mujtahid 
scholar or any believer has to start from studying the third principle of accidentals, then 
move to the second, the Prophetic experience, before one can get a view, one among 
many possible others, of the essentials, or the essence of religion, and Islam. Ijtihad has 
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to target the essentials and their meanings, and should not stop at the jurisprudential-legal 
aspects. This process has to be carried out by reason, and analytical methodologies.  
 Soroush holds a very new view of the Quran, revelation, and the Prophet´s 
mediation. He believes in the createdness of the Quran with Muhammad’s moment. That 
is, the Quran is neither a text authored by Muhammad nor a word-for-word revelation. 
Soroush holds the opinion that revelation is not the Quran Muslims have now. Revelation 
is the divine message inspired to Muhammad by God through Gabriel. He uses the 
German term “Blick” to mean that revelation is an “attitude” or “outlook” that is 
sent/revealed to Muhammad, an exemplary and perfect man. Muhammad’s prophethood 
is the historical exposition of this revelation. The Quranic verses then were not revealed 
the way they are now, but are “signs” of revelation, and are “informative” of the way 
Muhammad reacted to revelation, the Blick, within the Arabian historical context, and 
according to what his Companions were asking him about, and in the language they 
spoke and understood.  This means that the Quranic laws were mere propositions of the 
Prophet, his transmission of the message of revelation, to his companions of the time. 
These laws are historical and are not final. This also means that the Quranic length could 
have been longer if the Prophet lived longer, and if more questions from the Companions 
were raised at the time. This then also means that the written Quranic injunctions as they 
are recorded now are not revelation itself, but one of its manifestations.
1249
  
 The Quran is seen not only as the Word of God created at a certain point of time 
as the early Mu´tazilla argue, but it is seen as the Word of Muhammad himself: 
Let me also add here that I consider myself a “neo-Mu’tazilite.” I believe that the 
Qur’an is God’s creation. The Mu’tazilites said this. But we can take one step 
further and say that the fact that the Qur’an is God’s creation means that the 
Qur’an is the Prophet’s creation. The Mu’tazilites didn’t explicitly take this step 
but I believe it is a necessary corollary of their creed and school of thought.
1250
 
This is a radically new and unprecedented move in Islamic theology.
1251
 In his 
new philosophy of religion, which bolsters the ground for new rational theology, 
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revelation is certainly seen as divine, from God, and belief in God and His Prophet is not 
doubted. Yet, what is now being advanced is that revelation - revealed as Quran and 
compiled in book format as Musḥaf - is not the exact words of God. God’s revelation is 
like a muse, an “inspiration” for poets, and Muhammad transmitted this “inspiration,” in 
the language he knows, and the style his people understand, to reveal the essentials of the 
new religion of Islam, without doing without the accidentals, i.e. the socio-cultural 
circumstances that bound both the Prophet and his community. If Muhammad lived in a 
different context, time and space, revelation could have been translated differently, but its 
core message would have been the same.
1252
 This means that a lot of the accidentals are 
additions that a believer in Islam has to understand according to various circumstances. 
Only such a historicist view of the main source of Islam, Quran, saves the Islamic core 
message of guidance. Soroush smashes the classical idea of the infallibility of the Quran. 
Some of it, he claims, can be fallible. What remain infallible are ideas like that of God, 
Prophethood, Life, and the Hereafter – the pillars of iman/ faith in Islam – because these 
make part of what he calls “master values” (like Life, Humanity, God, versus “servant 
values” like goodness, ethics, justice, solidarity) without which life becomes 
meaningless.  
 Soroush’s new interpretation of revelation and the Prophetic experience makes 
him believe that the believer’s high expectations of religion can be dangerous. 
“Maximum religion” or “maximum religiosity” is not easy to achieve because there are 
many accidentals that stand before one reaches the essentials. To reach the “possible 
maximum” of religiosity, the believer has to exert himself and try to catch the Blick of 
revelation as the Prophet did, and lead a spiritual, internal experience, as the Prophet did 
– and as all prophets of religions do. The ijtihad of the believer starts from a “cultural 
translation”1253 of the past and early experience of revelation into the present. That means 
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that linguistic, socio-political and economic circumstances have to be translated from past 
to present; they are accidentals, and to reach the essentials, this historical translation of 
the revelation and its experiences into the present has to be undertaken, following 
epistemological and hermeneutical modelling that serves the purpose: “The events that 
have taken place in the history of Islam, whether in the age of our main religious leaders 
or thereafter, are all accidentals and might not have occurred. This being so, they cannot 
be included in the articles of faith.”1254 Soroush includes what is seen by the orthodoxy as 
the fiqh essentials and worship obligations as accidentals as well:  
There can be no doubt that the underlying contention is that most of the precepts 
of fiqh and even its basic tenets are accidentals. Even prayers and fasting have 
been made proportionate to what people can endure on average. If their endurance 
was much greater, the obligations may well have been more severe.
1255
 
Soroush is not worried about what kind of fiqh would emerge from his philosophy of 
religion. He says this should not be a detaining concern for now. Otherwise put, 
“historical Islam” has to be differentiated from “the spirit of Islam.” At a certain point, 
Soroush outlines fourteen points that can help in deconstructing historical Islam to reach 
its essence, goal and spirit. I quote these points in this long passage: 
Religion does not have an Aristotelian essence or nature; it is the Prophet who has 
certain goals. These goals are religion’s essentials. In order to express and attain 
these intentions and to have them understood, the Prophet seeks the assistance of 
(1) a particular language, (2) particular concepts and (3) particular methods (fiqh 
and ethics). All of this occurs in a particular (4) time and (5) place (geographical 
and cultural) and for (6) a particular people with particular physical and mental 
capacities. The purveyor of religion is faced with specific (7) reactions and (8) 
questions and, in response to them, gives (9) specific answers. The flow of 
religion over the course of time in turn gives rise to events, moving some people 
to (10) acquiesce and others to (11) repudiate. Believers and unbelievers fall into 
(12) particular relationships with each other and religion; they fight battles or 
create civilizations, (13) engage in comprehending and expanding religious ideas 
and experiences or (14) wrecking and undermining them.
1256
 
These features of accidentals in religion challenge the common view believers have of it, 
i.e. “the maximalist expectation of religion.” Believers generally wish to find everything 
in religion, as a “maximal source and reservoir;” they seek perfection in religion, and 
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forget about the accidentals that hinder the direct sight of its essentials. Again, for the 
case of fiqh law, and though he states repeatedly that his concern is not merely to 
challenge these current orthodox norms but to raise primarily theoretical concerns, 
Soroush believes that classical ijtihad extracts maximums from minimums, and makes of 
legal norms a final verdict instead of considering them minimums that are able to be 
readjusted according to circumstances and the spirit of religion. When “normal 
conditions” for a normal life are not applicable, legal norms should not be applied 
maximally as they are now, for the maximum religiosity and its possibility is absent; the 
accidentals are many to make the maximum applicable.
1257
  
More clearly, Soroush is demanding to consider fiqh and religion in general this-
worldly, and not other-worldly. When considering religion this-worldly, then Sharia and 
ethics precepts [should and should not, dos and don’ts] are considered “necessary and 
sufficient” to run the social affairs and solve the problems that emerge from them. This 
means that the rationale behind law can no longer be said to be a divine secret or a hidden 
divine hikmat/ rationale. Law has to be judged according to its “immediate - and not 
ultimate - consequences.” Otherworldly oriented religion sees laws as duties the main 
aim of which is the production of felicity in the hereafter; the consequences are reaped in 
the hereafter, and not here. This otherworldly view lags behind society needs. It loses the 
spirit of religion and busies itself with the accidentals and the hereafter, without making a 
link with this world. In 1996 in Harvard University, Soroush titled his lecture as “Is Fiqh 
Possible?” - following Kant’s question “Is metaphysics possible?” and Iqbal”s “Is 
religion possible?” – and came to the conclusion that a fiqh that tries to place both this-
worldly and otherworldly  on a par is impossible.
1258
 Doing so “reduce[s] the role of fiqh 
to zero.”1259 Fiqh is incomplete; it is perfect in terms or precepts (theory), and not in 
planning; it is minimalist, not maximalist; it is not religion.
1260
 For Soroush, besides fiqh, 
minimum religion features touch every aspect that concerns human beings. Fiqh has 
always followed society and asked it to follow rules, and not the opposite. Religion and 
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its relations to other sciences (exact sciences or social sciences) have to be considered 
minimalist, too. The same can be said about governance and politics. It is society 
transformations and their needs that make governance and not religion’s maximalist 
views.  
Soroush’s conception of religion touches immensely core theological issues of 
good and evil. He argues that “ethics is for life. It teaches us how to live. It serves and is 
subject to life.”1261 He distinguishes between “master values” and “servant values.” The 
latter are “for life;” the former are what “life is for.” Most values - he says, presumably, 
ninety-nice percent – are servant values, since they are for life. For example, we do not 
live to tell the truth; we tell the truth to live. Ethics have context. In war, one may lie to 
survive. Servant values are etiquette, and they change according to context. So, when 
people say modern life has changed values, they mean that servant values have changed 
because of life circumstances. This is not relativism, argues Soroush, for relativism 
touches also the master values.  Master values, which life is for, are very few, and 
without them life is meaningless; they do not change according to context; they are not an 
etiquette, “In the absence of these values, life is not worth living. They are very few in 
number and basically consist of the things that human beings hold most dear, such as 
“God” or “humanity” or “life itself.”1262 Soroush does not see any intrinsic value in 
values. Their purpose says how good or bad they are, “Telling the truth is not intrinsically 
good and lying is not intrinsically bad. Their goodness and badness arise from their 
effects and consequences in life.”1263 
Religion is minimal on theological issues as well. Soroush asserts that religion 
leaves a lot unsaid about God, His attributes, the Day of Judgment, Resurrection, 
Paradise and Hell. Theological and philosophical debates on these issues testify that not 
much has been said, and still more is being explored by believers and mystical 
experiences as time goes by. For example, the question of free will is still being debated, 
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and so is the attribute of God´s speech: how does God speak? Soroush again uses his 
minimalist approach, as well as the prophetic experience of revelation and his mediation, 
besides the human interaction in history to say that much is not said yet, and more is yet 
to be explored by believers who take the path of prophetic experiences, as the mystics do, 
and as sciences also develop.  
Religious leaders, including the Prophet, were/are bound by certain social and 
historical constraints, so their expression of religion remains minimalist; it expands and 
contracts, depending on circumstances. The accidentals that cover the essentials in 
religion are plenty. This makes the claim of the seal/ end of prophecy and the perfection 
of religion understood in two ways, one of them is more plausible than the other: religion 
is perfect in guidance, and not in details. The end of prophecy does not mean the end of 
religious knowledge, but simply the end of the revelation of new guidance, a new 
prophet.  The seal of prophecy does not mean that the dictates of the prophetic experience 
are final, perfect, and maximalist. The spirit of guidance is so, but the details part is open 
to human interaction and social transformations. “A maximalist religion undermines 
religion itself.”1264  
The theories of religious knowledge, its contraction and expansion, and the 
expansion of the Prophetic experience lead to a pluralist view of religion. Soroush 
outlines two main pillars of religion: 1) “diversity of understanding religious texts,” and 
2) “diversity of interpretation of religious experiences.” The outcome of the two, 
respectively, is 1) intra-religious and 2) extra-religious pluralism. For diversity of 
understanding religious texts, Soroush admits that historically no religious text has been 
interpreted without disaccord among believers. The history of theology testifies to this. 
Besides analytical understanding of religion, Soroush takes a lot from the Sufi tradition, 
especially from his mentor the famous jurist and Sufi Jalalu Addin al-Rumi (d. 896). 
Rumi saw all religions as truth systems within truth – “truth within truth.” Each religious 
system of truth comes at a certain point of time, with particular Prophetic experiences; 
these do not catch all human experiences; they leave space for difference; believers have 
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to live them differently. No believer can grasp the picture of truth, unless he walks in one 
of its paths, and its paths are many. However he tries, the believer would be bound by 
time and space circumstances. This is God’s will, “The first sower of the seeds of 
pluralism in the world was God himself who sent us different Messengers.”1265 God 
intended the text to have no one meaning, “We therefore have to say that they are all the 
Creator’s intentions.”1266  
As to “diversity of interpretation of religious experiences,” it derives from the 
“diversity of understanding religious texts.” Like texts, humans are pluralists, and they 
project their pluralism on texts and their meanings. Especially in Islam, there is no 
religious authority to decree one interpretation, and the individual is the one who lives the 
religious experiences and is solely judged by God according to that, “Everyone carries 
their own burden of responsibility and appears before God singly.”1267 Pluralism then is 
no longer about asking if a system of interpretation or a personal interpretation of it is 
true or false, but about seeking to understand meaning in it, “The point is that we should 
not ask these questions [of truth and falsehood] in the first place and we should look at 
the plurality of people’s views and beliefs from a different perspective and that we should 
see and read a different meaning and spirit into it.”1268 All interpretations are fluid, open 
to assumptions and extra-religious influence, “the world is filled with impure identities 
[...] the reason for this impurity is the humanization of religion.”1269 
These broad lines of religious diversity in understanding and human interpretation 
results in two kinds of pluralisms: positive and negative. Positive pluralism is the norm in 
the world. The world is a priori pluralist, but it is positive because this realization from 
within religion comes later, a posteriori, after each religion realizes its various 
interpretations and also realizes the diversity of the world. It is rich, admits various 
interpretations, and acknowledges that none of them can be swallowed up or dissolved, 
                                                          
1265
 Ibid., 130  
1266
 Ibid., 178 
1267
 Ibid., 123 
1268
 Ibid., 122-123 
1269
 Ibid., 143-144. Soroush says that “a human religion is gradually born which is in keeping with human 
beings and an answer to their real circumstances” (xxiv-xxvi). For the case of Islamic main sectarian 
division, he says “Neither Shiism nor Sunnism is pure Islam”; “We have no pure race in the world, no pure 
language and no pure religion.” (143)  
397 
 
since each of them has “incommensurable particularities.”1270 Different prophecies 
cannot be compared in “kind” but in “degree,” since they all preach a version of truth, 
from the same God.  Positive pluralism is based on unity and nominalism. Religiosities 
based on “reason” and “experience” give rise to pluralism, while religiosity based on 
pragmatism and instrumentalism (“pragmatic/instrumental” religiosity) does not. 
Negative pluralism is “pragmatic/ instrumental.” It is inauthentic, and lacks something, 
like certitude or truth. Reasoned pluralism is negative pluralism. In another 
epistemological differentiation of pluralism, Soroush says that positive pluralism is 
“reason” based, while negative pluralism is “caused”: by reasons he means the 
interpretative rules of a phenomenon, while the causes are its changing events. Reasons 
identity and explain facts, and the relation between causes-and-effects, while causes only 
account for the proximate effects.
1271
 
Soroush’s epistemological position rests on “reasoned pluralism,” and 
“hermeneutic pluralism,” for they affect religious understanding, and lead to 
“epistemological pluralism.”1272 Reasoned pluralism (positive pluralism) embraces 
plurality to which everyone is invited to participate, according to their truth. This 
engenders “rational modesty.”1273 This means that no one considers his beliefs as the 
chosen ones, or the only true ones any longer. Monopoly of God and truth is over; 
pluralism, which is the norm of the world, prevails. Politically, no society then has to be 
governed by one ideological/ pragmatic/ instrumental interpretation. Theologically, truth, 
guidance, felicity, and salvation have to be considered as shared; worship has to be 
sincerely to God and not to particular sects or rituals, or historical incidents or figures. 
Soroush is by no means implying that rituals have to be left aside for pluralism; rather, he 
says that they have to be perceived differently, modestly, pluralistically, and rationally. 
He puts it this way:     
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This is not to say that the followers of all sects and religions should needlessly 
abandon their own practices, rituals and beliefs, and turn into a uniform mass. All 
that is required is for them to look at the plurality and diversity of rituals and 
beliefs from different perspectives; not to imagine that the essential core of 
rightful guidance is confined to the teachings of theology and fiqh; and not to 
operate on the basis of the assumption that anyone who has a few specific articles 
of faith engraved on their minds (Shiis, Sunnis, Protestants, Catholics, etc.) is 
rightly guided and saved, whereas anyone else is misguided and doomed. Let 
them also take into account people´s deeds, longing and diligence. Let them not 
imagine that Satan has the upper hand over God. Let them also study the hidden 
ways in which God chooses to guide people. And let them, most of all, value 
moral virtues higher than mental habits and sharia practices.
1274
 
For Soroush, it is easy to be an “emulative believer” who stops at his tradition of truth 
and negate the rest. On the other side of religiosity life are also “reasoned believers” or 
“reflective believers.” That latter cannot, and should not, try to turn the former into 
reasoned ones. The world is full of emulative believers, and they only need to enlarge the 
scope of their understanding of religion for more pluralism, beyond differences that 
historical accidentals, or causes, have brought about. The essentials are what should unite 
people to reclaim the pluralist world. “Rational spirituality” –to borrow Mohamed 
Arkoun’s term- is the way here, since it can be shared, different rituals and sects apart, 
“What remains is the necessary minimum of spirituality and guidance granted and 
bequeathed to humanity.”1275  
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2. Conceptualizing the Idea of European Islam: Overcoming Classical Dichotomous 
Thought   
 
a. Taha Abdurrahmane’s Framework of Reading Reformist Projects  
 
 To put my synthesis of European Islam in its framework as outlined in the main 
introduction, I start with introducing Taha Abdurrahmane’s critique of modern Quranic 
studies that he considers mimetic of the Western path towards modernity.
1276
 
Abdurrahmane’s critique aims at capturing “modernity spirit” (rūḥu al-ḥadātha) instead 
of “modernity fact” (waqiʻ al-ḥadātha). The former “is the constellation of values and 
principles that are able to improve the civilizational being of man in any place and time,” 
while the latter “is the realization of this spirit in a specific time and place.”1277 
Modernity spirit is what is needed for a new reading of the Quran for intellectual revival.  
Modernity fact has to be studied as a mere realization of this spirit. Western modernity 
exemplifies modernity fact, and because it is so, it has to be rejected as a model, because 
spacial and temporal circumstances contributed to its realization, in light of modernity 
spirit. Islamic thought has to focus on modernity spirit, and thus use its own tradition to 
capture this spirit; it should not mimic a fact. When it works on the spirit for its 
intellectual innovation, it is called “continuous innovation” (ibdāʻ mawṣūl); it fuses 
modernity spirit with what is useful in the tradition, i.e. the link with the divine. It is a 
“discontinuous innovation” (ibdāʻ mafṣūl) when it cuts ties with this tradition.1278 (I will 
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be refer to “continuous innovation” in European Islam, and contemporary Islamic 
thought, as “perpetual modernity.”1279)     
 Abdurrahmane specifies three principles of modernity in the West (first developed 
in Europe), which mimetic modernists follow without “innovation” (ibdaʻ).1280  These 
tree principles are based on one major fact: a “conflict fact”1281 that characterizes modern 
Western thought, conflict between man and the Church. I put these principles in a reverse 
order to match “world-society-individual” framework. One, Western modernity focalizes 
this life and world, and neglects the hereafter; this makes all modern innovation 
“discontinuous” (mafṣūl), and not “continuous” or “linked with” (mawṣūl) the divine.1282 
This principle is a reaction to encounter the political guardianship of the Church. Two, 
discontinuous modernity of the West depends on human reason and departs from 
reference to revelation, as a way of encountering the intellectual guardianship of the 
Church. Three, it centralizes man and neglects God, as a way of encountering the 
spiritual guardianship of the Church. Western modernity is reactionary, and based on 
conflict with the Church. This renders it incomplete.
1283
  
 The above three principles of Western modernity have been used by mimetic 
modernists as “plans” (khuṭaṭ) to read the Quran. These are the “humanization plan,” the 
“historicization plan,” and the “rationalization plan.”1284 One, the humanization plan 
(khuṭatu al-ansana or attaʼnīs) “aims at dropping the sacramental point (rafʻ ‘ā’iq 
alqudsiyya) by moving the Quranic verses from the realm of the divine to the realm of the 
human.”1285 Examples of this plan include dropping reverence phrases and terminology 
and replacing them with literary one, like dropping “al-Qur’an al-Qarim” (the revered 
Quran), “ʻāya qarīma” (revered verse), “ṣadaqa allāhu alʻazīm” (God is Right, in the end 
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of citing the Quran), “nuzūl al-Qur’an” (descent of the Quran).  This leads to turning the 
Quran into a linguistic text like any other texts (mumāthala lughawiyya). Moreover, the 
cultural context of the quran is read as a move from the absolute stage of the Quranic 
message to the stage of a relative one open to various interpretations, which, accordingly, 
implies its incompleteness.
1286
  
Two, historicization plan (khuṭatu atta’rīkh or arkhana) “aims at lifting the aspect 
of obligation (rafʻū ʻā’iq al-ḥukmiyya) by arguing that the Quran has come with eternal 
and irrevocable obligations, and the way to lift this aspect is to read these obligations in 
their context and time of revelation.”1287 What mostly happens with this plan is that 
obligation verses (āyāt al-aḥkām) are turned into verses of guidance, with no enforcing 
injunction, a plan which limits the Quran to the internal private ethics.  Methods of 
abrogation, (nāsikh and mansūkh), eminent and hidden meaning (ḥukm and mutashābah), 
Mekkan and Medinan periods (makkī and madanī) are used to relativize clear injunctions 
that are considered answers to particular historical circumstances. Even worship pillars 
are considered a historical manifestation of religion, and are thus relativized. At the end 
the plan calls for renewing, i.e. modernizing (taḥdīth), religion.1288  
 Three, the rationalization plan (khuṭatu attaʻqīl or ‘aqlana) aims at lifting the 
metaphysical aspect, by using the available empirical, positivist and rational 
methodologies of reading the sacred text. This is mostly done through the following: a 
critique of Quranic studies (‘ulūm al-Qur’an), use of methods of comparative religions, 
and Christian theology (lāhūt), use of methods of sociology, linguistics, semiotics, 
historiography, psychology, psychoanalysis, modern criticism, discourse analysis, 
hermeneutics, and opening the reign of human reason to be applied on any verse. Among 
the results of this plan is that there occurs a change in the meaning of revelation (wahy), 
which is given the meaning of “a talent man is endowed with,” while the metaphysical 
issues become to mean myths, and worship obligations become rigid rituals. The 
dominance of rhetoric in Quran, through metaphors and stories, is considered part of the 
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mythical, and the verses on djin, superstitution, and Satans are seen to target a historical 
mindset, and not a modern one. The distinction and supremacy of the Quran (afdaliyya) 
becomes negotiated; the changes that occurred to Torah and Bible are seen applicable to 
the Quran, too.
1289
  
The three plans, for Abdurrahmane, are mimetic of the Western conflicting encounter 
with religion.
1290
 Their results change facts about the Quran and generalize doubt on its 
entirety. Most importantly, they aim at simple critique of the religious, for the sake of 
weakening faith in it, and are not based on renewing faith and rational contemplation 
(attadabbur).
1291
 In his recent work, The Spirit of Religion (2012), Abderrahman says that 
Western thought has idolized reason (allaha alʻaql), and turned it into a tyrant of 
modernity (tāghūt al-ḥadātha),1292 since it enforces oblivion of the divine (at-tansiyah or 
nisyān, or al-insā’).1293 It creates “a world governed by oblivion” (ʻālam nāsī), in 
opposition to a “contemplative world” (ʻālam dhākir). The former is inhabited by a 
“horizontal man” who conceives just what he sees, while the latter is inhabited by 
“vertical man” who conceives also what he does not see.1294 Abdurrahmane’s project of 
“Islamic modernity” uses the same plans but innovatively, and makes the fusion of 
ethical reasoning and piety the axis of the project. In so doing, he claims to foster 
“continuous innovation” that preserves ties with the tradition (ibdāʻ mawṣūl), instead of 
“discontinuous innovation” (ibdāʻ munfaṣil). I now refer to his three “innovative plans.”   
Abdurrahmane argues that there is “no entrance to modernity for Muslims without a 
new reading of the Quran.”1295 For him, the “prophetic reading” inaugurated the first 
“modern Islamic realization” (alfi’l al-ḥadāthī al-islāmī al-auwal). Now, there is a need 
to inaugurate the “second modern Islamic realization,” and call it “continuous 
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innovation” (ibdaʻ mawsūl).”1296 Two conditions are required for such a realization. The 
first condition consists in renewing the modern experience/ realization in its interaction 
with religion. That is, the place of religion has to be fundamentally integrated in 
modernity renewal; it should not be an interaction based on conflict but on continuity and 
harmony (tarshīd attafa’ul addīnī). The second condition consists in rehabilitating the 
mimicked modern realization (iʻādat ibdāʻ al-fi’l al-ḥadāthī al-manqūl) so that another 
“fact” of modernity can be realized, in light of both the “religious spirit” and “modernity 
spirit.”1297 Multiple modernities are possible. Arab-Islamic thought has the right to 
difference.
1298
 Three “innovative plans” (khuṭaṭ ibdaʻiya) are its basis.  
One, the “innovative humanisation plan” denotes that man is honoured with the task 
of inhabiting the world (takrīm al-insān bi al-istikhlāf). The Caliphate principle (al-
istikhlāf) is the highest in ranking after divinity. God has willed that man does not only 
care for his private matters but also carries the honorary message of inheriting the world, 
a deposit (amāna) he should ethically care about. Moreover, this humanization of the 
divine does not aim at effacing sacredness, but at honoring man by moving the Quranic 
verses from divinity to man’s access through the latter’s methods of interpretation. This 
does not weaken the divine; it transfers the task of religious interaction to man through 
language in its human interactive aspect; the divine is linguistically limitless, not bound 
to specific patterns of language, which humans keep deconstructing to reach what it 
denotes. The Quran is not only a linguistic show, but a text full of intentions and 
meanings that one has to find out. Each verse has some divine aspect. Linguistically, it is 
unrivalled, and human linguistic plurality can help in finding their various meanings.
1299
 
Two, the “innovative historicization plan” aims at establishing ethics and not 
dismissing obligations. It links Quranic verses with their context in time and space for 
ethical reasons. Understanding verses in context does not weaken religion and makes of it 
a phenomenon of the past mythical mind. Quranic verses keep their value accordingly. 
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The first realization of these verses-obligations during the Prophetic period is but their 
first exemplary realization, and not the last. They can be renewed. Prescriptive verses 
have two faces: legal/ jurisprudential and ethical; the former follows the latter, and not 
vice versa. Besides, historical events and stories are meaningful; they are cosmic signs 
for the mind to expand its horizons of thinking (mabda’ al-iʻtibār). Following such an 
understanding, the sealing of revelation then goes beyond the time of its appearance; each 
era becomes its possible age of realization. The historicity of revelation becomes 
“futuristic,” and it should be always modern through its constant newness and update to 
answer this futurity aspect.
1300
  
Three, the “innovative rationalization plan” aims at expanding reason (tawsīʻ alʻaql) 
and not the erasure of the divine (maḥw al-ghaybiyya). Abdurrahmane considers that the 
use of modern methodologies of understanding texts and scientific phenomena should 
“expand reasoning horizons” (tawsī’ ufuq attafkīr). From here comes his use of the term 
“expanded reason” that goes from mere scientific analysis to existential contemplation 
(versus the “abstract” and “guided” reasons).1301 In the innovative rationalization plan, 
the scientific study of Quranic verses does not weaken the religious. The divine mind and 
the values behind it are not like the pure mechanic and analytical mind. The expanded 
mind uses contemplation (tadabbur) principle, and links the visual phenomenon and facts 
with their inner and deeper values and meanings, and is attached in a particular way with 
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the heart. Stories are not mythical, but are for more thinking, which the Quran clearly 
encourages doing. Overall, the expanded mind does not contradict modernity, but simply 
aims at guiding and fathoming the ethical being of humankind.
1302
  
Despite this brief introduction to Abdurrahmane’s project of another possible 
modernity, his thesis is that “Islamic modernity”1303 is grounded on the “original unity” 
between the sacred and the profane, religion and politics. Synthetically, this is argued for 
in three points. First, he does not deny modernity core values, which he refers to as “the 
spirit of modernity.”1304 His critique is against a mimetic projection of the Western fact of 
modernity on Islamic thought and Muslim majority countries. Western modernity is 
reactionary; it is based on a conflict with religion; so, mimicking it risks projecting a 
history on a different one. Second, what becomes also clear in his critique that stems 
from his Islamic perspective is that the divine does not conflict with the “expanded 
reason,” which is in a constant flux of thinking for both spiritual satisfaction and 
management of worldly affairs. In Abdurrahmane’s philosophy of religion, there is an 
“original unity” “between religion and politics, or more clearly between worship 
(ta‘abbud) and world-management (tadbīr).”1305 He calls this “al-i’timāniyya” (from 
amāna), or “divine trust.”1306  
Third, and most importantly, Abdurrahmane affirms that he restores to Islamic 
philosophy its own worldview, which some early scholars of Islam lost in their 
interaction with Greek philosophy that first lived the dichotomy of the divine versus 
mundane, and which the modern West has inherited, and which, in turn, has influenced 
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many Muslim reformists.
1307
 Since the 1970s, Abdurrahmane has devoted himself to re-
grounding Islamic philosophy on an ontological fact he sees has been lost from early 
Islamic times. This ontological fact is the “original unity” between religion and politics, 
and between this-worldly and other-worldly affairs, which makes religion vital to human 
life, for religion means ethics, and man without ethics is impossible. Abdurrahmane 
argues in length that religion equals ethics, “religion and ethics are one.”1308 He does not 
separate the two. He sees them as one ontological unit. “The existence of man […] does 
not precede the existence of ethics, but accompanies it.”1309 And since religion (and 
consequently ethics) has existed with the existence of man,
1310
 the following syllogism is 
reached: there is “no man without ethics, […] no ethics without religion, […] and no man 
without religion.”1311 Linking ethics to work he says, “ethics in Islam are the origin of 
any work.”1312 Based on this project of ethics, Abdurrahmane says a new “civilization of 
ethos” is needed; it is the “awaited for civilization.”1313  
Applying Abdurrahmane’s Analytical Framework to the Studied Islamic 
Scholarship  
Now that Abdurrahmane’s framework of reform based on reading the Quran has been 
introduced, its implications for my work on European Islam have to be clarified. Three 
generations of scholarship in Islamic thought were presented mostly separately (in Part 
IV, Section 1) as predecessors of European Islamic reform. Occasionally I referred to 
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other scholars for links, and frequently I recalled the three axes framework, world-
society-individual. However, I was more concerned with presenting those projects than 
with going at that stage into reading them in light of Abdurrahmane’s analytical 
framework. Before I end with presenting my deductions and conceptualizations on 
European Islam, I still have to use Abdurrahmane’s framework so as to clearly  answer 
the question of revisionism and reformism in European Islam later on. I use his three 
plans of “humanization, historicization, and rationalization” in their “innovative” sense to 
synthesize my reading of the Muʻtazila, the early and mostly late reformists whose 
projects are contemporary to the scholars of European Islam. (After that I use the same 
plans to synthesize my reading of European Islam). 
One, on innovative humanization. The humanization of the world is ethical. This is 
the case because of the ontological/ original unity man, religion and ethics enjoy, 
according to Abdurrahmane. This can be expressed in two points. First, it should be 
remembered that Abdurrahmane underlines the ontological freedom of man. Second, man 
has used this freedom and shouldered himself with the divine message of religion, which 
has become a divine trust (amāna or i’timaniya) for him to attend to as a caliph, an heir 
of God on earth. This divine message is ethical. Ethics, it has to be remember, equals 
religion, for Abdurrahmane. Since man is ontologically created free, and ethics and 
religion are one, and also man and religion are inseparable, according to Abdurrahmane, 
then man’s work is inseparable from the ethical paradigm inherited from the divine. Any 
human work is (supposed to be) religious in essence, and is thus (supposed to be) ethical; 
the other way around is also correct: ethics (= religion) engenders ethical (= religious) 
work.   
Otherwise interpreted, divinity passes to man, without the latter becoming divine 
himself. Rather, the divinity he can reach depends on his effort to interpret the revealed 
message, the Quran in this case, in the most adequate manner that answers the ethical 
essence of the divine trust. So, reading the Quran remains a human process, as long as it 
does not forget the ontological trust or neglect it. The sacredness of the responsibility of 
man endows him with a divine aura that has to be perpetually looked for and developed 
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for the good of the world. While originally man cannot take the place of the divine 
because it is born out of His Will, what remains for man to do in his historical and 
physical existence is to humanize this divinity. This happens mostly through language, 
and interpretation of the revealed text. And since there is no other revealed text to be 
awaited for, from the Islamic perspective, the idea of sealing revelation gives man even 
further powers to humanize the divine, with permission of the divine Himself.  
If man is ontologically free, established as a caliph on earth, and, further than that, 
expects no further guiding revelation, what remains to be understood from this is that the 
world is divinely willed to be human in its “management,” or tadbīr, using 
Abdurrahmane’s term. What this line of argumentation leads to is that justice or injustice 
in the world – assuming that ethically justice is the most important value human beings 
worldwide aspire to on this mundane world – is in the hands of man. Man as an heir is 
equipped with liberation, which implies responsibility, and a divine guiding message, 
which is ethical in its essence, i.e. freedom is highly tied to responsibility. Details are for 
man to ponder over and develop for the good management of the world.  
On the face of it, Abdurrahmane’s argument, as I understand it, may appear to go 
against the late Muʻtazila line of argumentation (Part IV, Section 1a-b). Abdurrahmane 
stresses the original unity between man and religion, religion and ethics, and ethics and 
man, while the Muʻtazila, with reference to Qadi Abd Aljabar, see man and ethics as 
ontologically separate entities; that is why they believe in the objectivity of ethical 
values. Their distinction between normative ethics and value judgments explains their 
defense of the objectivity of ethics. This fundamental “cognitive” difference between 
Abdurrahmane as the modern ethicist and the Muʻtazila as the early ethicists in Islamic 
thought can be explained “methodologically” with reference to the historical era of each 
of the two. The Muʻtazila appeared in the formative and productive period of Islamic 
theology. Political and theological rivalries between religions (for example, Islam, 
Christianity, and Zoroastianism), sects and schools (Khawārij , Murji’a, Jabriya, 
Qadariya; Shi‘a; Ashʻaria, etc.), besides the opening to Greek philosophy, certainly 
impacted the Muʻtazila theological views and their ethical theory. Moreover, despite their 
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high elevation of reason in understanding revelation, the Muʻtazila could not live an age 
beyond theirs; religious reasoning, to call it so, was dominant, and they hardly had any 
political force to help in disseminating their thought.
1314
 Even when in power for only 
about forty years in Islamic “majority” history, the Muʻtazila ethical theory did not 
oppose, for example, the Sharia law, because it was advanced to be considered unjust, or 
unegalitarian, and was seen as the guardian of social justice and minority rights, against 
some religious and tribal customs of the time.  
As to Abdurrahmane who lives in a modern period of human history, he can see that 
Sharia law has not been updated to cater for the changing human need for centuries; now, 
its aim of social justice is not achieved when it is applied, for various internal and 
external reasons, theological, socio-cultural, political and economic. This being the case, 
he speaks out his view that ethics in Islam is not mere Sharia law applied out of text and 
context. For him, re-reading the Quran is a requisite, to reground Islamic thought on its 
main objective: the ethical being of man. For such a project to mature, he calls for the 
renewal of ‘ilm al-kalam (Islamic theology), since it historically was the base of Islamic 
intellectual productivity in the past (see the introductory notes on kalam, Part IV, Section 
1).    
Abdurrahmane and the Muʻtazila, however, meet at least on two fundamental points, 
which are the two prime tenets in Muʻtazila diction: Tawhid (Oneness) and divine 
justice.
1315
 It should be recalled that the Muʻtazila advanced their defense of Islam and 
divine justice in difficult socio-political turmoil in Islamic history, when sectarianism and 
later on dynasties and rulers were fighting over who governs the Muslim community. The 
above two tenets aimed at defending Islam as a religion of liberation and justice. Tawhid 
was theologically interpreted to mean, among others, ontological liberation and equality 
of man, and socio-politically to mean that no ruler should step over basic rights and 
duties the divine prescribes for all human beings, without mediations of priests (imams) 
or political rulers that claim divine authority (Commanders of Faith). Thus, the divine 
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 See more on these historical facts presented in brief in Part IV, Section 1.  
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 The Muʻtazila are known by five tenets; Tawhid and divine justice are the first two important ones. For 
the other three, and their moral interpretations, see Part IV, Section 1. 
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was made innocent of the injustices ordinary human beings inflicted on others. This was 
further defended by the second tenet, divine justice, which meant that responsibility for 
socio-political injustice was man’s alone, and not the divine, or the misinterpretation of 
its liberating and just message.  
The elevation of the place of reason in Mu’tazilite thought as a precedent of 
revelation was meant to serve their (five) tenets, enforce human agency and 
responsibility, and thus free the divine from man’s errors and injustices. Though they 
considered that human reason can objectively distinguish between the right and wrong, 
they simultaneously saw in revelation an endorsement of the achievements and 
capabilities of reason; they saw them as compatible and complementary; if contradictions 
appear, it is human reason that has to work more to check what went wrong during the 
interpretation of revelation. This is what also Abdurrahmane argues but from a different 
methodological background. That is for a link between Abdurrahmane’s framework and 
the Muʻtazila referred to earlier (Section 1a-b, Part IV). 
As to what kind of link can be built between Abdurrahmane’s humanization plan and 
the reformists, my earlier distinction of “early” and “late reformists” help here.1316 The 
early Arab-Islamic Renaissance reformists were more preoccupied to awaken the masses 
to their political rights of self determination and liberation. Their use of the religious 
incitement was mainly for that purpose. They kept the classical interpretation of man as 
Caliph on earth, but that Caliphate had to liberate itself first from human (European) 
dominance. The idea of Tawhid and social justice –to recall the Muʻtazila tenets - lacked 
realization on the ground, which meant that human liberation and social justice could not 
be realized under colonialism and European paternalism. The re-awakening the Arab 
Renaissance reformists initiated remained limited in scope. Their call for the revival of 
the place of reason and philosophy in Islam was framed within the classical sciences of 
interpretation that did not allow reason to directly discuss, for instance, Sharia law on 
equality of genders at the legislative level, equality of believers with non-believers, 
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 By “early reformists” I meant the first modernizing reformists of the 19th century. I briefly referred to 
Afghani, Abduh, and Rida.  By “late reformists” I meant the 20th century reformists. I grouped them into 
three categories, and I referred to 1) Rahman, Arkoun, Hanafi, and Abu Zayd, 2) Mernissi, Wadud, and 
An’naim, 3) Aljabri and Soroush. For more, see Part IV, Section 1c-d. 
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equality in inheritance, the application of the penal code, and other social affairs (al 
mu‘āmalāt).  
In general, the early reformists lacked a clearly defined approach that takes into 
consideration their belief in Islam’s social justice and liberation based on the Quranic 
ethos. To put it in words close to this section’s analysis, the early reformists classically 
believed that man is the heir of God on earth, but they did not go so far as to read Sharia 
prescriptions according to the supposed human agency the heir is endowed with. Human 
agency, for the early reformists, works only in the spaces that the Sharia does not clearly 
intervene in. Reason either follows or confirms Sharia prescriptions. The humanization of 
the world here remains partial. The divine texts still rule, and man follows their 
prescriptions, not taking into account their ethical élan for social justice into account.  
Regarding the late reformists, Abdurrahmane, as seen above, is critical of some of 
their advances, especially regarding their reading of the Quran.
1317
 Still on the plan of 
humanization, the major critique Abdurrahmane launches on these scholars is their 
mimetic humanization of the divine through empowering man’s interpretative 
methodologies, which end in lifting the sacred aspects on the Quran. That is, mimetic 
humanization of the revealed text ends in de-divinizing the text, and thus humanizing the 
source of faith in general, instead of keeping its divine aura. My reading of the reformists 
interpretations leads me to disagree with Abdurrahmane’s critique here. I do not think 
that the scholars I have studied earlier do aim at de-divining the Quran. As I will make it 
clearer as I proceed, contemporary/ late reformists, as well as European Islam studied 
scholars, generally aim at humanizing the divine message through the human 
interpretation according to space and time. They do not cut ties with the divine; they do 
not “kill” the divine in their humanization of its manifestation in the world. This is my 
contention. I briefly recapitulate some of the views of these reformists to consolidate my 
point. I will show that even the “mimetic” scholars, in Abdurrahmane’s view, can be 
classified among the “innovative” ones – following the “innovative humanization plan.”  
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 Abdurrahmane is critical of Arkoun, Abu Zayd, and Hanafi while supportive of the work of Rahman, 
Soroush, to name these scholars I myself refer to in Section 2, Part IV.  
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In the previous section (Section 2, Part IV) I tentatively classified the reformists I 
introduced into three categories: 1) “hermeneutists,” or “ethicists-textualists” 
(exemplified by the work of Fazlur Rahman, Mohamed Arkoun, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, 
and Hassan Hanafi), 2) “egalitarianists-legalists” (Fatema Mernissi and Amina Wadud, 
and Abdullahi Ahmed An’naim), and 3) “neo-rationalists” (Mohamed Abed Aljabri and 
Abdulkarim Soroush). I noted then that they could all be called “rationalists,” 
“secularists,” or “liberals,” because their projects have the material that could be 
understood as such. At the same time I also noted that such labels could be 
misunderstood if they are quickly linked to especially European “rationalism,” and 
“secularism” – though such comparisons are unavoidable. These scholars are aware of 
how challenging they are to the orthodoxy, and also how critical they are of Eurocentric 
appropriation of modern values. These late reformists, unlike the early reformists who 
stopped at Sharia prescriptions, go so far as to read the Quran in light of modern values 
and social sciences. In this aspect they are “modern,” but I emphasized that they try to 
preserve a special place for the divine. This makes them attached to the “traditional,” but 
in a modern context, and not in a traditional one. In simpler terms that echo 
Abdurrahmane, they are spiritually liberal but not secular in the “classical” sense of 
relegating the divine to the private or gradually abolishing it because it is irrelevant to 
modernity.  
In the previous section I also inferred three “wellbeings” from the reformists’ various 
projects. These wellbeings are “cosmic wellbeing,” “social wellbeing,” and “individual 
wellbeing.” “Cosmic wellbeing” is the one that matches the innovative humanization plan 
discussed in this stage centered on the axes of the world (in world-society-individual). By 
way of an illustration, Fazlur Rahman emphasizes the ethical élan of Islam, and proposes 
to read the Quran in light of that overall élan, and not just in light of particular 
prescriptions. His “double movement” approach should be remembered here to match the 
text with the context, the past with present. To succeed in this approach the Quran has to 
be read as a “feeling-idea-word” process, whereby the Prophet Muhammad felt the divine 
message, got the idea behind it, and expressed it according to his time, space 
circumstances and subsequently people’s mindset. What this means is that the divine 
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message to be well understood and realized in its best forms, it has to take into account its 
context and people’s aptitudes. That is why Rahman was critical of classical orthodoxy, 
mysticism, (European) rationalism, and modern attempts of reforms that are either 
salafist-conservative or secular à l’Européenne. What Rahman aspired to see was the 
realization of the Islamic ethical and social message on the socio-political ground. This, 
for him, could happen without cutting ties with the divine. The divine is the source of 
ethical behaviour that has positive impact on one’s personal ethics and sense of being in 
the world. So, in Rahman’s approach, humanizing the divine text does not deprive it of its 
divinity. Rather, it makes it just more realizable, realist, and this-worldly.  
As to the other three hermeneutists and text analysts (Arkoun, Abu Zayd and Hanafi), 
they read the Quran as a text, but they keep insisting that considering it so does not mean 
its divinity is weakened or put aside once and for all. Arkoun and Abu Zayd distinction 
between revelation in its “orality” (oralité) as descended on the Prophet, and how it was 
kept in the heart of Quran memorizers and how it was later compiled into the Book/ 
Musḥaf has historically enforced the manner in which it has been interpreted by “the 
official orthodox corpus” (in Arkoun’s terms). This distinction influenced the way 
Islam’s humanism had been practiced before it became written. It is this humanism that 
they try to uncover by deconstructing Islamic accumulated thought. Hanafi works within 
the same hermeneutical premises, and mostly emphasizes human liberation and social 
justice Islam advocates through its first pillar of Tawhid. The fact that these scholars read 
the Quran as a text upon which they apply textual analysis methods does not steal the 
torch of divinity from God, but simply gives man, the agent, the freedom and faculties he 
is granted to activate and update human interpretation of the divine. They do not imprison 
human faculties of interpretation just because there is fear of misusing them. They are 
already misused by some violent and conservative voices, and to keep on imprisoning 
liberty of conscience makes more harm to the divine text itself. It is part of “spiritual 
responsibility” – to use Arkoun’s term- to speak against global injustices; “progressive 
hermeneutics” sides with the weak and the oppressed, since it considers “human life as an 
absolute value” in Hanafi’s words. Human interpretation of the divine text does not 
question divinity; it “brackets” this question, and considers the text a tool, and not an end 
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in itself. Human agency imbues the text with the content that aims at preserving social 
and cosmic order, and that is what a Caliph is supposed to do in the land he inherits.
1318
  
Two, on innovative historicization. At this level, Abdurrahmane is critical of some 
reformists since their historicization and contextualization projects of revelation 
prescriptions leads to considering religious obligations, including worship rituals 
(‘ibādāt), as part of this historicist readings, and thus can be dropped in the modern age, 
which is a different context. Abdurrahmane seems afraid lest the ethical content of 
religious obligations is swept away and replaced by “modern morality” – to call it so - 
that alone cannot replace certain meanings religious rituals, practices, and metaphysical 
stories give to the believer.  Sharia obligations, rituals and stories narrated in the Quran 
are cosmic signs for “contemplation principle” (mabda’ al-i’tibār), i.e. they are signs that 
teach moral lessons that exert the believer to think more, and deepen his piety and ethical 
wellbeing for the private matter (individual wellbeing). For the social wellbeing that 
matches most this plan of historicization, it is principally the legal and social Quran 
prescriptions that are controversial. From the historicization plan, it is not the very same 
prescriptions that have to be kept and practised to show that the divine still has a place in 
society. Rather, the innovative historicization plan requires that it is the spirit of the old 
Prophetic era that has to be kept, and now be renewed; the Quranic social prescriptions 
(like the penal code) served the social wellbeing of the early Islamic community, but do 
not now, seeing that the political and socio-cultural realities have changed. Social welfare 
was on offer, and the penal code, for instance, was an adequate and accepted practice at 
the time. Now, since the current historical moment is different from the earlier one, the 
historical spirit that adapts divine prescriptions requires adequate interpretations. This is 
what late reformists/ contemporaries do advocate - leaving aside for awhile 
Abdurrahmane’s fear of historicizing even the worship rituals, like the prayers and 
pilgrimage.    
If I invoke the example of the “egalitarianists-legalists” (Mernissi, Wadud, and 
An’naim), their utmost interest through their historical reading of the sacred text is in the 
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 Read, for example, Hanafi’s thematic approach of the Quran, Part IV, Section 1.  
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prescriptions that concern the social order. Mernissi and Wadud, for instance, have re-
read the Quran from feminine perspectives, and have reached the point that man and 
woman are ontologically equal in God’s creation and judgement. There is no superiority 
given to one over the other in creation. Difference is spoken about in the revealed text 
when woman is invoked within her Arabian social context of the time, the 7
th
 century. In 
light of this fundamental distinction that characterizes the Quran, they affirm that 
woman’s inferior position in society has been based on the social mention of her position, 
which has ever since been turned into an established rule by the patriarchy.  
An’naim’s work is also more concerned with the social implication of Sharia law on 
matters of equality of genders, equal citizenship of believers with non-believers, and the 
application of the penal code, to cite but these main controversial issues. An’naim, like 
his tutor Mohamed Mahmoud Taha, emphasises the distinction between the Mekkan 
versus Medinan revelations, the abrogating and the abrogated, and demands their revival 
as adequate distinctions that stem from the tradition itself. The Muslim mind had to wait 
for modernity to realize that such early distinctions can work, after centuries of their 
neglect. This historicist juridical revision is solidified through An’naim’s historical 
reading of the Islamic “states”; he realizes that an Islamic state that ruled simply on the 
basis of divine prescribed laws never existed. The state has always been secular; it is 
society that has been religious and the state integration of religious prescriptions has 
taken place for legitimacy. The idea is that the “second message of Islam” of universal 
human rights and social justice is now viable, in light of modernity values.  
Rahman and Hannafi’s hermeneutics, for example, also link their projects with the 
social benefits such interpretations bring to society. Divine prescriptions are good as long 
as they are good to society’s public welfare (maslaḥa ‘āmma). Rahman’s attempt to apply 
his project in Pakistan in the 1960s, under the invitation of the government, by 
interpreting Sharia social prescriptions according to the modern challenges goes in line 
with the idea of improving the public good. Rahman was called an apostate, and 
threatened by the orthodoxy for his interpretations. He had to leave/escape to the US. 
Hannafi’s “Progressive hermeneutics,” hermeneutics in defence of the oppressed and the 
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poor, is expressive of the idea of social wellbeing, too. Aljabri’s expansion of the Sharia 
objectives to include more modern human socio-political and scientific rights also aim at 
making the social message of Islam a lived reality. Soroush’s philosophy of religion, 
which he says is rooted in the Islamic tradition, in which he sees that fiqh (Sharia law) 
cannot pretend to be both divine and secular goes in the same direction: fiqh is for this 
world, and that is how divine prescriptions have to be interpreted.  
Overall, for these scholars concerned with egalitarian and legal aspects of Islam, 
historicization plan or level of analysis targets the socio-political aspects that religious 
prescriptions deal with. They are not preoccupied with weakening the worship rituals that 
concern the individual. Their focus is on the religious prescriptions that tackle social 
affairs. Their aim is to activate the social message of Islam, based on the equality of 
citizens. Historicization plan can be further clarified with the place of reason and human 
agency conferred on man according to the plan of innovative rationalization.   
Three, on innovative rationalization. Rationalism in its Euro-modern version, 
according to Abdurrahmane, is based on two principles: 1) it presupposes no ethics in 
science, and/ since it 2) acknowledges no prior knowledge to reason. That is how it 
denies revelation; or, when it does not deny it, it subordinates it. To project such a 
rationalist view on the Quran means that the metaphysical world it describes in stories is 
no longer valid for the modern world; these stories ethical teachings and call for 
contemplation over the world (attadabbur) are relegated  to the realm of irrationalism, a 
process which leads to the erasure of the place of the abstract divine (maḥw al-
ghaybiyyah). The heart, which affects a lot the human thinking and interaction with 
cosmic phenomenon through the intuition, is not given its place in the world of pure 
reason. Rationalism in this sense is limited to the positive and empirical phenomena. 
Reason becomes mechanical, analytical and responsive to what it sees and analyses. The 
world beyond it is nonexistent, until it is perceived by the mind.  
For Abdurrahmane, this limits the vastness of horizons man’s mind is entrusted with. 
As a replacement of this “abstract reason” that deals with analysing concrete 
phenomenon, and “the guided reason” that deals with doing things, Abdurrahmane 
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proposes the “supported reason,” which he also refers to as the “expanded reason” that 
has the capability of fathoming the internal identity of things and their significance. What 
Abdurrahmane means by the internal identity of phenomena or things is their ability to 
challenge the mind to build links between all the existing entities to make sense of them, 
instead of treating them as separate mechanical entities. What he drives to is a return to 
the “original unity” of worlds (the divine and the mundane, the religious and the political) 
and its implications for his ethical project. A brief reminder of his thought of 
humanization of the world explains his view of innovative rationalization.  The original 
divine trust (amāna) man carries is ethical. On the first moment of creating man, religion 
was also created, as an accompanying guidance/ remembrance for him on earth. Since 
earth, and the world at large, is gifted to man for inheritance, it cannot be but one that is 
guided by providence (God’s blessings). Religion is this guiding and accompanying 
blessing. If Abdurrahmane’s logical sequences of original unities or bonds are simplified 
here, they could be worded to give this fundamental result: man is an ethical being.
1319
 
Man’s existence is ethical, and so is his reasoning. The ontological freedom of man 
makes him face the fundamental question of choice. Being created ethical, with a 
freedom to choose either to keep this ethical gift or not, the choice of man on earth 
becomes as follows: either remain ethical (=religious) and live it, or leave it. 
What this means in concrete terms is that the work of man (i.e. action, or agency, or 
subjectivity, to use them interchangeably) is originally ethical, and thus religious, even 
when it comes from an actor who states he is not religious, or anti-religious. Innovative 
rationalization here trespasses the classical binary of religious and secular, or divine and 
mundane. This dichotomy is solved at the ontological level, at the source level.  Bringing 
to discussion Abd Aljabbar Muʻtazilite work can be interesting for a brief construction of 
intellectual continuity in the Islamic tradition. Abd Aljabbar’s objectivist ethical theory 
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 These unities or bonds are as follows: there is no man without religion; there is no religion without 
ethics; there is no man without ethics.  He also says that human existence and religious existence are one, 
and that there is no ethics without reason.  This makes human existence, religion, ethics, and reason 
inseparable units. This goes beyond the Platonist statement “man is a political animal.” For Abdurrahmane, 
the political itself is part of the ethical; so, for him, man is an ethical being, or an ethical animal. The 
ontological freedom of man makes him either live and keep this ethical aspect, or leave it. The question of 
man on earth for Abdurrahmane is to be ethical or not to be.  
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emphasizes that ethical values can be reached by reason; revelation does not create them 
but simply promulgates them. So, supposedly, there can be no contradiction between 
values of the good as reached by reason and as prescribed by revelation. If there is some 
contradiction, it is for man’s reasoning to amend it. The Muʻtazila do not say that values 
are objectivist simply because reason defends them; they do not deny revelation; they 
make it stand equal to reason. Otherwise put, since reason arrives to the ethical without 
revelation; and since revelation comes just to promulgate this ethical, this means that 
reason, revelation, as well as ethics all stand equal at some point. This point cannot be 
historical, this worldly; it would not make any more sense to argue for rational ethics, and 
still believe in the divine if the meeting point of reason-revelation-and-ethics were on 
earth; that would be irrational. Revelation would make no sense. Rational ethics of the 
Muʻtazila make sense because reason-revelation-and-ethics stand equal at the ontological 
point, the point of creation, which happened “somewhere else” in a different world other 
than this human one. If the Muʻtazila kept their belief in the divine, despite their very 
rational advances, it is because they considered the denial of revelation as the denial of 
the sources of the rational ethics they argued for and defended.  
The Muʻtazila have historically been linked with extreme rationalism that, for some, 
could end in the denial of the divine; their idea that through reason alone one can 
understand God and thus accept the idea of the divine and revelation was understood as a 
subordination of revelation to reason. My interpretation of the Muʻtazila’s approach of 
harmonizing revelation and reason through ethics has been backed up by 
Abdurrahmane’s innovative rationalization plan in which he conditions the existence of 
man with religion and ethics. The contention here is that the Muʻtazila’s objectivist 
ethical theory presupposes that reason itself is ethical in its functioning; its creation is 
ethical, and so is its doing (action/ thinking). Reason is not neutral. It is either ethical 
(and thus religious), or it is not. It is free not to be ethical, but this freedom does not mean 
it is secular; in this framework of interpretation, the secular and divine dichotomy 
disappears; what replaces them is the nature of action, whether it is ethical or not.  
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In light of this meta-ethical interpretation, how can human concrete action be judged? 
If human reason is able to fathom the ethical, and reach the divine, does not this mean 
that it is this same reason that can establish value judgements? Cannot human reason then 
prescribe and prohibit codes of conduct, punish and reward accordingly, as does 
revelation in classical/ orthodox interpretations? Conservative interpretations fear giving 
reason supreme authority because that would impact the classical revelation prescriptions 
that were revealed at certain times and spaces of human history. Innovative 
rationalization which espouses itself to the divine, responsibly and inseparably, does not 
face this fear for the reason invoked in innovative humanization plan; i.e. man is the 
Caliph, and there is no further revelation to descend on man and guide him (seal of 
revelation). Thus, the “expanded reason” of Abdurrahmane, or the “ethical reason” –to 
call it so after having made it clear that reason and ethics are inseparable- has no other 
choice but to act ethically, if it aspires to keep its inheritance of its own world in good 
shape. To answer the action of reward and punishment, innovative rationalization invites 
“ethical reason” to learn from the past revealed prescriptions, fathom their morales, and 
envisage corresponding prescriptions and prohibitions in light of human historical 
evolution. Man is the one who can judge now what is good and what is bad – but always 
keeping in mind that reason and ethics are inseparable in this process.  
The early reformists (naḥḍa reformists) generally remained entangled in the 
dichotomy of religion versus reason, thought they kept calling for the revival of the place 
of reasoning faculty in dealing with the new socio-political challenges. Their attempts 
remained theoretical, and limited to the classical hermeneutical methodologies of 
integrating human opinion (ra’y) when divine texts are clear on certain matters, as is the 
case with Sharia law prescriptions, or when specific social matters have already been 
answered by classical scholars of jurisprudence. As seen earlier (Section 1c, Part IV), al-
Afghani faced Ernest Renan to defend rationality in Islam. Abduh tried to reform the 
Azhar educational curricula in Cairo, and referred to the Muʻtazila in the early version of 
his risālat attawhīd (Message of Tawhid), but had to drop that reference from the later 
versions, because of the possible critique he faced from the orthodox scholars of the 
university. His fatwa, for example, on allowing “interest benefit” (ribā) to face the new 
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economic challenges was not also welcomed. Rida, Abduh’s student, was for putting the 
common good (maṣlaḥa ‘āmma) above even the socio-political tradition of the Prophet. 
Only worship rituals remained untouchable for him. He tried to develop the idea of 
“eclectic theology” (talfīq) in a voluminous work as a reference. What is meant by this 
recapitulation of these early reformists attempts of reviving Islamic thought is that  their 
approach of dealing with socio-political changes remained based on classical 
hermeneutics and Islamic sciences classifications, and also on the religious versus 
rational dichotomy that the modern context has entangled them in. It is the later 
generation of reformists that would try newer interpretations of how to reconcile reason 
with religion.   
The late reformists (or the contemporaries) try to surmount the dichotomy of religion 
versus reason through their various interpretations of the sacred text and Prophetic 
experience. The reformists studied here (Section 1c, Part IV) all emphasize the pivotal 
role in understanding the message of religion, and in developing a more rational faith. 
Again, none of them denies the divine; and none of them makes reason the only ultimate 
source of knowledge and individual wellbeing. Reason leads human life as long as the 
management of the public affairs, and the world at large, are concerned. I use the 
previous classification of these reformists into three categories to refer to how they 
perceive the place of reason in “new” Islamic thought.  
First, the “hermeneutists” (Rahman, Arkoun, Abu Zayd, and Hannafi) nowhere in 
their texts argue that human reason has to substitute the divine for cosmic, society, and 
individual wellbeing. Rahman, who may be considered the most ethicist of these 
hermeneutists, is critical of paganist use of reason
1320
 which is purely materialist and this-
worldly, and not transcendent. Though he attempted radical, seemingly secular, reforms 
in Pakistan with the government of his country in the 1960s through social reforms, he, 
however, remained cautious of making of reason the ultimate reality of human existence. 
In Rahman’s project, reason works to activate the ethical message of Islam which is 
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 By “paganist use of reason” I echo his critique of radical secularism which he suspects of paganism; for 
him, it calls for separation between religion and politics, but it aims at bashing religion for life once and for 
all. That is why he calls it paganist (polytheist or atheist) in intent.  
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social justice. That is, it works on the behaviour of the person, in light of the ethics of the 
Quran and the Prophet, which Sharia law prescriptions alone do not summarize. 
Hannafi’s “progressive hermeneutics” go in the very same line of Rahman, i.e. providing 
for the élan of social justice, and the hermeneutist has no “neutral” or “metaphysical” 
concerns to busy himself with other than this-worldly matters.    
Arkoun and Abu Zayd, who are very close in their projects of literary-historicist 
deconstruction of the sacred text, also consider the role of reason in grasping the spiritual 
dimensions of revelation, and in interpreting the socio-political prescriptions in light of 
this dimension. They are very critical of the way metaphysical stories narrated in the 
sacred text are interpreted. That has led some to consider their reading a critique of the 
sacred itself, and Taha Abdurrahmane is one of them. Arkoun and Abu Zayd’s work 
questions the sacredness of the written text (Musḥaf); their approach tries to go to the first 
moments of revelation, the oral moment as descended on the Prophet, and as the latter 
interpreted it in the language his people understood. The desacralization of Arabic, as 
well as the Musḥaf, means that the orthodoxy reasoning that has dominated Islamic 
thought for centuries is questioned.  
Unlike the way Abdurrahmane reads them, I do not see that Arkoun and Abu Zayd 
target desacrilizing the sacred, but they aim at rethinking Islamic reason that has been 
narrowed down to the limits the “Closed Official Corpus” –to use Arkoun’s phrase- 
traced for it. It is outside this closed corpus that a new reason has to emerge (Arkoun’s 
“emerging reason”). Arkoun, for instance, refers to the Muʻtazila who believed in the 
createdness of the Quran, and thus the multiplicity of readings it bears, outside its limited 
interpretations advocated by its non-createdness that Ash’ari and Hanbali orthodoxy 
advocate. Abou Zayd also believes in the createdness of the Quran, for that allows him as 
a hermeneutist to read it as a linguistic text, a mediation between God and man for the 
wellbeing of man on this world. Considering it otherwise makes of it an “imaginary” 
(taṣauwurī) text, destined for a metaphysical world which only God Himself fathoms. So, 
what human reason touches in revelation is not divinity as conveyed to the Prophet in the 
oral version of the Quran, which is not doubted, but touches the orthodox codification 
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and compilation of the Quran in its written format, which has affected how Sharia laws as 
overall prescriptions of religion should be interpreted. While the orthodoxy depends on 
the classical work of early Muslims, these reformist scholars go to the original texts, and 
revise the place of human agency based on that first moment of revelation. The 
rationalization plan advocated here then does not question the divine; it questions the 
early interpretations that have been divinized by Muslim orthodox scholars. Based on this 
reading, the question of Sharia precise prescriptions on gender (in-)equality, inheritance, 
polygamy, and other social affairs have been revised by these scholars, as seen in the 
earlier section (Section 1c, Part IV) 
Second, the “egalitarianists” (Mernissi, Wadud, and An’naim) also enter the debate of 
the place of reason in Islam by comparing the general message of Islam with its 
specificities that concern especially equality. The three of them mention the Muʻtazilite 
idea of createdness of the Quran for its implications: possibility of human interpretation 
of the Quran’s non-eternal clear prescriptions. Their prime concern, however, is the 
current gap between the general message of Islam (social justice based on the equality of 
all), and its particular prescriptions (like Sharia laws on inheritance, the masculinist tone 
in the Quran, the penal code). Through their contextualist readings, they have realized 
that the classical interpretations have remained very particularist to the 7
th
 century 
Arabia, and that the Islamic universalism has been narrowed down to that limited scope 
of interpretation. Their activation of human agency to seek justifications of equality from 
within the Quranic texts did not need their denial of the divine. What they consider to 
have done with it is that they have re-humanized a message that is destined for human 
beings, but which was divinized in time by the early interpreters of the tradition.  
The “egalitarianists” do also assume the view of the createdness of the Quran in 
particular time, thus its openness to human reinterpretations and adjustments to new 
social conditions. Without such an assumption, human agency becomes sterile, and the 
universalism and equality of Islam as its general message –or the “second message” in 
the wording of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha - stands for becomes unrealistic and not this-
worldly.  Mernissi’s “pride” in the ontological equality prescribed by the Islamic 
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message, Wadud’s “gender jihad,” An’naim’s non-divinity view of Sharia law and the 
concept of “civic reason” are some of the earlier notions used to defend reasoning in 
updating/ re-visiting the scriptures.  
Third, the “rationalists” (Aljabri and Soroush) pursue the idea of the createdness of 
the Quran, and the ability of man to live the divine message rationally. Aljabri 
deconstructs knowledge based on the discipline of explication by analogy and rhetoric (al 
bayān epistemology), as well as the Eastern (illuminist/ mystic) system of knowledge 
(al‘irfān epistemology), and calls for the revival of demonstrative knowledge (al burhān 
epistemology) of Ibn Roshd/ Averroes, the 12
th
 century Aristotelian philosopher. The 
“Averroest spirit” (arrūḥ arrūshdiyya) is the way to the future.  (Averroes reconciled 
reason and revelation through coupling them as two different systems of searching for the 
same truth.) From this premise, Aljabri theorizes for democracy and universal human 
rights from within the tradition. Through the “objectives of Sharia,” he revises the 
prescribed prohibitions, and expands the list of rights and duties of human beings as 
citizens in the modern world. He rationalizes the prescribed Sharia laws in their past 
context by especially invoking the “reasons of revelation” (asbāb annuzūl), since he does 
not consider that reason is a separate entity in man which aims at replacing God.  
As to the place of reason in Soroush’s project, it could be portrayed as the most neo-
Muʻtazilite/ neo-rationalist among all the reformists cited here. He does not only consider 
the createdness of the Quran by the divine at a certain moment in history, but goes so far 
as to say that the written Quran as Muslims have it now is the word of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Revelation was the moment of descent of this now written text. This means 
that Muhammed intervened linguistically in the text to match his audience socio-political 
and intellectual capacities. Even with this very radical view of the Quran, Soroush, 
however, still preserves the sacred place of revelation as the oral process that the Prophet 
lived at a certain moment.
1321
 That is, the written version of this revelation is translatable 
                                                          
1321
 I actually wonder how Abdurrahmane fears that Arkoun, Abu Zayd, and Hanafi’s hermeneutical 
readings of the sacred text could desacralize the sacredness of the Quran, and considers these scholars 
“mimetic modernists” while he considers scholars like Soroush as “innovative contemporaries” though 
Soroush’s view of the Quran, in my view, is the most radical. For the latter, the Quran in its written format 
now is the word of Muhammad. And if one recalls the fact that the Prophet himself urged his companions 
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now to other languages and contexts. Human reason has not only the capacity but also the 
duty to translate the Prophetic exemplary era to the current and future eras as well, 
otherwise the idea behind revelation would remain imprisoned in that 7
th
 century Arabian 
context. As detailed earlier (in Section 2d, Part IV), Soroush moves from this reading of 
the 1) Quran, and 2) the Prophetic experience to 3) argue that it is then human reason that 
should do the work after the “Seal of Revelation.” Human reason has to uncover the 
“essentials of religion” by peeling off the “accidentals” that cover it; among the 
accidentals is the Prophetic experience itself, and all the work and accumulated 
interpretations added by the Caliphs, and jurists after him. When the mind goes through 
this process of deconstruction, it realizes that religion as a social phenomenon is not 
“maximalist” but “minimalist” in what it provides; i.e. the believer should not expect to 
find all answers in the sacred texts, because these are covered by accidentals that are 
contextual; human reason, to reach the essentials, has to “reflect.”  
“Reflective believers” (vs. “emulative believers”) can realize that religious fiqh/ law, 
for example, cannot be both this-worldly and other-worldly. It is just this-worldly; this 
implies that even religious morality does not make sense, because it cannot be 
metaphysical and worldly at the same time. What the “reflective believer” arrives at is 
that there are few “master values” (like God, Life, Humanity), which may be said to 
correspond to the essentials of religion, and many “servant values” (like equality, justice, 
solidarity, etc.), which may be said to correspond to the “servant values.”1322 The idea 
here is that human reason lives the experience of servant values on a daily basis, and thus 
contributes to shaping them, constructing them, and changing them when need be. These 
values are servant to man in life; there is nothing intrinsic about them; their consequences 
and benefits to man are the measurement of their value. This makes human reason the 
most responsible for the choices it makes about them. Morality, accordingly, is “active 
morality,” lived morality, and not “higher morality” that orthodox interpretations of 
religion prescribe for believers.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
to differentiate between his words (Sunna) and those of God (revelation), then one would think that 
possibly Soroush’s view is the one that could lead to desacralizing the Quran, though he in no way intends 
his interpretation to be interpreted as a pejorative desacralization attempt.  
1322
 This correspondence is my own interpretation, based on the followed framework of analysis.  
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Such a radical rationalization of religion and ethics could have been theorized without 
any link to the divine. But Soroush still believes that religion gives meaning to the values 
humans realize, live and construct,  and mostly to the “master values.” Though human 
agency is very remarkable when it comes to servant values, the latter remain meaningless 
if the master values, few as they are, are not reflected upon. These make of many a 
rational man a believer. The divine, consequently, is not revolted against, even when 
reason controls worldly matters. There is a bond of gratitude between the two, 
summarized in “spirituality and guidance” bequeathed on humanity by the divine – to use 
Soroush’s words – and the highest manifestation of this bond is sincerity and morality in 
action – to echo Abdurrahmane.  
Continuity in Islamic Thought: the Epistemological and Ontological Bond 
Having introduced Abdurrahmane’s three plans for a more innovative reform of 
approaching the Quran, along with the link I have built between his plans and the Islamic 
three generations of scholarship (1) the Muʻtazila, 2) the early reformists, and 3) late 
reformists), I now stop to make a critical recapitulative note on the question of ethics, 
revelation and reason in light of what has been said above. I do so before I proceed to 
read European Islam in light of Abdurrahmane’s three plans and how I interpret them. 
The note I invoke here before I proceed is around this question: how can Muslim 
reformists call for the rationalization of ethics, and faith, without causing “some damage” 
to belief in the divine? Otherwise said, is “rational faith” –which I believe to be the 
meeting point of all these reformists - possible? In both the main introduction to this 
work as well as the introduction to Part IV I stated that what is new in European Islam –
following the three generations of Islamic scholarship - is the move towards the 
rationalization of ethics. I also mentioned George Hourani’s classifications of Islamic 
classical scholarship and their views on reason and revelation. I do not aim at confusing, 
or converging, Abdurrahmane’s framework used above, with Hourani’s. That is why I 
stop at the latter’s classification, and use his work as a passage to the former’s. As I noted 
earlier when referring to his classification, it is the place of both reason and ethics in 
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Islamic thought that makes his classifications worth-noting here. My notes on kalam 
(Section 1a, Part IV) was considered and started with for this reason, too.    
The fact that kalam made the relation of reason and revelation, and thus the sources of 
ethics, its primal focus in the early Islamic era is now being repeated at the age of Islamic 
search for theologico-philosophic renewal. It is for this reason that I started this work 
with the assumption that there could be no renewal in Islamic thought if the issue of 
ethics is not made at the center of the debate, which can impact other fields, socio-
political, economic, etc. This assumption is endorsed by most of the reformists referred to 
in this study.
1323
 Because of the diverse contributions of various Islamic schools to the 
debate, Hourani summarized the debate into two questions: one (1) ontological and the 
other (2) epistemological. Out of these two questions he deduced five tendencies or 
directions in classical Islamic thought. Below I refer to them in a succinct fashion, as a 
way of paving the way for my reading of the studied reformists, and European Islam 
afterwards.  
The ontological question is formulated as follows: What is the nature of ethical value 
concepts such as the good and the just? Hourani provides two main answers or 
perspectives to the nature of the ethical value/ right from the Islamic tradition: A) 
objective (objectivism) or B) subjective (subjectivism). The nature of values, or a right, is 
(A) objective when “there are real qualities or relations of acts that make them right [...] 
independently of the opinions of the person who judges them right or wrong.”1324 This 
means that values do not hold an intrinsic value in themselves; rather, they acquire such a 
value through the benefits they beget. This view was held by Muslim early philosophers 
(like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) and by the Muʻtazila (as seen in Section 1a-b, Part IV).  The 
nature of values, or right, is (B) subjective when it has no objective meaning; i.e. “it 
                                                          
1323
 For more on the place of kalam in Islamic thought, see Section 1a-b, Part IV.   
1324
 Hourani, Islamic Ethics, 23-48; 270-276. For more, see Hourani, chapters 3 and 16. In chapter 3, he 
works on the ontological and epistemological classification; in chapter 16 he works on the rational 
classification of renowned schools and philosophers of Islam.  I note here that in chapter 3, he puts the 
Muʻtazila in “partial rationalism” class, while in chapter 16 he put them in the class of “independent reason 
supplemented by revelation.” In light of his overall work, the Muʻtazila are rationalist, and when he put 
them under the “partial rationalists” label, he wants to make it clear at that stage that he distinguishes them 
from the Western view of rationalism, which makes no reference to the divine, whereas the Muʻtazilaview 
does.  
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means whatever is approved or commanded by someone or other.”1325 The first type of 
this subjectivist view is (Ba) termed “human social subjectivism”; i.e. it is the community 
of the believers, the umma, which emphasizes certain values, that may be a mixture of 
religious and customary laws, and elevates them to the status of authority for the 
community. This goes with the idea that whatever is good for the community is good for 
God. The second type of this subjectivism is (Bb) “theistic or divine subjectivism” by 
which is meant that “ethical value concepts must be understood in terms of God’s 
will.”1326 This view has become the dominant one among Sunni jurists and theologians.   
As to the epistemological question, it reads as follows: How can man know the 
presence and force of ethical value concepts in particular situations?  According to 
Hourani’s synthetical classification, classical Islamic thought provides two answers: one 
is C) rational (rationalism) and the other is D) traditional (traditionalism). The rational 
tendency (C) defends the idea that “what is right can be known by independent 
reason.”1327 This tendency is twofold: (Ca) one is “completely rational” and contends that 
what is right can be “always” known by independent reason, as most Islamic 
philosophers like Al Farabi and late Muʻtazila argued, and the other (Cb) is “partially 
rational” and contends that what is right can be reached by reason alone (late Muʻtazila 
are also categorized here), or by sources derived from revelation like consensus and 
reasoning by analogy (as defended by Hanafites and Malikites), or by both (as defended 
by the Malikite Averroes). This contention is reconciliatory, and sees no contradiction 
between reason and revelation. As to the traditional tendency (D), it contends that an 
ethical value, or what is right, can be known only by revelation; reason can be used only 
to prove this contention, through conclusions reached by consensus and analogy 
                                                          
1325
 Hourani, Islamic Ethics, 23 
1326
 Ibid., 24 
1327
 Ibid., 24. By “reason,” to re-articulate it here, is meant its general sense which covers thinking that is 
naturalist, empiricist, or intuitive at times. Hourani says that Quran calls for the use of “reason” but does 
not specify which kind of reason exactly. So, he takes it to mean a judgement that is arrived at by 
experience or experiment, without necessary recourse to the scriptures.  
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methodologies; it becomes a dependent reason. Ibn Hanbal, the Zahirites, Ibn Hazm, Ibn 
Taymiya, and the Wahhabies belong to this (epistemologically) traditional class.
1328
  
After this classificatory view of classical Islamic thought, Hourani ends his book with 
a passage in which he says that if Islamic thought seeks revival, it has to build on the 
rationalist heritage of the Muʻtazila.1329 (His work, it has to be remembered, makes no 
reference to the reformists.) His conclusion about the Muʻtazila is based also on his own 
reading of the Quran, besides the intellectual tradition of early Muslim scholars.  He 
thinks that the Muʻtazila seem the closest to the way the Quran speaks of values and 
reason.  Ontologically, he argues that “the Quran frequently refers to objective values, 
which cannot be analysed completely in terms of commands and obedience. This 
conclusion coincides with that of the classical Muʻtazilites.”1330 That is, values in the 
Quran are emphasized through the frequent invitations to contemplation, reasoning, 
empiricism, and experiences, historical be they, scientific, or prophetic. These values, as 
he reads the Quran, are not linked just with “commands and obedience” as some Quranic 
verses specify. The call for reasoning is more emphasised than particular prescriptions, 
which means that values though emphasized throughout the Quran, they are also left 
often unspecified for human reason to explore. This rationalist perspective on the 
ontological level is demurred at the epistemological level, where “all knowledge” –in its 
abstract and general form- is still considered divine, “Here the emphasis is on man’s need 
for divine guidance in ethical matters.”1331 Human ability to rationally reach the value of 
values is espoused to divine guidance in conceiving and construing knowledge.  
                                                          
1328
 Ibid., 24-25. In chapter 16, he labels one class as “revelation as supported by imams”; here he includes 
the Shi‘a who believe in the infallibility of the imam. They can be categorized in the “traditional” tendency 
which makes revelation (or sent imam in this case of the Shi‘a) as the source of ethical values. Chapter 16, 
270-276 
1329
 This passage was already quoted in Section 1, Part IV, when making my notes on kalam and ethics. I 
make this extract from it here again: 
If I had a choice of what intellectual path Muslims should follow – a choice which I do not have, 
looking at Islam from outside – I would start over again at the points where the early jurists and 
the Mu´tazilites left off, and work to develop a system of Islamic law which would openly make 
use of judgments of equity and public interest, and a system of ethical theology which would 
encourage judgments of right and wrong by the human mind, without having to look to scripture at 
every step (Hourani, Islamic Ethics, 276). 
1330
 Ibid., 37  
1331
 Ibid., 37  
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In summarizing terms based on the above abbreviated classifications, the view that 
Hourani hopes Islamic thought to build on is 1A2D, or simply AD: ontological 
objectivism, and traditional epistemology. The two levels (ontology and epistemology) 
are not severed, as the Muʻtazila already tried. Human reason, however able it is to 
conceive and construct values, remains attached to the divine, the source of “all 
knowledge,” for “guidance in ethical matters” in Hourani’s words. Now, in my reading, 
what this further means is that knowledge as produced by man is in essence ethical, and 
that reason however objectivist it may be at the ontological level, it is also in essence 
ethical. I explained earlier, through Abdurrahmane’s project of ethical reason, how the 
objectivism of Muʻtazila reason remains divine, despite the common interpretation that 
tries to look simply at their ontological interpretation of the nature of ethical values, 
without considering their epistemological view which remains traditional, i.e. linked with 
the divine. Otherwise, why did their rationalism not lead them to deny God once and for 
all? Examining just one side of their work to prove that they were “secularists” - i.e. 
dichotomous in their vision of the world as made of two, the divine and the sacred - fails 
to perceive their holistic view. That is what I have reached in my reading of the scholarly 
traditions dealt with until now. This is where lies, briefly now, the difference between 
“Islamic” and European rationalism. European rationalism is based on a separation 
between epistemology and ontology. The past, or the tradition in the sense of the divine 
or ontology, is denied. European reason expects no guidance from any other authority. 
That is what I reach in my study of the reformists, a conclusion which I will afterwards 
show to be also fostered by European Islam reformists.  
The Muʻtazila, the early and the late reformists, as seen in earlier sections and 
paragraphs, all emphasize the place of human reason in interacting with revelation. Still, 
they all keep reference to the divine. This is what I call later on the “rationalization of 
ethics” for “rational faith.” This is the “revisionist-reformist” argument I present for the 
question of this section (what is new in European Islam?). That is also the rationale 
behind describing the comparative stage as theological in its justification of reforming 
Islamic thought; that is, reform is envisaged within the ontological-epistemological bond, 
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and not without it. With these references and inferences my dealing with European Islam 
in the next section of this work should be clear enough.  
b. Conceptualizing the Idea of European Islam  
European Islam Projects: Recapitulation   
A recapitulation of some of the main work done until this stage seems a requisite 
for an understanding of this evaluative stage, in light of John Rawls’s idea of overlapping 
consensus.  As seen earlier, Part I, II, and III of this work are devoted to a detailed 
description (descriptive stage) of the four versions of European Islam according to my 
structure and aims outlined in the Introduction, i.e. following the “textual analysis 
method.” Each Part depicts a particular view of European Islam as developed by Bassam 
Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou, and Abdennour Bidar, respectively. The descriptive 
stage provides the answer to this sub-question: what is European Islam? The version of 
European Islam of each scholar is studied, with reference to the socio-political context 
from which he emerges.
1332
 The comparative stage (Part IV, Section 1) revolves around 
this question: what is new in European Islam? It constructs three generations of Islamic 
thought (the Muʻtazila, the early, and late reformists) as predecessors of the emerging 
European Islamic thought.  It argues that there is continuity in Islamic thought, since it 
theologically preserves ties with the divine though it gives human reason the authority to 
manage worldly affairs. This continuity traced, it is now time to see its manifestations in 
European Islamic texts. Below I first recapitulate the main reform agendas of the studied 
scholars, before I subsequently examine their implications using Abdurrahmane’s 
framework “humanization-historicization-and-rationalization” – a framework that 
tentatively matches the comprehensiveness of religion which I conceive in “world-
society-individual” framework. As will be clarified, this framework results in the 
following argument: European Islam is “revisionist-reformist” in its overall reformist 
tendency.  
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 I do not aim to go into those details again in this section. Either check the part devoted to each scholar, 
or read the main introduction of this work for a clearer view on the spacial and temporal circumstances that 
are behind the development of various discourses on European Islam.  
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 Tibi builds his version of Euro-Islam from a securitization (political) perspective. 
He securitizes the issue of reforming Islam. He considers most of the reformist projects 
as inadequate, or not reformist enough, if they do not endorse fully what could be termed 
Euro-modernity model, or what he refers to as “cultural modernity” – i.e. modernity à 
l’Européene. Tibi’s Euro-Islam could be read as based on three levels of readings. First, 
Islam is not Islamism. Islam is peaceful, and personal; Islamism is violent and 
hegemonic. The socio-political and cultural realities of the Muslim majority countries are 
scrutinized, based on European modern sociology and political philosophy. Despite the 
analytical tools he uses, he does not claim that it is the Quran/ scriptures themselves that 
are generally the problem behind stagnation. The predicament of Islamic majority 
countries stems from the inability of Arab-Islamic reason to live up to the ideals of 
religion itself, ideals he summarizes in peace and spiritual nourishment for the individual. 
He argues that so much of tribalism and patriarchy have influenced the status quo of 
Muslim majority societies.  
Second, secular Islam is the key for reform. The resurgence of religion and 
violent fundamentalism are symptoms of the failure of political Islam, or Islamism, to re-
emerge intellectually. The inability to perceive a “civil Islam” that can cope with global 
changes leads to a defensive reaction that takes the past Muslim political community as 
the model for Islamic states where religion and politics are fused. The revival of religious 
concepts like Sharia law, umma, and jihad manifest an inability to develop a modern 
political philosophy that takes current challenges into account. Islamism, for Tibi, is a 
threat to Muslim majority countries, to the neighbouring Europe, and to world peace. It 
has to be fought.  
Third, “cultural modernity”1333 is the way towards religious reform and cultural 
change. Euro-Islam is the version of this reform in Europe. Three pillars form “cultural 
modernity” that “Euro-Islam” has to embrace: 1) the secularization (vs. de-secularization) 
of politics, 2) the endorsement of individual human rights to develop pluralism (vs. 
supremacism claimed by the religious dogma), and 3) the revival of the classical heritage 
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 Tibi’s “cultural modernity” is what I refer to as “Euro-modernity.”   
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of falsafa (philosophy) and rationalism (vs. orthodoxy), as was exercised by the 
rationalist school of the Muʻtazila, and other philosophers like Averroes. For Tibi, Islam, 
when it embraces these values which he considers European in origin, can be “open,” 
“civil,” “secular,” “liberal,” and “pluralist.” This is in brief the framework of Tibi’s 
reformed of Islam, and “Euro-Islam.”  
Unlike some scholars who suspect Tibi of Orientalism, I do not do so.
1334
 Tibi’s 
reform agenda that ends in Euro-modernity, and Euro-Islam, originates from his concern 
as a Muslim with the future of reform. He does not want to see any further reform 
failures, especially with the rise of violent religious fundamentalism in some parts of the 
world, which seems to have influenced his approach to the extent of not listening to 
recognized reformers from within the Muslim majority societies and Muslim 
communities in Europe. His rejection of the work of reformists like Arkoun, Abu Zayd, 
Hannafi, the early work of An’naim, as well as the work of Ramadan on European Islam, 
makes him rejectionist of interesting projects that revisit the main Islamic sources 
(Quran, Sunna, and classical scholarship) from within the tradition. His praise of 
Aljabri’s work, on the other hand, does not find theoretical echoes in his own approach, 
knowing that Aljabri’s project is fundamentally an examination of the classical Islamic 
thought within the Arabian mindset and culture. Such a critique makes the reader of Tibi 
welcoming of his ideas, but not so of his methodology and references that are Euro-
centered – not to say Euro-centrist. More particularly, Tibi remains entrenched in the 
private vs. public European, especially French, dichotomous relation between the state 
and the Church/ religion. He does not try some other pathway that overcomes this 
classical dichotomy. What he brings to Islamic thought is more politically oriented, and 
leaves the theological unfathomed. Henceforth, he does not solve the real predicament of 
Islamic thought in the modern age, and as lived (i.e. as manifested in Euro-Islam) in 
liberal societies. His idea of secularizing Islam through private vs. public classical 
solution faces a major problem when the idea of rationalism, as he advocates, is thought 
of more deeply. The Muslim European citizen, for instance, has to live the private vs. 
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 See, for instance, As´ad Abu Khalil, “Review of Tibi’s The Challenge of Fundamentalism (1998),” The 
International History Review, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sept. 1999), 841-843. 
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public dichotomous way of life; that is, the secular remains superior, since it dominates 
all public life, while the private remains personal, and has to be kept as invisible as 
possible. If Tibi’s “secular Islam” adapts to secular Europe, it does so from an adaptive, 
defensive, and classical perspective: faith is not part of the plural life he advocates, since 
it has to be kept private.  
Tibi’s “liberal Islam” is also “classical,” or Euro-modernist, because it 
presupposes that modern values are European, and what religion (Islam) has to do is to 
abide by these values which are taken to be superior. Tibi’s project replaces religious 
dogma and superiority with Euro-modernity superiority complex. It is again the same 
Eurocentrist view of the modern and the traditional that remains behind the scene of such 
a reform. It is not grounded on theological re-reading of the sources. It is adaptive, to 
differentiate it from the reformists. This gap in Tibi’s approach is more delved into by the 
other scholars (Ramadan and Oubrou), and especially Bidar who re-reads modernity as a 
sacred moment. As I will state in due time, Bidar’s project could be read as a 
philosophical-theological continuity of the political adjustments of Tibi’s work.1335 
According to the various projects referred to, with reference to the evaluative 
methodology introduced in this work, Tibi’s project appears to be the least reformist. 
 Ramadan’s reform agenda and version of European Islam could be read as an 
attempt that covers the theological missing part in the work of Tibi.
1336
 I distinguish two 
stages in Ramadan’s work, which can be termed “early Ramadan” and “late Ramadan.” 
Three levels of work characterize “early Ramadan.” First, he integrates the beautiful in 
the tradition. He re-reads, for example, the Prophetic experience from an ethical 
perspective, and situates his views on the controversial issues that Islam in Europe 
especially raises (issues of loyalty, jihad, polygamy, and gender equality for instance). 
Second, he situates himself in the line of the early reformists like al-Afghani, Abduh, 
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 Maybe, if Tibi’s Euro-Islam were profoundly reformist, Bidar, would not have needed to conceive a 
more reformist approach that goes beyond the secular versus religious, private versus public, or what I refer 
to as “classical dichotomous mode of thinking.”  
1336
 The chronological appearance of their discourses has to be born in mind. Tibi coined the term Euro-
Islam in 1992, and Ramadan’s work that uses the term of European Islam came out in 1999, though he 
already entered the debate and wrote on Islam and laïcité in 1994. Tibi suspects the project of Ramadan 
which he considers “fundamentalist” in tendency.  Such details can be found in Part I and II.   
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Rida, and his grandfather al-Banna. His call for renewal in juridical theories remains 
advocated from within the classical hermeneutical sciences, though he tries to be eclectic 
in his approach and takes from various juridical schools. Third, at this level, Ramadan is 
very much entrenched in the classical dichotomy of Islam vs. the West, and his early 
books testify to that. For example, in his earlier texts he speaks of “Islamic modernity” as 
a replacement of the irreligious and unethical Western modernity; his critique of some 
aspects of Western modernity (like unlimited liberty, materialism and consumerism) 
earns him many non-sympathizers and contributes to constructing the image of “double 
speak”1337 around him.  It is mainly from his Radical Reform that another Ramadan, or 
“late Ramadan,” develops. As he notes in the same book, and earlier in introducing 
Western Muslims, Ramadan moves from calling for a “small intellectual revolution” into 
calling for a “true intellectual revolution,” à la Kant’s “Copernican Revolution.” 
Ramadan moves from “adaptation reform” to “radical reform,” or “transformation 
reform,” to use his terms.  
Ramadan’s radical reform is based on three main concepts the scope of which 
intertwines. One, “Sharia” is redefined as “the way.”1338 Far away from the conservatives 
and radical secularists’ reduction of Sharia to legal matters, and the penal code, as the 
media also does, Ramadan makes of Sharia a philosophical concept that means a way of 
life, or a worldview, irreducible to particular law prescriptions or isolated norms. Sharia 
becomes the way of a universal Islam that protects three major rights in Ramadan’s 
classification: Life, Nature, and Peace. They make the first three guiding objectives of 
Sharia for Ramadan.  
Two, the abode of Testimony (dar ash-Shahada) becomes the living experience 
of Sharia in the sense that it knows no private versus public distinction, nor does it know 
the geographical classifications of the Abode of War (dār al ḥarb) and Abode of Peace 
(dar al-islam/ assilm). Neither time nor space can interrupt the validity of this concept 
                                                          
1337
 The term is the title of a book on Ramadan, written by the French journalist Caroline Fourest. See more 
on Ramadan’s controversy in Part II.  
1338
 This definition is classic, known more among the Sufists. What renders it new is the context, and the 
other concepts that go with it. See Section 2a, Part III.  
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because it becomes the living proof of belief, the basis of which is the first pillar of Islam, 
Tawhid (Oneness). Shahada/ Testimony concept empties some other concepts like that of 
the umma, jihad, and daʻwa (proselitization) from their interpretations that are invoked 
by some fundamentalists, especially in Europe. The Umma is not a geographic entity, but 
a spiritual community; the jihad is spiritual, and against oppression of the oppressed and 
injustice done to the world and nature; and proselitization is not in inviting people to 
what one believes in, but in simply living truly what one preaches.  
Three, I condense the other various views of Ramadan on reason, environment, 
economics, etc., in the concept of “ethics,” or the “ethical.” At the heart of this concept is 
his consideration of the Universe as a Second Book of Revelation, besides the First Book 
which is the Revealed Quran. Such a consideration could be read as the most radical in 
Ramadan’s view – his “Copernican Revolution” - because of the following main reason: 
reading the universe as a Second Book of revelation means that the universe is sacralised 
and human agency is not given a second place, after revelation prescriptions like those of 
the Sharia law, but is made equal to the First Book, which he considers a book of 
guidance.
1339
 The management of the Universe is in man’s hands, and the only “thing” 
that links it with the First Book is guidance, spirituality, summarized in ethical 
responsibility. Human reason that governs the Book of the Universe keeps its ethical 
guidance provided in the Word of God (Second Book).
1340
 This is the major sign of 
“continuity” and “attachment” to the metaphysical in Ramadan’s reform project. The 
ethical here is lived as a “testimony” (Shahada) that follows “the way” (Sharia). The laws 
that govern man in the universe are no longer made ready somewhere else, but are 
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 Despite such a move in Ramadan’s thought, his view that the Quran should not be read as a human text 
because it is the eternal Word of God may contradict his consideration of the Universe as a Second Book of 
Revelation. How can Ramadan explain his view of a God who reveals an eternal Word/ Book that is 
complementary of a changing Universe ruled by human beings “equally,” since the prescribed laws in the 
First Book may no longer be valid in front of the changing laws of man in the Second Book? Ramadan 
could find it difficult if he thinks of going into theological debates about the attributes of God. That is one 
of the challenges he should consider if he aims at developing his project further; otherwise, his readers will 
have to take charge of that in light of his various notes here and there, which are generally not deep enough 
on that level. I bracket this note for now, and consider that such a point is not raised in my main text above. 
1340
 As I will clarify later, Ramadan is close to Abdurrahmane’s view of making ethics and reason 
inseparable; the only difference is that he still considers them in Two Books, while Abdurrahmane 
considers them in one.   
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developed in this same universe. That is, knowledge, however produced by man, remains 
spotted with divinity through the concept of Shahada that follows the Sharia. Since the 
Two Books are complementary, and considered on an equal status, that means that their 
laws that govern human societies should not be contradictory; rather, they should be 
complementary, if not the same. Tareq Oubrou moves to this direction of fusing laws, 
and thus erasing the idea of “secular” versus “divine” laws. 
Oubrou aims at secularizing Islam through theological foundations (“theological 
secularization”), an approach Tibi calls for but does not theorize from within the 
tradition. Oubrou considers three Books: Revelation, the Universe, and Man. This 
denotes that God, the omnipresent Creator, is disconnected from one single reading of the 
Quran. If revelation is the mediation between God and man, man is also a mediation 
between God and revelation itself. So, there is a world of mediation that has to be taken 
into account when interpreting God and revelation. Such mediation happens in the 
universe, in context, in which the leading agent is man. Based on this division, Oubrou’s 
argumentation could be condensed into three levels.   
One, Oubrou believes that the diversity of the world necessitates the development 
of “geotheology,” a theology that takes its spacial (geographical) and temporal conditions 
into account. The national, regional, and global levels are what he considers for a 
successful development of the concept of geotheology. In the case of Islam, the notion of 
the political umma is accordingly invalidated. Each national political entity can develop 
its version of living and practicing Islam (French Islam for example); the same applies 
regionally (European Islam), for the proximity between these geographies that share 
particular history and cultural habits. This way, what remains of Islam at the global level 
is its broad lines of ethics and spirituality. Oubrou is aware of the fact that geotheology 
ends in minoritizing Islam, for it is only in this way that Islam can be universal. A 
“double reflection” between the guiding text and the lived context becomes a constant 
necessity, to keep the approach of geotheology perpetually updated.  
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Two, the minorititzeation of Islam is developed through his concept of “Sharia of 
the minority.” The latter relativizes Sharia to cater for the needs of its believers. He 
develops levels of readings of fatwa classical juridical tool (positive and negative fatwa) 
so as to make religion merciful and beautiful (douce) to its adherents, and an added value 
to their life, and not a burden, a practice he says the Prophet teaches (the joy of faith, 
ḥalāwat al īmān). Such an approach “contracts” the Sharia, and “relativizes” it, unlike the 
classical view that makes of Sharia jurisprudence maximalist in its catering for the 
expectations of believers.
1341
 The relativization of Sharia goes then through the three 
levels of geotheology, and ends in “ethicizing” it. The improvement of one’s behaviour 
as well as one’s sense of being is the essence of Sharia, and its legal aspect is but a means 
to that good. 
Three, because he aims at relativizing Sharia through ethicizing it, Oubrou does 
not want to see that in the modern liberal societies of Europe –France in his case- the 
believer is divided between two laws, one secular and one religious. Such a situation is 
burdensome for the believer. The way out is to fuse the two laws, by incorporating 
French law –for example- into the “metabolism and the economy of the Sharia” (his 
terms). This is what he aspires to see in the future, a “theological secularization of Islam” 
that allows Muslims to feel both religious and still contributors to the secular and modern 
European world they reside in.  
Until now, Tibi is found to be an advocate of direct secularization by the adoption 
of laïcist dichotomy (private vs. public). Ramadan softens this classical dichotomy by 
presenting the universe as a Second Revealed Book in which man’s vicegerency and 
rational advancement is complementary to the guiding ethical principles generally 
conveyed in the Revealed Book, the Quran. This paves the way to considering human 
(secular) laws part of the divine will. Oubrou works at this level of convergence and aims 
at fusing the two laws in an attempt to go beyond approaches that still divide the world 
                                                          
1341
 Oubrou says that he developed in his approach from the 1980s, by reading, among others, the work of 
Soroush. That is why I could see that his view of “contraction” and “relativization of Sharia” is close to that 
of Soroush. See Section 1, Part III, on Oubrou, and Section 1d, Part IV, on Soroush.  
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into two, like Ramadan’s. Abdennour Bidar tries another more innovative path in 
European Islamic thought.    
Bidar, the youngest of the three previous scholars, comes to break away from 
what I referred to earlier as the “classical dichotomy of thinking” by sacralizing 
modernity, beyond the consideration of Two or Three Books (as Ramadan and Oubrou 
attempt). This view is the most innovative of the three previous ones. Bidar does not only 
challenge Islamic thought to go beyond the “box of thinking” it has been entangled in at 
least for the last two centuries when it first came in contact with the modern Europe, and 
the West in general, but also challenges European secular and atheist thought to go 
beyond living a constant binary opposition in faith and politics. Bidar sees modernity as 
the age of maturity of man: modernity values have sensitized man to his capabilities, and 
religious values are the guardian of these values, guardian (not in the sense of being 
paternalist) since modernity in its Western version has failed to capture the infinite 
energy man is endowed with. Considering modernity values sacred values dismisses the 
“classical dichotomy of thinking” for being minor and finite: being either religious or 
secular, divine or mundane, Eastern or Western, does not give a complete version of the 
capabilities of man. The convergence of the divine and the secular give birth to “rational 
spirituality” and “ethical responsibility” harmoniously. This makes his “theosophic 
approach,” or “rational theology” approach. Bidar reaches this argument through three 
stages of intellectual development.  
 First, the concept of Self Islam is formulated, following a personal experience of 
faith in a secular context. Having grown up in a secular context with a “traditional” 
understanding and practice of Islam common among practicing believers, Bidar realizes 
that a believer living in a modern society lives internally a difficult life that sees the 
world as replete with dichotomies and binary oppositions. Henceforth, the concept of Self 
Islam comes to converge these dichotomies by sacralising modernity, i.e. by seeing it as 
an “unprecedented event of the sacred” willed by God Himself. He fuses the Islamic 
pillar of Tawhid (Tawhid) and Testimony (Shahada), the mystic tradition of the Sufies, 
and modernity three values (liberty, equality, and fraternity).  
439 
 
Second, at this stage, Bidar is still preoccupied with the Islamic issue of how to 
read the sacred text in light of modernity values. Here, he speaks of five matrixes: God, 
Creation, Prophethood, Quran, and the umma (umma in the sense of “all nations”). The 
link between these matrixes is eternal, and that is how Bidar preserves the ontological ties 
between the first matrix and the fifth one. To summarize them here, the creation of man 
from the soul of God and his stay in Heaven till his creation is perfected, and then 
descended on earth after having been taught “all names/ knowledge,” makes man the 
chosen caliph of God, His heir. The “all names” taught to him in Heaven followed him as 
a reminder on earth through Prophethood and guiding books like the Quran. Creation, the 
universe, is created to facilitate this descent and reign of man. Peoples are created equal, 
with the same divine spirit and same trust of inhabiting the world, and managing it in 
light of the “eternal gratitude” taught through “spiritual pedagogy” of revealed books. 
What this denotes is that the distinction between the metaphysical and physical/ historical 
world disappears. Man does not need to live two worlds as if they were discontinuous. 
The physical life of man does not differ from its metaphysical one; whatever one does in 
this world will be continued in the other world. If one wants to do justice to the divine 
which is part of him, it should be done here. There is infinity imbued in the soul of man, 
received from the divine on its creation, and this infinity has to be lived, with no breaks 
and separation between this world and other world. The divine attributes are man’s too. 
That is the ground for “Islamic existentialism” that does not limit itself to the physical 
world, but lives it as if it continued later on in a different stage. Accordingly, the 
“inheritance of the world” presupposes the “immortality of man.”  
Third, this stage of Bidar’s work tries to open new paths of thinking not only for 
Islamic thought but for Western thought as well. Without the first two stages, Bidar 
would not have come to argue about the need for “overcoming religion and atheism” 
altogether. He recognizes the pivotal role religion has played in human history and 
building of past civilizations, despite the dark side of this link. By overcoming religion he 
does not deny it. Rather, he means “modernizing it,” without remaining also trapped in 
the limitations of radically secular, or/and atheist, modernity. This stage of “overcoming” 
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attempts not only a reconciliatory worldview where tolerant religion and soft secularism 
cohabit but aspires to merge them into one worldview.   
According to Bidar, the idea is to merge together the religious and the secular, the 
divine and the mundane, since they are both parts of the whole.
1342
 Neither classical 
Islamic thought that negates modernity nor modernity which negates the divine is the 
way for the future civilization of man. The “new Adam” has to live again the bond 
between the divine which is a “spiritual pedagogy” that teaches “rational spirituality,” 
and the secular world which is the “inherited” space that is mercifully and gracefully 
given to man for his wellbeing and self realization. Such a view would have immense 
socio-political implications on the modern pluralist world: only the ethical that preserves 
the good deserves human moral attention; the classical distinction between the secular 
and the divine becomes redundant, and so become their respective laws. The divine does 
not need to be protected as a separate world; rather, it is the world as inhabited by man 
that deserves this protection. Only highly committed agency, like that of the divine that 
acts only mercifully and justly, becomes the basis of measurement of human action.  
Conceptualizing the Idea of European Islam Using Abdurrahmane’s 
Framework 
As a reminder, the concern at this stage of my work is theoretical-theological, that is 
why reference to case studies or particular issues is considered secondary for now. It is 
renewing the conception of religion as a comprehensive doctrine that is in focus. These 
theoretical advances could be confidently considered new directions and manifestations 
of kalam (Islamic theology) because the place and intentions of God, Prophethood, 
revealed Book, the metaphysical world, and the place of reason are all reconsidered in the 
studied contemporary Islamic thought and European Islam in particular. 
 I use Taha Abdurrahmane’s three innovative plans (humanization, historicization, 
and rationalization) because I see them analytically inclusive of various reform projects 
                                                          
1342
 As I have noted in the section devoted to presenting Bidar (Part II, Section 2), there are strong echoes 
of Mohammed Iqbal in his work. The idea of one indivisible world is Iqbal’s, too, but the latter did not 
present an approach of reading the divine and modernity as does Bidar; he simply presented a critique and 
proposed pathways.  
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of Islamic thought. It is not directed for or against just one or some of them, but is generic 
in the sense that it considers the comprehensiveness of religion and thus can grasp the 
potential or weakness of any reform project. I make clearer my use of these “three plans” 
by matching them with the triadic framework that depicts the comprehensiveness of 
religion: world-society-individual. Abdurrahmane’s framework then helps a lot in 
detecting the aspects of theological reform in European Islamic thought. Having made 
this note, I now read European Islam projects accordingly. I end my analysis of each 
“plan” with broad ethical implications that lead to the conceptualization of the idea of 
European Islam.
1343
 I use a table to illustrate the framework I follow, the major concepts 
used by the studied scholars, and the main concepts I generate following the established 
framework.  
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 I use these implications in consolidating my concept of “perpetual modernity” that I see European 
Islam to be contributing to, along with other contemporary Islamic reformist projects outside Europe. This 
will be done in the following section, “Consolidating the Idea of European Islam through Perpetual 
Modernity,” (Part IV, Section 2c).       
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World Axis  
One, on the humanization of the world through divinely willed inheritance for cosmic 
wellbeing, based on the principle of fraternity. My argument here is that European Islam 
defends man’s “inheritance of the world”1344 as a divine will and consequently reclaims 
the ontological bond between the two spheres, the metaphysical and the physical, for 
“cosmic wellbeing,” based on the “principle of (universal) fraternity” (mabda’ al-
ikhā’).1345 I explain this view as follows. Abdurrahmane’s view of man’s reading of the 
sacred text should not aim at desacralizing and de-divinizing it, nor should it aim at 
divinizing man as a replacement of God. Rather, it is the idea of the Caliph that is echoed 
here: man as a Caliph is endowed with infinite capabilities that allow him to preserve the 
trust (amāna) that he was entrusted with in descending on earth, after his creation had 
been perfected. This means that the sacred text is not put aside as a text that can be dealt 
with just in the private sphere. Carrying out the trust of working good for the world 
(islāhū al ʼardi wa iʻmāruhā) is strongly emphasized. This does not make it a mere 
private matter, though it starts private, as will be understood from the rationalization 
innovative plan.  
In European Islam studied texts, Tibi’s project of reform and Euro-Islam relegates the 
understanding of the Quran to the private sphere. The public sphere is secular and it is for 
the political to find answers for it. This view reduces the holistic approach of religion to 
an unacceptable extent for the believers who want to feel and live religion also in public. 
Even though he calls for re-reading the Quran in light of German legal theory 
hermeneutics, and even if such a reading works to update Islamic law to face the modern 
way of life, his view of separating religion from politics, and the private from the public 
is strongly emphasized. This taints his project of reform with continuity in perceiving a 
conflict between the divine and the secular. According to Abdurrahmane’s framework of 
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 In this section, the concepts or phrases in inverted commas are mine, unless otherwise indicated.  
1345
 The principle of fraternity here is not limited to the religious, or the Muslims alone, because at this 
level of innovative humanization of the world, it is understood as inconceivable that Islam or Muslims in 
religious terms are the only ones shouldered with the responsibility of taking care of the universe as their 
inheritance. It is a responsibility of all men. This is how the new interpretations of Creation, Revelation, 
and the Universe see the place of Man and his ethical role in contributing to the wellbeing of the world. 
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innovative plans for religious renewal, and compared with the other studied projects, 
Tibi’s view does not “qualify” as innovative since it still works within the religious and 
secular classical dichotomous thought.   
In comparison, Ramadan and Oubrou have an innovative view of the sacred text and 
its place in the physical world. I allow myself to put them in one category, despite some 
methodological dissimilarities between them, the main of which I point out as follows. 
“Late Ramadan” considers the sacred text a First Book of revelation while the universe is 
a Second Book: to understand one necessitates the understanding of the other; they are 
put on equal footing. In my view, this is challenging to conservative Islamic thought 
which claims that such a view is not new. Ramadan does not introduce a new 
hermeneutical reading of the sacred texts; he is even critical of considering the Word of 
God (Quran) a text like any human text. Instead, he, for example, uses his jurisprudential 
studies background to arrive to the fact that the physical world, the universe, is another 
revelation that has to be taken into account in understanding the Word of God. Ramadan 
preserves the sacredness of the Quran, as Abdurrahmane also calls for, and does not 
consider it created at a certain time as the Muʻtazila and some reformists like Arkoun and 
Soroush do. For him, it is the eternal Word of God. The sacredness of the text preserved, 
he, however, elevates the status of the Book of the Universe to its status, and makes them 
equal. How can the Word of God be eternal, and at the same time equal to the Book of 
the Universe? Ramadan does not provide an answer that is clear and deep enough about 
this question which can lead to deep theological debates (like the question of time, space, 
divine being and existence).  
In my understanding of his project, I can say that Ramadan brackets the question of 
the createdness of the Quran and tries to resolve it through his immersion in 
jurisprudential classical theories from which he develops updated Sharia objectives to 
face the new challenges of modern life. That is why he elevates the Book of the Universe 
to sacredness. This way he not only preserves the divinity of the Quranic texts, but 
preserves the sacredness of Creation (the Universe) as a whole, as if this sacredness were 
lost at a certain point of time in history and needed modern time to be recalled again. 
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Since the Word of God is eternal, thus divine, and since the Universe is equalled in 
divinity with the Word of God, this means that the Universe is also a Word of God willed 
at the same time when the World was willed/ created, otherwise how could they be made 
equal in divinity if they were not created at the same time and for the same purpose, even 
in the case of assuming that the Word was not created? To say that the Universe is equal 
to the Word in purpose but not in time of creation would lead into a theological debate 
about the intentions of God, or His arbitrariness in Creation. I do bracket this hypothesis 
in this work (Ramadan still has to face this challenge, if he wants to clarify his project 
further). The idea I drive to, which was expressed earlier in reading especially 
contemporary reformists, is that Ramadan restores to the universe its ontological 
sacredness at the age of modernity, and simultaneously restores to man his central place 
in interpreting the divine so as to manage the inheritance humanly-divinely, as it were. 
Further implications of this move will be noted when dealing with “historicization-and-
rationalization” plans.   
Oubrou is close to Ramadan’s perspective, though differently in methodology. He 
speaks of Three Books: Revelation, Creation, and (the inner self of) Man. He does not 
fear the fact that reading the Quran as a text could lead to its desacralization because it is 
for human beings and they are the ones to read it according to their context. That is what 
his geotheology approach is about. So, unlike Ramadan who tries to preserve the divine 
aspect through sacralising the Universe and thus indirectly read Sharia law, for example, 
in context, Oubrou seems closer to the views of the Muʻtazila and he prefers to centralize 
man himself as a Book that keeps revealing itself in context, in light of Creation 
(Universe) and Revelation Books. For Oubrou, the way to inherit the world passes by the 
notions of time and space (geotheology) which, gradually, reveal not only the diverse 
manifestations of the divine, but mostly reveal the diverse stages man goes through in 
understanding its capacities of management of the world it inhabits. What I see 
geotheology to be pointing at theologically is that the (Quran) cannot be eternal but 
temporal: it requires time and space to be highly taken into account to envisage an 
appropriate manifestation of the divine in them. This goes in line with Oubrou’s idea that 
there is a need for a new theology of God that passes by understanding the conditions of 
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man. Since the latter depend on context, they have to be constantly revisited, otherwise 
formalizing man’s conditions would lead to formalizing the understanding of God, which 
goes against the idea of the required rational belief, based on contemplation of the inner 
and outer sides of Creation and Man. All in all, Oubrou does not seem to fear the 
desacralization of the revealed text if it is interpreted by man because it is destined to be 
for his good and contentment. The inheritance of the world through the interpretation of 
revelation does not annihilate the divine which has to be constantly interpreted 
geotheologically. Ties with the divine are preserved.    
I consider Bidar to have managed to put the major views of the other three scholars 
under his concept of man’s inheritance of the world as a divinely willed fact that is not 
disconnected from the metaphysical world. Bidar’s five matrixes (God, Creation, 
Prophethood, Quran, and umma) harmoniously defend the idea of the sacredness of the 
universe and the man that inhabits it. Bidar innovatively re-interprets the place of God, 
the Universe, and Man from an Islamic perspective, and in light of the Quranic verses on 
creation of both man and the universe. Unlike the three previous scholars, he 
theosophically engages in a theological attempt of re-understanding God and His 
intentions behind Creation by going through explaining some of His attributes which He 
has generously put in the soul of man on his creation. It is these attributes that make man 
divine in his dimensions and actions as long as they try to reproduce aspects that match 
His attributes of especially mercy and generosity. Man’s inheritance of the world cannot 
flourish until such attributes are vividly endorsed by the heir. In light of this view, the 
sacred text has nothing to lose, since the actor is man, and the text is but a spiritual guide 
for remembrance of the divine attributes man seeks to humanize in this physical world.  
Overall, what I see emphasized on the “innovative humanization plan” from 
European Islam perspective is that the physical world is recovering its primal place 
compared with the metaphysical one. The original moments of creation as narrated in the 
Quran are revisited. The idea European Islam seems to reach is that there is an 
ontological bond between the Creator and the created, and it is this bond that can preserve 
the wellbeing of the world (cosmic wellbeing) which is now in man’s charge, the heir 
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(Caliph). This is not the concern of the religionists alone, or Muslims alone. Cosmic 
wellbeing is a global concern. It expands the meaning of the principle of fraternity (not 
only normatively but also legally. The principle of equality explains fraternity further; the 
example of re-interpreting Sharia law prescriptions on non-Muslims and women will 
clarify the point). 
The divine is not denied or killed so that man inherits the universe. On the contrary, 
this inheritance is seen as a will of God Himself. For the good management of this 
universe, this ontological trust between God and man is enriched by the infinite energy 
divine attributes represent. It is for the sake of the good of this physical world that God 
and His attributes are considered symbols of beauty, mercy and generosity - attributes the 
preservation of which leads to no abuse of man’s infinite energies. Having experienced 
some tragic developments in human history at the age of “irreligious” modernity, 
European Islam claims to be targeting the recovery of, and contribution to, human 
responsibility by elevating the standards of morality to the attributes of the divine. This 
puts no limits to human energies to be innovative since the divine is limitless at that level. 
The challenge for the new man, in light of this reclaim of the divine in European Islam, is 
to be divine in action for the preservation of the good of the world. Tibi’s privatization of 
the issue aside, this is the view the other three scholars emphacize. Putting Tibi aside here 
does not mean that he negates the divine; he just keeps it alive in a classical dichotomous 
style of thought, which is not what the other three scholars do. Despite Tibi’s difference 
here, I overall consider the above view the one European Islam is directing itself to, 
namely inheriting the world with God’s consent. God is not killed; man takes his place in 
the physical world, and also takes his attributes as the way to go to build a new human 
civilization that reconciles the divine with the humane. The inheritance of the world 
necessitates a high level of responsibility and generosity that echoes divinity aspects in 
man.  
The inheritance of the world in European Islam entails “cosmic wellbeing,” which is 
a shared responsibility, a global one. Fraternity principle, as a universal value that 
trespasses Euro-modernity and classical limits of fraternity among co-religionists, is a 
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requirement towards the enhancement of cosmic wellbeing. Bidar, for example, uses this 
“modern value” as one of the values needed to renew the Islamic view of fraternity. 
Abdurrahmane does the same in re-visiting the universality of Islam. What this implies 
from the doctrinal perspective is that European Islam, so understood, not only minoritizes 
the place of Islam in the world (to remember Oubrou here), after centuries of dominant 
supremacist view as the last revealed religion (which is Tibi’s view), but also divides the 
task of the good management of the world among all its inhabitants where Muslims are 
but partakers in this ethical work (which is Ramadan’s view, to cite him as an example). 
More precisely put, the Islamic perspective of ontological equality of all human beings 
makes them also equal in sharing responsibility of managing the Universe, despite the 
fact that other religions and cultures may have developed a totally different view of this 
same ontological perspective, and translated this development in different 
epistemological productions, some of which may have clearly cut ties with the divine, as 
Euro-modernity has done. This means that European Islam acknowledges modesty at the 
epistemological level, so as to answer the requirements of fraternity principle that aim at 
overcoming difference at the metaphysical level and facilitating human cooperation at the 
worldly level.    
Society Axis 
Two, on the historicization of revelation through fiqhology (practical fiqh) for social 
wellbeing, based on the principle of equality. My argument here is that European Islam 
historicizes the revealed text, and consequently shoulders man with the responsibility of 
interpreting the prescribed laws in the sacred texts according to human society’s needs. 
That is, fiqh law is for this world, and not for the divine satisfaction at the metaphysical 
world. Practical fiqh, or fiqhology, needs to be constantly revised to match the divine 
universal message for perpetual peace and social justice, based on the “principle of 
equality” (mabda’ al-musāwāt). I argue for this as follows. Abdurrahmane’s innovative 
historicization, to be recalled, aims at preserving the divinity of the revealed text even in 
the case of reading its prescriptions historically. In my study, I have found that European 
Islam also reads the revealed prescriptions (Sharia law) historically, without this being an 
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aim to de-divinize it. For example, narrated stories in the Quran about the past miracles, 
prophethoods, and the otherworld are not belittled or considered mere mythical stories by 
European Islam studied texts. Rather, they are generally considered part of faith for 
contemplation and morality lessons. This corresponds to what Abdurrahmane calls 
“cosmic signs” for reflection and meaning (mabda’ al-i’tibār). This point is mostly 
invoked by the three scholars, Tibi aside again.  
As to the revealed prescriptions on socio-political and economic matters, they are 
interpreted according to the socio-political and economic life of the 7
th
 century Arabian 
society. Society most important matters here concern the state of the community of 
believers, or their belonging to it from a minority position, equality of genders, equality 
among believers and non-believers, social justice, and the public welfare. (Individual 
matters are mostly deduced from the innovative rationalization plan which comes 
afterwards). In this point, all the four scholars historicize the 7
th
 century Arabian context, 
and bracket it as one realization of the Quranic message among other possible ones. 
However, historicizing the formative period of Islam does not bracket the Prophetic 
experience which is considered exemplary in living revelation ideals on the ground. On 
the contrary, the Prophetic example makes renewing the ideas of religion possible on this 
world if the way he lived revelation in its context is relived again. That is, the Prophet 
understood revelation in light of the socio-political and cultural circumstances of his 
society, and that is why his period remains exemplary. If revelation could be understood 
in the same fashion, another exemplary moment is possible. That is the aim behind 
Ramadan’s study of the biography of the Prophet, Oubrou’s decomplexification of 
religion through ethicizing it to answer its ideal the Prophet spoke of (namely the beauty 
of faith, ḥalāwat al īmān), and Bidar’s conception of the future man as a “new 
Mohammed.” The idea of the Seal of Prophecy is taken to mean that the model is given, 
and on it should be based future interpretations.    
When it comes to more specific views on the state, equal citizenship, and social 
justice, Tibi’s view can be put in a different side though his view is secularist and 
strongly defends state neutrality, equal citizenship, and public welfare. He does so from 
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his angle of private versus public dichotomous worldview, while the three other scholars 
endorse the same socio-political rights but without relegating the religious to the private. 
While he remains concerned with the political/ public sphere, the three other scholars 
engage religion in the public sphere through theological justifications for most modernity 
values. Ramadan’s Second Book (the Universe) implies that socio-political matters can 
no longer be in the hands of texts scholars (‘ulamā’ annuṣūṣ) alone; the task is shared 
with context scholars (‘ulamā’ al-wāqiʻ). Though he is more concerned with calling for a 
radical reform at the theoretical level first, he gives examples on how Sharia law can be 
revisited to be compatible with secular laws in liberal societies, based on Sharia expanded 
objectives. Oubrou invokes the “Quranic moment” to historicize its socio-political 
prescriptions which he revisits by means of “double reflection” of present-past-present 
movement in reading the texts. He ends in calling for converging the divine and secular 
laws for “secular theology.” Revealed prescriptions are for this world; they are not 
supposed to contradict man-made laws as long as they improve the social public good. In 
the same line of argumentation goes the view of Bidar on the prescribed revealed texts. In 
his first stage of intellectual development, he centralizes three modernity values (liberty, 
equality, and fraternity), and defends their theological validity. The value that matches 
most this historicization plan is that of equality – equality of genders, equality among 
believers and non-believers before the law, which means equality of citizenship for social 
justice. In a second stage, he historicizes the five matrixes he develops to fit his theory of 
immortality of man and Islamic existentialism. 
 I see that European Islam, as reflected in the studied texts/ scholars, answers the 
requirements of Abdurrahmane’s innovative historicization plan in three ways. One, the 
Prophetic experience is interpreted as exemplary in time for its ability to have matched 
the ideals of revelation with society’s way of life. That is for instance Ramadan’s view, 
though it is also shared by the others. Two, revelation prescriptions or fiqh law is not 
made the core of Islam, but just part of its outer manifestations. Modernity values that do 
not cut ties with the divine and serve the public good are embraced as part of faith. This 
renders fiqh law more practical (practical fiqh) and constantly open to change according 
to context. Oubrou’s geotheology and secular theology, and Bidar’s consideration of 
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modernity as an unprecedented event of the sacred are examples in defence of this view.  
Three, and most importantly, this lived physical world is considered a context where 
revelation makes sense; revelation is for this world and has to be interpreted for that 
purpose. Social justice and the public good are its concerns at this level – remembering 
that it targets three levels “world-society-and individual.” The metaphysical world is not 
denied, but is considered a continuity of this one.  
The general inference one ends up with at this level is that European Islam considers 
revelation secular in intentions, though metaphysical in essence. That is why the bond 
between the two constructs the idea of continuity (ittiṣāl) between two worlds, henceforth 
their equality (Ramadan’s view) or their convergence (Oubrou’s aim, and Bidar’s view), 
as illustrated in the innovative humanization plan. What this denotes at the societal level 
is that the human faculty is shown capable of being in charge of the world, and capable of 
remembering the divine even when revelation prescriptions are historicized and relegated 
only to the sphere of reference and guidance (Ramadan and Oubrou’s “testimony 
concepts,” and Bidar’s “eternal gratitude”). More clearly, the divine’s creation of 
diversity among human beings is now emphasized as a willed act, and the way to go with 
it is not to try to homogenise it (diversity), but to realize through it the most important 
rationale behind it, i.e. equality and social justice, or what I termed earlier “social 
wellbeing.” Social wellbeing becomes tied to fostering the principle of equality, first 
among co-religionists themselves, and next among non-religionists as well, following the 
principle of fraternity.  
Individual Axis 
Three, on the rationalization of individual faith through the principle of ethical 
liberty for individual wellbeing, based on the principle of liberty. My argument here is 
that European Islam substantially elevates the place of human agency and reason in 
dealing with faith at the personal level, making of the “principle of liberty” (mabda’ al-
ḥurriyya) the basis of this elevation. Two vital deductions could be made here, which 
distinguish liberty in Islamic thought from Euro-modernity. First, without the feel of 
liberty, European Islam (and contemporary Islamic thought in general) would not have 
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gone so far as to humanize revelation and historicize its juridical prescriptions. The 
principle of liberty could be described as already rooted in contemporary Islamic thought 
since it has produced various discourses on how to reform. European Islam various 
versions is an example. Second, even though the principle of liberty has gone so far as to 
immortalizing man, reading the Quran as a text, and interpreting revelation and the 
Prophetic example historically, such a liberal feel in interpretation has freely not opted 
for denying the divine once and for all. Liberty in Islamic thought seems so free, to put it 
so, to the extent that it does not want to free itself from the divine.  
The explanation I have for this choice of liberty, in light of European Islam texts and 
Abderrahman’s framework, is that it is the divine that makes liberty meaningful and 
makes of human existentialism free from meaningless freedom. That is, the divine 
expands the horizons of liberty with its (divine) infinite attributes. Human reason, from 
European Islam perspectives, had to wait for modernity to realize such a link, and find 
out that liberty does not necessarily require the denial of the metaphysical referent. The 
latter does not block liberty, but nurtures it with attributes that make its realization more 
demanding. Otherwise said, the divine liberates freedom from subjective whims that 
could appear meaningful to the individual but not so for society and the world. The 
ontological union between the various matrixes (God, creation, revelation, prophethood, 
umma/humankind) conditions liberty to what could be termed “divine standards of 
action.” These standards are, among others, liberty to do and liberty from doing, justice, 
mercy, generosity, and creativity (remember the tenets of the Muʻtazila, Ramadan’s 
ethics of justice and mercy, Oubrou’s praise of beauty of faith and cosmic order, and 
Bidar’s invocation of mercy and generosity). The ideal practice of liberty has to take 
these attributes as its models; since the latter are infinite and on constant manifestation, 
according to man’s ability to realize them, so is liberty as could be practiced by man: it 
should be constantly improved for the betterment of the wellbeing, social wellbeing, and 
cosmic wellbeing. When such a view of liberty is understood, the innovative plan of 
rationalizating ethics and faith could be understood, too. 
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This said, the rationalization of ethics in European Islam does not develop into a 
replication of the Muʻtazila rational ethical theory, as that of Qadi Abd Aljabar (presented 
in Part IV, Section 1b, and also interpreted in light of Abdurrahmane’s framework in a 
subsection above when referring to George Hourani’s classification of the place of reason 
in classical Islamic thought, Part IV, Section 2a). It, however, develops into making 
equations. Religion is summarized in its ethical power; ethics is not considered merely 
objective, as the Muʻtazila did, but as equivalent to the divine, which nurtures it with its 
attributes. Reason is not considered a separate entity, but part of a whole. It is 
ontologically born/ created ethical, and what it does on the epistemological physical 
world is that it works out details for a good materialization of its ethical basis. Religion, 
ethics, and reason become equal. Henceforth, man as an ethical being, as I concluded 
earlier in introducing Abderahmane’s project, is endowed with the liberty to be either 
ethical or not to be (so). This is the question that faces the modern man, according to this 
Islamic perspective. Another look at European Islam projects helps in explaining the 
point further.  
Tibi, to be recalled, is a strong defender of individual human rights for the success of 
Islamic reform and Euro-Islam in particular. He is also a defender of the early Islamic 
rationalists, like al-Farabi, Ibn Roshd and the Muʻtazila. He, nevertheless, says that faith 
is a private matter, and its place is the private sphere. At this level of analysis, a 
challenging question could be posed on Tibi: if he calls for rationalizing faith, why 
should it remain private? In my perception, a rational faith should be trusted and allowed 
visibility in the public sphere. This right can sometimes be allowed even to dogmatic 
religious practices as long as they are not a threat to the public security and order and do 
not go against the law of the state, so why should Tibi’s call for the rationalization of 
faith still stick to the idea of relegating it to the private sphere? Tibi’s view is not 
elaborate enough to face such a challenging question; it is blinded by the private vs. 
public classical view of approaching religion in Europe. That is also why Abdurrahman’s 
framework does not read it as innovative.  
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The other three scholars hardly speak of religion from the private versus public 
perspective because their reform projects aim at overcoming it. To start with Ramadan, 
he elevates the Universe to the stage of divinity (First Book = Second Book). This 
implies that Sharia prescriptions for socio-political as well as individual matters (like the 
questions of equality, inheritance, and penal code) which are divinely prescribed can be 
re-arranged according to this world’s needs. Ramadan does not say revelation 
prescriptions are “wrong”; he says human reason “is capable of” understanding its intent, 
and thus able to reform the way it has been interpreted for mundane matters. In giving 
human reason this capability, he shoulders it with a responsibility that makes its 
capability “equal” to the divine’s reactions to the Prophetic moment and Muhammad’s 
society needs. Ramadan’s elevation of the Universe to the stage of divinity means that the 
caliph in charge of this universe is supposed to match (or at least try to match) the divine 
in its ability to prescribe laws and provide answers that do bring benefit to society. This is 
the responsibility human reason in Islam is supposed to do: to constantly look for 
replicating the Quranic moment and Prophetic experience according to diverse human 
needs as they transpire in light of the ethics of the divine and “capabilities” of man.  
Ramadan’s idea of Two Books means that he merges human rational capabilities with 
the ethics as generally outlined by the revealed text. The fact that he embraces European 
modernity values as long as they give dignity to man and preserve equilibrium in the 
natural universe (and rejects that part of modernity that denies the divine and leads to 
abusing human dignity and meaning in life) means that what he retains from the divine 
are its ethical guidelines for the wellbeing of the world, society, and man, as broad as 
may this seem. His “Copernican revolution” does not give reason alone full reign; it 
binds it to the ethics of the divine, though the latter no longer intervenes in worldly 
matters directly. The classical (conservative) signs that the divine still plays a direct role 
in human societies through Sharia law are now being gradually changed by reading these 
laws in their historical context. This reading of Ramadan’s project at this level makes him 
close to Abdurrahmane’s idea of innovative rationalization where the divine and revealed 
prescriptions and narrated stories are “signs” for contemplation from which could be 
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developed other forms of management of the world, as long as their ethical spirit or 
essence is kept.  
Since the essence of the divine (First Book) is ontologically ethical, and since it is 
made equal to the Second Book, this means that the latter’s spirit is also ethical. Ramadan 
does not say clearly that human reason is created ethical (at the ontological level), but his 
idea of the Second Book says that it is supposed to find this out by itself through 
remembering the divine trust (amāna) (and also) through experience and produced 
knowledge. So, at least at the epistemological level reason is supposed to be ethical. This 
view is indirectly proposed –and deduced- at the ontological level through the equation 
he builds (First Book = Second Book). If the Second Book that is epistemologically 
ethical equals the First book that is ontologically ethical, it also goes right to assume that 
this equality binds reason which comes later to the divine (which comes first). 
Consequently, even if the second assumption is the one that is most close to Ramadan’s 
view, it does not change the conclusion that ethics at the epistemological level is bound to 
(or equal to) ethics at the ontological level. More precisely, religion for Ramadan 
becomes equal to ethics, and reason becomes equal to ethics; subsequently, religion and 
reason are equal. That is what I mean by the “rationalization of ethics,” or the 
“rationalization of faith.” This fits very well Abdurrahmane’s innovative rationalization 
plan.  
The same process of linking the divine, ethics and reason applies to Oubrou who 
speaks of Three Books and equally emphasises the question of ethics and spirituality in 
Islam. Since Oubrou is close to Ramadan on this matter, I do not need to say the same 
thing about him. Bidar’s example, however, deserves a pause because he goes beyond 
Ramadan (and Oubrou) in speaking of Books, and makes the bond between the physical 
and metaphysical even stronger.  
Bidar’s last intellectual stage (stage 3) of overcoming religion and atheism explains 
well the previous stages of Islamic existentialism (stage 2) and Self Islam (stage 1) which 
all together underpin the place of reason in faith. Bidar does not reproduce a scheme of 
two harmonious worlds as Ramadan and Oubrou do. Rather, he speaks of one world, the 
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historical (physical) world, in which the divine and the secular are inseparable. Modernity 
is considered a will of God, so the divine versus secular dichotomy on which Euro-
modernity and most classical thought is based is overcome. Self Islam is based on Euro-
modernity three basic values (liberty, equality, and fraternity); Bidar provides theological 
justifications for them, both from the Quran, the Sunna, and from the Sufi tradition of 
Islam. Belief that is inherited culturally, without personal engagement in deconstructing it 
and subsequently endorsing it (or leaving it) with conviction, remains a classical dogma 
that soon falls into supremacist views that deny the other his being and difference, which 
is willed/ created by the same divine power.  
Bidar’s Islamic existentialism aims at converging the physical and metaphysical 
worlds into one that the believer experiences physically. So as not to severe the physical 
world from the metaphysical one, Bidar formulates a link between five matrixes (God, 
Creation, Prophethood, Quran, and the umma), the mother/ father of which is the matrix 
of God, the divine. The other matrixes develop from the soul and will of God. The 
universe of the divine (in the metaphysical world) manifests itself in the physical 
universe in which Islam claims the sealing part (Seal of Prophecy). In light of this chain 
of matrixes, the individual’s capacity of reasoning is ontologically bound by the divine 
spirit. This makes human’s capacity to act and reason infinite, like the infinity attribute of 
the divine. It also makes human reason the divine’s heir. This inheritance is generously 
given to man on his creation. The divine cannot put or create in man something that 
harms him, because the divine attributes of justice, beauty, and mercy, for example, make 
such an option impossible.  
Ontologically, then, human reason is imbued with (good) divine intents and 
capabilities. It is these attributes of the divine that Bidar passes on to the heir of God on 
earth. He conditions his freedom of thought and reasoning to the ethics of the divine. 
Bidar seems to echo one of the ideas of his theological-philosophical mentors, Mohamed 
Iqbal. The latter considers man a “co-worker” with God in the universe: if God created 
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the world, man has made it more beautiful.
1346
 Human pure reason could have been taken 
as the ultimate source of ethical action and morality, but Bidar prefers a higher source for 
reference, and in so doing he elevates the standards of ethics to those of the divine. Such 
a deduction corresponds to the argument of Abdurrahmane: faith, ethics, and reason are 
inseparable at the ontological level. By implication, they are also inseparable at the 
epistemological level, particularly that he speaks of one world where the heir of God does 
not need to wait the metaphysical world to feel, perceive and activate such a unity. 
Though ethical values have their origin in the metaphysical world, it is in the physical 
one that they are practiced and measured.  
In my reading, the rationalization of ethics and individual faith in European Islam 
takes the following format: religion = ethics = reason. This deduction has been inspired 
by the use I have made of Abdurrahmane’s “innovative rationalization plan.” The 
deduction confirms the preservation of the divine by rationally integrating it in the 
individual’s modern way of life. Neither “pure reason” nor “pure religion” answers alone, 
or separately, the individual’s needs.   
Recapitulation: towards a Conceivable European Islam  
This most important section of my work has tried to conceptualize the idea of 
European Islam. This conceptualization attempt has been preceded by describing four 
projects on the topic, revisiting some important phases in Islamic scholarship (the 
Muʻtazila, early reformists, and late reformists), and introducing Abdurrahmane’s 
framework to analyse the innovative aspects in contemporary Islamic thought, and 
European Islam in particular. Abdurrahmane’s framework has been substantially used, 
first, because it matches the comprehensiveness of religion in trinity framework I 
summarize in “world-society-individual,” and, second, because it guides in tracing 
innovative readings in Islamic thought. What I do below is that I condense my 
conclusions on European Islam in light of the intellectual excavations I have tried in this 
work.   
                                                          
1346
 I refer to Iqlal’s poem where he mentions man as a “co-worker” when dealing with Bidar’s works, in 
Section 2, Part III.  
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Following Abdurrahmane’s framework, I have shown that among the four projects 
studied here Tibi’s is not innovative since he is still occupied with the classical idea of 
the divine vs. the secular, private vs. public, etc. Ramadan and Oubrou try gradually to 
move away from this classical dichotomy; they are innovative. Bidar stands as the most 
innovative. His theological readings illustrate a daring move from classical religiosity as 
well as classical atheism and secularism. European Islam as a concept, succinctly, is more 
innovatively expressed by the last three projects. More precisely, my use of the concept 
of European Islam is the culmination of my reading of especially the last three projects 
(Ramadan, Oubrou, and Bidar) in light of Abdurrahmane’s critical framework. I 
summarize it here. 
European Islam has been captured by Abdurrahmane’s analytical three plans of 
“humanization-historicization-and-rationalization,” which intertwine. Each of the three 
plans is shown to match my tentative triadic framework that captures religion’s 
comprehensiveness “world-society-and-individual.” In the first plan, the place of the 
world in the reformist European Islam, it has been illustrated how it is considered an 
inheritance willingly granted by God for management to the Caliph. This means that the 
way revelation has to be interpreted should be physical, this-worldly, and not 
disconnected from the realities of this world. It has to be “humanized” without being de-
divinized. In the second plan, society is seen as the fieldwork where the first plan of 
humanization of the world takes place, based on the historicization of revelation. 
Historicization aims at contextualizing revelation prescriptions so as to differentiate 
between the “essentials” and “accidentals” –to borrow Soroush’s terms – and thus reach 
revelation intent by rendering fiqh (law) practical and pragmatic.  
At this level, European Islam theologically justifies modernity values of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity since they correspond to social justice and public good Islam 
advocates. In the third plan, the individual is centralized as the principal interlocutor with 
revelation. Humanization and historicization of revelation leads to its rationalization. The 
fear here is that such a rationalization revolts against the divine (and kills God!). This 
does not happen in European Islam – nor so in the reformist projects mostly developed in 
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Islamic majority countries as seen in Section 1c-d, Part IV. Henceforth, the 
rationalization of interacting with revelation at this level could be considered the most 
innovative plan among the three. At this level, religion is made the source of ethics which 
reason has to invoke in managing the inherited world.  European Islam, accordingly, 
follows this format: religion = ethics = reason, which is inferred from Abdurrahmane’s 
work. As explained earlier, the three become ontologically and epistemologically 
inseparable. That is the main characteristic of and theological justification for a 
conceivable European Islam.   
As to answering the guiding sub-question of this part of work (what is new in 
European Islam?), a threefold response in provided: European Islam rationalizes ethics, 
and in so doing it is “revisionist-reformist,” or “traditional-modern.” First, it rationalizes 
ethics in the sense that it promotes both the place of human reason in interpreting 
revelation, and also raises the place of ethics as the most important rationale behind 
revelation. Formalist legalism becomes secondary, and inspiring for understanding divine 
intents and ethics. Second, European Islam is revisionist/ traditional in the sense that it is 
not the first to call for renewing Islamic thought based on human rational faculty. The 
Muʻtazila, early reformists and late reformists have been shown as calling for 
rationalizing religion and ethics, though following different approaches. Debating the 
place of reason is not new in Islamic thought. Thus, there is continuity and contact (it-
tiṣal) with the tradition. The current debate on reason echoes the kalam productive period 
on the same theological issue, among others. Most of this debate has, however, been 
entrapped in the classical dichotomous mode of thinking (two worlds, two spheres, 
private vs. public, etc.).  
Third, European Islam is reformist/ modern in the sense that it tries to converge the 
two spheres, the metaphysical and physical into one. The consequence of this 
convergence is that religion, ethics, and reason are made equal and inseparable. The 
fundamental questions of being and freedom (how to be? How to act?) become ethical: be 
either ethical or not. This convergence of spheres and universes could not have been 
achieved if the example and achievements of Euro-modernity have not been used and 
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built on. European Islam integrates modernity values and enriches them by re-linking 
them with the divine (fraternity, equality, and liberty, which match in my reading “world-
society-individual” order). It preserves the divine in its modernity. It is because of this 
difficult enterprise of modernizing without cutting ties with the divine that I see in 
European Islam a fertile material for a new version of modernity which can be called 
“perpetual modernity,” or “continuous modernity” versus “discontinuous modernity” that 
does without the authority of the divine, (ḥadatha mawṣula or muttaṣila, vs. ḥadatha 
munqati‘a). The divine here, again, means ethics, universal as broadly as they have been 
deduced above. The next section on Abdurrahmane’s principles and pillars of the essence 
of modernity will illustrate my concept of “perpetual modernity” that I see European 
Islam to be developing. It builds on his concept of “second modernity,” or “spiritual 
modernity” and on the conceptualized idea of European Islam.   
c. Consolidating the Idea of European Islam through Perpetual Modernity  
This section goes on with the conceptualization of European Islam and its opening 
towards revisiting modernity in its own fashion. The second guiding sub-question of this 
work (“what is new in European Islam?”) is still the center of this part of the evaluative 
stage, especially the second part of its answer, which id “European Islam is revisionist-
reformist.” The conceptualization does so far need profundity and, most importantly, 
measuring by means of invoking basic modern principles and values. For this purpose I 
keep referring to Taha Abdurrahmane’s project of re-grounding Islamic thought. I used 
him before to form the framework of European Islam mostly with reference to how to 
approach the sacred text. Now I use his project of “second modernity” as a fitting scheme 
for European Islam’s reformism. I do so through two stages. I first present the three 
principles and their pillars (two pillars for each principle) of Abdurrahmane’s approach to 
modernity, his critique of Euro-modernity, and his concepts of “second modernity.” 
Then, second, I re-visit European Islam in light of these principles and pillars. My major 
aim behind examining the aspect of “reform in European Islam” using Abdurrahmane’s 
framework of “innovative modernity” is to corroborate my previous conceptualization of 
European Islam, and to ultimately pave the ground for John Rawls’ requirements of 
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reasonableness of doctrines for the flourishing and stability of a just political liberal 
society (which the closing section of this work deals with).  
In this evaluative stage (third stage) of my work I have started with introducing 
Taha Abdurrahmane’s critical framework for “continuous innovation” in Islamic thought. 
The framework is composed of three plans (humanization, historicization, and 
rationalization). To understand the utility of these plans for my argument of continuity as 
well as reform in European Islam (revisionist-reformism) I have first used them on 
Islamic thought projects referred to in the comparative stage (stage 2), i.e. on the 
Muʻtazila, the early and late reformists (Part IV, Section 2a). I have then moved to 
putting the broad lines of conceptualizing European Islam in light of this framework (Part 
IV, Section 2b).  
In conceptualizing the idea of European Islam I have built a network of concepts 
based on the studied texts and the analytical framework used to approach them. 
Henceforth, I have arrived to the following deductions, which I reiterate to link them with 
the subject of the present section on “perpetual modernity.” This conceptualization breaks 
away from Euro-modernity style of dealing with religion, and opens new pathways for 
what I refer to as “perpetual modernity,” or which Abdurrahmane labels “continuous 
innovation” that breeds “second modernity.” The conclusions that have conceptualized 
the idea of European Islam go through Abdurranhmane’s “sprit of modernity” for 
consolidation, before they are finally consolidated through Ralws’ “political Liberalism.”  
Taha Abdurrahmane’s Essence of Modernity: Principles and Pillars 
Abdurrahmane’s project of renewing Islamic thought is based on his idea of the 
“right to difference” in culture and religion as in philosophy analytical thinking, because 
there is “no creativity without particularism.”1347 The “right to difference” overcomes two 
major obstacles that have weakened Islamic thought and imprisoned it in its mode of 
mimickery: one is the “concept of unitary thought” (mafhūm al-fikr al-wāhīd) which 
standardizes and imposes one style of thinking over all cultures and their philosophies 
despite their difference, and the other obstacle is the “concept of the status quo” (mafhūm 
                                                          
1347
 Abdurrahmane, The Arabic Right to Philosophical Difference, 17; (see also The Islamic Right to 
Intellectual Difference, Chapter 4 on the types of intellectual difference and the principles of preserving it).  
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al-ʼamr al-wāqiʻ) which gives in to especially the political hegemony that is backed up 
by its previous “concept of unitary thought.”1348  The right of difference is but a 
reclamation of a natural right that characterizes the universe. “This right cannot stand 
without liberty as a natural right.”1349  
From this premise Abdurrahmane moves to distinguish between two kinds of 
modernity as a way of finding space for the right of difference to be exercised by Islamic 
thought. One is the “essence of modernity,” or the “spirit of modernity” (rūḥu al-
ḥadātha), and the other is the “fact of modernity” (waqiʻu al-ḥadātha).  The latter 
manifests itself in the way it is realized by the West, or what I have been referring to in 
this work as Euro-modernity. This kind of modernity practices three “absolute 
sovereignties” of costly results on the modern world: sovereignty on nature, on society, 
and on the individual.
1350
 Mostly, the fact of modernity has sometimes been summarized 
in rationalism, and at others in secularism; sometimes it has been condensed in the ideals 
of humanism, individualism, and at others in liberty. Seeing its repercussions that have 
been exported sometimes by force to the rest of the world, it has to be rejected, not in its 
entirety, but in the way its principles have been interpreted and practiced. Modernity has 
to grow from within. Any other option is mimetic. Multiple modernities are possible 
through understanding the “spirit of modernity” or the “essence of modernity.”1351  
As to the “essence of modernity,”1352 it is “innovative” because it recovers to man 
his ethical essence. “The essence of man is ethical.”1353 In this “second modernity” man’s 
wholeness is recovered, and is not divided: his material outer being is considered an 
indivisible part of his spiritual inner being.
1354
 In the “second modernity” which gives 
man his role of the prime free agent who can revise and devise concepts, modernity 
becomes minor, and not the opposite as the “first modernity” (“the fact of modernity” of 
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the West) has dominantly exercised it. Man recovers his majority (i.e. maturity) place, 
which means that this same man can revisit modernity and its practices. This is what the 
“second modernity” aims at, “man is more powerful than modernity.”1355 Such a role is 
given back to him because his ethical essence urges him not to accept mimicry and 
subjugation position. Since the essence of the actor is ethical, so becomes of what he 
innovates: the essence of modernity is equally ethical.
1356
 What Abdurrahmane does 
through his ethical reading of modernity is that he expands the premises of the “first 
modernity,” and allows other cultures, religions, and philosophies to contribute to it, 
instead of making it the one and only correct version. As will be further explained below, 
the horizontal values (i.e. physical/ material) of the first modernity are backed up by 
vertical ones (metaphysical/ spiritual) to overcome the limitations of the “fact of 
modernity.”1357The “second modernity” is more open to accommodating the diversity 
that characterizes the modern world.  
The “essence of modernity” is based on three principles, and each of them is built 
on two pillars: 1) the principle of majority (mabda’ arrushd), and its two pillars of 
autonomy (rukn al-istiqlāl) and creativity (rukn al-ibdāʻ), 2) the principle of criticism 
(mabda’ annaqd) and its pillars of rationalization (rukn attaʻqīl) and differentiation (rukn 
attafṣīl, or attafrīq), and 3) the principle of universality (mabda’ ashshumūl) and its 
pillars of extensibility (rukn attawasuʻ) and generality (rukn attaʻmīm). It is clear from 
the start that Abdurrahmane refuses to base his reading of modernity on classical 
concepts (like liberty, rationalism, and secularism) either because his basic principles – as 
will be illustrated below- cover them or because they have been separately abused and 
their interpretations exaggerated.
1358
 This will be made clearer as these concepts are 
explained, along with a critique of the way they have partly been interpreted by the first 
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modernity.
1359
 In my reading, it is this kind of modernity that is the center of this part of 
work to understand the reformist direction European Islam is taking. Explicating these 
terms follows first, before I integrate my earlier conceptualization of European Islam in 
this frame of the essence of modernity. My concept of “perpetual modernity” is the result 
of fusing Abdurrahmane’s principles of modernity with my earlier conceptualization.1360 
I visualize these principles and pillars in a table, before explaining them. 
Principles 
 
      Pillars 
 
Principle of 
Majority (1) 
 
Principle of 
Criticism (2) 
 
Principle of 
Universality (3) 
1a Autonomy   
1b Creativity   
2a  Rationalization  
2b  Differentiation  
3a   Extensibility 
3b   Generality 
      Table 1: Taha Abdurrahmane’s Principles of Modernity and Its Pillars 
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1) The Principle of Majority (mabda’ arrushd) 
By the principle of majority in modernity is meant the maturity of man and the 
realization of his majority (i.e. maturity) capacities. Two pillars uphold this principle. 
First, autonomy: the major human being enjoys his inalienable rights and pursues his 
goals without deterrence from any other human authority. Second, creativity: the major 
man quests for being creative in his way of thoughts, sayings and actions based either on 
newly devised values or ones developed from old ones in a more updated and creative 
manner.
1361
  
This principle and its pillars, as briefly presented above, have been practiced by 
the West in a form of “intellectual tutelage” on Islamic thought. At the autonomy 
level, this has been done based on three hypotheses which particularly colonial and 
hegemonic West advances: a) “the tutelage of the strong outsider equates care for the 
weak”; b) “the internal tutelage is that of religious entities”; c) “modernity is 
autonomy from internal tutelage.”1362 Abdurrahmane considers these hypotheses 
erroneous, in three corresponding ways: a) paternalism goes against the spirit of 
majority and autonomy; b) Islamic history did not experience a religious authority like 
that of the Church and the clergy; c) because Islamic history did not experience a 
similar religious tutelage as that of the Church, so its adoption of modernity cannot be 
the way Europe adopted it; religious authority cannot be annihilated in the modern age 
simply because Europe did so to break away from the tutelage of the Church. 
Abdurrahmane says, “the tutelage prevalent in our environment is not that of religious 
scholars but of the coloniser and foreign hegemony that take myriad shapes, going 
even so far as to use us as its spokespersons;” thus “all that we need to do is strive to 
liberate ourselves from this tutelage by embarking on the process of thinking for 
ourselves.”1363 Autonomy in thinking is then of two kinds: one is “responsible 
autonomy” (istiqlāl mas’ūl ), which cuts ties with the Western tutelage and renders its 
autonomy creative (“creative autonomy,” istiqlāl mubdiʻ), and the other is “minor 
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autonomy” (istiqlāl qāṣir), which seems free but its practice of this freedom takes 
place within a traced premise created by someone else; that is, free as it may seem, it 
is not reach the level of autonomy; this autonomy is mimetic (istiqlāl muqallid).1364  
As to the creativity level, Abdurrahmane considers that Western modernity has 
adopted it in its own way, based on three hypotheses. These are as follows: a) “the 
highest form of creativity is what constitutes an absolute rift”; b) “creativity creates 
need in the same way that it satisfies it”; c) “the most authentic creativity is one where 
the self reaches ultimate fulfilment.”1365 Abdurrahmane refutes these hypotheses as 
follows: a) no absolute rift with the past is possible; most human values are ahistorical 
since they are tied to the essence of humanity, and the essence does not change; 
creative modernity is not that which cut ties with the past, but that which builds on it; 
it is a “modernity of values” and not a “temporal modernity;”1366 b) high increase in 
economic and technological progress has also increased the level of consumption and 
material self-fulfilment to uncontrollable levels; to make of modernity a process of 
equilibrium for human development, spiritual nourishment has to increase, too, so that 
the modern man avoids loss of meaning of liberty and being; for this purpose, 
inventing aesthetics and morals that take the modern conditions into account is of 
tantamount importance; c) self-fulfilment turns into selfishness and indulgence if the 
wellbeing of the other is not considered as part of self-fulfilment; the individualism of 
first modernity can be faced by the solidarity values of second modernity, for the 
“good is a transcending rather than a limitative value,” and “charity to the other is a 
charity to the self.”1367 
2) Principle of Criticism (mabda’ annaqd) 
The principle of criticism means a shift from a state of belief to one of 
questioning and criticism. It is backed up by two pillars: rationalization, i.e. the 
sovereignty of reason, and differentiation, i.e. the action of drawing distinctions among 
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coherent elements to facilitate the comprehension of the mechanisms of a concerned 
element or component. Rationalization is best represented through the achievements of 
natural sciences, bureaucracy, technocracy, capitalism, and techno-science. 
Differentiation has touched all the institutions and forms of social and individual life. 
This includes differentiation in the field of knowledge (differentiation between science, 
law, morals, arts), in the field of culture (between the spheres of theoretical, practical and 
symbolic values), in the social arena (between the tasks and roles delegated to the diverse 
social actors), in the field of economy through work division, and in politics through the 
principle of secularity (that differentiates between religion and the state).
1368
 
However, despite its importance, Abdurrahmane says that the methods of this 
principle have in most part been blindly borrowed from the West without taking into 
account the difference of the material on which it has been applied in the Islamic 
environment and its tradition. This has opened an era of mimicry and distortion of facts 
as accumulated in the tradition over the centuries. Applying this principle and its pillars 
endangers the spirit of modernity, so unveiling their erroneous premises is what 
Abdurrahmane does. 
Abdurrahmane argues that the premises upon which the pitfalls of rationalism 
are first exercised by Western modernity are threefold. These premises are: a) “the 
mind grasps everything”; b) “man is the master of nature”; c) “everything is open to 
criticism.”1369 He refutes these premises, and expands their interpretation. Against the 
first (a) premises, he brings up his logical utensils to argue that, firstly, the mind 
cannot bring itself to reason, though it does fall within the ‘all’ that the mind is said to 
be able to comprehend, the rule being that the means should be stronger than the 
object it seeks to rationalise. Henceforth, to rationalise the mind, a mind that is 
stronger than it is needed, and to rationalise this second mind, another one that is 
stronger is needed, thus falling in a vicious circle. Secondly, the mind cannot 
rationalise the whole as it is part of this whole; the part cannot encompass the whole. 
There are then things or phenomena to which reason in its abstract version cannot be 
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applied. It needs expansion to engender “supported reason” or “expanded reason” as 
will be noted below in introducing “differentiation pillar.” For Abdurrahmane, man 
carries within himself a spiritual world where values and ideals mingle with 
knowledge and machines. Contrary to what is widely believed, the realm of passion 
and emotions is no less rationalistic than the world of knowledge though its form of 
rationalisation is lighter. The “desired mind” – or “expanded mind”- should 
accommodate this emotional world in the same way that it accommodates sciences 
and values. The rationalisation engaged in by the reasonable man is therefore one that 
seeks knowledge and manufactures machines in light of the noble imports profoundly 
ingrained in man’s soul.1370  
As to the second (b) Cartesian premise of “man is the master of nature,” 
Abdurrahmane considers it a kind of fiction, “this premise is no more than a metaphor 
that falls within the realm of beautiful fiction.”1371 Man did not create nature; he does 
not own it, so he cannot master it. Its mysteries do not stop from enthralling the 
modern man at times, and at revolting against him at others owing to human waste, 
contamination and over-technologization. The perception he holds on this is that of an 
ethical being with nature that requires a treatment of gratitude, “Nature is the mother 
to man, not his slave [...] and the mother can never be a slave to her infant.”1372 The 
alliance between man and nature should expand to include also the intangible world, 
which is part of the whole.  
The third (c) premise - “everything is open to criticism” – is narrow in scope, too. 
There are matters that have no tangible sings such as spiritual values and ideals. The most 
convenient way to understand them is to live them, and experience them. Criticism here 
would require another or other reasoning levels and analytical criticisms to reach some of 
the realized aspects of these values and ideals. This is referred to as “varied criticism,” as 
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opposed to “uniform criticism.”1373 Abdurrahmane recognizes a strong connection 
between three premises (a, b, c), that is why he calls for a constant communication 
(dialogue) between the three in light of the interpretation he has given to each. He puts it 
this way:  
Once we acknowledge that man, nature and life are different but interrelated, we 
will realise that proof can differ in three ways. First, each of the three fields has its 
own critical logic if tackled on its own; second, the logic of each field should be 
adjusted in accordance with its degree of interrelation with that of the other fields; 
and third, that the logic reached, when consideration is taken of this interrelation, 
may help guide the specific logic of each sphere, this guidance being of course 
different from one sphere to another.
1374
 
As to the pillar of differentiation, Abdurrahmane alleges that it has focalized the 
issue of distinction in at least two premises: the premise of a) “dissociating modernity 
from tradition” and that of b) “separating politics from religion.” For mimetic modernists, 
or Euro-centrists, this means that the Islamic heritage is cut off from modernity; so, it has 
to build these ties following modernity values.  However, for Abdurrahmane, projecting 
these differentiations on the Islamic tradition can be rejected for a number of reasons. 
First (a), modernity spirit is not purely Western-European. Previous influential 
civilizations also experienced it, though according to the human achievements of the 
time; otherwise, how could the fact of civilizations, their fall and rise, be explained? They 
were modern in the fashions of their own times. Second (b), the Islamic civilization has 
contributed to planting the seeds of modernity in Europe. Third (c), even in case the 
Islamic heritage may not clearly show that the spirit of modernity is part of its tradition, 
and the current realities illustrate the absence of any signs that defend this argument, the 
principles of modernity still make part of this tradition; the tangible aspects of this spirit 
are not necessary conditions to say that they are absent when they are not visible.
1375
  
Regarding the second (b) premise of “the separation of politics from religion,” a 
very important premise that characterizes especially Western modernity, it is given 
particular attention in the various works of Abdurrahmane, which certainly cannot be 
                                                          
1373
 Ibid., 45-46 
1374
 Ibid., 46 
1375
 Ibid., 47 
469 
 
presented in this limited space. Overall, his argumentation targets redefining the 
concepts of religion and politics according to the principle of criticism and the pillar 
of differentiation. The argument starts as follows. The above premise, in Western 
modernity, is based on three assumptions: a) “the dissociation of modernity and 
tradition is an absolute separation”; b) “the dissociation of reason and religion is an 
absolute separation”; c) “differentiation is conditional upon the demise of 
sacredness.”1376  
Abdurrahmane refutes these assumptions, one by one. For the initial assumption 
above (a), he first considers that a big confusion took place in using interchangeably 
the concepts of Church and religion in European modern history. The politicized 
clergy that was tyrannical in its practice of authority does not represent the religion of 
Christianity. Supposing that the political clergy represents this faith, this does not 
necessarily mean that when this clergy is no longer in power this religion will 
consequently disappear.  Second, he asserts that modernity did not grow in one surge, 
but had been a process that infused a lot of the past achievements before it came up 
with its worldview. Its origins could be found in the Greek, Judaic, and Islamic 
traditions, too. Seeing that it emerged out of these dominant religious traditions, its 
spirit cannot deny religiosity as its component.  In this sense, it does not totally cut ties 
with the past, including religion. Third, humanist modernity concepts have built on the 
classically religious ones: “perfection,” “brotherhood” and “time,” for example, have 
turned into modern concepts equivalent to “progress,” “solidarity,” and “linearity in 
history,” respectively. Fourth, religious leaders, and scholars of religious background 
or interest, were also among the pioneers of the European Renaissance and later 
Enlightenment, like Erasmus, Descartes, Newton, Kant and Hegel.
1377
   
The second (b) assumption – “the dissociation of reason and religion is an 
absolute separation” – is also refuted because it is based on understanding religion as 
mythical, transcendental and irrational. The relegation of religion to invisibility in 
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Western modernity is based on linking religion with irrationality. This assumption can be 
contested if at least three possible significances of the irrational surface in the discussion.  
The first (1) is that the irrational stands for the impossible, such as bringing together two 
extreme opposites; the second (2) stands for what cannot be grasped by the mind, either 
because it goes beyond its premises or falls in a different category; the third (3) stands for 
that which cannot be judged by reason, either for confirmation or refutation. So, what 
then is referred to as transcendental may be irrational in one of the above three senses. 
Yet, the point is that irrationality here is measured or judged through ordinary reason that 
is critical of tangible components only. Religion requires a “higher mind” to understand 
it, or part of it. This higher mind is called the “soul” or “spirit.” What follows from this is 
that the “impossible” – as in one above (1) -, “what cannot be grasped by the mind” (2), 
or “that which cannot be judged by reason” (3), may be contrasted only with “ordinary 
reason” whose mechanisms are unable to go to the level of the three assumptions. Other 
possible mechanisms of a “higher reason” may be able to approach these levels and 
assumptions, and thus make the contrast between religion and reason weak or even 
absent. That is, if what is called religious is transcendental, then there is no logical need 
to subject it to an ordinary reason that does not match its requirements, mechanisms, and 
levels.
1378
  
The third assumption of differentiation – “differentiation is conditional upon the 
demise of the sacred” – is equally refused by Abdurrahmane because it has wrongly 
considered sacredness and magic equal. Since magic is found irrational, through the 
differentiation methods applied to it in both the social and exact sciences, so is said of the 
sacred. In his differentiation, sacredness is the attribute of worshipping something that 
transcends this world and rises high above, while magic is used to describe something 
that comes into contact with this world and interacts with it, even merging totally with it. 
Sacredness is connected to cosmic signs (ǎyat) that are of high significance in human life, 
and their significance remains a human quest, part of their rational classification/ 
differentiation, while magic soon falls under this classification, and proves to be limited 
in its significance. It is this deep significance contemplated in the universe that can turn 
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one into a spiritually rational being, and thus a “connected” part with the intangible part 
of the universe. Abdurrahmane words it this way:  
Man is inherently not a discontinuous whole [...]. Our relationship with the world 
is no longer one where we seek to take away all the secrets of the world in order 
to exploit it, but to discover them in order to people and develop the earth; nor is 
this relationship one of detachment from the universe’s phenomena but of 
harmony with them because they are the only key to its innermost secrets.
1379
 
Communion with the world, as described above, opens the principle of creativity in 
modernity to new horizons of exploring nature and dealing with the sacred. The 
exploration of the hidden mysteries of the world unveil creativity energies in man, 
endorses his trust of nature and hope in life, and turns fear of the sacred a means of 
inspiration. To use terms from his recent work The Spirit of Religion (2012), “the 
expanded reason” develops the idea of the “expanded man” who leads a “vertical life” 
(transcendental) besides the “horizontal” (physical) one. He becomes a “connected man” 
(insan muttaṣil) with the transcendental and intangible in the universe.1380 
 Creativity in the pillar of differentiation, henceforth, is based on two principles, 
according to Abdurrahmane: the “rationalization of religion,” and the “distension 
[expansion] of politics.”1381 He affirms that most of religious Sharia-based rules are 
rational but “should be placed within their contexts in each of modern life’s fields.”1382 
As to the rules that seem irrational, “we need to endeavour to rationalise them in 
accordance with new circumstances, or to re-conceptualise rationalisation in such a way 
as to encompass these rules.”1383 Religion and reasoning faculty are bound together to 
find justifications that either rationalize religion or religionize reason by expanding its 
horizons in dealing with the transcendental.
1384
 From his Islamic perspective, religion and 
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reason are not supposed to be opposing entities but parts of one whole. Abdurrahmane 
tries the same with the second principle of differentiation pillar: politics. He distances his 
definition from its Western counterpart.  
“The right to difference” as a natural right based on human liberty to choose, 
started with earlier has to be born in mind here. While in the West politics is conceived as 
“running the public affairs through rules and regulations laid down by the Western people 
themselves,”1385 in the Islamic context Abdurrahmane conceives of it as “running public 
affairs through rules and regulations selected by the people,”1386 thus drawing a lucid 
distinction between choosing and drawing up. What he reaches with this distinction is the 
right to decide how public affairs should be run: either through pure human creativity, or 
through human creativity as inspired by the divine, a choice Western modernity cut off in 
devising its modern politics, “I may choose what I have not devised. The rules in our 
[Islamic] context may be of our own devising or of divine inspiration, but they are all of 
our own choice.”1387 Accordingly, politics in its new definition is based on the right to 
choose first, and on the right to devise next. What this implies is of high importance. The 
rationalization criteria used to evaluate the political act would follow the same definition 
of politics above: rationalization criteria have to be based not on examining the 
rationality of rules as “laid down” by people but as “chosen” by them first. Henceforth, 
“the “rationalisation” of the political act becomes conditional upon the degree of “choice” 
available within it.”1388 
3) The Principle of Universality (mabda’ ash-shumūl) 
According to this third and last principle, modernity is intrinsically based on a 
move from particularity, or individuality, to universality. Universality denotes “the 
process of surpassing the particularity of modernity in its two senses, the contextual (al-
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majāl) and the social (al-mujtamaʻ).”1389 These two senses are what Abdurrahmane terms 
“extensibility” and “generality” (or “generalizability”), two pillars that back up the 
principle of universality. Extensibility means that “the process of modernity is not 
restricted to one or more specific fields. It permeates all the spheres of life and levels of 
behaviour, influencing thought, science, religion and morals, as well as law, politics and 
economy.”1390 Its action within a given field impacts other fields and triggers 
transformations that transcend the limits of this field. Generality means that “modernity 
does not confine itself to the society where it emerges. Its highly sophisticated products 
and values which call for the liberation of man are applicable to other societies, heedless 
of the historical and cultural differences existing between them.”1391 Generality paves the 
way for “a new phase of modernity called globalisation.”1392 The two pillars are further 
explained below, first as the West has interpreted them, and next as Abdurrahmane re-
interprets them.  
Abdurrahmane analyses the pillar of extensibility first by unveiling the way it has 
been conceived by Western modernity. Following this pillar, (Western) modernity has 
been interpreted based on three premises, or assumptions: a) “modernity is inevitable”; b) 
“modernity engenders absolute power”; c) “the essence of modernity is an economic 
one.”1393 The first assumption asserts that modernity is unavoidable, in all its aspects 
because they are comprehensive and the most developed. The second premise gave 
reasons for exporting modernity principles by force or by will, and turned it into a 
hegemonic discourse. The third premise makes of economy and consumerism the main 
manifestations of modernity, and turning its other values (liberty, equality, justice, etc.) 
into means for the economic end. Economy in Western modernity is not part of the social 
fabric; rather, it has become an independent field that influences all the other fields, 
which gradually turn into its servant-fields. They consequently lose their independence, 
their creativity, and their ability to contribute to human flourishing. Socio-cultural norms 
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become useless, and a mere means to the consumerist mindset. This threefold 
extensibility of modernity cannot be universalist in Abdurrahmane’s view.  
Abdurrahmane presents “three truths”1394 to counter the three premises of 
extensibility as interpreted by Western modernity. These three truths give extensibility its 
authentic universality. One, the “defeatist logic”1395 of the first premise –“modernity is 
inevitable”- that accepts Western modernity as the only way for human development falls 
in the same logic that created it: Western modernity was not inherently imposed on man 
from outside by some other human faculty, nor was it divinely imposed; rather, it was 
man himself who devised it and chose it. This primal value of liberty is denied to the 
other non-Western. Western modernity is a “historical phenomenon,”1396 in 
Abdurrahmane’s view, and it should not be considered an insurmountable model; 
otherwise, creativity becomes repetitive and uncreative. The first “truth” that counters 
this first defeatist premise is that “man is more powerful than modernity”1397: while the 
Western version can become obsolete with age, man cannot, because it is he who 
influences human history and the world of ideas in light of the historical circumstances of 
his time. Extensibility has to take this “truth” into consideration for continuous renewal. 
This consideration allows the Islamic perspective to be creative, and so it does for other 
perspectives. Modernity frees itself from Eurocentrism based on such new premise/ truth, 
and allows new contributions from other cultures, civilizations, religions, and 
philosophies to create “a new global project of development” that may shape a better 
“second modernity” or even take a “different name.”1398  
Two, against the second premise of extensibility as conceived of by Western 
modernity – “modernity engenders absolute power” – Abdurrahmane proposes a “second 
truth.” That is, egotism, materialism and self-indulgence are challenged to be wholly 
extensive by equally increasing interest in the inner self and psychology of man. The 
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second truth works following this principle: “man’s corporeality is part of his 
spirituality.”1399 Recalling Abdurrahmane’s view of complementariness between the 
physical and transcendental/ metaphysical, it becomes evident now that gratifying just 
one side at the expense of the other does not grasp the wholeness of man. The inner side 
has to be developed as is the material side. In his words: 
If the application of one of the principles of modernity involves the permeation of 
all the aspects of human life, this premise entails that modernity incorporates 
man’s soul in the same way that it does as regards his body, catering to his 
spiritual needs in the same manner as to his material needs. It even makes the 
fulfillment of material needs conditional upon that of the spiritual ones.
1400
  
The point here is that “material modernity” has to match “spiritual modernity,” and vice 
versa.
1401
 If material modernity has to revisit its values so that they accommodate human 
diversity and inner demands, so is required of spiritual modernity that has to radically 
renew faith to encompass material needs. In other terms, the “horizontal values” (material 
values) of man have to open up to the “vertical dimension” (transcendental dimension) of 
his life.
1402
  
Three, against the third premise of Western extensibility – “the essence of 
modernity is an economic one” – Abdurrahmane proposes the “third truth” which works 
on the basis that “the essence of Man is a moral and ethical one.”1403 Accordingly, the 
self-gratification that economy allows to satisfy hides behind it the quest for human 
perfection that starts in the present and lives the idea of the future, or what Abdurrahmane 
calls “continuous perfectibility” (al-istikmāl al-mutawāṣl) and “futurity” (al-istiqbāl al-ā 
jil, or al-mustaqbaliyya).
1404
 Due to the fact that material gratification alone cannot grasp 
the inner side of man, spiritual gratification, with its possibly various worlds, has to 
accompany it (material gratification). So the practice of perfecting one’s material 
aspirations become bound by morals derived from divine inspiration and divine 
spirituality. The future then is not a purely modern concept, but it is deeply rooted in 
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religious vocabulary, “religious morals and ethics are truly the morals that confer 
perfection on man because they carry within themselves the awareness of the future.”1405 
Now I turn to explaining the second pillar of universality principle: generality. 
  The pillar of generality, to be recalled, means that “modernity does not confine 
itself to the society where it emerges.”1406 Its values which call for the liberation of 
man are applicable to other societies, regardless of the historical and cultural 
differences that may characterize them. However, Western modernity has 
misinterpreted this pillar in practice mostly because it has always presented the 
abolishment of religion as a condition for the realization of this practice. Western 
modernity has conditioned the generality of modern values by preventing religion 
from contributing to this generality. This malpractice has been based on three 
premises, according to Abdurrahmane: a) “modernity sustains individual thinking”; b) 
“secularity preserves the sanctity of all religions”; c) “the values of modernity are 
universal.”1407 The three premises share the principle of viewing religion as irrational, 
so individual thinking and the preservation of religion are this worldly based, which 
does not make them universal, since other societies do not hold the same Western 
negative view of religion; the fact that Western secularism preserves religion does not 
mean that it welcomes it as a contributor to its values, a fact that affects both 
individual thinking and its universality. As he does with the previous principles and 
pillars, Abdurrahmane re-interprets these premises of generality from his Islamic 
perspective to make them more accommodative of religion. 
 One, against the individualist thinking that the first premise of generality –
“modernity sustains individual thinking”- engenders, Abdurrahmane proposes 
reviving the meaning of “human being” as a universal being. The view of society as 
composed of “a gathering of individuals that we take as a whole entity but whose 
hearts are divided, each preoccupied by furthering his own interests” does not make of 
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modernity a universal enterprise.
1408
 It is the “human being” who can make a value, or 
values, universal, and can thus contribute to the making of a “universal society” (al-
mujtamaʻ al-‘ālamī) because it thinks beyond society, a limitation the individual falls 
in. As a practitioner of what Abdurrahmane calls “extensive thinking” (attafkīr al-
muta’addī) versus the “restrictive thinking” (attafkīr al-qāṣir) of the individualist 
individual), the human being engages in thinking “with the assumption that our 
[Muslim] thinking is about the other as much as it is about ourselves.”1409 “Extensive 
thinking” implies that “intellectual parity” (al-maʻiyya fikriyya) is a practice exerted 
by all “human beings” for the sake of the “universal society.” The necessity for this 
parity is justified by at least three facts. First, extensive thinking takes into account the 
fact that a problem that touches one society can travel to other parts of the world; so, 
solving such a problem would require solving it at the global level. Second, the 
cultural disintegration of communities in the globalized current world has amplified 
the need for their interaction; the problems they face are similar, and solving them 
individually is not easy. Third, non-governmental associations, like independent 
persons, are crossing borders all over the world, making involvement in society not 
the sole duty of that particular society in a particular geography. Extensive thinking 
has allowed for extensive action on the ground, weakening by thus the restrictive 
action of the individual who cares only for self-gratification.
1410
  
Two, against taking for granted the premise that “secularity preserves the 
sanctity of all religions,” Abdurrahmane demands of modernity to exert its criticism 
principle on all religions to differentiate between them, and see which of them is more 
rational or not, and which of them can be learnt from in devising public affairs. He 
says, “To say that all religions are equal would be as much of a fallacy as to say that 
policies, philosophies and thoughts are equal. There are differences between religions 
as there are differences between these.”1411 Applying differentiation for clarity among 
religions can solve the major issues of differentiations in Western modernity - religion 
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versus politics, revelation versus reason, private versus public. Some religions are 
more rational than others, the way some philosophies and policies are more rational, 
and thus beneficent, than others. For Abdurrahmane, Islam is more rational, at least 
among the three monolithic religions, and if the West has put all religions in one 
basket, Muslims have to rethink this Western differentiation, by overcoming them in 
light of considering the essence of modernity and not the fact of modernity. 
Nonetheless, modernity hides either its inability to go into such a level of criticism and 
differentiation of religion or its contempt for them as equally irrational and thus its 
superficial discourse of protecting them and treating them as equals. Both options 
(either/or) show that religion is not of importance to Western modernity. To surmount 
this “restrictive thinking,” rationalizing religion and expanding the meaning of politics 
–as explained when dealing with the previous pillars and principles- is the way out to 
regain trust in religion as a contributor in the management of world affairs. Besides, 
“extensibility in thinking” contributes to comparative studies of religions and to 
dialogue.
1412
    
Three, against the misapplication of the third premise of generality pillar – that 
“values of modernity are universal” – Abdurrahmane recalls that human values have 
always been universal, but their contextual interpretation have made the difference and 
created diversity in the world. Western modernity is itself a historical variety of universal 
values; the difference they have made is that they have their particular circumstances, and 
exporting these values with these particular circumstances which other societies may not 
have gone through goes against the spirit of modernity itself, “the Western application of 
modernity as we witness and experience it is far from being universal.”1413 It follows 
from this line of argumentation that Abdurrahmane distinguishes between (1) “contextual 
universality” (kawniyya siyyāqiyya), where an idea or an object, though created in a given 
society, may be re-invented in another one, going beyond its primary innovative aspect to 
be added on and enriched by another or other societies, and (2) “non-contextual 
universality,” or “absolute universality” (kawniyya ittlāqiyya), where an innovation first 
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emerged in a particular society is fostered as such by others that adopt it, mimic it, or 
even consider it immutable. It is “contextual universality” that caters for the spirit of 
modernity, and allows diversity in creativity, a fact that endorses its universality, “values 
cannot be disconnected from their context, either the context in which they are created or 
the context in which they are re-created.”1414 Contextual universality allows for the 
multiplicity of applications of the universal values, and feeds cultural exchange and 
hybridization.
1415
  
In sum, Abdurrahmane’s three principles of modernity (majority, rationality, and 
universality) have first been presented as they have been narrowly interpreted by the first 
modernity, or quasi-modernity, of the West, and have subsequently been re-interpreted 
from the Islamic perspective, in light of the achievements of Western modernity, and 
world continuous changes. Six pillars, or concepts, have been developed, each for every 
principle above: creativity and autonomy for the first principle of majority, rationalization 
and differentiation for the second principle of criticism, extensibility and generality for 
the third principle of generality.  
Succinctly put, and corresponding to each of the six pillars of the essence of 
modernity that are required to initiate a second modernity, the following conclusions are 
deduced. One, autonomy does not mean freedom from the religious tutelage that the West 
suffered from, but means autonomy from the Western monopoly of modernity which has 
turned it into a colonial tutelage. Two, creativity does not require total break from the 
tradition and revelation because modernity means renewal of values; these values, to be 
recreated, need inner energy which spirituality substantially contributes. Three, 
rationalization of religion is required, but this does not mean that the mind can grasp 
everything, because its consciousness cannot encompass itself, nor can it criticize 
everything because not all that is around it is tangible; the mind cannot prevail over 
nature; it lives with it as a mother to man. Four, differentiation cannot be total, because 
man is part of the whole, part of the world that he lives in; levels of reason are required to 
capture the cosmic signs; expanded minds are needed for that practice. Five, extensibility 
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does not mean that the first modernity is the only and final version of its essence; man is 
more powerful than modernity. As a moral entity, man can always reshape the first 
dominantly material manifestations of modernity and colour it with values that give him 
meaning. That is genuine extensibility, and not the economic alone. Six, generality means 
that extensive thinking of the human being considers the universal society in whatever it 
thinks about, and thus shows that solidarity with the other is a requisite in generality. This 
means that the universality of values renders them contextual, able to be reshaped by 
different cultures and philosophies, and cannot be replicated on one absolute universality 
model.
1416
  
In renewing the principles of modernity, Abdurrahmane has been driving to the 
following conclusions. One, the spirit of modernity differs from its reality. Two, Western 
modernity is but one realization of the spirit of modernity. It is quasi-modernity, or first 
modernity. Three, all nations are equal in appropriating the spirit of modernity. Four, 
Islamic thought and the reality in the Islamic majority societies has been closer to quasi-
modernity than to the essence of modernity. Five, modernity is internal and creative; it 
should be home-made. Six, creating “our internal modernity” requires rejecting the first 
modernity that is pregnant with many pitfalls.
1417
 
Until now, in the evaluative stage in this work, I have introduced two aspects of 
the work of Abdurrahmane. First, I have presented his “three innovative plans” 
(humanization-historicization-rationalization) in reading the revealed text (Part IV, 
Section 2a). Second, I have used this framework to conceptualize the idea of European 
Islam, in light of the four studied scholars (Tibi, Ramadan, Oubrou, and Bidar), taking 
into account three axes that correspond to the comprehensiveness of religion (world-
society-individual) - (Part IV, Section 2b). Now, third, in this section (Part IV, Section 
2c) I have until now introduced Abdurrahmane’s framework for innovative modernity 
where principles and pillars of the essence of modernity are developed and explained. 
The remaining part of this section fuses the work done in this evaluative stage by 
building links between the innovative plans in reading revelation and the pillars of the 
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spirit of modernity. That is, I revisit my conceptualization of European Islam as I have 
firstly formed it using Abdurrahmane’s three innovative plans by, secondly, using his 
three principles of modernity. Overall, my primal aim here is to study aspects of 
modernity and reasonableness in European Islam, using Abdurrahmane’s framework of 
“innovative modernity.” It is a way of solidifying my previous conceptualization of 
European Islam, and also paving the ground for John Rawls’ requirements of 
reasonableness of doctrines for the flourishing and stability of a just political liberal 
society.  
The theoretical links I build here aim at enforcing my idea of European Islam as 
being revisionist-reformist, and more particularly aim at clarifying my concept of 
“perpetual modernity” that I believe it is opening to. “Perpetual modernity” (ḥadatha 
da’ima or mawṣula) is close to Abdurrahmane’s concept of the “second modernity” that 
is nurtured by “continuous innovation” as opposed to “discontinuous innovation” that is 
mimetic of “first modernity” of the West (ibdāʻ muttaṣil or mawsul versus ibdāʻ 
munqati’). It also renders modernity clearly an “unfinished project,” to use Jorgen 
Habermas’ phrase.1418 Abdurrahmane uses “continuous innovation,” as seen previously, 
to speak of another possible “Islamic modernity” because his project aims at reviving 
Islamic thought based both on its ethos and modern achievements. He, however, remains 
generally entangled in this binary of Western and Islamic thought, though he tries to 
critique them both. My use of “perpetual modernity” takes into account Abdurrahmane’s 
view, but also considers other Islamic reformist projects, and those of European Islamic 
scholars in focus, which he does not refer to in his work. “Perpetual modernity,” as I see 
European Islam is contributing to shaping, tries to overcome what I refer to as “classical 
dichotomous thought” in three major ways, which I outline below (in the paragraph after 
the next).  
My conceptualization of European Islam, as I argue in this section, perpetuates 
modernity. It builds on Euro-modernity as well as the version of Islamic modernity as 
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Abdurrahmane theorizes it (i.e. the essence of modernity). European Islam’s modernity is 
neither Euro-centrist nor Islamo-centrist. It stands in a third space between the two. It 
tries to break the strong “classical dichotomous thought” of secular versus religious, 
revelation versus reason, private versus public, etc. It is revisionist, or traditional, in the 
sense that it preserves the divine as the core of its ethos. It is reformist, or modern, in the 
sense that it embraces modernity values, but re-interprets them according to the divine 
ethos. Perpetuity in modernity stems, henceforth, from the fact that neither revelation per 
se, nor modernity per se, claims stability in interpretation. Rather, since its ideal is social 
stability and social welfare, perpetual modernity requires that revelation remains modern, 
constantly revisited to answer human needs, so it remains appealingly “new” in the eye of 
its beholders. Such reciprocity in rejuvenation perpetuates revelation through a modernity 
that accommodates it and revisits it continuously. Perpetual modernity is religious-
friendly. Religion is equally perpetually modern. I have three reasons that support this 
argument. Each reason corresponds to a level of conceptualization that assembles a 
number of concepts devised and developed all the way through until this stage of my 
work. I first summarize my three reasons, or three levels, in the following paragraphs, 
before I explain them subsequently (in “Perpetual Modernity Framework Explained: 
Three Level” sub-section).   
According to my reading, European Islam’s modernity is perpetual for three 
reasons, which I subsequently present in terms of levels of concepts. It is (1) perpetual in 
the sense that the inheritance of the world, through innovative humanization plan of 
reading revelation, matches the principle of majority as enshrined by the essence of 
modernity. It is (2) perpetual in the sense that practical fiqh (Sharia law), through 
innovative historicization plan, matches the principle of universality as enshrined by the 
essence of modernity. It is (3) perpetual in the sense that the rationalization of ethics and 
faith, through innovative rationalization plan, matches the principle of criticism as 
enshrined by the essence of modernity. Table three (3) below summarizes this 
understanding of European Islam and innovative/ perpetual modernity, and the major 
concepts henceforth devised. 
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(1) Axes  
 
(2) Plans  
 
(3) Deductions  
 
(4) Principles of Perpetuity  
Aims 
 
 
 
 
Framework 
Concepts 
for a 
Comprehensive  
Religion                  
                 
Innovative Plans 
for Renewing 
Islamic Thought  
Deductions from 
European Islam 
 
Essence of Modernity 
 
Principles Pillars  
a World 
Innovative 
Humanization 
Inheritance of the 
Universe  
Principle of 
Majority  
Autonomy  
Creativity 
Cosmic 
wellbeing 
b Society  
Innovative 
Historicization 
Practical Fiqh/ 
Fiqhology  
Principle of 
Universality  
Extensibility  
Generality  
Social  
wellbeing  
c Individual 
Innovative 
Rationalization 
Ethical Reason/ 
Rational Faith  
Principle of 
Criticism  
Rationalization  
Differentiation   
Individual 
Wellbeing  
Table 2: Basic Concepts of European Islam and Perpetual Modernity  
At this stage I emphasize that this classification cannot deny the heavy 
intertwining between (1) the three axes I have envisaged to encompass the 
comprehensiveness of religion: (1a) world- 1b) society- 1c) individual), (2) European 
Islam’s three main deductions: ( 2a) inheritance of the world- 2b) practical fiqh - 2c) 
rationalization of faith), that match (3) the three innovative plans of Abdurrahmane: (3a) 
humanization- 3b) historicization- and 3c) rationalization), and (4) his three principles of 
modernity (4a) majority- 4b) universality- 4c) criticism) which I take to endorse the idea 
of perpetuity. The fact that each principle of modernity is backed up by two pillars allows 
it (the principle) to be mobile among the other levels of comprehensiveness, European 
Islam’s deduced concepts, and innovation plans.  
For example, at the (1a) “world/cosmic” level, it is not only the (2a) inheritance of 
the world, through (3a) the innovative humanization plan, that correspond to (4a) the 
principle of majority as required by the essence of modernity. The two pillars of the 
principle of majority (autonomy and creativity) are also required by other levels (society 
and individuals) for the success of the innovative interpretation of other plans 
(historicization and rationalization). The same applies to other axes, plans and principles. 
The principle of criticism (4c) cannot be limited only to rationalization plan (3c), 
rationalization of faith (2c) and the individual axis (1c). The principle of criticism’s two 
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pillars (rationalization and differentiation) are also required by society (1b), practical fiqh 
deduction (2b) and historicization plan (3b). 
The overlapping between these axes, plans, principles and deductions illustrates 
that the success of renewing religious thought and modernity cannot be at the expense of 
bargaining their principles; that is, one principle alone, or one level of interpretation 
alone cannot secure the success of this harmonious outlook. The pitfalls of dogmatic 
religions and irreligious modernity have shown that spirituality alone, law alone, or 
rationality alone cannot work well and for a long time. Perpetual modernity, as I conceive 
of it, requires good balancing between these principles, though it is conceivable that 
considering all these principles always equally for all situations is also impossible. 
Perpetuity requires constant revisiting of these principles for a “modern modernity,” i.e. 
self-rejuvenating modernity. Figure three (3) shows how intertwining these levels of 
analysis could be. I close this note. Having summarized my view at this stage, I now turn 
into making these links clearer.  
 
Figure 1: Intertwining Territories between the Concepts of European Islam 
and Perpetual Modernity  
 
1-World 
2- Humanization 
3- inheritance  
4- Majority 
 
1- Society  
2- 
Historicization 
3- Fiqhology 
4- Universality 
 
 
1- Individual 
2- 
Rationalization 
3- 
Reasonable/rat
ional faith  
4 Criticism 
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Perpetual Modernity Framework Explained: Three Levels   
One, innovative humanization of the inherited world through the principle of 
majority for cosmic wellbeing. Three major aspects govern the first axis of perpetual 
modernity as developed by my reading of European Islam: revelation in the physical 
world (1a) is innovatively humanized (2), responsibly inherited (3), autonomously ruled 
and creatively re-created by man (4) (See Figure 1 above). The inheritance of the world 
gives the Caliph (heir) infinite liberties in managing the world, without sacrificing/ 
killing the divine, because this inheritance is willingly given to him, and also without an 
intermediary human agency that proclaims the position of guarding the rights of God and 
the duties of man. Man does not need to go into a fight with God to “have” the world. 
Rather, man is empowered by divine attributes to “be” in the world. Man is major 
(mature or rāshid), but his majority here is not static. It is a process that requires 
perpetual autonomous realization and creativity. (Abdurrahmane’s majority principle, and 
its pillars of autonomy and creativity are relevant in this point.)  
Divine attributes of infinite energy, creativity, mercy, justice, and beauty, for 
example, are sources of constant inspiration for the human being whose soul remains part 
of the Great Life/ Creator. There is no other revelation expected, and it is now up to man, 
the Caliph, to care for the world because it is his. As long as man emulates the Creator in 
His attributes of creation, justice, and mercy, there is no fear of the freedoms of man, for 
the divine attributes guide him: God cannot act foolishly, arbitrarily, and so should man. 
Divine attributes are a high threshold for man to reach. Man’s perpetual work on that 
level makes his autonomy responsible and creativity mature. The divine is a reference by 
which ethical action – i.e. ethical here in the broad sense of being good, and God always 
Wills the good for people - is measured. By the divine as a reference I mean that there is 
a constant act of remembrance (or i’tibār) through the religious pillar of Testimony 
(Shahaha) the broad significance of which is not only to believe in Unity but also, and 
most importantly, to believe that belief is comprehensive, atemporal, aspacial. Testimony 
bears the idea of trust (amāna) that bonds the human and the divine. Even in the case of 
any morality code that humans develop rationally (as will be referred to below), this trust 
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or Testimony, remains the utmost manifestation of belief in and communion with the 
divine.  
The fact that the world is humanized does not belittle the role of the divine, for 
the Caliph carries the divine within himself through the bond(s) of trust and Testimony. 
The major/ mature agency of man does not, and cannot, liberate itself from the divine 
simply because whatever the Caliph thinks is autonomous or creative and thus human is 
essentially divine in nature as well. If the Euro-modern man liberates himself from the 
divine to be free, the (Islamic) new modern man, or what I have referred to earlier as the 
Muslim Prometheus,
1419
 can be free without such a liberation (from the divine). On the 
contrary, liberty of man to rule the world cannot be mature unless it wears the attributes 
of the divine, which are the values Euro-modernity itself advocates (attributes, or values, 
like liberty, equality, fraternity, solidarity, etc.). The difference at this level between 
mastering the world in Euro-modernity and inheriting/ managing it in perpetual 
modernity is that the latter summons the energy of man to live not only a horizontal life, 
but also a vertical one that leaves space of creativity infinitely open. Vertical thinking, or 
perpetual thinking, to call it so, does not aim at conquering the world, but at exploring the 
unknown, which ends in expanding both the horizons of human energy and divine infinite 
powers. The universe becomes a laboratory to be creatively explored, without a constant 
psychological fight over what is secular and what is divine. Vertical thinking tries to 
make sense of human existence beyond its material, concrete and immediate benefits. 
Maturity of man grows as such thinking expands. Perpetual thinking inspired and 
empowered by divine attributes makes the understanding of both religion and modernity 
able to go beyond formalisms of classical religiosity, classical atheism and secularism. 
Neither classical religion nor classical modernity alone is the way to live the future 
civilization.
1420
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Henceforth, the humanization of the inherited world, through the principle of 
majority, engages into vertical thinking for cosmic wellbeing.
1421
 Cosmic wellbeing here 
simply means the harmonious outlook the individual develops in rationalizing religion 
and the understanding of the canons of the universe. It is especially based on the idea of 
merging the physical and the metaphysical as if they were part of a whole. The physical 
world is sacralised, and modernity, henceforth, is seen as part of the sacred. The diversity 
that characterizes the world becomes part of the divine will. The primal impact of such a 
perspective is that the majority (i.e. maturity) of man fraternicizes nations, religions, and 
philosophies – based on the principle of fraternity.1422 This could be read as a clear sign 
of epistemological modesty from the part of contemporary reformist  Islamic thought and 
European Islam in particular. Epistemological move may be interpreted as a sign of 
defeatism, weakness, inability to overcome the “Islamic predicament” or “crisis.”  That 
could be just one valid interpretation of such a move. A more articulate interpretation of 
the move, in my perspective, is as simple as this: modesty in understanding the divine 
message is the most challenging step a comprehensive religion could take. In light of the 
argument developed throughout this work, the concepts of inheritance, innovative 
humanization, and majority principle that I have knitted in this first level/axes of analysis 
(world), I could say the move is more of an epistemological reformation, fuelled with 
scholarly courage. It could be read as a sign of an expanded intellectual revisionism of 
some of the most established religious dogmas and interpretations. Overcoming the 
immutability of interpreting prescribed Sharia laws is a reformist move, compared to the 
existant various conservative trends in contemporary Islamic thought.  
The point I want to make here is that cosmic wellbeing as a consequence of the 
interpretation I have given to the principle of majority is very much linked to the 
interpretation I have earlier given to the principle of fraternity in humanizing the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
societies. The same thing applies to Islamic thought which has been trying to renew itself for the last two 
centuries or so. The future civilization is the one in which the two historically antagonizing entities, “Islam 
and Europe,” come to acknowledge each other and give birth to a hybridized worldview where modernity 
and religiosity converge to face the various challenges that face each of them, and which can be a threat to 
the world at large, be they political, economic, environmental, etc.  
1421
 I used the term cosmic wellbeing in Section 2b, Part IV, when conceptualizing the idea of European 
Islam. 
1422
 The principle of fraternity was also deduced from reading European Islam texts in Section 2b, Part IV.  
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understanding of revelation, following the established methodological framework. If 
human beings are now in charge of interpreting revelation and humanizing its message, 
do not they then consider that the same God that speaks to them does also speak equally 
to “others,” whatsoever is their religion or philosophy of life? The moment revelation is 
handed down to man to interpret, the idea of supremacy - like saying “my religion is the 
best or most true, or most intact” – gains modesty and the idea of God becomes more 
inclusive of the other, thus the validity of the principle of fraternity.  
Two, innovative historicization of revelation prescriptions through the principle 
of universality for social wellbeing. Three major aspects govern the second axis of 
perpetual modernity as understood in my reading of European Islam: revelation as it finds 
space in society (1b) is innovatively historicized (2b), fiqh law is pragmatically re-
interpreted (3b), and universality principle is embraced for social wellbeing (4b).  The 
historicization of the denotations of revelation perpetuates in time and space the broad 
ethical lines of revelation without freezing them in a particular historical period of time as 
that of the 7
th
 century Arabia. Though revelation is sacred, its prescriptions for social 
affairs are bracketed as historical. This allows for perpetual modernization of these 
prescriptions – in the sense of updating them according to societal needs and changes. 
Revelation prescriptions are not belittled as backward, but as relevant for a particular 
context in particular times. Having passed their times, these prescriptions are now 
interpreted in light of the general message of revelation, which is social justice and social 
wellbeing.  
The revealed prescriptions (like the penal code and inheritance division) are 
studied as sources of ethical reasoning in re-reading revelation and its relevance for social 
affairs. Law as prescribed by revelation is no longer considered the ultimate version of 
the translation of revelation into positive law. Rather, it is the intent of revelation that is 
mostly searched for as the rationale behind these prescriptions, and based on this intent, 
new, more adequate laws can be envisaged. Laws as prescribed by modernity are thus not 
rejected just because they are purely man-made. Revelation is man-interpreted 
(historicized) in light of modernity challenges; the same is done with Euro-modernity 
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(historicized). The principle of universality as re-interpreted by Abdurrahmane weakens 
the Euro-centrist interpretation. If man is major (mature) to reinterpret revelation, so can 
he do with modernity. The fact that modernity can be expanded and generalized to cover 
other contexts and societies is not negated. Instead, it is further expanded in the sense that 
if the European man could work out his own version of modernity, a non-European could 
do the same. The value of liberty, and the concept of human being cannot apply to some 
(Europeans) and not be so to others (non-Europeans). The principle of universality 
appropriates Euro-modernity values and impregnates them with divine spirituality so as 
to overcome the extravagant materialism of the first modernity.   
What appears to be the value of perpetual modernity in securing social wellbeing 
is that it covers, or at least tries to cover, the non-concrete, the non-material 
psychological aspirations human beings nurture within their apparently material bodies. 
Perpetual modernity recognizes that the historicization of revelation is part of the 
humanization process of the religion in focus – humanization as innovatively interpreted 
above. Thus, keeping the manifestation of the divine also in social affairs is not 
problematic to this process. Humanization and historicization here do not aim at 
enforcing further the private versus public debate of religion. Rather, they try to 
overcome it. The way to do that is to consider man in his entirety, and not only in his 
material, visible aspects which material and economic modernity can answer. Perpetual 
modernity is at this level spiritual – “spiritual modernity” of Abdurrahmane is to be 
recalled here. Laws that serve the material common good render at the same time 
spiritual satisfaction to the consumer whose inner side is not in conflict with its outside, 
seeing that the common good that modern laws secure do elevate the threshold of needs 
of man from a stage of an individual in society to a human being in the global society 
where the other is not forgotten while working out ways of preserving the common good. 
The principle of universality in this level does not only capture the un-material needs of 
the human being, but also captures the material and un-material needs of the other as 
well. What this means is that the principle of equality becomes vital in reading revelation 
for social wellbeing and for the “universal society” – to use Abdurrahmane’s term.  
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Three, innovative rationalization of faith through the principle of criticism for 
individual wellbeing. Three major aspects govern the third axis of perpetual modernity as 
understood in my reading of European Islam: the interaction of the individual with 
revelation (1c)  is innovatively rationalized (2c), reasonably ethicized (3c), and critically 
embraced (4c).  The rationalization of faith becomes the ultimate conclusion after the 
humanization and historicization innovative plans.  Instead of banning the divine from 
man’s modern thinking, perpetual modernity proposes a more advanced understanding of 
religion and faith whereby reason is either expanded – or at least invited to expand its 
horizons of analysis to the intangible components of the universe and religion – or made 
equivalent to the essence of man, religion, and ethics.
1423
 The Euro-modern man claims to 
“grasp everything,” but “everything” is only tangible; it ignores the intangible, and still 
claims to be comprehensive of “everything;” it fails to either modestly claim its 
limitations or its inability to develop more sophisticated analytical tools that approach the 
intangible.  
Perpetual modernity builds on the above limitations and expands the scope of 
reasoning by at least two means, henceforth applying the principle of criticism to itself 
for innovative perpetuity. First, rationalization encompasses the intangible not because it 
is irrational but because it carries the potential for new manifestations of rationality. 
Perpetual modernity, at this level, does not disregard the intangible. Considering it part of 
the whole of man and the universe, it keeps reason in the process of rationalizing the 
cosmic signs that have been for long considered mythical and irrational. It keeps space 
open for possible findings that can enlarge the capacities of reason. While this process of 
deciphering cosmic signs and seemingly irrational aspects contained in religious practices 
and faith keeps going, all these signs and rituals altogether are taken positively, as an 
exercise for both rational faculties and spiritual feelings, which makes the boundaries of 
both reason and faith in constant mutability, and permanent vertical thinking about 
horizontal life.  
                                                          
1423
 I recall my formation of this interpretation in the following: religion = ethics = reason, Section 2b, Part 
IV.  
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Second, I go back to my earlier format of “religion = ethics = reason” to comment 
on the pillar of differentiation in Abdurrahmane’s principle of criticism. The point here is 
that reason is not only an isolated part of the whole/ entity of man. Reason is not only that 
mechanical part that is invoked to categorize and differentiate items or components that 
man needs to analyse. “Ordinary reason” stops at this level of mechanical analysis. 
Reason in perpetual modernity especially stands for the kind of reason Abdurrahmane 
calls “expanded reason,” which is the essence of every human action. If Euro-modernity 
has rationally pigeonholed human action in categories, and has thus led to differentiating 
morality from actual action, ethics from business, religion from politics, management of 
the world from contemplation of the world, etc., perpetual modernity espouses reason to 
ethics, and the latter to religion – “religion = ethics = reason.” The essence of human 
reasoning becomes religiously ethical. This link between the three is connected to the 
earlier interpretation that the majority of man (according to the majority principle) cannot 
be universally beneficial to him (cosmic wellbeing) unless it is tied to the divine 
attributes of the good (mercy, justice, etc.). Otherwise put, the ontological bond between 
the Creator and Creation, between the divine and the physical world through revelation, 
finds its utmost resonance in man’s Testimony to live the trust (amāna) that is fused in 
his capabilities to act in the world. That is, the natural, or original, trait of the spirit of 
man is good; reason, religion, or ethics are but means to activate this good and channel it 
through for concretization.  
What this interpretation of perpetual modernity boils down to is that knowledge 
production through the apparatus of criticism of “everything” is based on the principle of 
liberty. Man is free to act as he wishes at all levels, except from “one thing.” Man cannot 
root out divine attributes of the good (as the aim of ethics) from his soul, however he tries 
to avoid that in actual action his body carries out. That is why I earlier read 
Abdurrahmane as saying that the fundamental question that actually faces the modern 
man is to be either ethical or not to be.
1424
 The implication of this reasoning is that the 
ontological and the epistemological are united. Arguably, knowledge production should 
not be produced “neutrality” and afterwards classified as “ethical,” or “religious,” or 
                                                          
1424
 See Section 2b, Part IV, on “Conceptualizing the Idea of European Islam.”  
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secular.” The ideal of this reasoning is to initially produce knowledge that is all of these: 
secular, religious, and ethical. For the individual, then, to think and act ethically, he does 
not need to think of two worlds, one religious and one secular, or two spheres, one 
private and one public. They all intertwine, and to imprison religious thought in the 
private sphere – according to this interpretation - is like imprisoning ethics at home. 
There is no liberty in imprisoning part of man anywhere, especially if this part of man is 
the most essential for his wellbeing, and his wellbeing affects social wellbeing, and 
cosmic wellbeing.  
Overall, such a high level of relations between various concepts that are replete 
with meaning, modernity and religion become intertwined to inseparable levels to the 
extent that the renewal of one of them denotes the renewal of the other, and the failure of 
one of them to renew itself means the failure of the other. To avoid the “classical 
dichotomous thought” and its mode of analysis, perpetual modernity as manifested in 
European Islam aims at burying this distinction and reciprocal blame. A religious 
conservative commentator would say that the world is religious by default, and modernity 
values are the means that allow it to rejuvenate itself. A secularist commentator would 
take the opposite attitude and say that it is just because secularism is tolerant, that 
modernity values are married to religion; and since religion is tamed by modern values, it 
is fine to allow the religious to interpret it the way they like, though the world is secular 
by default. An atheist, whose attitude is closer to the secularist, would say that since 
religion has accepted (most) modernity values, lives this world and shares the rules of the 
polity as agreed upon by the majority, though they still think of a metaphysical world, 
then there is no doubt that the world as lived politically at least is by default Godless, i.e. 
God is not visible in the political rules devised for citizens. Perpetual modernity gives 
space to the three main worldviews. Unlike Euro-modernity that mostly satisfies just the 
secularist and atheist, perpetual modernity gives a large space of confidence to the 
religious. Such a comprehensive attempt aims at shattering dichotomies. The point I want 
to make is that perpetual modernity is truthful to various doctrines, and does not “lie” to 
various views. It does not tell the secularist that the world is secularist by default just to 
win his heart. It does not do the same for the atheist and religious either. With this 
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interpretation I enter the realm of “overlapping consensus” as devised by Rawls’ political 
liberalism where the religious, philosophic or moral doctrinal differences are all put aside 
–as if they were equal- for the consolidation of the “political.” Conceiving European 
Islam for “perpetual modernity,” with the links of terms as done before, aimed at paving 
the ground for evaluating the possibilities of conceiving European Islam as a “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine,” which the ultimate section of this work advances.  
d. European Islam as a “Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrine”   
This section ends the primal circle of conceptualization endeavour that has been 
taken in this work. It is an attempt to bring together two theoretical projects, one 
theological and one political, despite the strong intertwining territories between them (i.e. 
theology and politics). It may be risky to attempt a demanding endeavour in a closing 
section in a work of theory and conceptualization. However, as an addition to this 
enterprise of thinking through bridges, and bringing my interdisciplinary background into 
facing its diverse components, I have preferred to close this work with this level of 
abstraction, instead of avoiding it because it could be “dangerous” or “damaging” to the 
harmony constructed in the previous parts, or because it could be “methodologically 
untenable.”   
The rationale behind this endeavour is to examine how it is possible that the idea 
that European Islam, through overlapping consensus framework, offers an internally 
pluralist theological doctrine of the “good” out of which a reasonable European Muslim 
believer may effectively mediate his normative commitments to European Islam as a 
comprehensive theory of the “right” with his political commitments to the liberal 
constitutional society in which he lives. For this purpose, I first introduce John Rawls’ 
main traits of his idea of “overlapping consensus,” and the “political” in “political 
liberalism.” I introduce the general terms that serve my purpose, without going into a 
critique of Rawls’ work. It is not my aim here. Subsequently, I try a political 
conceptualization of European Islam in light of my earlier generated concepts and the 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus framework added in this section. 
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John Rawls: Political Liberalism and the Idea of Overlapping Consensus
1425
 
The Conception of the Political   
John Rawls’ work in contemporary (Western) political philosophy has established 
itself among the classics in the field. Robert Nosick says that contemporary political 
philosophers “must either work within Rawls’s theory or explain why not.”1426 Brian 
Barry describes the current historical period a “post-Rawlsian world.”1427 In this part of 
my work that does not aim at analysing Rawls but at understanding European Islam using 
one of his major ideas for stability in a just society ruled by a constitutional democracy, I 
introduce two aspects of his work, one theoretical and one practical, i.e. his “theory of 
justice,” and “political liberalism,” respectively. I mostly refer to some of the basic terms 
these two phases of his work have contributed to contemporary political theory.
1428
 It is 
this move from a highly theoretical project to a more practical one that stands behind the 
adoption of Rawls’ framework here.1429 Though my focus is on his idea of “overlapping 
consensus,” I cannot jump into it without going generally through the framework and 
concepts that it is based on. For that reason, I do the following. I bridge his theory with 
its more realistic framework of political liberalism where a “political conception of 
justice”1430 is constructed. From the latter I take the idea of overlapping consensus as the 
most suitable to my work on European Islam.  
Rawls’ magnum opus A Theory of Justice (Theory in short, 1971) theorizes for a 
just society, based on a shared conception of the political, where justice, stability, and 
moral differences are all respected equally. The two main principles of justice, the 
                                                          
1425
 I am assuming that a section entitled “Why Using Rawls’ Political Liberalism in Understanding 
European Islam?” is read. Methodologically, it is a very relevant “Section” in my whole work. See: 
Introduction, Section 4. 
1426
 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 183 
1427
 Qtd in Hadji Haidar, Liberalism and Islam, 2 
1428
 The assumption here, to voice it as simple as this, is that Rawls’ work is taken to be the most 
convenient for use in a growingly pluralist world in Western contemporary political theory. I use some of 
the ideas of Rawls because of their high level of abstraction, their higher chances of viability, and even 
higher level of being endorsed by many people and citizens of various religious, philosophic, and moral 
doctrines.  
1429
 As Rawls says, “we turn to political philosophy when we face deep political conflicts, and when our 
shared understandings of politics breaks down or is about to fall apart.” Political Liberalism, 44. 
1430
 Ibid., xlv 
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principle of equality and difference principle,
1431
 are achieved by the “free and rational 
persons” behind “a veil of ignorance.” It is at this level called “the original position” that 
the principles of justice are agreed upon fairly, where no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged by natural chance or social circumstances, hence the name “justice as 
fairness.”1432 The main critique Theory faces is that it is in itself a comprehensive 
philosophical doctrine that should not be (indirectly) imposed on other religious or moral 
doctrines for the sake of the just society. That is, it simply lacks diversity, which renders 
its stability unsecure. In Rawls’ own terms, Theory does not recognize the political 
diversity in the constitutionally democratic and liberal societies, “Theory does not 
distinguish between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions.”1433 It is this fact 
that leads him to develop the project of “political liberalism.”  
In Theory Rawls theorizes the way for a just society, and in Political Liberalism 
he defends it further for the sake of its stability in a world characterized by pluralism and 
different theories of the good, or “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” to use Rawls 
terms, be they religious, philosophical, or moral. In introducing Political Liberalism, he 
says that his second work has been driven by the following question, which, I believe, 
every ordinary human society grapples with: 
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free 
and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible 
that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live 
together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is 
the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support of 
such an overlapping consensus?
1434
 
                                                          
1431
 Theory, Chapter 2. The theory’s two basic principles of justice are as follows:  
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (Theory, 53). 
1432
 Theory, 3 
1433
 Political Liberalism, xli 
1434
 Ibid., xx 
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Not having abandoned the basic principles of Theory, as he admits,
1435
 Rawls opens up 
more to the realities of especially Western liberal democracies characterized now by the 
presence of various religious, philosophical, and moral “comprehensive doctrines.” To 
safeguard the liberal principles of a “well-ordered society” in a constitutional democracy, 
he devises the idea of “political liberalism” where it is the “political” that brings about 
together the various doctrines found in the current plural society. The comprehensiveness 
of liberalism, as that that of E. Kant, and J.S. Mill, is put aside as hegemonic and moral in 
essence and more attention is paid to the preservation of the “political” per se – though its 
principles remain liberal, thus the name “political liberalism.”1436 Rawls puts it as 
follows: 
Thus, a main aim of PL [Political Liberalism] is to show that the idea of the well-
ordered society in Theory may be reformulated so as to take account of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. To do this it transforms the doctrine of justice as fairness as 
presented in Theory into a political conception of justice that applies to the basic 
structure of society. Transforming justice as fairness into a political conception of 
justice requires reformulating as political conceptions the component ideas that 
make up the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness.
1437
 [Emphasis added]  
What should be underpinned from the passage above is that the theory of justice is 
described as a “comprehensive doctrine,” and because of this comprehensiveness it 
cannot answer the practical needs of pluralism as a fact which characterizes current 
liberal societies. To solve the good idea of justice as fairness, Rawls proposes 
                                                          
1435
 Rawls argues that “[N]ot very much of the content of the doctrine of justice as fairness needs to be 
changed” in the political society being envisaged in Political Liberalism. For instance, he asserts that the 
significance and content of the two principles of justice and of the basic structure are the same and only 
need to be understood now within the “political” framework of Political Liberalism. On the other hand, he 
notes that the meaning of autonomy has substantially moved from being moral autonomy in the Millian 
sense of individuality and Kantian sense of liberal comprehensive doctrine to being political autonomy 
(Political Liberalism, xli-xlii, n. 8). Through political autonomy, the citizen moves from rejecting the idea 
of moral autonomy as a believer in a particular comprehensive doctrine into endorsing the ideas of freedom 
and equality as a citizen, a political person. Political Liberalism, xliii.  
1436
 Rawls makes it clear that the move from Theory to Political Liberalism is basically a move from moral 
to political philosophy:  
In Theory a moral doctrine of justice general in scope is .not distinguished from a strictly political 
conception of justice. Nothing is made of the contrast between comprehensive philosophical and 
moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain of the political. In the lectures in this 
volume, however, these distinctions and related  ideas are  fundamental (Political Liberalism, xv). 
1437
 Ibid., xli. Rawls explains the “basic structure of society” as the “main society's political, constitutional, 
social, and economic institutions and how they fit together to form a unified scheme of social cooperation 
over time […]. This structure lies entirely within the domain or the political.” Political Liberalism, xli, n. 7.  
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“transforming” it into a “political conception of justice.” How does Rawls argue for that? 
In his words quoted above, “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and 
just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” Rawls relativizes the 
comprehensiveness of any existing doctrine by “politicizing” it – to put it this way – 
because he sees that no political system can be plural and at the same time based on just 
one comprehensive doctrine.
1438
 I sketch out three main features of the conception of the 
political.  
 First, the “political,” besides being a moral conception whose content is shaped by 
certain ideals and norms, is especially oriented towards the “political, social, and 
economic institutions” as its main subject or content. These institutions fit together in 
“one system of social cooperation” over the generations. This focus is what Rawls calls 
the “basic structure” of the “modern constitutional democracy.”1439 Second, the political 
tends to be inclusive –on the condition of being “reasonable” which will be explained 
later- without being comprehensive. It is “freestanding.” The political conception of 
justice is freestanding “when it is not presented as derived from, or as part of, any 
comprehensive doctrine.”1440 The political is or can be supported by various 
comprehensive doctrines in society without it being summarized in the doctrine of just 
                                                          
1438
 I can say that Rawls also “liberalizes” all doctrines, but I bracket this view here. That is why some 
scholars, like Bhikhu Parekh suspects Political Liberalism of being a philosophical comprehensive 
doctrine; if not already now, then it could turn into one in the future, as it secures the stability of 
overlapping consensus. However, not to say much here, the idea of overlapping consensus aims at stability, 
but the political society it works on has to keep permanently the debate of who fits in, and how far, etc. 
That is, securing stability, though an end in itself, is, most importantly, a process, a project always in the 
making, that is why comprehensive doctrines should not fear “fully converting to liberalism” because in 
that case, overlapping consensus and the idea of political justice may make no sense at all! Moreover, 
Rawls makes it clear that political justice cannot cover all virtues; it cannot be a doctrine, or a full doctrine; 
it needs other virtues, which it gets from other doctrines: “we should not expect justice  as fairness, or any 
account of justice, to cover all cases of  right and  wrong. Political justice needs always to be 
complemented by other virtues” (Political Liberalism, 21). That is another work to be thought of by the 
future generations when Political Liberalism has taken some good space in plural societies. I have 
anticipated and summarized a number of issues in this note.  
1439
 Political Liberalism, 11.  This basic structure is assumed to be that of a “closed-society” that has no 
relations with other societies, and the citizen enters it by birth and leaves it only with death (Political 
Liberalism, 12). I interpret this to mean that the “political” secures stability and justice by clinging so much 
to its basic structure, which other societies may not share, and may even try to weaken. Seeing the general 
idea I want to withdraw from Political Liberalism, I do not stop at other minor details of each concept, 
otherwise this section would turn into a work on Rawls, which is not my intention.  
1440
 Ibid., xliii.  
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one or some of them. “It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine.”1441 
Third, the political can be nurtured by the “implicit public political culture of a 
democratic society.” “Public culture” includes the constitutional institutions and public 
traditions, the way they are composed and interpreted, and the way they are perceived in 
society as part of “common knowledge.”1442 The success of the “political” then requires 
all citizens in the closed society to contribute to it, despite the diversity and difference of 
their doctrines. How is it possible to bring different people to agree on one content of a 
concept – the political? Three more fundamental ideas solidify the project: “the idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation,” “the idea of the original position,” and “the 
political conception of the person.” These three fundamental ideas give shape to the 
political, to the “idea of a well-ordered society.”  I say more on each below. 
 The political requires that citizens consider their society “as a fair system of 
cooperation.” Rawls lists three main aspects of cooperation. One, cooperation does not 
mean “merely socially coordinated activity” that is decreed and controlled by a central 
authority. Rather, it means recognizing public rules as fundamental to the citizen/ 
person’s conduct. The person endorses these rules, and makes them part of his daily 
comportment. Two, for the person to adopt such rules, the others in society should adopt 
them too, otherwise it would be unjust, and disadvantageous to him (or/and her). Shared 
adoption of these rules are called “fair terms of cooperation.” “Reciprocity” is crucial in 
this aspect; it does not mean the simple share of advantage, but means taking into account 
the two principles of justice into account; mutual advantage could be disadvantageous to 
one part than to the other. Three, and interestingly, “[T]he idea of social cooperation 
requires an idea of each participant's rational advantage, or good.” That is, each 
participant has to think rationally of the good he receives from the cooperation he is 
involved in “when the scheme is viewed from their [the person’s] own standpoint.”1443 
                                                          
1441
 Ibid., 10 
1442
 Ibid., 12-14. Note that “public culture” here serves the “political,” while “background culture” in 
Rawls’ differentiation is “comprehensive” since it is disseminated not in public, but in particular 
institutions, like churches, associations, universities, clubs, teams, etc. which are part of daily life and 
“culture of the social.” (Political Liberalism, 14) 
1443
 Ibid., 16. Such cooperation seems very rewarding; however liberal it looks, it still keeps part of the 
doctrine of the engaged person to himself; it does not efface, it appears, the existential questions that may 
have indirectly pushed him to cooperate. On the other hand, this may even lead him to renew his perception 
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No need to say again that the person as a normative concept, as used by Rawls here, is 
considered free, equal to other persons, and endowed with moral powers that can 
conceive the good, and rational powers that can form judgments and inferences.
1444
 
However, this can also mean that when cooperating, there is a space to think of why one 
is working/cooperating, and for what reason; so, the political aside, the doctrine one 
belongs to is given space to live, and to be thought of rationally when cooperating with 
others, even when the thing cooperated on does not think initially of the doctrine of the 
person and its place; as a fair pay off, the person who cooperates fairly, gets his doctrinal 
idea preserved somehow, if not materially then at least psychologically, which he thinks 
of preserving, possibly as a fundamental part of his identity or aim in life: “persons also 
have at any given time a determinate conception of the good that they try to achieve. 
Such a conception must not be understood narrowly but rather as including a conception 
of what is valuable in human life.”1445 Now that the main features of society as a fair 
system of cooperation are outlined, the question that is faced is the following: “How are 
the fair terms of cooperation to be determined?” Are they divine, laid down by God? Or 
are they laid down by some supreme authority, or by some moral order that tries to be 
inclusive of various doctrines available in society?
1446
 These are delicate questions. 
 Rawls proposes “the idea of the original position” as “a device of representation 
[...] of public reflection and self-clarification” for the attainment of wider agreement 
possible.
1447
 The original position, mostly its prominent device called the “veil of 
ignorance,” seeks a point of view that is empty of any particular doctrinal, historical, 
social, political, or economic features that may have been accumulated over time by the 
persons seeking agreement. In the original position, persons speak metaphorically from 
“behind the veil of ignorance” where they all stand free and equal, empty of any 
considerations that may advantage one or some over others.
1448
 This device demands that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of both his doctrine and the political perception he is engaged in, actively and fairly; he may realize that 
there is no conflict between his doctrine and the political. I will come back to this point later when I invoke 
European Islam.  
1444
 Ibid., 19 
1445
 Ibid., 19 
1446
 Ibid., 22 
1447
 Ibid., 26 
1448
 Ibid., 23 
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“the parties [cooperating] are not allowed to know the social position of those they 
represent, or the particular comprehensive doctrine of the person each represents.”1449 
The original position here veils the comprehensive doctrines from directly appropriating 
the principles that govern the political conception of justice, and thus prevents them from 
dominating it. Highly theoretical as it is, how does the political conception place the 
person in light of the idea of the original position?  
 The “political conception of the person” has three main features in Rawls’ work. 
One, as free citizens, persons are featured as having the moral power to have their own 
conception of the good. They are able to revise their perceptions of the good based on 
their reasonable and rational faculties. Their status as free citizens does not change even 
when their views of the good change over time. Citizens usually do not lead a life solely 
political. They pursue other non-political ways of life, shaped by other doctrines. 
However, their political citizenship gives shape to their way of life and shows them what 
they want, though that can keep changing. It is this moral capacity of free citizens that the 
political person enjoys and preserves, which remains crucial to his political and social 
cooperation with other citizens, however different or not it may be with other doctrines 
simultaneously followed by other citizens.
1450
 Two, free, citizens are featured as having 
the capacity to self-authenticate their claims. This capacity allows them to demand that 
institutions cater for their claims as they stem from their conception of the good, which in 
turn could be implicitly nurtured by their doctrines, as long as these claims are allowed 
by the public conception of justice. Three, free, citizens are considered capable of taking 
responsibilities of their ends, which impacts how their claims in general are evaluated. 
This also renders them responsible of matching their claims with the principles of justice 
as endorsed by everyone, cooperatively, in society: “[T]hat is, they can adjust their ends 
so that those ends can be pursued by the means they can reasonably expect to acquire in 
return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.”1451 
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 The three ideas above are essential features of the political in Political Liberalism. 
They construct what Rawls calls “the idea of a well-ordered society.” Broadly, and in 
light of what has been said, such a society is characterized by three aspects:  
 First [...], it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else 
accepts, the very same principles of justice; and second  […] its basic structure—
that is, its maim political and social institutions and how they fit together as one 
system of cooperation—is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to 
satisfy these  principles […]. And third, its citizens have a normally effective  
sense of justice  and so they  generally comply with society's basic institutions, 
which they regard as just.
1452
  
This “well-ordered society” has until now been broadly described, based on ideas of the 
political conception of justice, the person, and society itself. Doctrines have been 
mentioned as unavoidable and inerasable from society, however just it [society] may be, 
and however reasonable they [doctrines] could be. They are strong components of 
society, but what is their place in Rawls’ political society? And what is the condition –or 
conditions- that they should meet to enter the political and secure its justice and stability? 
It is here that the requirements of “reasonableness” are introduced for the various 
doctrines –religious, philosophic, or moral- that compose society. It is only 
reasonableness that promotes pluralism from a mere fact into “reasonable pluralism” that 
is able to sustain the political through the idea of overlapping consensus –which the 
coming paragraphs explain gradually.  
 As a definition, a “doctrine” – which can be religious, philosophic, or moral - is a 
“conception” (not only a “concept”1453) that can be “fully comprehensive if it covers all 
recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system.”1454 That is, 
it is a system that includes conceptions about what is life, what is of value in life, and 
how social, economic, political, etc., relations should be considered to lead such a good 
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life. A doctrine is only “partially comprehensive when it comprises a number of but by no 
means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated.”1455 For 
example, a partial doctrine may not include a code of conduct in the field of politics, or 
economics, or some other particular field of human relations. This fact of pluralism of 
doctrines as well as their levels of comprehensiveness, means that the polity cannot 
accommodate them all unless there is a framework that allows each to be “in” without 
being domineering. This same framework curtails the fully comprehensive doctrines so 
that they do not become coercive; at the same time, the partially comprehensive ones 
would be covered in the areas where their doctrine does not provide clearer conceptions 
for conduct. Such a framework serves no doctrine in particular but serves all together. 
This is the aim of the “political conception of justice” in Rawls’ work. There are, 
however, conditions to tailor such a serviceable and just framework. Remaining with the 
question of doctrines and pluralism, Rawls requires reasonableness so that they contribute 
to building “reasonable pluralism.”  
 Rawls applies the distinction between “reasonable” and “rational” on persons 
before he uses them for doctrines. On defining the first he invokes the principle of 
“reciprocity”: 
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide 
by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those 
norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable 
to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose.
1456
 
In clearer terms, persons are reasonable when they are ready to enter into a debate to 
build agreement, leaving aside their own personal interests that may be purely egoist or 
doctrinal, “Reasonable persons, we say, are not moved by the general good as such but 
desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with 
others on terms all can accept.”1457 Reciprocity is essential for the reasonable because it 
advantages everyone not equally, but justly. “The overall criterion of the reasonable is 
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general and wide reflective equilibrium.”1458 In simple terms, “reflective equilibrium” is 
the process of deliberations and adjustments or reciprocity that the citizen enters till 
“reasonable agreement” on the content of the political is reached. The “unreasonable” do 
the opposite; they enter agreements but “[T]hey are ready to violate such terms as suits 
their interests when circumstances allow.”1459 As to the “rational,” it is an individual that 
seeks “ends and interests peculiarly its own,” though Rawls warns that such an individual 
can have strong love for his society, and nature, for instance.  The difference is in the 
level of moral stimulus behind a choice that serves society, “[W]hat rational agents lack 
is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair 
cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might reasonably be 
expected to endorse.”1460 That is, the rational can endorse cooperative agreements for the 
wellbeing of society of individuals, but he remains morally untouched by such behaviour. 
I may put it this way: the rational can be convinced by the idea of the political, but not 
persuaded by it, while the reasonable is both convinced and persuaded.  
 What the distinction between the reasonable and the rational leads to is the 
concept of “reasonable comprehensive doctrine.” The latter becomes a conception, or a 
system, that holds a particular view about human life, and the virtues and behaviours that 
support such a worldview. Rawls gives it three main features. First, “a reasonable 
doctrine is an exercise of theoretical reason” in the sense that “it covers the major 
religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or  less  consistent and 
coherent manner.”1461 It does so by organizing values in a system that renders them 
compatible with one another to picture the core worldview the doctrine targets. Each 
doctrine has its own system of categorization, which allows persons to distinguish one 
from the other. Second, “a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is also an exercise of 
practical reason”1462 when it allows persons in general and its adherents in particular to 
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prioritizes some values over others when a situation brings them together. Third, “a 
reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging,” which means 
that “it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine.”1463 The 
fact that it links itself to some past but still uses theoretical and practical reason to update 
its value system means that however it tries to seem stable over time “it tends to evolve 
slowly in the light of what, from its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient 
reasons.”1464 What these features imply is that reasonable people cannot reasonably 
reason the same way because of the various reasonable reasons or causes that lead them 
to adopt a particular type of reasonableness. These causes behind “reasonable 
disagreement” are termed “the burdens of judgement.”1465 Reasonableness, in other 
words, requires “reasonable disagreement” that is founded on reasonable burdens of 
judgement. 
The three features of reasonable comprehensive doctrines have three implications 
that end up in forming “reasonable pluralism.” These implications are as follows: 1) 
reasonable persons have to accept the consequences of the burdens of judgement; i.e. 
they have to accept “reasonable disagreement;” 2) “reasonable persons do not all affirm 
the same comprehensive doctrine;” 3) “reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to 
use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not 
unreasonable, though different from their own.”1466 In a note, Rawls gives an example to 
differentiate between the reasoning of the person and the reasonableness of his doctrine: 
he says that a subjective view of some person may be unreasonable, possibly because of 
blindness or capriciousness; “this does not make the doctrine as such unreasonable.”1467 
With this level of reasoning, difference is not seen always as a result of ignorance or 
hatred or search for power and dominance; difference could simply be the result of 
different ways of reasoning.
1468
 It is this mode of thinking that makes “reasonable 
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pluralism,” which is different from “pluralism as such,”1469 or “simple pluralism.”1470 
Reasonable pluralism, henceforth, is “the natural outcome of the activities of human 
reason under enduring free institutions.”1471 Having argued further that society is deeply 
divided by diverse reasonable comprehensive doctrines, besides others that may be 
unreasonable, the question comes back: how is it possible to conceive of a stable and just 
society where free and equal citizens are deeply doctrinally divided?  With some essential 
terms introduced above, it is now the “idea of overlapping consensus” that has to be 
brought out as one of the ideas of Political Liberalism that aims at sustaining and 
stabilizing the sought for “well-ordered society.” Starting with its features it becomes 
gradually clearer. 
The Idea of Overlapping Consensus  
Rawls outlines three major features of overlapping consensus. It is political, moral 
(not general and comprehensive), and stable. First, overlapping consensus as a 
fundamental idea for a public conception of justice, is political. It targets the basic 
structure of society – the political, social and economic institutions. If it does not work 
for the basic structure, it cannot be political. It is political because it is independent, or 
freestanding; it is not dependent on any specific religious, moral, or philosophical 
doctrine.
1472
 This empowers it with what Rawls calls “liberal legitimacy,” i.e. a 
constitutional liberal democracy, as envisioned in the well-ordered society, cannot be 
based on one comprehensive doctrine. Pluralism is taken to be an enduring fact, and not a 
temporary one. 
Second, overlapping consensus is moral but not in the sense of being another 
comprehensive doctrine that can be added to the already existing doctrines. It is a device 
that brings together all the reasonable existing doctrines without itself being one or 
turning into one, for “no general and comprehensive view can provide a publicly 
                                                          
1469
 Ibid., 63 
1470
 Ibid., xxx 
1471
 Ibid., xxiv  
1472
 Ibid., 144 
506 
 
acceptable basis for a political conception of justice.”1473 Through reasonable pluralism, 
it does not aim at establishing a community that adopts one comprehensive doctrine 
either. The fact of reasonable pluralism makes it very difficult for overlapping consensus 
to become a comprehensive doctrine. Rawls does not deny the fact that “firmly held 
beliefs” are expected to “change in fundamental ways” with time so that the idea of the 
political works – always based on the principles of justice as fairness.1474 Ideally, 
overlapping consensus would like to see a citizens’ comprehensive doctrine merging with 
the concept of the political, so that stability –as will be referred to below- is granted. So, 
the object of overlapping consensus is moral: the realization of the political conception of 
justice through stability. The conception of justice in society, justice principles, the 
conception of citizens as free and equal persons are requisites that make it a moral 
consensus, though not a comprehensive doctrine as any other doctrine (the liberalisms of 
Mill and Kant, Marxism and Utilitarianism, for example).
1475
 The fact that overlapping 
consensus does not base its moral standing on any existing doctrine does not make it 
“skeptic” or “indifferent.” The idea is to satisfy as many existing doctrines as possible 
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without at the same time declaring itself tied to just one of them; every moral doctrine has 
to find its space in the political,
1476
 without this meaning that questions about “truth” are 
solved, let alone some political questions that remain open to discussion. Overlapping 
consensus neither rejects questions of truth as irrelevant nor does it solve them; it allows 
discussing them reasonably within the framework of the political.
1477
  
Third, overlapping consensus is stable. It secures stability for the political 
conception of justice. In Rawls words, “[T]his means that those who affirm the various 
views supporting  the political conception will  not withdraw their support of it  should 
the relative strength of their view in society increase and eventually become 
dominant.”1478 Even in the case of shifts in power – for example, if a minority becomes a 
majority – the political conception of justice does not change; the same basic principles 
that govern the political remain stable. Stability, along with the other two features of the 
political and moral, renders overlapping consensus different from the status of modus 
vivendi in which stability is not secure. In modus vivendi, as long as the gain of each 
community or doctrine is secured, stability could be formed and preserved; if such a 
community or doctrine’s power increases, its ambitions to overrule the agreements and 
                                                          
1476
 Political Liberalism, 150 
1477
 Political Liberalism, 151. Rawls further says in a note:  
When certain matters are taken off the political agenda they are no longer regarded as appropriate 
subjects for political decision by majority or other plurality voting.” He gives the example of 
abolishing slavery, serfdom, and the protection of freedom of conscience as “correctly settled once 
and for all. (Ibid., 151, n. 16) 
Other doctrinal truths that are part of the core beliefs of some doctrines have to be discussed internally, 
among the members of these doctrines, and if they come to the public, they should do so following the 
many principles introduced until now, and also the principles of the “idea of public reason” which I do not 
introduce here. For more on that, see Political Liberalism, Lecture VI: “The Idea of Public Reason,” 212-
254. From overlapping consensus, some interesting statements can clarify this here. For instance, Rawls 
says, “by avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and philosophy's profoundest 
controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlapping consensus” (Ibid., 
152). Few paragraphs later, he goes so far as to say that if a comprehensive doctrine is true, and yet 
endorses the conception of the political, then the other doctrines, even though they may be different from 
this one assumed true doctrine, can also be true, since they contribute to the political too. A long passage 
explains it:  
If any of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in the existing overlapping consensus is true, 
then the political conception itself is true, or close thereto in the sense of being endorsed by a true 
doctrine. The truth of any one doctrine guarantees that all doctrines yield the right conception of 
political justice, even though all are not right for the right reasons as given by the one true 
doctrine. So, as we have said, when citizens differ, not all can be fully correct; yet if one of their 
doctrines should be true, all citizens are correct, politically speaking. (Ibid., 153-54, n. 19). 
1478
 Ibid., 148 
508 
 
cooperation with the other partners become very possible, thus endanger any previous 
consolidations of the political conception of justice. Overlapping consensus makes the 
principles of justice inherent in the political conception of every contributing doctrine, 
hence renders it hardly feasible that these contributing doctrines change justice with 
injustice. This implies that the principles of justice as fairness go deep into citizens 
comprehensive doctrines to the extent that they no longer wish to withdraw from them; 
they become part of their comprehensive doctrine which may have initially had 
reservations over such a conception of justice or may have fully refused it in the first 
place.  To erase such a possible tension between the citizen as a political agent as well as 
a believer in his doctrine, Rawls pictures a merger between the two as the ideal version of 
overlapping consensus:  
[I]n an ideal overlapping consensus, each citizen affirms both a comprehensive 
doctrine and the focal political conception, somehow related. In some cases the 
political  conception is simply the consequence of or continuous with, a citizen's 
comprehensive doctrine; in others it may be related as an  acceptable  
approximation given the circumstances of the social world.
1479
  
The point here is that benefits of justice to the self and other become immeasurable that 
no reasonable person or reasonable doctrine would wish to change them or rebel against 
them.
1480
 Stability of overlapping consensus, in brief terms, stems from the fact that 
“values of the political are very great values and hence not easily overridden;” they 
“govern the basic framework of social life—the very groundwork of our existence—and 
specify the fundamental terms of political and social cooperation.”1481 The constitutional 
regime secures diversity; no comprehensive doctrine feels that its existence is at risk, for 
“no conflict of values is likely to arise.”1482 In case they do, the “very great values of the 
political” of tolerance, reasonableness, and fairness can overweigh them.  The freedom 
and equality enjoyed by persons of various doctrines make the political conception a 
defendable project. It is defendable because, among the other previous reasons, the values 
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it defends for the public good –like tolerance, reasonableness and fairness - are “liberal.” 
These values flourish in a constitutionally liberal, democratic regime.
1483
  
The three features of overlapping consensus – being political, moral, and stable – 
described above do not transpire over a night and thus create a well-ordered society. They 
take shape over two stages, which Rawls calls “constitutional consensus” and 
“overlapping consensus.” It should be remembered that Rawls builds his project of 
political liberalism on the European heritage of the Reformation, and the development of 
toleration as a way to avoid further religious conflicts.   It is from this historical basis that 
the stage of constitutional consensus is developed. This first stage of building a 
constitutionally democratic regime requires that the conflicting views - that may have had 
to go into war before sitting for negotiations and agreement – subscribe to some basic 
principles that secure a minimum of stability and constitutional liberal democracy. 
Constitutional consensus then is an initiation to a new conception of society and the 
political where various doctrines tolerate each other, and all work together for the welfare 
of society – social justice. It is at this stage a form of modus vivendi. It initiates the 
citizens to the political procedures, principles and rights of a democratic government – 
like the legislative and electoral procedures, freedom of political speech and freedom of 
association. These principles and rights are reached through deliberations by means of 
“public reason,” the “allegiance to institutions,” the fact of “reasonable pluralism” and 
the effects of “moral psychology.”1484 These principles push the citizens to revise or shift 
their comprehensive doctrines to serve the conception of justice in this framework.
1485
 
Yet, “these principles are accepted simply as principles and not as grounded in certain 
ideas of society and person of a political conception, much less in a shared public 
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conception. And so the consensus is not deep.”1486 What especially remains unsettled at 
this stage are “the more exact content and boundaries of these rights and liberties, as well 
as what further rights and liberties are to be counted as basic and so merit legal if not 
constitutional protection.”1487 This means that the various doctrines have not consolidated 
their views as very compatible or supportive of the conception of political justice. They 
still consider a gap between their doctrine and the political. Pluralism here is still 
“simple” and not “reasonable.” The second stage – which is overlapping consensus - is 
where a substantial move towards the endorsement of the political conception of justice 
takes its ideal form. 
Unlike constitutional consensus, which is close to being a prolonged modus 
vivendi, overlapping consensus is an independent political, moral and stable conception 
of the political. In overlapping consensus, the various doctrines that cooperate for the 
realization of society as a fair system of cooperation do not support such an ideal from 
their own reasons alone, nor do they support them as a “political compromise.”1488 
Though they have different conceptions of the good which each doctrine derives from its 
conception of truth, in the society they envisage, they have to share the conception of the 
right for the sake of stability. They go beyond that.  They integrate the political 
conception of justice as part of their doctrine. That is how stability is secured. All the 
concepts introduced until now are devices that contribute to the political society 
envisaged by overlapping consensus. In brief terms, Rawls states two conditions for the 
functioning of overlapping consensus: a) it must be correctly based on the concepts and 
principles described until now (i.e. constitutional liberal democracy basics), and b) it 
must be stable thanks to the principles that support it and which it simultaneously 
encourages.
1489
 What should be retained until now is that overlapping consensus is a 
leading idea in political liberalism that aims at solving the fundamental question of how it 
is possible to have a stable and just society profoundly divided by various doctrines: 
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The problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of 
political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of 
reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may 
freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues. 
Emphatically it does not aim to replace comprehensive doctrines, religious or 
nonreligious, but intends to be equally distinct from both and, it hopes, acceptable 
to both.
1490
 
Having said so, I ultimately point to Jorgen Habermans’ question to Rawls. The question 
is whether overlapping consensus adds a justification to the conception of the political or 
whether it adds a condition to social stability.
1491
 Overlapping consensus seems to do 
both. This is further illustrated by Rawls in his “Reply to Habermas” article.  
Overlapping consensus carries the political conception of justice within it and 
tries to protect it through the stability it seeks. It is a core idea to the realization of the aim 
of Political Liberalism – along with other ideas: “public justification,” “stability for the 
right reasons,” and the liberal principle of “legitimacy,” as Rawls explains in his 
“Reply.”1492 The four terms intertwine. Public justification which is a requisite for 
legitimacy is impossible without overlapping consensus (and its stability).  
Thus, in Political Liberalism, overlapping consensus has a vital place.  Owing to 
the fact that legitimacy for the constitutional liberal democracy cannot be gained without 
public justification, I note here that Rawls outlines three stages of justification, and they 
take a lot from, or intertwine with, overlapping consensus. First, “pro tanto justification” 
of the political conception considers only “political values.” The original position and 
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deliberating in public from behind the veil of ignorance –as public reason requires- give 
amble answers about the basics of a just and constitutional society.  
Second, “full justification” is expressed by a citizen as a member of civil society. 
At this second, he somehow adds the political conception to his comprehensive doctrine 
either as true or reasonable, depending on the type of the doctrine. However freestanding 
the political conception is, this does not mean that it cannot be integrated into some 
doctrines as a “module,” as part of the doctrine in some of its political aspects. 
Accordingly, the citizen, and his association or doctrine, do find within their doctrine 
what answers the requirements of the political, and keep apart the non-political aspects of 
their doctrine.  
Third, “public justification” -  which is a basic idea of political liberalism along 
with the three other ideas of overlapping consensus, stability, and legitimacy – “happens 
when all the reasonable members of political society carry out a justification  of  the 
shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive 
views.”1493 What this implies is that citizens look at each other as reasonable and coming 
from reasonable comprehensive doctrines that all support the political; such an attitude 
makes them all equal defenders of the political, each claiming it as his while at the same 
time knowing that the other does the same; “this mutual accounting shapes the moral 
quality of the public culture of political society.”1494 They all become reasonable and 
political. Despite their original differences of the conception of the “good,” now it is the 
“right” that unites their attitude. Each of them becomes confident that he and his doctrine 
contribute to the political, and are themselves political. For these doctrines to reach such 
an agreement, they have go through conditions and aspects of reasonable overlapping 
consensus, as seen earlier, “Only when there is a reasonable overlapping consensus can 
political society's political conception of justice be publicly—though never finally—
justified.”1495  
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Features of European Islam as a “Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrine”  
Seeing the shift from studying texts to understand how they mostly revisit religion 
theologically to how this understanding could be interpreted politically,
1496
 I will have to 
proceed following a “founded assumption.”1497 This assumption is twofold: 1) it 
considers European Islam as a “theory of the good,” or a “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine,” and 2) it considers that European Islam seeks the “permanence of social 
justice.” First, European Islam is a theory of the good, or what I take Rawls to mean by a 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrine.” I opt for this assumption of “a theory of the good” 
based on the theological justifications the Islamic tradition advances, which is also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rigid comprehensive doctrine. it is constantly being deliberated, without this endangering the stability and 
justice it brings about. For justifications of my use of Rawls in evaluating European Islam, revisit the main 
introduction, and my notes on “Methodological Concerns,” and more specifically a sub-section entitled 
“Why Using Rawls’ Political Liberalism in Understanding European Islam?” There, I provide three main 
reasons behind my choice, and refer to the few but interesting available works that also use Rawls in 
reading especially Islamic classical jurisprudence and contemporary conservatives. 
1496
 As a reminder, by the “theological” I broadly mean the study of religion in its physical and 
metaphysical dimensions, or the meaning of religion in its secular and divine dimensions. By the “political” 
I mean the “management of social affairs,” taking into account the “world-and-individual” dimensions into 
account, in light of the religious theological dimensions, without this being reserved only to the religious. 
The “management of social affairs” becomes “the management of world affairs,” and thus inclusive of the 
three axes (world-society-individual), as well as other axes besides religion, like man-made religions, 
philosophy, morality, etc., or what Rawls calls “doctrines.” Overall, theology means the contemplation 
(tadabur) of religion, and politics means the management (tadbīr) of world affairs. I have borrowed the 
terms “contemplation” and “management” (tadbīr and tadabur in Arabic) from Taha Abderrahman who 
uses them to define religion and politics, respectively. Note that I have given his definition of religion to 
theology. That is, while he says that religion means the contemplation of the world, I say that theology is 
the contemplation of religion, which in turn is a contemplation of religion. Abdurrahmane, The Spirit of 
Modernity, 64; The Spirit of Religion, 509. 
1497
 I say it is a “founded assumption” because my work until now has been based on two arguments that 
support it: political challenge(s) and theological interpretation(s). These two challenges intertwine, and they 
are the driving force behind the way the whole argument of this study is structured. One, the political 
challenge: it is quite obvious that the reform searched for by contemporary Islamic thought in general and 
European Islam in particular is not taken as a leisure activity. There is a challenge to face, and this 
challenge has manifested itself politically. It is European modern polity that has shown that Muslim 
communities within Europe, and also Muslims in Muslim majority countries, face various problems within 
the polity they reside in. European Islam is, then, part of the “revision” going on in the so-called Muslim 
world. Two, the theological challenge: this “revision” is not only political but is most importantly 
theological. The policies that show the Muslims in the defensive, unable to, or unwilling to, adjust to the 
constitutionally liberal societies they reside in, have pushed for more thorough revisiting of their religious 
basic texts to read them anew in light of human modern changes and challenges. Without justifications 
from within the tradition itself, ordinary Muslims would often suspect modernity and what modern 
societies ask them to abide by and endorse. To overcome a psychological dilemma the believer faces in 
living modernity without endorsing it, theological management – i.e. re-visiting- of religious texts is 
evidently taking its course. European Islam tries to answer this need. Generally, the two arguments are 
founded on historical records, political decisions, sociological realities, and theological texts and 
interpretations. See the main introduction of this work, and Section 1a-b, Part IV, for more on what I mean. 
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emphasized by European Islam as I showed in earlier sections; it aims at establishing 
cosmic wellbeing, social wellbeing, and individual wellbeing. In theory, what else is 
needed to show that a theory/ a doctrine is good, apart from these three major axes 
(world, society, individual)? As it seeks the good, it obviously keeps its right to be also a 
theory of the right (i.e. Islam as a religion of right, or a right divine religion that claims to 
be the seal of divine prophecies). European Islam here is introducing itself as both a 
religion and a political theory for modern Muslim citizens – thus both “right” and 
“good,” to echo terms that are also used in Rawls’ project. The management of religion 
(attadabur) and the management of world affairs (attadbīr, in Abderahmane’s terms) are 
not separated; they are merged. As seen earlier (Section 2b-and-c), it tries to overcome 
“classical dichotomous thought” that divides the world into binaries of religious versus 
secular, divine versus mundane, etc.
1498
  
It simple terms, European Islam just does not cut ties with the divine. It considers 
the secular world part of the divine. In clearer terms, and using “common terms,” the 
theory of the good European Islam proposes is the political version of Islam, not the way 
political Islam has been claimed by non-reformist movements or violent movements (like 
the Taliban-al-Qaeda or even the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Sudanese Islamic 
Movement) as synonymous of a global umma or a restored Caliphate. That is, European 
Islam as a theory of the good tries to manifest its aspects of the good in the physical/ 
                                                          
1498
 This does not necessarily mean that the emerging European Islamic thought will develop into a very 
copy of Western liberal thought the way it is perceived now. It is the perception of the world and modernity 
in this case that have changed; it does not necessarily mean that Euro-modernity becomes the future of 
Islamic thought; it could, but it is not a necessary conclusion. (Revise the levels of rationality as I explained 
them in Taha Abderahmane’s project (Section 2c, Part IV). Rawls also makes it clear that there are levels 
of rationality, and reasonable pluralism illustrates that different doctrines could be rational but not the 
same.) To draw a comparison that some may have strong reservations about, I can say that while 
Reformation in Europe ended up with liberalism taking over the place of the Church (as a religious unified 
authority), European Islam as a version of reformist Islam does not take over the place of the Islamic 
unified authority –which does not exist officially in theory - but simply recognizes that it has for long opted 
for a division between politics and religion which it now renounces by re-uniting them. Certainly this has 
not been an easy realization, nor an easy step to theorize. In this sense there is reformation here, but it is not 
the same as that of European Reformation. The point here is that Islamic reform seems to have achieved 
what Reformation has achieved. However, the theological differences in this reform seem to me 
substantially different. I do not say more here. My point should be clearer by reading Sections 2a-b-c, Part 
IV. 
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secular world. These manifestations are what I try to explain in light of the work done 
until now, by bringing up some of the basic terms generated so far.  
Second, continuing with the assumption followed here, I say that European Islam 
seeks the “permanence of social justice” as its main good.1499 This part of the assumption 
is also a “founded assumption.” It is so because, as has been illustrated through the 
previous parts of this work on various historical periods of Islamic thought, past and 
present, the idea of securing social justice comes often as a vital value to defend. For 
example, the idea of Tawhid has been interpreted to mean man’s liberty from being 
enslaved by any other human or market or ideological force. The divine attribute of 
“justice” has also been taken as a leading one from which humans should learn in living 
the divine message. The work of the Mu’tazilite Qadi Abd Aljabar and his explanation of 
the tenet of Tawhid and Justice is one example (Section 1b, Part IV). With the early and 
later reformists, Mohamed Abduh, Fazlur Rahman, Hassan Hanafi, and Tariq Ramadan, 
to name but these, social justice is vital in their interpretation of the message of Islam, 
too. No one has developed a whole theory about justice alone; they have, nevertheless, 
integrated it in their various projects, and have referred to Quranic verses and hadiths as 
further arguments for their views.  
As to the term “permanence” in “social justice,” it is also another deduction I take 
from my previous various scholarly projects I have studied in this work. The meaning of 
“permanence” echoes the idea of “peace” that Islam calls for. Peace here is not only 
political but also “cosmic,” “social,” and “individual,” as I have understood it while 
conceptualizing the idea of European Islam (Section 2b, Part IV). Moreover, the section 
devoted to the concept of “perpetual modernity” tries to work on these levels of peace 
through “perpetual” revision of the message of Islam, and this way it keeps itself 
modernizing, according to external changes and challenges (Section 2c, Part IV). 
However, since it is the political concern that matters here when dealing with the idea of 
                                                          
1499
 Rawls quotes Kant as saying: “If justice perishes,  then it is no longer worthwhile for men to live upon 
the Earth,” Political Liberalism, lx, n. 40.  
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overlapping consensus, I now say that “permanence” serves the idea of “stability” which 
Rawls stresses.
1500
   
In brief terms, the theory of the good European Islam especially advocates 
politically is the “permanence of social justice.” To proceed to the last section of building 
links between the conceptualized European Islam and overlapping consensus requires 
that all the previous various used as well as generated terms are kept in mind.
1501
 My 
argumentation follows my previously used three axes (world-society-individual). I note 
that I make a small re-order in these axes: I refer to the individual axis at the second level 
instead of the third for the reason I will explain in due time. This shift is methodological, 
and does not change the substance of the argument. Each of these axes uses the generated 
concepts of European Islam and presents them in three points as I explain in the 
following. 
  
 
                                                          
1500
 I cannot explain all the concepts all at once; I try that, but I also try to avoid being repetitive. So, 
methodological reasons require that there are elements that should be understood even superficially at first 
when first mentioned till the place of their explanation is rightly reached. I often remind myself of the great 
J.J. Rousseau who would warn his readers in his political writings that they should wait and read through 
till the concepts he uses become clearer in due space.  
1501
 As another reminder, in my analytical reading of European Islam selected texts, I use the triadic axes of 
“world-society-individual” as a comprehensive framework to understand what the various interpretations of 
the studied scholars aim at in their reformist attempts. With this axis in mind, I apply the framework of 
Taha Abdurrahmane to the study of texts, to find out that my triadic axes match to a large extent his three 
innovative plans of “humanization-historicization-rationalization” (Section 2a, Part IV). Based on these, I 
devise three main concepts for my own version of European Islam: “inheritance of the world-practical fiqh-
rationalization of ethics” (Section 2b, Part IV). I subsequently evaluate these concepts in light of modernity 
values, using Abdurrahmane’s three principles of the essence of modernity for my purpose “majority-
universality-criticism.” I end up interpreting Abdurrahmane’s “second modernity” as “perpetual 
modernity” in light of my earlier concepts for European Islam. I end up saying that European Islam’s 
modernity is perpetual for three reasons, which I subsequently present in terms of levels of concepts - these 
levels and concepts have been generated as evaluation and conceptualization went on gradually. It is (1) 
perpetual in the sense that the inheritance of the world, through innovative humanization plan of reading 
revelation, matches the principle of majority as enshrined by the essence of modernity. It is (2) perpetual in 
the sense that practical fiqh (Sharia law), through innovative historicization plan, matches the principle of 
universality as enshrined by the essence of modernity. It is (3) perpetual in the sense that the rationalization 
of ethics and faith, through innovative rationalization plan, matches the principle of criticism as enshrined 
by the essence of modernity. Below I try to revisit these concepts with overlapping consensus framework in 
mind.   
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World Axis – Humanization of Revelation 
I have earlier argued that European Islam innovatively humanizes the inherited 
world through the principle of majority for cosmic wellbeing. This inheritance is 
considered a divine will. European Islam defends man’s inheritance of the world as a 
divine will and consequently reclaims the ontological bond between the two spheres, the 
metaphysical and the physical, for cosmic wellbeing, based on the principle of (universal) 
fraternity. Man as a Caliph is endowed with infinite capabilities that allow him to 
preserve the trust (amāna) that he was entrusted with in descending on earth, after his 
creation had been perfected. This means that the sacred text is not put aside to be dealt 
with just in the private sphere. Carrying out the trust of working good for the world is 
strongly emphasized. I briefly synthesise thoughts on this axis below in three points, as 
have further been conceptualized in Section 1b, Part IV. 
One, revelation in the physical world is innovatively humanized, responsibly 
inherited, autonomously ruled and creatively re-created by man. The inheritance of the 
world gives the Caliph (man) infinite liberties in managing the world, without sacrificing/ 
killing the divine, because this inheritance is willingly given to him, and also without an 
intermediary human agency that proclaims the position of guarding the rights of God and 
the duties of man. There is no other revelation expected, and it is now up to man, the 
Caliph, to care for the world because it is his. As long as man emulates the Creator in His 
attributes of creation, justice, and mercy, there is no fear of the freedoms of man, for the 
divine attributes guide him: God cannot act foolishly, arbitrarily, and so should man. 
Divine attributes are a reference, a high threshold for man to reach. By the divine as a 
reference is meant the constant act of remembrance through the religious pillar of 
Testimony (Shahada) the broad significance of which is not only to believe in Unity but 
also, and most importantly, to believe that belief is comprehensive, atemporal, aspacial. 
Testimony bears the idea of trust (amāna) that bonds the human and the divine. Even in 
the case of any morality code that humans develop rationally, this trust or Testimony, 
remains the utmost manifestation of belief in and communion with the divine.  
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Two, the fact that the world is humanized does not belittle the role of the divine, 
for the Caliph carries the divine within himself through the bond(s) of trust and 
Testimony. The major/ mature agency of man does not, and cannot, liberate itself from 
the divine simply because whatever the Caliph thinks is autonomous or creative is 
essentially divine in nature as well. The divine is not against human agency, its maturity 
and creativity. 
Three, the universe becomes a laboratory to be creatively explored, without a 
constant psychological fight over what is secular and what is divine. Vertical thinking 
tries to make sense of human existence beyond its material, concrete and immediate 
benefits. Maturity of man grows as such thinking expands. Perpetual thinking inspired 
and empowered by divine attributes makes the understanding of both religion and 
modernity able to go beyond formalisms of classical religiosity, classical atheism and 
secularism. Neither classical religion nor classical modernity alone is the way to live the 
future civilization.  
Henceforth, the humanization of the inherited world, through the principle of 
majority, engages vertical thinking for cosmic wellbeing. Cosmic wellbeing here simply 
means the harmonious outlook the individual develops in rationalizing religion and the 
understanding of the canons of the universe. It is especially based on the idea of merging 
the physical and the metaphysical. The physical world is sacralised, and modernity, 
henceforth, is seen as part of the sacred. The diversity that characterizes the world 
becomes part of the divine will. The primal impact of such a perspective is that the 
majority (i.e. maturity) of man fraternicizes nations, religions, and philosophies – based 
on the principle of fraternity.
1502
 This could be read as a clear sign of epistemological 
modesty from the part of contemporary reformist Islamic thought and European Islam in 
particular.  
The epistemological move may be interpreted as a sign of defeatism, weakness, 
inability to overcome the “Islamic predicament” or “crisis.”  That could be just one valid 
interpretation of such a move. A more articulate interpretation of the move, in my 
                                                          
1502
 The principle of fraternity was also deduced from reading European Islam texts in Section 2b, Part IV.  
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perspective, is as simple as this: modesty in understanding the divine message is the most 
challenging step a comprehensive religion could take. In light of the argument developed 
throughout this work, the concepts of inheritance, innovative humanization, and majority 
principle that I have knitted in this first level/axis of analysis (world axis), I could say 
that the move is more of an epistemological courage than of modesty, if modesty is 
understood pejoratively by some. Overcoming the immutability of interpreting prescribed 
Sharia laws is a courageous move. For example, the “late reformists,” or contemporaries, 
have moved beyond the reform limitations started by the “early reformists” of the Arab 
Renaissance (See Section 1c-d, Part IV). The point I want to make here is that cosmic 
wellbeing as a consequence of the interpretation given to the principle of majority is very 
much linked to the interpretation given to the principle of fraternity in humanizing the 
understanding of revelation.  
However innovative may seem the perception of the world in European Islam, 
this level of theological revision and interpretation has to be bracketed in Rawls’ overall 
project of Political Liberalism. Overlapping consensus requires that the deeply 
controversial issues of a cooperative doctrine have to be left to be discussed by the 
believers of this same doctrine. I consider this issue of interpreting the world from a 
religious perspective as deeply controversial because each doctrine – be it religious, 
philosophic, or moral – has a different perception of nature, creation, death, and life, etc. 
It is this deeply controversial issue that creates the worldview of each doctrine, and 
results in difference. A political society as envisioned by Rawls does not concern itself 
with this issue that seems to have no solution, nor does it need one in the first place, for 
each doctrine has the right to believe in its own way of pursuing the good, which 
becomes its version of the right for reasonable pluralism. However, I believe that though 
I do agree with this way of studying doctrines for political reasons, I still see that the 
innovative perception of the world which European Islam has developed impacts the 
other two axes (society and the individual) which are more political, and thus of more 
interest in the Rawlsian framework. I elaborate this, based on three points.  
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One, the physical and the metaphysical are one. Not all versions of Islam do 
agree with the reformist European Islam, and not all reformists go in the same line of 
thought. The examples of the Universe as a Resealed Book (in Ramadan’s project), the 
secularization of Islamic theology (in Oubrou’s project), and existential Islam (in Bidar’s 
project) make the doctrinal perception of the world as wholly a sacred space allows for 
the interpretation that European Islam in this sense could be even more accommodative 
of the political as Rawls advocates it. One of the possible repercussions of these projects, 
as illustrated in earlier parts of this work, aims at finding ways of considering modern-
secular law as Islamic, as long as it achieves the same ideals of Islam. This doctrinal 
perception, though it has to be bracketed in the thinking “behind the veil of ignorance” at 
the original position stage, it cannot be denied at later stages of the political life. I explain 
this further with my next point.  
Two, stability of the political well-ordered society is required by the divine. It was 
also noted earlier that Rawls expects strongly affirmed beliefs to change substantially 
with time to endorse from their own beliefs the requirements of the political. I think that 
European Islam moves into that direction, based on the tradition as well as the modern re-
interpretation of the same tradition. I consider this example. If the citizen has to endorse 
political values of the constitutional liberal society from behind the veil of ignorance in 
the pro tanto justification stage, he has to go further and integrate these values in the 
doctrine he believes in for the sake of stability of overlapping consensus, otherwise the 
consensus remains constitutional. The point I stress here is that theological reformation as 
proposed by European Islam, whether bracketed at a certain stage of overlapping 
consensus if this framework is used, or left to be claimed in public without a particular 
framework, can substantially contribute to the stability envisaged by this political 
framework. That is why I do not see the reason why reformist voices should not be 
considered in studies that use Rawls framework, and only the pre-19
th
 century scholarship 
is studied (I referred earlier to the studies of March and Fadel, for example).  
Three, every human system of social justice is substantially divine. If I go so far as 
to say how European Islam theological/ doctrinal revisions further help in endorsing 
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justice as fairness as an ideal for the political society, I can say that the fact of 
humanizing revelation –as explained in Section 1, Part IV for world axis- and inheriting 
the world so that man uses divine attributes to support, here, social justice makes the 
(Muslim) citizen equal to the (secular or atheist) citizen who does not use a revealed 
Book to support a constitutional liberal democracy. The humanization of revelation, 
through the principle of majority and its pillars of autonomy and creativity, make the 
heir/ Caliph a citizen who has to work with others –religionist or not- to endorse a just 
social system – always assuming that Rawls’ is the best available framework for social 
justice. Universal fraternity as a cosmic feature moves from being doctrinal/ Islamic into 
being shared, for justice as fairness equally aims at that in its world of a closed-system 
that one leaves only by death. The idea behind making these conceptual links between 
Rawls’ and mine as developed earlier (Section 1, Part IV) is mostly to stress how they 
can be useful in supporting from a theological perspective the political aims discussed 
here, though, again, theological/doctrinal matters are bracketed in Rawls’ political in 
most, but not all, stages of his argumentation for overlapping consensus. These 
fundamental points noted, I move to discuss the other more political axes – society and 
the individual – where such links and comparison of terminology becomes clearer.1503  I 
start with the individual axis, so that my attempt of matching the three axes with the three 
stages of justification in Rawls’ overlapping consensus become evident.  
Individual Axis - Rationalization of Revelation  
European Islam substantially elevates the place of human agency and reason in 
dealing with faith at the personal level, making the principle of liberty the basis of this 
elevation. The whole process is part of the principle of criticism European Islam has 
adopted to revisit its interpretation of the interaction between faith and man in the modern 
age. Otherwise put, rationalization, ethics, and liberty become vital in understanding 
European Islam. The concepts of the heir of God (Caliph), immortality of man, and 
                                                          
1503
 I am not aiming at matching by force the generated terms seen in earlier sections on European Islam 
with Rawls’ framework. I am simply trying to find shared grounds. There is a lot of condensation of terms 
here because I have explained them in length all throughout Part IV of this work. To be understood, going 
through the previous sections is a requisite. I cannot re-explain each term each time I move to another level 
of abstraction and argumentation.   
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development of practical fiqh do not make sense at the world and social axes if they do 
not have further implications on the individual axis. Also at this level, I outline three 
major points.  
One, there is no faith without reason. The rationalization of faith becomes the 
ultimate conclusion after the humanization and historicization innovative plans.  Instead 
of banning the divine from man’s modern thinking, European Islam proposes another 
understanding of religion and faith whereby reason is either expanded – or at least invited 
to expand its horizons of analysis to the intangible components of the universe and 
religion – or made equivalent to the essence of man, religion, and ethics.1504 Bidar’s 
concept of Self Islam clearly endorses this view of faith in both ways: the expansion of 
the role of reasoning in belief, and the ethicization of the role of religion. Rituals apart, 
their meanings are more emphasized, despite the diverse significances they could hold. 
The individual is considered a modern believer if he reflects on the implications of the 
ritual. This reflective process engenders more understanding of the self, faith, and 
diversity in the world, and engenders modesty in belief (versus the supremacist view 
orthodox believers hold); the reflective believer – to borrow Soroush’s term – reaches the 
fact that truth cannot be one, and that the divine has to be understood in that sense, 
otherwise its divine attributes of majesty and greatness are belittled by the same believer 
who believes that God is great. To use the Rawlsian terms of the rational and reasonable, 
the individual is invited first to be rational in his beliefs, and second to be reasonable so 
as to accommodate the others’ differences and what the latter imply: cooperation to reach 
agreement on political matters. In other words, reflective equilibrium as a mechanism of 
reaching cooperation cannot succeed if the believer-citizen does not expand his horizons 
of reasoning and consideration of his beliefs to allocate space for the others.                        
Two, there is no faith without ethics. Religion is summarized in ethics. The latter is 
considered equivalent to the divine. Reason is not considered a separate entity, but part of 
a whole. It is ontologically born/ created ethical, and what it does on the epistemological 
level is that it works out details for a good materialization of its ethical origin. Religion, 
                                                          
1504
 I recall my formation of this interpretation in the following: religion = ethics = reason, Section 2b, Part 
IV.  
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ethics, and reason become equal. Henceforth, man as an ethical being is endowed with 
the liberty to be either ethical or not to be (so). This is the question that faces the modern 
man, according to this perspective, and he is free to choose to be ethical/ religious/ 
rational or not to be. The implication of this ethical aspect is that whatever rational choice 
an individual makes is part of the religious as long as it serves certain major aims: 
individual wellbeing, besides social and cosmic wellbeing. Divine attributes and 
prophetic behaviour are models to learn from; they set a high standard for moral 
comportment of the individual. The emphasis on Islamic ethics, especially through divine 
attributes and prophetic teachings, makes reformist Islamic thought attached to its prime 
source, which is revelation, but shoulders the individual with carrying this attachment in 
his behaviour first, more than through community rights that could be unreflective. I 
reinvoke some examples on the matter.  
Bidar raises the Kantian two questions: “what shall I do with my life?” and “what I 
am allowed to hope for?” He answers these questions as follows, respectively: act good 
for immortality, and escape death by love which grows with piety. The ethical dimension 
emphasized by European Islam does not aim at remaining tied solely to the Islamic 
framework; rather, it aims at considering ethics universal. As Ramadan puts it, it is not 
enough to call for “Islamic ethics,” or “Islamic art,” or “Islamic economy,” while 
inequality, for instance, rampages this same label. It is going out of narrow considerations 
of ethics that led Bidar, in his third stage of intellectual development, to call for 
overcoming religion and atheism alike in an attempt to construct one world where the 
religious and nonreligious dichotomy disappears; ethics, as supported from various 
doctrines, breaks the dichotomy, and following Rawls, only a political framework unites 
them. Liberty in faith allows the nourishment of Self Islam that is modern, rational, and 
ethical beyond the jurisprudential labels of the “permitted” and the “forbidden” (al ḥalāl 
wa al ḥarām) that belong to the classical binary perspective that divides the world into 
Islamic and un-Islamic. This does not mean that such terms are considered irrelevant and 
will be forced to disappear; they are needed for ethical reasoning; what is required is to 
impregnate them with new meanings, as have been attempted in the three axes, world-
society-individual.  
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Three, there is no faith without liberty. Without the feel of liberty, European Islam 
would not have gone so far as to humanize revelation and historicize its juridical 
prescriptions. The fact that it voices its reformist projects shows that it has internalized 
the principle of liberty in its mode of thought. More importantly, even though the 
principle of liberty has gone so far as to immortalizing man, reading the Quran as a text, 
and interpreting revelation and the Prophetic examples historically, such a liberal feel in 
interpretation has not opted for denying the divine once and for all. Liberty in Islamic 
thought seems so free, to put it so, to the extent that it does not want to free itself from the 
divine. European Islam does not kill God to celebrate liberty; it considers the latter an 
original endowment that has to be explored to understand the divine. The Muslim 
Prometheus, as I have called him in reading Bidarʼs project of the immoratlity of man, 
works with God. He becomes a “co-worker” with God, to echo Iqbalʼs image. 
The explanation I have given earlier for this choice of liberty by European Islam is 
that it is the divine that makes liberty meaningful and renders human existentialism free 
from meaningless freedom. That is, the divine expands the horizons of liberty with its 
(divine) infinite attributes. Human reason had to wait for modernity to realize such a link, 
and find out that liberty does not necessarily require the denial of the metaphysical. The 
latter does not block liberty, but nurtures it with attributes that make its realization more 
demanding. Otherwise said, the divine liberates freedom from subjective whims and 
meaningless atheism. The ontological union among various matrixes (God, creation, 
revelation, prophethood, humankind) conditions liberty to what could be termed “divine 
standards of action” – attributes like justice, mercy, generosity, and creativity. The ideal 
practice of liberty has to take these attributes as its models; since the latter are infinite and 
on constant manifestation, according to man’s ability to realize them, and so is liberty as 
could be practiced by man: it should be constantly revisited for the betterment of 
individual wellbeing.  
 Henceforth, what happens at this level/ axis, is that the individual Muslim citizen 
finds that European Islam empowers him from within his two traditions (the Islamic faith 
and European socio-political culture) to faithfully and confidently engage in the political, 
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not “as if” it were part of his religious doctrine but because it “truly” is so. Following 
European Islam, the Muslim citizen finds out that what he might have always considered 
just a possible space of his involvement from, say, a minority position, is no longer so. 
The freedom and equality he might have seen as part of Europe, and not Islam, before are 
now legitimized as his, too. On the other hand, the Europe he might have considered 
before as “godless,” or “nihilist,” or “fully atheist” is no longer so, and one major proof 
of that is his presence, his Testimony/ Shahada, on the soil of Europe. Moreover, the 
same Europe he might have belittled as “godless” is the same that has contributed to his 
modern understanding of his own faith, and has updated his ethical value-system through 
the values of equality among genders and citizens, despite their religions. The pluralist 
Europe becomes a historical opportunity for the Muslim citizen to reflect on his beliefs 
and understandings of God, and his learning from the prophetic model of behaviour.  
The point here is that the Muslim citizen of Europe revises some of his doctrinal 
perceptions of the good, espouses them with other perceptions the pluralist Europe 
provides, and enters a shared space of the right, i.e. the space of the political. Using 
Rawls terms for correlations, he realizes that his comprehensive doctrine is reasonable, 
pluralist, and contributes substantially to the ideals of the political. This brings us close to 
the full justification stage required in building (stable) overlapping consensus. The citizen 
here sees that his comprehensive doctrine –European Islam- supports the basic structure 
of society. There is no necessity to point to the fact that differences remain, both on 
minor issues regarding rituals for example, and also regarding the claim to truth. Those 
are left for internal discussion among believers. Still, whatever difference there may 
remain, the core of the political seems to be agreed upon from the perspective of the 
religious doctrine. Three examples illustrate the point further.     
 Example One: Sexual Liberty 
  I strongly note that European Islam is aware of the fact that its rationalization 
praxis does not touch every aspect of faith; if it does, then there is no need for faith in the 
first place, if it can be replaced by pure human reasoning. Moreover, this level of 
rationalization is not required by the political as well. Political liberalism acknowledges 
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that there are aspects of doctrines that can remain unexplainable, seemingly irrational, 
and those remain non-public, but not necessarily private. They remain part of what the 
believer clings to as part of the path of truth the doctrine teaches. This does not need to be 
changed for political reasons; it can be so only for 1) personal or 2) doctrinal reasons’ 
sake. I try to explain this through the example of sexual liberty, starting from “doctrinal” 
reasons first then “personal” ones some believers may advance.  
By doctrinal reasons’ sake I mean possible reforms that the doctrine goes through. 
But in Islam, officially, there is no central authority to change some of its beliefs. I give 
an example that may be controversial to many believers and attract the curiosity of many 
non-believers. I on purpose refer to this example, which I assume many shy away from 
giving, because I am aware of the sensitivity that arises out of discussing freedom, 
equality and sexuality in contemporary Islam, especially in Europe. A number of readers, 
Muslim or not, may quickly jump to conclusions in reading reformist European Islam. 
One of the main critique from the conservatives would be that European Islam clearly 
allows the most ominous ḥarām/ forbidden acts in Islam, adultery in the case of 
individual liberties, simply because it strongly defends liberty and equality. Extreme 
secularists that like to hear clear cut answers about the compatibility of Islam with liberal 
Europe would act similarly and say that European Islam still does not specify it clearly 
that such freedoms are guaranteed and Muslims are sexually free. Both sides tend to 
forget that ethical requirements bind all values in different ways, and one answer cannot 
be sufficient. It is unreasonableness to expect one answer to such issues. This said, I then 
make two inferences regarding this issue from European Islam perspectives as I have 
studied it in this work.  
One, European Islam has no central authority to tell Muslims that adultery, before 
or after marriage, is “ḥalāl/ permitted” simply because liberal laws do not generally 
criminalize it (while Muslim majority countries do, except Turkey that has repelled the 
law a few years ago to comply with EU standards).
1505
 Even if it had that central 
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 With the Arab Spring, the same issue is raised by some voices, as is the case with Morocco, to give one 
example. Some human rights activists demand the annulment of the law that criminalizes adultery as 
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authority, it might not allow it first because it stresses the aspect of personal 
responsibility and liberty without central tutelage, and second because the essence 
European Islam wants to keep is ethical (however broad and unclear the definition of 
ethics may be), and it considers the issue of sexual freedom a space for individual 
exertion and discipline, seeing that it always refers to divine attributes and prophetic 
teachings as models for self liberation, piety, and the preservation of family institution, 
among other virtues. Consequently, ethics require a high standard of commitment from 
the citizen, be him a believer or not, and when he enjoys freedom and quality such a 
commitment is tested. Accordingly, if a Muslim in Europe commits such an act, and he is 
still not criminalized by law, because liberty grants him such a right as long as it is 
practiced with the consent of the partner, it remains the role of his religious association/ 
community to punish him somehow to learn “a lesson,” but still without this causing the 
intervention of the state; i.e. such a punishment can be psychological, but not corporal or 
violent; it is only the state that has the right to legislate laws. European Islam does not 
want to be ghettoised nor does it want to be isolated from the wider secular society in 
terms of law. It refuses minority rights status. It seeks secularizing its laws, but in this 
case secular law does not provide any prohibition to the adulterers. Apart from the mild 
psychological punishment the community can show, it does not seem there are ample 
alternatives that address the issue apart from accepting it as a personal responsibility with 
the consequences that it may bring about (maybe losing the trust of the whole family 
forever, or living a psychological lifelong internal discomfort and feel of guilt, etc.).  
One might think of this first scenario/ inference: maybe the European Muslim 
believers, not necessarily from a ghetto perspective, can ask for the adoption of a mild 
law at the state level, and lobby for it to be accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims alike 
because it aims at preserving family ties especially for the adultery of married adults. If 
that is the case, it may no longer be seen a “pure Muslim issue.” It becomes the issue of a 
majority or all of society; if they support Muslims to lobby for it, then it is a public issue 
that enters the sphere of the Rawlsian concept of the political. If a doctrinal issue of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
practiced with consent among adults. See my “Morocco’s New Constitution and Individual Freedoms: 
What Future Scenarios?” 26 April 2012, available at http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022044 . 
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Muslims becomes so important to be addressed at the state level, then it means that others 
also share the concern. At that level, it is no longer an issue of a particular minority. 
However it may be solved, the way of raising the issue seems democratic. But since this 
scenario is far from being possible in the current socio-political context, the second major 
inference may provide further insights into the issue.  
Two, the second inference I make on the issue of sexual liberty is based on the 
principles of freedom and equality. It has been argued repeatedly that European Islam 
defends equality of genders and their liberty. It criticises, for instance, any patriarchal and 
sexist consideration of the body of women. It is against formalizing a decent attire of 
modesty; it allows each to dress the way he wishes. It invites man to overcome the image 
of looking at women only as a body but as a human being that is equal to man in rights 
and duties. The requirement is to elevate the understanding of human nature by elevating 
the old look at the roles of man and women (man works outside, woman works at home). 
Gradually, the argumentation can be pushed further by some and say that freedom and 
liberty allow one to explore the body as he wishes, especially that there is no legal 
prohibition at the state level that can prevent such a wish, as explained in the previous 
paragraphs. I have jumped over other details and possible scenarios to touch one major 
issue that has caused violence and even killings among some Muslim families in Europe.  
To link the issue to the scholars studied here, I refer to a story that Oubrou refers 
to in Profession imam. It is a real story of a young Muslim woman who is accused of 
having had a sexual affair outside marriage (before marriage). I develop details through 
assumptions that Oubrou and the lady do not make, to further explain the point. On her 
official marriage with a practicing Muslim young man, not the one she had slept with, the 
bridegroom discovers that his bride is not virgin. This same partner is Muslim and he 
loves her. The assumption is that she loves him too and there was no forced marriage; the 
assumption is also that he is either conservative or open but blinded by jealousy. 
Discovering she is not virgin in the wedding night, he makes a scandal, shames her in 
front of the guests and asks for divorce and the pay back of the wedding expenses. How 
would European Islam as I understand it consider such a case? Various answers can be 
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given: the young man is conservative, illiberal, blindly jealous, possessive, very rude to 
dishonour his wife in public; he is masculinist-sexist; he can never believe in freedom 
and equality, etc. As to the young woman, she may be described as follows. She is naȉve: 
having had an affair before marriage, why should she think that everyone else has an 
affair before marriage, too? She is honest: she could have restored her virginity, but she 
did not want to fool her husband; she is liberal; she is a light believer; liberal as she is, 
this does not mean she does not believe, or that she will be unfaithful to her husband after 
marriage, etc.
1506
 All these answers may turn into strong arguments for some believing 
citizens.  
For the case above, Oubrou says that if there is love and trust, the case could not 
have gone into that direction of public embarrassment of the lady and divorce. First, he 
says that virginity is not a condition in marriage in Islam. Very intimate matters are for 
the couple to discuss in private. Reciprocal agreement on marriage, free from family or 
community pressure, is the prime condition. Love, respect, trust, ethics, piety, to name 
but these, are emphasized values for the success of marriage. He condemns the behaviour 
of the bridegroom, and refuses judging the bride for what she might have committed 
before marriage, knowing in this case that the bride defended herself by saying that she 
lost her virginity when she was practicing some kind of sport that required a lot of 
movement. Whatever may be her explanation in this particular case, other cases are not 
always caused by sports incidents. Few young Muslim ladies were killed in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Italy because their parents or brothers found out they had affairs before 
marriage; more so, they found out they had affairs with non-Muslim men, which adds to 
the problem – bearing in mind that most classical jurisprudential opinions forbid a 
Muslim woman from marrying a non-Muslim man, let alone having a sexual affair with 
him outside marriage. The point here is that European Islam is against any violent 
intervention against the choices Muslims make, whatsoever these choices may be.
1507
 It 
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 I have avoided detailing a scenario of each of these possible answers. They can all make interesting 
cases to study more closely; yet, I narrow the scope to the point I select.  
1507
 Like adultery, this also applies to homosexuality, and apostasy for example. While apostasy is accepted 
as an expression of freedom of conscience, homosexuality is accepted as sometimes a natural inclination 
that the doctrine cannot accept but tolerate and help in finding solutions to, though “the idea of finding 
solutions to” can be refused by Muslim, and non-Muslim, homosexuals because they generally say they are 
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has both reclaimed the religious dictum that religion cannot be exercised by force (lā 
ikrāha fī addīn), and has also internalized the values of the basic structure of a liberal 
constitutional democracy, and cannot deride from them. What it does is that it gives its 
own solutions, basically ethical, to the problems that it cannot face or change from a legal 
perspective. It leaves to society and the individual a large space of manoeuvre, based on 
liberty, equality and piety.  
Example Two: Daily Prayers 
Traditionally, a Muslim is not expected to rationalize the daily duty of the five 
prayers, the second pillar of Islam after the profession of Shahada/ Testimony. It is a 
daily duty that is expected to be carried out with utmost devotion and spirituality. 
Spiritual discipline and humility teachings that it is replete with aside, there is no 
classical agreement on the meanings of its ritualist gestures and timings. As a discipline, 
some say, there is no need to seek meanings in the gestures as such. They are not the end, 
but the means to an end, being closer to God, spiritually faithful, and what all that 
requires. Many reformists as well as conservative scholars have always been critical of 
unreflective rituals. This does not mean they asked for freezing it or cancelling it. They 
just ask the individual believer to accompany his ritual duties with internal spiritual 
elevation that and good action. So, European Islam may actually be seen as bringing 
nothing exceptionally new on the matter. It is just stressing something that is already 
existent in the tradition. Still, what is new is the context in which such a call for 
individual involvement is underlined. While a believer in a Muslim majority country may 
not have the chance to reflect upon rituals because he is born in a Muslim family and 
surrounded by a practicing community, with the pressure it may have on him to practice 
too, a European Muslim – the European  Muslim seems free from the community and 
state pressure to practice a pillar-ritual without free will and reflection. This may not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fine they way they are; it is not an illness, but a natural inclination; it is divinely chosen; they believe; they 
are not abnormal in that sense. 
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seem something special, but the European Muslim feels its exceptionalism, because the 
context both invites him and pushes him to reflect on what he does.
1508
  
What I want to reach here is first the contextualization of the issue of prayers 
from the political practice which has also contributed to discussing the place of this ritual 
in the modern times and societies. It should be remembered that Bidar found it very 
difficult to pray while a student of philosophy in ENS of Paris, because the context made 
it hard for him. This has contributed to reflecting fundamentally on the place of rituals in 
general. Other ordinary Muslims ask the imam-theologiam Oubrou for issues about the 
prayer, too. The same applies to Ramadan to a large extent. It is then a ritual worth 
referring to.  
The conceptualized European Islam seems resistant to giving in to the political 
dictates of a society, dictates that may be unfair to a religious minority. I see two major 
issues with the example of prayers, issues represented by two major types of Muslim 
believes: 1) a practicing Muslim who wants to observe the exact timings of the prayer, 2) 
and a Muslim believer who wants to practice this ritual but on his own way; he may call 
himself liberal, or secular, or open; he does not deny the place of the prayer in religion, 
but deals with it in his own fashion. The first case may be more complicated politically, 
and the second one theologically, to use the terms in their commonly understood way in 
this clarification. They certainly intertwine. I say few words on the political complication, 
because I deal with both cases more theoretically-theologically afterwards, following 
European Islam framework as conceptualized here. 
 The current liberal societies of Europe allow Muslims their right of prayer and in 
most cases allow them to have their worship rituals in worship places – though 
sometimes these worship rituals are considered associations and not clearly defined as 
mosques, besides some mosques that are designed as official and have relations with the 
state to facilitate understanding between the religious community needs and the state. 
Some public and private administrations even allocate some space of rituals for religious 
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 The principles of rationalization and majority of the essence of modernity in Abdurrahmanʼs 
framework should be remembered here, Section 2c, Part IV.  
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people, which is mostly attended by Muslims. Sometimes such ritual places are called 
spiritual space or contemplation space, and are for all religions; but since some Muslims 
tend to be more practicing, they are the ones who frequent them most. Availability of 
worship space aside, there is the other side of the story. Sometimes, Muslims are not 
allowed to pray at work because that would disrupt the chained work, say, of the 
company that manufactures cars. Still, a devout practicing Muslim who cares about the 
exact timing of prayers would try to use the lunch break for example to pray in his office, 
or in some corner in the company where he finds some privacy for few minutes. In worst 
cases, the manager would say any visibility of difference and religiosity is not allowed in 
the company because it is a secular space even when the worker uses his own lunch time 
to pray, instead of asking for few minutes more or replacement of those prayers times 
with extra-work. Such a ban does not appear democratic to the Muslim citizen. A secular 
worker can smoke in his break time or lunch time, and even may have bear or wine 
during his lunch break. Beer or wine, the manager or this worker may argue, are not 
religious signs, so they are allowed. The Muslim worker would still defend his case and 
say that even if it may be a non-religious sign (though the Catholic Christians, for 
instance, do consider wine as blood of Jesus Christ, thus a religious sign), it still 
advantages a worker over another; it advantages a moral-philosophic doctrine, secularism 
or atheism in the case of the worker who drinks, over a religious doctrine, Islam in the 
case of the worker who prays.  
This noted, I return to infer how the political and theological, in Rawlsian-
European Islam, intertwine and respond to the role and place of this ritual in liberal 
context. First, from the Rawlsian political perspective, the Muslim should be allowed to 
pray at work, preferably in a space devoted for that. At the same time, the political has no 
right to intervene and force a particular interpretation on such a vital ritual for the 
believer. He cannot be asked by the state to reduce his prayers time, shorten their 
frequency, or annul them as irrelevant or irrational. At the same time, reasonableness 
expects that citizens-believers have partial, in case of not full, rational justifications for 
the attachement to a particular doctrinal ritual like prayers. That is, besides the purely 
doctrinal justification, there should be another level of justification that makes this 
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practice reasonably acceptable in the public domain which is shared by other citizens of 
different faiths and moral doctrines. A full comprehensive doctrine is expected to have 
various justifications of its belief system, and Islam, in my study, provides such 
justifications. European Islam is aware of this, and it faces it. It is only the internal debate 
within the doctrine that can enter into justifications of this type. So, the external factors 
directly or indirectly intervene in re-visiting the role and place of the ritual that is 
supposed to be most private in relation with the public domain. Again, a doctrine like 
Islam claims comprehensiveness, thus able to face these challenges. European Islam 
brings to the surface some of these arguments, because the context prioritizes them.  
The pillar of prayers retains its fundamental space in the versions of European 
Islam studied here despite the nuances that characterizes each approach. What they share 
is the disciplinary role it has on the conduct of the behaviour and how it answers the daily 
existential needs of the believer. I make inferences of how it is conceived based on my 
framework of the rationalization of revelation as it corresponds to the individual axis, and 
also based on the previous three notes I made above on this axis (reason, ethics, and 
liberty).  
One, it should be clear by now that the rationalization of religion does not mean 
the full annulment of the rituals that on the surface seem irrational. It is a point similar to 
the idea of man as an heir of God, but the heir does not need to kill God to place himself 
at an influential agent in the universe. By rationalization is meant reclaiming emphasis on 
the reflective aspect that is required to understand the divine and one’s place in the world. 
By reflection and reading the message of religion in its entirety, one can reach rational 
significances of rituals that may look irrational. The basis of this rationalization makes 
the other point: ethics.  
Two, reason is understood as ethical in its essence, for whatever God offers man 
is ethical and sacred in essence; reason is sacred, too. As to what it leads or brings about, 
that is left to the other point man is endowed with, liberty. I say first more on the ethical 
with reference to the concept of Testimony/ Shahada, as emphasized by all the studied 
scholars. The concept of Shahada is the basic thought they see vital in any ritual. The aim 
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is to testify to one’s witness to the divine as it is present in the human, and how the 
human presents the divine in his thoughts and in his deeds. Shahada testifies to the 
sacredness of man, and to the humanization of the divine message; they are for each 
other, and the source of this intertwinement is the reading of the physical and 
metaphysical as both sacred and complementary to each other – as is advanced on the 
worl d axis. So, however rational the advancement is made here, remembering the divine 
remains vital, as a way of controlling reasoning consequences. Remembrance (or zikr), as 
Bidar considers it, is an act of gratitude to the infinite creativity taught to man through the 
attributes of the divine. Nevertheless, reasoning and ethicizing rituals cannot achieve its 
ends if the concerned individual is not free.  
Three, liberty is essential in understanding the religious message. The ritual, when 
practiced free from the community pressure seems more meaningful, since it reflects the 
individual’s rationalization process that might have allowed him to endorse certain 
doctrinal practices as he wishes them, thus the development of Self Islam, to use Bidar’s 
term. When such a reflective process is gone through some rituals risk losing their 
traditional place among believers, and the call to reforming them becomes controversial. 
That is the reason why scholars from within speak of intention and remembrance as 
fundamental, otherwise the reform called for is not sincere but a mere political-
ideological invitation. To cite examples, Ramadan does not go so  far as to say that even 
the rituals are negotiable; even in his Radical Reform that is innovative on the 
jurisprudential level, it does not seem so on the worship level. Ramadan retains the role 
of remembrance through the ritual as fundamental for ethical behavior. Oubrou, as an 
imam, is asked whether it is acceptable to pray just as much as one could, and not 
necessarily following the exact number and timings of the ritual. He shows more 
flexibility on the matter, believing that to pray less or not on due time is better than not to 
pray at all. As to Bidar, he goes further and revises even the worship rituals, and says 
they are negotiable, the way religious law is. Because he spiritualizes everything (space, 
time, action, speech, food, etc.), he sees no difference between the prayer and good 
speech, good behaviour, and so on. He mostly takes the individuality of the act of prayer 
beyond the gesture itself, and centralizes its meaning. The way a believer kneels (sujūd), 
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for example, is considered the most intimate moment of communication with the divine; 
symbolically, it reminds man of his embryonic stage, of the moment when he was in the 
matrix (raḥim, womb) of the divine (arraḥmān, the Merciful). Prayers are strong 
moments of renewing this tie with the divine.  
Henceforth, since the human act is invited to be divine through sincere intent, 
then any act is a prayer, be it ritualized or not. However centered it may seem on the 
individual, it actually reaches out to include its impact on one’s behaviour with the 
others, all others, and not only the co-religionists. The ritual then moves from being 
individualist to being an individual act destined to the flourishing of the public, too. That 
is why European Islam mostly emphasizes its ethical dimensions that are reached by high 
reflection, more than on mere rituals, though the frequentation of the ritual, however 
unreflective it may be in the beginning, aims at reaching that elevated reflection level. It 
aims at making the divine present in human presence and existence, hence the meaning of 
Testimony. In its overall perception, European Islam allows the believer space of 
considerations of rituals according to one’s spirituality level and capacities.  
Rationalization ethicizes rituals, and rituals in turn ethicize rationalization. In this circle, 
rationalization cannot be but ethical.
1509
  
Example Three: Eid al-Aḍḥā Sacrifice (Bairam)  
However, if another example is taken, the political intervenes. The Muslim 
observer offers a yearly sacrifice of Bairam (Eid al-Aḍḥā): he slaughters a ram for 
instance.  It is not an obligation, but a confirmed sunna of the Prophet; if one does not do 
it, it is not ḥarām to miss, though it has historically become part of the rituals. In Europe, 
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 There is another point one can infer from European Islam. It concerns the ablution (al wudū’), i.e. 
cleaning one’s body parts (the facial and intimate parts) before prayers. I can say that especially in Bidar’s 
case, it could be enough that the believer is clean to pray, as to going through the exact washing rituals is 
not necessary. The idea is to be clean. To return to Oubrou who aims at facilitating religious practice, it 
could be easier for believers at work to pray without going through the exact washing rituals. Still, not all 
European public bathrooms offer the facility of access to water in the bathroom to wash one’s sensitive 
parts, instead of just cleaning with hygienic paper. For a number of Muslims “squat toilets” are more 
comfortable.  That encouraged some Muslims in the UK, for instance, to demand adequate architectural 
facilities that accommodate also Muslims. See, Iqbal Akm, dir., “Muslims in the Work Place: A Good Practice 
Guide for Employers and Employees,” Stradford: The Muslim Council of Britian, 2005, 16, 23. 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/faith/approved.pdf  
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and a number of Islamic majority countries’ big cities, the believer is not allowed to 
slaughter the ram at home, or in the garden that is inside the city, visible to the public, for 
instance, for 1) ethical reasons (animal rights against torture in slaughtering; preference is 
to electronic shock first), 2) timing reasons (Muslim’s cannot all be given holidays on 
this day, or make it a national holiday for all), 3)  hygienic reasons (blood in the public 
sphere), to name these three main reasons. European Islam takes these law requirements 
into account: the believer is not asked to stop practicing the ritual once and for all in its 
common old form.  
European Islam can advance three views to answer the three challenges above. 
First, the Eid, besides the sacrifice, is also composed of communal prayers observed 
before midday, and only afterwards the sacrifice can be slaughtered and considered 
religiously acceptable. That is, the believer has a part of the ritual already observed by 
observing the collective prayer of the Eid, and thus his intention of remembering 
Abraham and Muhammad’s rituals cannot be denied. Second, the sacrifice timing, if 
space and hygiene conditions are secured, goes up to the third day of the celebration, 
which allows the believer enough time to arrange his work schedule and holidays 
accordingly, if he is so meticulous about the sacrifice ritual. Thus, the Eid day is not 
limited to the first day only; the sacrifice is considered sacred even if it is slaughtered on 
the second or third day after its official start. Third, the believer can buy the sacrifice and 
leave it in the slaughterhouse, which does the rest of the job for both ethical and hygienic 
reasons. This is different from doing it at home, which is psychologically more religious 
for the believer. However, amidst these choices and prescriptions, the believer may even 
take another direction of thinking, which European Islam encourages: the believer can 
give that sacrifice as a financial support to the needy; as a replacement of slaughtering, 
the believer still shows his ritualistic discipline and attachment to God but in a different 
way that could be more helpful to others, from social justice point of view. Such a 
believer would from within his own interaction with his doctrine thinks that God does not 
need man’s sacrifice to show belief; rather, He may be more pleased to see people 
helping each other. This reasoning is done by the believer and his community, and not by 
the political system which should not intervene directly in forcing such a re-
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interpretation, though, as Rawls notes, doctrines are sometimes required to change 
fundamentally with time to be political in the way he envisages it.   
Society Axis – Historicization of Revelation  
 I have argued that European Islam historicizes revelation through pragmatically 
interpreting the sources of jurisprudence (fighology), and the adoption of the universality 
principle for social wellbeing, and its pillars of extensibility and generality. European 
Islam consequently shoulders man with the responsibility of interpreting the prescribed 
laws in the sacred texts according to human society’s needs. That is, fiqh law is for this 
world, and not for the divine satisfaction at the metaphysical world. Practical fiqh, or 
fiqhology, needs to be constantly revised to match the divine universal message for 
perpetual peace and social justice, based on the principle of equality. 
The historicization of revelation perpetuates in time and space the broad ethical 
lines of revelation without freezing them in a particular historical period of time as that of 
the 7
th
 century Arabia. Though revelation is sacred, its prescriptions for social affairs are 
bracketed as historical. This allows for perpetual modernization of these prescriptions – 
in the sense of updating them according to societal needs and changes. Revelation 
prescriptions, referred to as Sharia Law, are not belittled as backward, but as relevant for 
a particular context in particular times. Having passed their times, these prescriptions are 
now interpreted in light of the general message of revelation, which is social justice and 
social wellbeing. The clear revealed prescriptions (like the penal code and inheritance 
division) are studied as sources of ethical reasoning in re-reading revelation and its 
relevance for social affairs. Law as prescribed by revelation is no longer considered the 
ultimate version of the translation of revelation into positive law. Rather, it is the intent of 
revelation that is mostly searched for as the rationale behind these prescriptions, and 
based on this intent, new, more adequate, laws can be envisaged. Laws as prescribed by 
modern needs are thus not rejected just because they are man-made.  
Laws that serve the material common good renders spiritual satisfaction to the 
consumer whose inner side is not in conflict with its outside, seeing that the common 
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good that modern laws secure do elevate the threshold of needs of man from a stage of an 
“individual in society” to a “human being in the global society” where the other is not 
forgotten while working out ways of preserving the common good. The principle of 
universality in this level does not only capture the un-material needs of the human being, 
but also captures the material and un-material needs of the other as well. What this means 
is that the principle of equality becomes vital in reading revelation for social wellbeing 
and for the universal society. Having re-outlined these theological interpretations of 
European Islam, what are then their clear political implications in the Rawlsian 
framework? On society axis I also underline three major points that I see European Islam 
has developed for political stability, in light of Rawls’ framework.  
One, the universality and eternity of the divine message cannot be a fixed 
constitution for changing societies. The historicization of revelation makes the realization 
of the Islamic ideal of social justice applicable under any framework that supports it. The 
idea of the Islamic state is taken to mean the ideals of Islam and how they find their way 
institutionally to realization. The Islamic message is rooted out of its classical spacial and 
temporal circumstances and implanted in the context of modernity. What this means for 
European Islam is that the constitutional state as developed in modern liberal societies 
does not conflict with the general ideals of Islam. On the contrary, the constitutional state 
prescribes duties and rights for all, which is a preliminary requisite for the flourishing of 
the idea of social justice. The Quran is not the equivalent of the Constitution in the 
modern sense of the term. If it is taken to be so, then it is no longer valid for this age. But 
it is still considered valid for the core moral ideals it calls for, and social justice is 
considered its core message when a community of peoples is involved. To refer again to 
the studied scholars, Ramadan, for instance, speaks of five core rights which the liberal 
constitutional state guarantees for Muslims, which makes it [the state] part of their belief 
as he does later in Radical Reform idea of Two Books.
1510
 As to Oubrou, he speaks of 
geotheology approach (a theology bound to the specificities of a particular political 
                                                          
1510
 These five rights are: the right to practice Islam, the right to knowledge, the right to found 
organizations, the right to autonomous representation, and the right to appeal to law. Ramadan also expands 
the classical five universal principles (maṣaliḥ or kulliyāt: the preservation of life, religion, mind, honour, 
and wealth) to include all the major rights defended by human rights international conventions. From these 
five he sketches a list of forty-one right or public good. See Section 2b, Part II.  
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geography) in which he considers the context a way of fathoming pluralism within Islam. 
A European Islam, or a French Islam, is the result of his approach.  
Two, the best system of social justice is the most adequate for the divine social 
message. The historicist approach to revelation requires that the best achieved human 
system is the one that should replace the historically unfit prescriptions of revelation. The 
classic “public good” and “objectives of the Sharia” as insisted on by Islamic 
jurisprudence throughout the centuries is read accordingly. Fiqh law is read as contextual, 
positive, an answer to the ideals of religion at a certain point of time. Now that the 
modern man has realized the value of equality of all, despite religion, colour, race, or 
gender difference, and that this gives more dignity to the individual, then that is 
considered more able now to give credit to the idea of justice than any earlier 
interpretation. Social justice cannot be materialized if inequality among human beings is 
not first established. The principle of equality, then, becomes central in practical fiqh. 
Recalling some views of the studied scholars is helpful here. 
Ramadan’s endorsement of equality principle is repeatedly emphasized. For 
example, while he considers all citizens equal before the law, for the case of inheritance 
law which is clearly divided in the revealed text and in most cases favours man to 
woman, he suggests preliminary to use state institutions to balance the difference in 
portion, taking into account the financial situation of both sides, for the sake of arriving at 
a more just division. He also calls for the moratorium/ freezing of the Islamic penal code 
till a more updated revisit and re-interpretation of these laws is carried out. He refers to 
these as proposals from his own readings, and calls for more discussions on his project to 
reach more updated interpretations that could be agreed upon by more scholars working 
in the field (“scholars of text” and “scholars of context,” as he calls them).1511  
As to Oubrou, he aims at fusing religious and secular law into one through secular 
theology. His views on marriage as a civil act, and not religious in the narrow sense of 
the term, is one example. He makes registration of marriage obligatory first in the civil 
                                                          
1511
 I do not need to note again that this brought his immense criticism especially among the French 
secularists and media predators. See Part II devoted to his work.  
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secular marriages office to secure that especially women are not mistreated and are 
financially not the losers in cases of divorce, for instance, if marriage is registered only in 
religious offices/ courts where law is still conservative and lags behind the equality 
principle. Moreover, his considerations of ḥalāl food for ethical and hygienic reasons, 
instead of being limited to being simply religious or Islamic, are also examples, among 
others, that endorse his project of secularizing theology, through fusing laws, always 
bearing in mind the ethical-spiritual dimensions in his approach. His approach of Sharia 
of the minority and relativization of Sharia by means of various types of fatwas explain 
the point further. That is, he treats religious cases on individual bases, and issues fatwas 
to the believer who consults him in a way that is very close or compatible with the 
French/ European laws. The case of the hijjab law is one example: he asks Muslim veiled 
women to uncover themselves in public institutions as law requires in France for 
instance. Believers, who have problems with prayers time at work, if there is no way to 
carry out this religious duty, can be postponed till one is at home. Similar facilitation of 
religious practice is left to the individual and his discipline and spirituality levels, not 
forcing them on him nor asking him to cancel them all if part of them is not properly 
observed for some reasons. This is more of an issue at the individual axis but it still has 
impacts of the social axis examined here. The idea is to allow the individual space for 
agency even with the worship rituals which have classically been considered 
unchangeable. The community is not allowed to pressure the individual in his profession 
of faith.  
Regarding Bidar, he defends the idea that modernity three major values (liberty, 
equality and fraternity) are part of the sacred, and are part of the modern rational faith he 
envisages more able to render justice to the Islamic message. What religion adds to these 
values is more fidelity to them, without thought of the material gain behind them. 
Attachment to these values, according to Bidar, has to stem from a deep love of the 
divine, a love that has to be seen in one’s behaviour with the other in society. Compared 
to social injustice lived in most Islamic majority countries, these scholars see in the 
constitutional liberal democracies more adequate political systems that cater most for 
human dignity and equality among citizens, despite their religious, moral and philosophic 
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differences. They go so far as to say that European Islam can be an example for reform in 
the Islamic majority countries.  
Three, beliefs require adaptation to the historicization of social values. European 
Islam recognizes the universality of modern values and how they permeate all political - 
and non-political - sectors of life. It also recognizes that these values, however great they 
are, do not need to be de-divinized to be political. The horizons of reasoning are 
expanded so as to give space to as many religious perspectives as possible, as long as 
they do not threaten peace and justice. Spiritual modernity or second modernity – to use 
Abdurrahmane’s terms – impact the individual’s psychology and morality and can 
sharpen his senses of moral obligations that further his citizenship responsibilities and 
loyalty to the social contract enshrined in the democratic constitution of the modern 
liberal state. That is, the values of modernity are considered a sacred will and part of the 
religious sector. The mundane-secular world is emphasized as the true space where the 
divine should be lived, with full engagement from the believing citizen. Other religions 
and varieties of moral and philosophical worldviews are treated equally politically 
(legally), though, like any other doctrine, European Islam generally still keeps the idea of 
considering itself the seal of the chain of revelations, though in a more demure and 
modest way.  
Plainly put, the shared space where modernity values permeate are not a land of 
war or haram, as are considered by some conservatives, but are a potential space for 
ethical agency and spirituality that are not defined simply by the outer rituals. The liberal 
Western Europe is not an isolated geography that is “godless” – as Ramadan looked at it 
in his earlier writings, an attitude he changed later with Radical Reform. The same 
applies to Oubrou who belonged to the conservative Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, and 
Bidar who had to go through immense internal dilemmas and intellectual endeavours 
before finding God also in Europe. Such a consideration of Europe as a spiritual space 
allows the Muslim citizen to overcome the binary division of Europe versus Islam that 
various factors have contributed to. The affirmation of the idea that Islam is at home (or 
inlandish) impacts the believer-citizen’s psychology and makes him embrace the political 
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system as part of his duty and space of agency. This can impact fundamentally the 
political participation and the feel of belonging that the early generation of immigrants 
lacked because they mostly considered themselves guests and Islam “an alien” to this 
land (or outlandish).  
Example One: Jihad  
Jihad may be a suitable example for the historicization of revelation prescriptions 
as society axis demands. European Islam historicizes the concept of jihad which affects 
fundamentally the classical/ medievalist geographical divisions as well as the idea of 
daʻwa or proselitization. It is by now evident enough that one of the main definitions 
given to it is “self-ijtihad,” “self-exertion,” to do good and be pious; so the struggle is 
internal to cultivate goodness. There seems no problem with this in a constitutionally 
liberal society. The problem remains to be examined when the term denotes “war against 
the infidels.” I focus on this controversial issue. European Islam does not consider 
Europe a land of infidels, which means that the concept of jihad takes other meanings. 
Accordingly, and deductively, I condense the way it is considered in four major options.  
One, jihad was divinely allowed, and is still so, only in the case of defence, never 
for justifying a war without being first assaulted against. It is only in such a case that a 
modern democratic state is allowed to defend itself. Still, this does not happen at random. 
It is not the concern of any one religious minority; religious leaders are not allowed to 
issue a fatwa to declare jihad in a constitutional democratic state. There are standards to 
meet. The issue has to go through a national debate in the House of Representatives, for 
example, and the international community has to show democratic support of it as a 
legitimate reply of self-defence. When this is done, then the defensive war can still be 
called jihad among Muslims –if they want to- but speaking state-wide, it is a war of 
defense of the whole pluralist society that has taken the decision (through the Parliament) 
to defend itself. Each doctrine can contribute to the debate in Parliament and through 
civil society from its own doctrinal perspective, but the framework of this debate is the 
political framework as has been described in Rawls work. Such a defence war then, 
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whatever justification it may internally have, is political, and the Muslims have no right 
to call it jihad when it represents diverse reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  
Two, traditionally, a Muslim citizen should not go into a war in which the 
adversary is Muslim or is composed of Muslim troops, for a Muslim should not fight a 
Muslim. This traditional view is problematic from European Islam perspectives, in the 
Rawlsian framework. It is problematic for many reasons. I cite some prominent ones. 
First, following the previous point, the war is gone into only in the case of defense. This 
means that the other side is “wrong” anyway in their attack. So, fighting them back is 
legitimate, whatever their religion or moral doctrine may be. Injustice has to be fought. 
Second, when the collective decision is taken in Parliament to defend the country (where 
social justice reigns), such a decision is not based on religious reasoning alone nor does it 
concern only the sensitivities of particular minorities and doctrines that contribute to the 
debate and the decision. It is a decision taken by all, and has to be assumed by all – or at 
least the majority, which is assumed to be a just majority. It is a political decision, not 
doctrinal. So, when invited to go to war to defend the country, the Muslim citizen cannot 
withdraw from his task, otherwise the social justice that both his religious doctrine and 
the political system he belongs to fall down and give raise to injustice, which is contrary 
to the sources of his ideals, political and doctrinal. Even abstaining from war in this case, 
and using “conscienscious objection” is unjustified. Third, in the battlefield, there are 
rules of good behaviour towards the enemy, be him Muslim or not. Fundamentally, the 
Muslim soldier has to remember that European Islam teaches him to consider everyone 
free and equal, and he should not be biased in showing morality and care for the enemy 
just because he is Muslim. Before facing him in the battlefield, there preceded 
negotiations and calls for peace, and war is the last option.  
Three, one of the classical and conservative ideas on jihad is that it is to expand 
religion and the land of Islam; if the new lands do not accept to convert, then they pay 
taxes (known as jizya) for protection by the Muslim army, not to mention other details. 
European Islam replies to this perspective as follows. First, Europe is already a land of 
Islam. Muslims have fundamental rights to exercise their religion freely. Even the 
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Muslim majority countries cannot be called Islamic lands in the classical sense of the 
term, because religious law is not fully practiced there for political reasons and socio-
cultural transformations in these societies. Moreover, religion is not about land but about 
the person, and in Europe citizens as persons have the right to be Muslim if they want to. 
Islam is everywhere and no longer needs jihad to make people hear about it. Second, a 
liberal constitutional democracy does not go into war to force people to convert to a 
religion or its doctrine of the good. Freedom and equality are essential values that do not 
allow such a perception of religion or communication with others who do not share the 
same doctrine. Toleration of difference is fundamental in a liberal society.  
Four, and more importantly, the state is secular in the sense that it believes in no 
one perfect religion that protects all reasonable comprehensive doctrines of the plural 
society.
1512
 So, it can never choose to defend and expand one religion (Islam in this case) 
and opt for waging wars to expand it. Other reasonable comprehensive doctrines cannot 
accept this; otherwise they withdraw from the social contract of the political to which 
they contribute equally. The secular state allows religions to flourish: to have their 
associations, worship space, and to discuss in public issues related to their internal 
doctrines and those related to the shared political. They can even practice proselitization 
as long as there is no discriminatory note in it, or call for violence, or hatred for the other 
citizens that hold different views of the same religion or of another religion. 
Proselitization here is canonized; believers can speak of their religion, as do political 
practices speak of their agendas for example. There should be no hidden agenda to 
overthrow the social contract, i.e. the basic structure of the well ordered society. Overall, 
a society with these beliefs and practices cannot aspire to endorse a jihadist perspective 
that contradicts all these values. Loyalty is to the political as a fair system of cooperation 
based on justice as fairness.  
                                                          
1512
 I am bracketing the critique that the fact that the state is secular means that the secular moral doctrine is 
preferred and has advantage over any religious doctrine. That is a reasonable critique and has to be taken 
into account for stability reasons. That is why overlapping consensus should be taken seriously by 
religious, moral and philosophical doctrines. Only when it is considered seriously could citizens of 
different doctrines find that the state is secular in a really neutral sense, and not secular in a biased sense. 
By bias is meant the version of extreme or radical secularism that considers the world secular by default, an 
attitude that is (nearly) atheist. It wishes that religion disappears in time as it keeps modernizing and 
liberalizing.   
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Example Two: Gender Equality  
A number of other examples can be examined on the social axis. For brevity, I put 
some of them in one example under the label of “gender equality.” The controversial 
legal issues that can go under the label are as follows: polygamy, inheritance law, 
testimony of women, and the place of non-Muslims. Homosexuality and apostasy can 
partially be considered within the scope of “gender equality” though they are certainly 
examples of liberty of conscience that adequately fit in the individual axis premise. Each 
case can be examined differently, but the general argumentation falls within the same 
general framework as conceptualized by European Islam. So, I focus on the example of 
polygamy, and from it inferences could be made to match the argumentation that could 
be developed for the other examples. Besides, in earlier sections I already referred to 
some of these examples. The structure as envisioned by society axis in light of European 
Islam and Rawls’ concept of the political and overlapping consensus was broadly 
summarized above as follows: 1) the universality and eternity of the divine message 
cannot be a fixed constitution; 2) the best system of social justice is the most adequate for 
the divine message; 3) the ahistoricization of belief requires adaptation to the 
historicization of values. This structure is rooted in the idea of historicization of 
revelation. To clarify further my point, I re-read the above example issues with reference 
to three principles: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These three liberties are universal, but 
they had been appropriated by Euro-modernity to the extent that non-European traditions 
have had issues using them again, for fear of misunderstandings. Still, as was seen in 
earlier parts of this work, Europe Islam uses these values and fills them in with Islamic-
spiritual values that the religious general message embraces. This to say that I use these 
three values as I have re-read them in conceptualizing European Islam (for more revise, 
Section 1b-c, Part IV).  
One, liberty of the individual is theologically granted, according to European 
Islam. God does not want slaves. He created free heirs, imbued their souls with his 
attributes, referred to in summary as “divine ethics” or “divine standars of action,” and 
allowed them responsible use of reasoning capacity. This theological understanding 
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entails that revealed prescriptions, if they are truly ahistorical, cannot be a fixed 
constitution for believers. Modern constitutions then, though human-made, allow ample 
space to consider the presence of the divine. Further than that, modernity itself is 
considered a sacred event that religions needed to elevate their understanding of man and 
the place of the divine. Added to this that Self Islam centralizes the revealed verse of no 
compulsion in religion; there is no faith without liberty. (I referred earlier to two 
examples on practicing religion on individual axes: sexual liberty, and the daily prayers; 
they give a clearer idea, I think, of the way this value is considered in European Islam. It 
is a liberty that does not deny the divine, but seeks it.) 
Henceforth, from European Islam perspectives a believer may advance the right 
of polygamy on the European soil. (I bracket for a while equality principle to answer such 
a proposal.) A believer can say that since liberty is so sacred in liberal constitutions, to 
the extent that adultery and sexual liberty are not punishable, so what does prevent 
polygamy from being allowed legally, too? The believer can advance enough arguments 
to defend his case. For example, 1) he may say that polygamy is based on the liberal idea 
of personal choice and maturity; 2) the first, second, or even third wife gives her consent 
to her husband to marry another wife; 3) the first wife makes an educated choice: as a 
citizen of Europe, she has a minimum educational level until the age of 15 or 16 as law 
requires, so she is aware of a minimum list of rights and duties to make a judgement; 4) 
his financial situation is good, and so is the situation his first and other potential wives, 
which means that they will not suffer with him financially, and cannot be a burden on the 
welfare state; 5) because he is a pious Muslim, he prefers to have legal wives than to have 
mistresses who may live with him for years and at the end he leaves them without having 
a stable life, possibly burdened with kids without financial support; the wife that agrees 
and the potential second or third wife may also be pious and prefers a man who marries 
on her legally than someone who cheats on her. 
 Such arguments are sometimes heard of among conservative believers as well as 
some young Muslims born in Europe. Such arguments are not based on the historical 
argument that the prophet allowed controlled polygamy (maximum four, with conditions 
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of consent, financial ability, and in cases of war in which more men die and more women 
are left widows without a breadwinner, and so on). These arguments above use the 
concept of liberty to argue for the permission of polygamy so that it is both legal and 
spiritually acceptable. The secular and atheist argument may seem week if the value of 
equality is bracketed. Considering the bracketed value of equality, their simple refusal of 
polygamy, while they allow sexual liberty and adultery at least from a legal perspective 
and not the moralist one, could be seen by the believer as unfair; the state secularism on 
the whole could be considered biased to the  side of the secularist. So, to push the 
argument further, the conservative believers would like to change the law once they 
become an electoral majority. That is what scares the secularists-liberals on the ground. It 
is here that I see European Islam able to address the issue differently, thus avoiding being 
on the conservative believer’s side or the secularist’s side. This leads to the second value 
of equality.  
Two, European Islam takes the liberal constitution as part of its doctrine, despite 
some of the laws that are not substantially compatible with the religious doctrine, even in 
its utmost reformist forms. Three main reasons can be considered, among others, in 
defending the equality value from European Islam perspectives. First, there is no 
difference between man and woman at the ontological level, at the creation period. There 
is no Quranic verse that elevates man over woman in terms of humanity or creation. The 
difference is on piety, which a woman can nourish more than a man, and vice verse. The 
inequality clearly stated in the Quran concerns, on all cases, the social affairs only: 
inheritance, family responsibilities, giving testimony in the court, and polygamy. 
European Islam is of the opinion that the mistake Muslim legalists  have made is that they 
based their judgements on the revealed prescriptions on the social affairs, which are 
historically unequal, instead of centralizing the equality status found in the Quran at the 
level and moment of creation. European Islam historicizes the Quranic prescriptions on 
social affairs, which are considered to answer the 7
th
 century Arabian society, and are 
thus adjustable, in light of the ontological equality the Quran reveals. Second, European 
Islam defends the ideal marriage as the source of a stable and natural family life, 
composed of a wife and a husband. For instance, Ramadan quotes the revelation verse 
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where it is stated that a husband can never be just among his wives even if he wishes to, 
and the best for him is to have just one wife. Third, as a loyal citizen to the liberal 
constitutional state, a Muslim man has to abide by the dictates of law, which decree that 
polygamy is illegal. The law is no longer considered un-Islamic (since revelation is 
historicized and any law is now reasoned about), thus possible to manoeuvre or refute 
once the power weight is on the side of the Muslims. Equality is a fundamental value in 
the political well-ordered society, and without it justice as fairness, which assumably 
Islam also defends, is impossible.  
As to the evident conflict of the value of liberty in the liberal constitution (which 
allows sexual liberty)
1513
 with the value of equality (which disadvantages the polygamous 
over the, say, atheist and secularist equality advocates) in this issue, European Islam, in 
light of Rawls’ overlapping consensus framework, advocates first and foremost an 
internal debate over this possible contradiction, taking into account theological and 
political circumstances. European Islam assumes that a believer who internalizes the idea 
of liberty as well as equality as the divine calls for them cannot bring about 
contradictions of values that are unsolvable. I explained this above. The additional point I 
want to make is related to the state intervention in the cases of conflicting values. I gave a 
similar argumentation when discussing sexual liberty on the individual axis.  The point 
can be explained as below.  
The assumption is that a good number of Muslim practicing believers internalize 
the value of liberty and equality to a large extent, and still stick to the right of polygamy 
as long as there is the right to sexual liberty even among adults who are married in an 
extra-marital affair. These believers want to exercise the right of sexual joy but legally 
and piously. Suppose also that there is no war in which more men are lost, and they can 
                                                          
1513
 Following the assumptions and scenarios formed here, there is no need to say that not every liberal is 
necessarily open to sexual liberty, be him an atheist liberal or a liberal who believes in  some religion, be it 
divine or not. The fact that liberal societies allow sexual liberty legally does not necessarily mean that 
every liberal is open to it; he may either abstain from enjoying this unpunishable “liberal right” outside 
marriage or refrain from condemning his society that practices it; he may be indifferent to it; his concerns 
with liberty may go beyond the various discourses on the body. This is to say that liberty does not 
necessarily bind itself to sexual liberty by default. I have opted for centralizing the controvertial issue of 
sexual liberty in this regard because it is related to polygamy as a possible expression of sexual freedom 
within legal boundaries of the liberal political society. 
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thus have an extra excuse. Psychological analysis can still illustrate that wives married to 
one man do not feel happy, and that he can never be just with them, even when he is a 
good and rich person. The polygamous citizen would use the same arguments about the 
allowed sexual liberty as a right: he would say, for example, that adultery is a treason, 
immoral, damages family values, increases divorce rate, impacts children life, and affects 
the way human beings speak of justice, fidelity, love, and sincerity. These are very strong 
arguments from the polygamous side. Even saying polygamy is against the great value of 
equality may not be enough at all. The assumption can further be that these are already 
known by all the people involved and society at large, yet the call to allow polygamy 
persists from some believers.  
European Islam reacts to this in defense of the liberal law that bans polygamy, 
but, like the liberal state, allows the freedom of expressing this doctrinal thought. 
Polygamy can pass into public debate and become a reasonable issue of discussion in a 
pluralist society only if it manages it go through the three stages of justification (pro 
tanto, full, and then public justification), or from constitutional to overlapping consensus 
stage, to bring to the table part of the idea of political liberalism that tries to be 
accommodative to various doctrines. The requirements of overlapping consensus are not 
easy to cater for, but at the same time not impossible, especially when a doctrine like is 
fully comprehensive and has developed complicated levels of argumentation over the 
centuries. I do not want to go into step by step details comparing polygamous analysis 
and overlapping different stages and requirements. I have tried that above differently.  
The idea I think European Islam defends is that the issue of polygamy can become 
a public issue in the envisaged society of Political Liberalism when other religious, moral 
and philosophic doctrines, not the Islamic one alone, endorse the same claim for some 
natural, social-economic, political, or any other, reasons. When such a situation 
transpires, then polygamy moves from being Islamic to being political, i.e. to being the 
affair of the state, maybe to balance gender birth rate after a war, an epidemic, or a 
natural/ cosmic event that may fundamentally affect the well functioning of the well 
ordered society. In such a situation, it is not only the Muslims who are concerned, but the 
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whole society. So, if the idea of polygamy is borrowed to restore population balance and 
birth rate, the Muslim citizens can no longer claim that the idea is purely theirs, and thus 
they can lead the majority to influence the law of the state. The mechanisms of 
overlapping consensus and the requirements of political liberalism remain the same. 
Polygamy becomes a state matter, a political matter for all; the Islamic doctrine becomes 
one of the contributing doctrines for social flourishing, even if it claims polygamy to be 
“originaly” its own proposal or idea to solve the social problem faced (i.e. the lack of 
males for some reasons).   
Three, the value I briefly refer to here in relation to gender equality issue is the 
value of fraternity, or tolerance as Bidar also refers to it. Fraternity value is considered 
central not only for social wellbeing but especially for the global society.  According to 
the new theological interpretations of the Quran and the Universe as equal sacred Books 
(Ramadan and Oubrou) or as one (Bidar), the consideration of gender equality and most 
importantly equality among Muslims and non-Muslims is pertinent. The three innovative 
readings of revelation (humanization, historicization and rationalization) render to the 
value of universal fraternity the result of internalizing the values of liberty and equality, 
though it could also be read as the value that causes them. Fraternity as tolerance is taken 
from the doctrine’s major source, the Quran, but it is updated in light of modernity 
achievements of liberty and equality. For the studied scholars, normative Quranic 
fraternity or tolerance did not always match the political history of Muslim majority 
countries; Islamic law, when applied, followed the revealed prescriptions and thus 
advantaged Muslims over non-Muslims, and men over women.  
The modern interpretations of the values of liberty and equality, according to 
European Islam, render justice to the Islamic normative messages (of liberty and 
equality) as seen above, and in earlier sections (revise Section 1a-b-c, Part IV). 
Henceforth, what was said above on these two values gives both theological and political 
justifications of the endorsement of fraternity principle, or tolerance. This fraternity/ 
tolerance can be described as twofold: external and internal. External tolerance includes 
the believers of other doctrines as equal before the law and part of the divine will of 
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difference. Such an acceptance of diversity becomes a sacred act, an act of worship. As to 
internal fraternity/ tolerance, it means the reconciliation of the doctrine with its own 
ideals of justice, equality, and liberty of believers. Both types of toleration have impacts 
on laws, which can no longer be unequal and discriminatory.  
In my earlier analysis of these developments of European Islamic thought I said 
that what it fundamentally realizes with modernity values is that Truth is Supreme, 
Absolute, and cannot be summarized in the claim of one doctrine. European Islam, in 
plain terms, modestly bows down to epistemological difference and speaks out its 
epistemological modesty, claiming that such a realization is itself part of the divine and 
thus a new form of spirituality. This big shift affects the mindscape of the believers’ and 
allows, consequently, the adoption of modern values – spiritually. This seems highly 
compatible with the Rawlsian political framework and the fair terms of cooperation 
between various doctrines, which at the end corroborate the liberal framework of the 
basic structure of society.    
What I am driving at behind my broad deductions on fraternity is that the gender 
equality example taken above for examination, with a focus on polygamy, can be 
expanded to touch on examples of the manifest discriminatory law of inheritance, and 
woman’s unequal weight of testimony compared to man’s (in Islamic law, man’s 
testimony, in a court for example, equals two women’s). It can also include the legal 
prescription that a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man. The same line of 
reasoning followed with the previous examples could be applied to these examples 
because they all revolve around the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even the 
issue of homosexuality can be confidently defended from European Islam argumentative 
apparatus, though it still does not recognize it as a “natural and acceptable practice,” and 
one should not expect it to accept it as part of the doctrine to say that it is truly reformist.  
What makes European Islam able to include these controversial issues within its 
scope and argumentation is that it does not criminalize them, or even show abhorrence to 
them, and invites respecting them as social facts and examining their future repercussions 
as could be examined any newly developing phenomenon in society and science. The 
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previous examples set a pattern of argumentation, which I hope is clear by now. 
Theoretical argumentation aside, sociological-anthropological works may be a further 
consolidation of these various examples of the studied voices of European Islam.
1514
  
                                                          
1514
 I propose a fieldwork example to foster my point that European Islam’s project seems possible on the 
ground, and some of its visible aspects are already lived: “Young Muslims in the Netherlands: 
Understanding Tariq Ramadan.” I refer to part of the results relevant to the theoretical work developed 
above. The fieldwork was conducted in a period of about three months during the summer of 2010. It 
focuses on young Muslims living in the Netherlands. It was considered important that they were born in the 
country or migrated to it while very young so as to make sure that they had passed most of their life in a 
European environment. Sixty persons participated in the study, 41 (68.3%) of them males and 19 (31.7%) 
females. Their mean age was 31 years and 10 months. The group of respondents disposes of a relatively 
high level of education. Nearly 80% has a higher educational grade. All questionnaires were processed in 
an SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software statistical system. 
The fieldwork asks basic questions that correspond to some religious visible practices, rituals, and other 
issues that are a matter of controversy in European liberal societies. These issues are clearly responded to in 
Ramadan’s various works, which is why they are used for this study. This list of questions and selected 
views of this scholar do not exhaust his other theological and political views (For more on this, see Part II 
of this work). Time, space, and the limited aims of this fieldwork did not allow making comparisons among 
various versions of European Islam. Moreover, Ramadan’s engagement with European Muslim Networks, 
and Rotterdam municipality in the Netherlands for a period of time before being fired made the focus on 
some of his ideas more relevant at the time.  
The questionnaire was divided into three sections, totalling in sixty four (64) questions: 1) “Islam and 
Dutch values,” 2) “Tariq Ramadan’s Project for European Muslims,” 3) “The Netherlands in Focus.” 
Section Two is most relevant here because it tries to measure how some proposals of Ramadan’s European 
Islam match the thinking of young Muslims in a liberal society like the Netherlands. In this Section, 
fourteen (14) views of Ramadan were presented to the respondents and they were asked to react to them 
through a simple scale consisting of three options: (1) agree; (2) neutral; (3) disagree. Below I cite the 
statements summarizing the scholar’s project, followed by a short commentary about the relevance of the 
study.  
Tariq Ramadan’s selected views go as follows: 1) Loyalty is for the country where one belongs, not where 
one comes from, 2) Gay marriage should be respected as a choice in Europe, though it is not allowed by 
Islam, 3) Freedom of religion is granted, 4) Wearing the headscarf/hijjab should not be obligatory, but a 
matter of choice, 5) Burqa is cultural, not Islamic, 6) Polygamy should not be allowed in Europe, 7) 
Besides Islamic inheritance code, women should be given equal rights through state institutions, 8) 
Arranged marriages is a cultural practice, not Islamic, 9) Ḥudūd sanctions like stoning should be 
temporarily frozen, 10) Islamic banking should be respected as a choice, 11) Islamic sciences do not 
contradict the general frames of science and reason, 12) Abortion is possible in particular cases, 13) 
Euthanasia is generally forbidden, 14) Literature works and arts that do not follow Islamic ethics should be 
respected. I do not want to discuss these statements and argue for them from European Islam perspectives 
as I did with the previous examples. That would require more space and invocation of the other parts of the 
fieldwork which I do not cite here. My aim behind referring to this fieldwork is primarily to show that a 
number of the issues that some consider an unsolvable problem, and thus make Islam incompatible with 
European liberal values, are not considered so by young Muslims who are born or have grown up in a 
European context. These young Muslims, as mentioned above, are not all of them aware of Ramadan’s 
project, yet they endorse his views. They neither deny their Islamic faith, nor do they endorse some 
controversial views that are against the laws of their country. Here, it does not matter whether they have a 
theological training, religious education, or whether they have studied only in European schools and their 
religious views are thus in favour of European values. The sociological fieldwork does not ask the 
informants what is their source of inspiration for the views they hold. Rather, it seeks to know how Islam is 
lived in a liberal context. That is the aim behind giving it as an example. While I do the theoretical 
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Recapitulation  
As a reminder, the attempt of reading European Islam as a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine has aimed at contributing to answering the leading question of 
this work: is European Islam possible? In the main introduction, I stated that it is possible 
theologically and politically. I have tried to defend this thesis throughout this work. The 
previous parts and sections approached the question from theological arguments. This 
final section integrates Rawls’ overlapping consensus of political liberalism as an 
evaluation of the theological advancements of European Islam. What I have reached in 
my understanding and argumentation is that European Islam is also possible politically – 
taking Rawls’ conception of the political as the framework of study.    
This endeavour has been carried out based on a fundamental assumption that 
considers European Islam a doctrine of the good that seeks the establishment of perpetual 
justice the way the Rawlsian project of political liberalism envisages it. Both in terms of 
theory and practice, I have advanced parallel arguments on controversial doctrinal issues 
that seem incompatible with the liberal Rawlsian framework. Based on the three axes 
device I have used throughout this study (world-society-individual), I brought to the 
political realm the reformist considerations of European Islam in light of the other triadic 
analytical device of Abdurrahmane (innovative humanization-historicization-and-
rationalization of revelation). I have tried to juxtapose these three levels of analysis with 
Rawls’ overlapping consensus stages (constitutional consensus and overlapping 
                                                                                                                                                                             
argumentation in this work, believer citizens on the ground provide a concrete example of the European 
Islam perspectives raised in this study.  
The idea reached in this fieldwork is that Ramadan’s project of European Islam has high agreement levels 
and seems already a lived idea among the young educated Dutch Muslims of Moroccan origin. There is no 
disagreement ratio with Ramadan which goes beyond the ratio of agreement; even in the cases of neutrality 
high percentage cases, agreement ratio still exceeds both neutrality and disagreement ratios in all the cases 
surveyed. That is, the responses to the fourteen statements that correspond to Ramadan’s reformist project 
are all agreed upon: the minimum agreement ratio marked is 40%, while neutrality highest ratio is 34% and 
disagreement is 32%, making by thus the agreement zone the most dominant. The fourteen statements are 
agreed upon with a percentage higher than 50%, except in two cases where it is agreed on with a 
percentage of 40% (for loyalty to the country of residence) and 42 % (polygamy to be banned).  
For the whole article, see Mohammed Hashas and Jan Jaap de Ruiter, ‘Young Muslims in the Netherlands: 
Understanding Tariq Ramadan,’ in Martina Topic and Srdjan Sremac, eds. Europe as a Multiple 
Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belongings (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, (forthcoming), 2013) 1-51. The pagination will appear differently in the final published 
manuscript. 
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consensus) and the three levels of justification (pro tanto, full, and public justification). 
Accordingly, this section has illustrated how the theological readings European Islam 
presents at the metaphysical/physical levels (world axis) affect the relational aspects at 
the mundane levels (individual and social axes). Despite the importance of the three axes 
of considering the theological politically, it is mainly the social axis that concerns 
overlapping consensus most. Here, European Islam’s historicization of revelation 
becomes pivotal. Not to be long here, I end with emphasizing this aspect.  
The quest for stability of the conception of the political, which is the embodiment 
of the idea of social justice, requires that religious laws that are discriminatory can no 
longer be applied in “a fair system of cooperation” where everyone is free and equal to 
everyone else. While the political system does not allow the unreasonableness of some 
doctrinal prescriptions, the believer and his association have to find ways to legitimize 
their endorsement of the system in light of their own sources. Such is the endeavour of 
the reformists of European Islam. Instead of reading their sources literally and 
ahistorically, they use various methodologies, either from their own tradition or borrowed 
from modern societies, to revisit their doctrinal texts and read them anew, with 
contemporary eyes, not aiming at deceiving their believers through their interpretations 
but aiming at solving problems and controversies they might have themselves felt as 
believers of this same doctrine. Their positions are “declaratory.”  
Issues related to the historicization of the divine message for social changes are 
fundamental in the project of European Islam and its adaptation to the requirements of the 
political conception of Rawls. Historicization of especially the social affairs prescriptions 
as specified in the sacred text, besides the ones added by the early Muslim Caliphs and 
scholars, renders the task of embracing the political of Political Liberalism feasible. What 
historicization seeks is chiefly the rationalization of laws related to social affairs as well 
as individuals. Because there are layers of rationalizations, which differ for various 
reasons, internal and external to religion and its believers, it is not possible to ask 
someone to be as rational as someone else. So, what becomes required for the well-
functioning of the political is that reasonableness is emphasized – i.e. the rationalization 
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that seeks midways for the right of all, and not only for the majority or the good of a 
particular doctrine. Rationalization of faith does not mean irresponsible individualization 
of faith. I have given some examples also in the individual axis about how a believer may 
rationalize his faith without leaving it altogether if he is so careful about preserving it.   
The point I would like to reiterate in recapitulating this section is that European 
Islam at the social axis internalizes the basic requirements of the political, and more 
precisely answers the demands of overlapping consensus and enters the third and most 
important stage of political justification, the public justification. After the individual 
internalizes the basic structure of the political just society and finds justifications for that 
from his doctrine (full justification), he moves further and considers that other citizens 
belonging to other reasonable comprehensive doctrines have done the same thing and 
internalized the political as part of their own doctrine though they still look at the 
political as freestanding. That is, citizens of various doctrines reach the idea that the 
political is for all but still does not stand on the side of any, despite the fact that each 
doctrine always considers that it has contributed to that same political. Such a 
psychological feeling is allowed and is required. Without it, stability of overlapping 
consensus cannot transpire. The political as a freestanding framework aims at imbuing 
every citizen with the fact that the other contributing reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
do equally endorse the political values that he (the citizen) also endorses. Whatever 
disagreement happens between citizens, associations, parties, and any actors inside 
society, the general framework of the political cannot be at risk, for it is the social 
construct that binds everyone and to which everyone has contributed. Differences in 
suggesting particular policies for whatever issue, for example, ideally cannot trespass the 
boundaries where a particular doctrine can feel discriminated against. Such cases of 
difference certainly happen, but the mechanisms Rawls suggests for the well-functioning 
of political liberalism in general and the idea of overlapping consensus in particular 
prevent falling into serious decisions that can weaken the legitimacy of the political.  
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Conclusion  
This work has dealt with the following main question: is European Islam 
possible? I have argued that European Islam is possible, following my conclusions from 
the studied texts. For further clarifications, I have tried to show that it is possible both 
theologically and politically, first by following the common distinction often referred to 
between religion and politics, and second by trying to go beyond it as European Islam 
calls for. I have provided various historical as well as methodological justifications for 
the thesis I advance throughout this work.   
The main aim behind raising the research question above has been to examine the 
aspects of newness as well as revisionism (traditionalism) in the studied texts and 
scholars that raise the banner of reform in Islamic thought. That is, I have tried to see 
what European Islam is really about, and what is its theological-political contribution to 
the debate on Islam in Europe. I have examined varied texts for theoretical justifications 
and comparisons of the ideas that come out of this particular idea of European Islam. As I 
have referred to in the main introduction, scholarship has been driven by political, 
sociological, and anthropological approaches, a number of which builds on a classical 
essentialist and Orientalist approach. Unlike these approaches, I have directly treated 
texts of scholars who speak of both Europe and Islam from within. That is one aspect of 
the originality of this work. It is comparatively content-based. The other aspect, as will be 
re-iterated, is methodologically-based. 
In defending this thesis, I have divided my argumentation into three cognitive 
stages that are methodological in aim. Each of these stages corresponds to a sub-question. 
I have called the first stage descriptive since it corresponds to the question that portrays 
the version of European Islam I work on: what is European Islam? I have studied four 
scholars as voices that call for “this” European Islam and try to theorize for it: Bassam 
Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou, and Abdennour Bidar. I use content analysis 
approach in reading their texts, focalizing their major ideas. While driven by political 
external pressure they consider historical, the four scholars raise theological matters and 
revisit their meanings as well.  
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 Their scholarly efforts aside, I have considered Tibi the least innovative since his 
approach is mostly a securitization of the issue of Islam in Europe, and there is hardly a 
theological elaboration of his version of Euro-Islam. His version requires a total division 
between religion and politics in the sense of private versus public, following the French 
laȉcité model, which makes some read him as an Orientalist, which I do not do.  Though 
his ideas are shared by the rest of the scholars, the way he defends them does not render 
his voice innovative. This view is corroborated by the evaluative framework followed in 
this study. Ramadan and Oubrou, who have moved on with their projects from their early 
conservative approaches, try a reconciliatory approach that is more innovative. Each uses 
his own devices for it. For instance, I have condensed the concepts of Ramadan in three 
(Sharia, Shahada, and ethics) and tried to read them in light of his approach of 
considering The Book of Revelation and the Book of the Universe as equal Books, an 
approach that can have immense impacts on the practical dimensions of religion. Oubrou, 
through the device of Sharia of the minority and geotheology, for example, tries to 
secularize Islamic theology and fuse the religious and the political laws into one.  
Bidar, the fourth figure studied here, takes these approaches further and proposes 
concepts that leave little space of arguments to both conservatives and extreme secularists 
since he aims at overcoming the ongoing interpretations of the physical and metaphysical 
altogether. His concepts of Self Islam, Islamic Existentialism, and his consideration of 
modernity as an unprecedented event of the sacred all work towards weakening what I 
have referred to as “classical dichotomous thought” that thinks through oppositions and 
binaries (religion vs. politics, divine vs. rational, private vs. public, Islam vs. Europe, 
etc.)  
Overall, in the descriptive stage, I have tried to show that these various projects of 
approaching the Islamic tradition and European modern values all aim at preserving the 
place of the divine for ethical inspiration to the individual and social norms. I have 
portrayed this conclusion in the image of a God who leaves the world, His propriety, to 
man. The latter keeps working on it as if He were not there. Neither man denies the 
existence of the divine, nor does the divine intervene in the world affairs of man any 
more to say that man’s work is good or bad, right or wrong. It is all to man to decide 
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now, with reference to the “divine attributes” of doing. Simply put, I have deduced that 
the “Muslim Prometheus” does not kill God to inherit the world.  
The second methodological stage of my work, referred to as the comparative 
stage, has dealt with the following sub-question: what is new in European Islam? The 
answer I have reached is that European Islam (1) “rationalizes ethics,” and in so doing it 
becomes (2-3) “revisionist-and-reformist,” or “traditional-modern.” In corroborating my 
conclusion, I refer to three scholarly generations from Islamic intellectual history: the 
early Muʻtazila as eminent rationalist theologians, the “early reformists” of the Arab-
Islamic Renaissance (naḥḍa), and the “late reformists,” or the contemporaries. My 
reference to these three scholarly tendencies in the history of Islamic thought aims at 
situating the aspects of newness and reform in European Islam. That is, a line of 
continuity or discontinuity has to be examined, so that the approach to European Islam is 
not done merely from current political perspectives, or from European modernity angels. 
I refer to past and present Islamic scholarships so as to situate better my understanding of 
European Islam. That is the aim of the comparative stage. I mention especially some 
basic ideas of Qadi Abd Aljabbar and the moral interpretations of his ethical theory. I 
also refer to the early and late reformists and realize that they all stress the issue of ethics 
and reasoning, which European Islam also does. Following these results based on 
comparisons, I move to the critical and synthetical third step, referred to as the evaluative 
stage.  
I have devised a comprehensive framework of three axes in evaluating European 
Islam: “world-society-individual.” I have first used this triadic framework to examine 
some of the theological advancements of the studied texts and scholars. I have matched it 
with Taha Abdurrahmane’s triadic framework he uses in critiquing some contemporary 
reformist projects in the Islamic world and in proposing three innovative plans for 
genuine renewal and development of a more “universal modernity” (that is not 
Eurocentrist), or what he also calls “second modernity.” I ultimately refer to this 
envisaged modernity as “perpetual modernity,” in light of my reading of European Islam.  
Abdurrahmane’s triadic framework is innovative “humanization-historicization-
and-rationalization” of revelation. Briefly, first, the “innovative humanisation plan” 
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denotes that man is honoured with the task of inhabiting the world (takrīm al-insan bi al-
istikhlāf). God has willed that man does not only care for his private matters but also 
carries the honorary message of inheriting the world - a deposit (amāna) he should 
ethically care about as his. Moreover, this humanization of the divine does not aim at 
effacing sacredness, but at honoring man by moving the Quranic verses from divinity to 
man’s access through the latter’s methods of interpretation. Second, the “innovative 
historicization plan” aims at establishing ethics and not dismissing obligations. It links 
Quranic verses with their context in time and space for ethical reasons. Prescriptive 
verses have two faces: legal/ jurisprudential and ethical; the former follows the latter, and 
not vice versa. Third, the “innovative rationalization plan” aims at expanding reason 
(tawsīʻ alʻaql) and not the erasure of the divine and the desacralization of its rituals and 
meanings (maḥw al-ghaybiyya).  
In my analytical reading of European Islam selected texts, I find out that my 
triadic axes match to a large extent Abdurrahmane’s three innovative plans. Based on 
these, I devise three main concepts following my deductive reading of European Islam: 
“inheritance of the world-practical fiqh (or fiqhology)-rationalization of ethics.” I build 
links among these concepts (Abdurrahmane’s and mine), and infer conclusions, which I 
word as follows: 1) the humanization of the world through divinely willed inheritance for 
cosmic wellbeing, 2) the historicization of revelation through fiqhology (practical 
fiqh),for social wellbeing, 3) the rationalization of revelation through reasonable faith 
for individual wellbeing. 
Following Abdurrahmane’s framework, I have shown that among the four 
projects studied Tibi’s is not innovative since he is still preoccupied with the classical 
idea of the divine vs. the secular, private vs. public, etc. Ramadan and Oubrou try 
gradually to move away from this classical dichotomy; they are more innovative. Bidar is 
the most innovative. His theological readings demonstrate a remarkable move from 
classical religiosity as well as classical atheism and secularism. European Islam as a 
concept, succinctly, is more innovatively expressed by the last three projects. More 
precisely, my use of “the idea of European Islam” is the culmination of my critical 
reading of especially the last three projects (Ramadan, Oubrou, and Bidar) in light of 
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Abdurrahmane’s critical framework. Otherwise put, when I speak of European Islam as I 
understand it and present it as an idea, I have the work of the three scholars above as my 
main reference. Tibi’s contribution cannot be neglected, but it does not have the same 
place in my idea as the others’ for the reasons I have especially developed in length in 
Part IV, Section 2, of this work.  
To consolidate my conceptualization of the idea of European Islam, and as a way 
of preparing the ground of reading this idea as a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine,” I 
subsequently evaluate its concepts in light of modernity values, using Abdurrahmane’s 
three principles of the “essence of modernity.” These principles are “majority-
universality-criticism” principles, backed up by their six pillars: “autonomy and 
creativity, extensibility and generality, rationalization and differentiation,” two pillars 
for each principle, respectively. I build links of varied used concepts and reach the 
following conclusions that European Islam and the essence of modernity principles share 
in their treatment of revelation and human agency. Together they underline the (1) 
innovative humanization of the inherited world through the principle of majority for 
cosmic wellbeing, the (2) innovative historicization of revelation prescriptions through 
the principle of universality for social wellbeing, and the (3) innovative rationalization of 
faith through the principle of criticism for individual wellbeing.  
I close this section by interpreting Abdurrahmane’s “second modernity” as 
“perpetual modernity” in light of my earlier concepts for European Islam. I argue that 
European Islam’s modernity is perpetual for three reasons, which I subsequently present 
in terms of levels of concepts. It is (1) perpetual in the sense that the inheritance of the 
world, through innovative humanization plan of reading revelation, matches the principle 
of majority as enshrined by the essence of modernity. It is (2) perpetual in the sense that 
practical fiqh (Sharia law), through innovative historicization plan, matches the principle 
of universality as enshrined by the essence of modernity. It is (3) perpetual in the sense 
that the rationalization of ethics and faith, through innovative rationalization plan, 
matches the principle of criticism as enshrined by the essence of modernity.  
 I end up my evaluative stage, and my work as a whole, by opening up my 
previous theological comparisons and argumentations to the political framework of John 
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Rawls. From the previous stages, I proceeded based on two major assumptions. I have 
first assumed that social justice is the main target of the conceptualized European Islam. I 
have also assumed that Rawls’ framework of “political liberalism,” with a focus on 
“overlapping consensus,” is the most adequate framework that can preserve the great 
values of both a liberal society of justice as fairness, and the great values of the doctrine 
under examination (European Islam) in the age of pluralism that characterizes the current 
modern liberal societies. I have used my comprehensive triadic axes also here (world-
individual-society), along with the triadic framework of Abdurrahmane (humanization-
rationalization-historicization), and tried to match them with the three levels of Rawlsian 
legitimacy for the constitutional liberal democracy (pro-tanto, full, and public 
justification). The reason behind this attempt is to find out how European Islam offers an 
internally pluralist theological doctrine out of which a reasonable European Muslim 
believer may successfully mediate his normative commitments to European Islam as a 
comprehensive theory of the good and his political commitments to the liberal 
constitutional society in which he lives.  
Accordingly, I have come up with the following intertwined conclusions, replete 
with concepts reached in previous stages of this work.  
First, world axis humanizes revelation. It henceforth leads to the following:  
One, the physical and the metaphysical are one;  
Two, stability of the political well-ordered society is required by the divine; 
Three, every human system of social justice is substantially divine; 
Second, individual axis rationalizes revelation. It henceforth defends the following:  
One, there is no faith without reason; 
Two, there is no faith without ethics; 
Three, there is no faith without liberty.  
Third, society axis historicizes revelation. It henceforth brings about the following:  
One, the universality and eternity of the divine message cannot be a fixed 
constitution; 
Two, the best system of social justice is the most adequate for the divine message;  
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Three, the ahistoricization of belief requires adaptation to the historicization of 
values. 
Based on examples, I have illustrated the above fundamental arguments European Islam 
presents theologically to defend its political affiliation to the liberal constitutional ideals 
as enshrined in the Rawlsian framework. These examples revolve around sexual liberty, 
worship rituals, jihad, and gender equality.  
 Having summarized it so, without having re-iterated all methodological 
justifications and reservations, I close this work by underlying three major points that 
may open this project to further comparisons, developments and challenges. One, I think 
that “the” European Islam conceptualized here, however “intellectual” it may seem, is “a 
lived Islam” of many believer-citizens who are born and educated in Europe. It has the 
characteristics to be the future of Islam in Western Europe. At the same time, besides the 
extreme secularism external pressure, it also has to face the internal pressure of extreme 
conservatives who see reformists as “light Muslims,” or sometimes as “not Muslims” at 
all. “This” European Islam can be described as the product of both pluralist Europe and 
pluralist Islam. So, it adopts both traditions (commonly considered incompatible), and 
challenges their centrisms and essentialisms. In this sense, European Islam is open, 
secular, and liberal. At the same time, it is also conservative in the sense that it does not 
deny religion its place in the public sphere. It also centralizes the “beautiful” side of 
religion – its ethical and spiritual dimensions. European Islam tries to merge two worlds, 
and overcome what I have referred to as “classical dichotomous thought.”  
Two, I think that European Islam is a continuity of the projects of reform that 
have been initiated in the Arab-Islamic world since the mid-19
th
 century. As I have also 
argued in the comparative part of this work, there are strong echoes of the early pluralist 
period of Islamic scholarship. The Muʻtazila were given as an example of rationalization 
of ethics and theological profound discussions. I do not believe that European Islam will 
stop at their legacy. On the contrary, they could be just an example for legitimating 
further developments/ reforms. From the mid-19
th
 century onwards, prominent projects of 
reform have been developed, especially by the contemporaries. So, while European Islam 
seems to have built on that tradition of reform, it has found a different socio-political and 
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economic climate where its chances of growth and legitimacy are more available than 
they are for projects in the Arab-Islamic majority countries where various factors deprive 
reform projects from development. The point here is that European Islam, as a project of 
Islamic Renaissance, may not, and should not, be considered the ultimate, or best, form 
of reform for the Islamic majority societies, for various socio-political, economic, and 
historical reasons, particularly if one underlines the fact that reform projects in the 
Islamic world are actually “more” solid theoretically-theologically, and they could be a 
real theological challenger to, or supporter of, “this” European Islam. The space of 
comparisons among Islamic theologies as they mature in various contexts is then 
immense for scholarship.  
Three, how can individual liberty survive when its meanings differ from a 
doctrine to another? In an ideal liberal society, conflict of values cannot be denied. The 
way to secure both liberty and diversity is to outline a social justice project, as Rawls has 
tried. Its individual aspect aside for a while, European Islam assumes a vital role to play 
for social wellbeing, which I have interpreted as its political version for the defence of the 
“permanence of social justice” – a classic argument in Islamic scholarship. I have also 
assumed that Rawls’ overlapping consensus secures the stability of justice as fairness in a 
society characterized by (reasonable) pluralism. One of the challenges to this assumption 
could be whether social justice can flourish only if the framework is liberal, founded on 
the freedom and equality of individuals. The challenge is whether the individual can 
develop a sense of social justice as a moral value in the first place, before he works on it 
within the political liberal framework of a constitutional democracy. The idea could be an 
easy “yes” but the presence of various doctrines in a pluralist society can create conflict 
of values, even when they all agree on the same values. Prioritizing them can become a 
real problem that threatens stability. That is why some doctrines may opt for calling for 
more minority rights to prioritize teaching some values over others. A doctrine may 
prioritize a value like justice because it is more socially-oriented, while another may 
prioritize individual autonomy because it considers it most important for self realization.  
The idea is that education in the family or community level becomes vital and 
possibly problematic if the framework of the political that binds every citizen does not 
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develop an adequate educational curriculum whereby each doctrine, be it religious, 
moral, or philosophical, finds echoes of its teachings and values. What this implies is that 
not all doctrines have the means to internalize (part of) the political as if it were (part of) 
their own doctrine. I have shown that European Islam, as a fully comprehensive doctrine, 
has that flexibility. But I do not think that all versions of Islam, and all other religions and 
philosophies, enjoy the same flexibility. So, comparisons between these various doctrines 
– religious, moral, and philosophic- can be another interesting enterprise that enriches the 
formation of pathways for the “permanence of social justice.”  
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